Title: Enhancing Wireless Security with WPA
1Enhancing Wireless Security with WPA
- CS-265 Project
- Section 2 (1130 1220)
- Shefali Jariwala
- Student ID
- 001790660
2Agenda
- Overview of WLAN
- WEP and its weaknesses
- Promise of WPA
- - Modes of Operations
- - Security Mechanisms
- What is WPA2?
- Encryption Method Comparison Table
- Conclusions
3Overview of WLAN
- WLAN Standards
- 802.11 1-2 Mbps speed 2.4
GHz band - 802.11a (Wi-Fi) 54 Mbps speed
5 GHz band - 802.11b (Wi-Fi) 11 Mbps speed 2.4
GHz band - 802.11g (Wi-Fi) 54 Mbps speed 2.4
GHz band - WLAN components
- Wireless Clients
- Access Points
- Requirements for secure WLAN
- Encryption and Data Privacy
- Authentication and Access Control
4Security Mechanism Wired Equivalent Privacy
- Confidentiality, Access Control and Data
Integrity - Both WEP Authentication and encryption are
based on a secret key shared between AP and
wireless client - WEP uses RC4 encryption algorithm
- Symmetric Key stream Cipher
- variable length key
- 64 bit 40 bit WEP key and 24 bit random
number known as IV to encrypt the data - Encryption stream cipher ? plaintext cipher
text - Sender sends the packet cipher text IV to
receiver - Decryption WEP key and attached IV
5WEP Encryption
WLAN security Current and Future, Park, J.S
Dicoi, D. IEEE Internet Computing, Volume7,
Issue5, Sept-Oct, 2003, 60-65
6WEP Authentication
- Two modes of authentication
- Open System ( No Authentication)
- Shared Key
Client
Access Point
Authentication request
Random challenge
Encrypted RC
Success/failure response
7WEP Weaknesses
- A single key is used for all APs and wireless
clients - Static WEP key Dynamic WEP Key
- Same key used for Access Control and Encryption
which gives rise to problems - Initialization Vector (IV) Reuse
- Ci Pi ? ksi and Ci Pi ? ksi
- Therefore, Ci ? Ci Pi ? Pi
- Known Plain text attacks
- WEP provides no replay protection
- When WEP was available it was not always turned
on
8Promise of WPA - Wireless Protected Access
- stronger security solution via standards-based
interoperable security specification known as WPA
(Wi-Fi specification) - WPA is a subset of 802.11i standard and
maintains forward compatibility - Run as software upgrade on APs and NICs and
minimizes the impact of network performance - Inexpensive in terms of cost/time to implement
and addresses all WEP weaknesses - Secure all versions of 802.11 devices
including 802.11b, 802.11a and 802.11g
9WPA - Modes of Operation
- Enterprise Mode
- Requires an authentication server RADIUS
- (Remote Authentication Dial In Service) for
authentication and key distribution - RADIUS has centralized management of user
credentials - Pre-shared key (PSK) Mode
- Does not require authentication server
- A shared secret is used for authentication
to access point - vulnerable to dictionary attacks
10Enterprise Mode Diagram
http//www.wi-fi.org/opensection/pdf/whitepaper_wi
-fi_security4-29-03.pdf
11PSK Mode Diagram
http//www.wi-fi.org/opensection/pdf/whitepaper_wi
-fi_security4-29-03.pdf
12Issues of PSK Mode
- Needed if no authentication server is in use
- shared secret revealed, network security is
compromised - No standardized way of changing shared secret
- It increases the attackers effort to do
decryption of messages - The more complex the shared secret is, the
better it is - as there are less chances of dictionary attacks
13Security Mechanisms in WPA
http//www.intel.com/ebusiness/pdf/wireless/intel/
wpa_cmt_security.pdf
14802.1X Authentication prevents end users from
accessing Enterprise networks
http//www.mtghouse.com/MDC_WP_052603.pdf
15Simpler Representation
Authenticator (Access Point)
Supplicant (Wireless Client)
RADIUS
Initiates connection
Port enabled State unauthorized
requests identity
responds with identity
Forwards the identity
Forwards Response
Supplicants Port enabled State authorized
