Agenda

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Agenda

• The Center for Army Lessons Learned Overview
• Focused Rotation a Vehicle for Change
• Urban Combat Operations, CALL Newsletter No.
  99-16
• Lessons Learned in an Urban Combat Training
  Environment (JRTC)
• The CALL Homepage and MOUT
• Other CALL Products
• Questions

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CALL Overview

• Organization and location.
• Mission Collect, analyze, and disseminate
  lessons learned, tactics, techniques, and
  procedures (TTP) and research material to the
  U.S. Army.
• History 1985, 89, 96, 97, 98 and NOW.

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Focused RotationA Vehicle for Change

• The TRADOC Trends Reversal Program (T-RAP)
  identifies negative trends observed at the CTCs
  and assigns a lead proponent to develop a
  corrective action plan (TRADOC Reg. 11-13) Oct
  96.
• The proponent develops a solution set and gives
  it to a unit to use and validate at a focused
  rotation.
• The proponent then implements a solution across
  the Army in a way that permanently corrects the
  problem.

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Urban Combat OperationsCALL Newsletter No. 99-16

• The idea November of 1997
• Soliciting support
• CO-OP Infantry School (MOUT Proponent)
• MOUT Collection Plan and Workshop
• Focused Rotation, March 1998
• Newsletter development and consensus

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Urban Focused Pre-RotationAssumptions (as of
Nov. 1997)

• 1. U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban
  areas is outdated.
• 2. The political realities of urban combat have
  resulted in the use of terms that tend to place
  limitations on the conduct of these operations.
• 3. The manpower resources needed to conduct urban
  combat is a problem for the U.S. Army. Under the
  current downsizing agenda, the Army does not have
  the soldiers to do the job on a scale of the
  Russian experience at Grozny and meet its two
  regional war mission.

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Urban Focused Pre-Rotation Assumptions

• 4. Training in villages will not prepare the Army
  for combat in the large metropolitan areas.
• 5. U.S. forces currently do not have the special
  weapons needed and lack the quantities of weapons
  necessary for urban operations. The weapons
  historically needed to do the job are in many
  cases either not in the inventory or not
  available for training in the urban environment.
• 6. Quantity of supplies is another issue that the
  Army must be prepared to address in the urban
  combat situation. Previous evidence shows that
  urban combat uses an inordinate amount of
  supplies, from ammunition to bandages.

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Urban FocusedPre-Rotation Assumptions

• 7. Munitions now in the inventory are not
  suitable for urban combat. In past wars the types
  of ammunition in the inventory worked for all
  possibilities.
• 8. Specialty communications equipment is now only
  available to special units. This communications
  equipment is needed now for regular infantry for
  training and potential combat operations.
• 9. Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated
  into urban combat training.

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Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training
Environment

• The Battlefield Operating System (BOS)
• TA.1 Maneuver
• TA.2 Fire Support
• TA.3 Air Defense
• TA.4 Command and Control
• TA.5 Intelligence
• TA.6 Mobility and Survivability
• TA.7 Combat Service Support

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TA.1 Maneuver

• There is a lack of focus in the movement to the
  objective, resulting in significant casualties.
• Units lack focus in the use of combined arms
  tactics, techniques and procedures for armor,
  aviation, and close air support for urban combat.
• Uncoordinated maneuver and over-watch are more
  common in the urban environment.
• Marksmanship at all levels is poor, with the
  exception of Special Operations Units.

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TA.2 Fire Support

• Units have problems with allocation of resources
  and positioning of fire support assets in the
  urban fight.
• Units do a poor job using restrictive rule of
  engagement in dealing with collateral damage and
  associated urban combat effects.
• Units were not effective in the use of counter
  battery fires.
• Units did a poor job in the use of precision
  munitions.

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TA.3 Air Defense

• There is a poor allocation of air defense
  artillery assets to support the urban fight
  overall.
• Attack aviation vulnerability in battle positions
  is not taken into consideration in the operations
  order planning.
• Focusing the correct air defense asset at the
  proper place and time in the battle is poor.

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TA.4 Command and Control

• Units do not effectively locate their command and
  control nodes.
• Leaders at all levels have problems with rules of
  engagement and proportionality.
• Sniper teams are not properly planned for or
  considered eyes on the objective.
• Wargaming and course of action development for
  urban combat needs work this must be more
  precise.

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TA.5 Intelligence

• The intelligence preparation of the battlefield
  (IPB) is not specific enough for the urban
  battle.
• The use of psychological operations and civil
  affairs operations are not planned well enough.
• Identification of decision points and setting
  conditions for success are not emphasized.
• Little thought is given to intelligence
  collection or care of civilians on the
  battlefield.

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TA.6 Mobility and Survivability

• The operations order does not properly allocate
  engineer resources for urban fight.
• Units are not effective in suppress, obscure,
  secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.
• Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.
• Lack of eyes on the objective prevent obstacle
  identification.

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TA.7 Combat Service Support

• Allocation of assets to support the urban fight
  is poor.
• Re-supply and casualty evacuation are not
  conducted well.
• Urban specific supply items ladders, knee and
  elbow pads, ropes with grappling hooks, as well
  as specialty weapons and ammunition need to be
  made available.
• Speed, not haste, should be the norm in urban
  operations.

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Conclusions

• The world in which the Army will fight in the
  21st century is even more politically complex and
  dangerous than just a few years ago. There is a
  dramatic increase in the lethality of weapons
  available to hostile elements. The United States
  must cope with advanced technologies that
  re-invent themselves in hours, days, and weeks.

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Conclusions

• The Army now faces a dangerous world without a
  defined foe. The enemy is nebulous, and the Army
  is caught between a highly successful (but
  increasingly outmoded) doctrine and the desire to
  prepare to meet future adversaries. Urban combat
  will be a small piece of any new doctrine.

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Conclusions

• The Army cannot wait for the next revision of FM
  100-5, Operations, to be completed. Possibly the
  best approach is to develop new TTP for future
  contingencies and conflicts now. Developing and
  formalizing the TTP may generate broader thought
  that will lead to the new doctrine.

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The CALL Homepage and MOUT

• http//call.army.mil
• MOUT hot button
• Links
• Published Articles CALL/FMSO/Others
• DOD Urban Operations Journals
• SAMS Urban Operations Curriculum
• USMC Related Articles
• Briefings

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Other CALL Products

• Newsletters
• Handbooks
• Special Studies
• CTC Bulletins

• Trends
• Videos
• News From the Front
• Training Techniques

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Connect
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Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training
Environment

• DTLOMS
• Doctrine
• Training
• Leader Development
• Organization
• Materiel
• Soldiers