Response ACCEPT/REJECT
requests identity from RADIUS
Forwards the request
Access points forwards the identity
RADIUS passes its identity
16Mutual Authentication
http//www.mtghouse.com/MDC_WP_052603.pdf
17TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
- TKIP is responsible for generating the
encryption key, encrypting the message and
verifying its integrity - TKIP ensures
- - Encryption key changes with every packet
- - Encryption key is unique for every client
- - TKIP encryptions keys are 256 bit long
- WEP Encryption key shared secret IV
- TKIP packet comprises of
- - 128 bit temporal key (shared by both
clients and AP) - - Client Device MAC address
- - 48 bit IV (Packet sequence number) to
prevent known plain text attacks (WEP 24 bit
IV) -
18TKIP for Data Privacy
- TKIP key mixing function temporal key per
packet key - Temporal keys - 128 bit, change frequently,
definite life - MAC Address Temporal key four most
significant octets of the packet sequence number
are fed into the S-Box to generate intermediate
key - Results in a unique encryption key
- Then, mix the intermediate key with two least
significant octets of packet sequence number
128 bit per packet key - Each key encrypts only one packet of data and
prevents weak key attacks
19Michael Message Integrity Check
- Used to enforce data integrity
- Message Integrity Code (MIC) 64 bit
message calc. using Michaels algorithm - MIC is inserted in the TKIP packet
- The sender and the receiver each compute MIC
and then compare. MIC does not match
data is manipulated - Detects potential packet content altercation
due to transmission error or purposeful
manipulation - Uses 64 bit key and partitions the data into
32 bit blocks - Various operations shifts, XORs, additions
20WEP vs. WPA
http//www.wi-fi.org/opensection/pdf/whitepaper_wi
-fi_security4-29-03.pdf
21Drawbacks of WPA
- Vulnerable to Denial-of-Service Attacks
- AP receives 2 data packets that fail MIC check
within 60 seconds -? active attack - Counter measure for APs which includes
disassociating each client using the AP - Prevents the attacker from getting encryption
keys - Users can loose network connectivity for 60
seconds
22Upcoming WPA2
- Uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- Symmetric key block 128 bit key
- Full 802.11i support including Counter Mode
with CBC- MAC Protocol (CCMP) encryption - CCMP CTR CBC MAC
- Will require or replacement hardware (APs and
NICs) - Certified Equipments due in late 2004
23Encryption Method Comparison Table
http//www.wi-fi.org/opensection/pdf/Wi-Fi_Protect
edAccessWebcast_2003.pdf
24Conclusions
- WEP is not secure anymore !
- WPA solves almost all WEP weaknesses
- WPA still considered secure and provides secure
authentication, encryption and access control - WPA is not yet broken!
- WPA2 is a stronger cipher than WPA and will
provide robust security for WLANs
25References
- WLAN security Current and Future, Park, J.S
Dicoi, D. IEEE Internet Computing, Volume7,
Issue5, Sept-Oct, 2003, 60-65 - Wireless networking security Security flaws in
802.11 data link protocols, Nancy Cam-Winget,
Russ Housley, David Wagner, Jesse Walker
Communications of the ACM-Volume 46, Issue 5 (May
2003), Pages 35-39 - http//www.cizgi.com.tr/makaleler/seminer/S2-1.pdf
- http//www.dtm.ca/download/wireless_toshiba.pdf
- http//www.intel.com/ebusiness/pdf/wireless/intel/
wpa_cmt_security.pdf - http//www.mtghouse.com/MDC_WP_052603.pdf
26References
- http//www.sans.org/rr/papers/68/1109.pdf
- http//www.sans.org/rr/papers/68/1301.pdf
- http//www.wi-fi.org/opensection/pdf/whitepaper_wi
-fi_security4-29-03.pdf - http//www.wi-fi.org/opensection/pdf/Wi-
Fi_ProtectedAccessWebcast_2003.pdf - http//www.hackfaq.org/wireless-networks/wpa-wi-fi
-protected-access.shtml - http//techrepublic.com.com/5100-6265-5060773.html