Agenda - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

About This Presentation
Title:

Agenda

Description:

... The CALL Homepage and MOUT Other CALL Products Questions CALL Overview Organization and ... 3 Air Defense TA.4 Command and ... in battle positions is ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:202
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 24
Provided by: us04
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Agenda


1
(No Transcript)
2
Agenda
  • The Center for Army Lessons Learned Overview
  • Focused Rotation a Vehicle for Change
  • Urban Combat Operations, CALL Newsletter No.
    99-16
  • Lessons Learned in an Urban Combat Training
    Environment (JRTC)
  • The CALL Homepage and MOUT
  • Other CALL Products
  • Questions

3
CALL Overview
  • Organization and location.
  • Mission Collect, analyze, and disseminate
    lessons learned, tactics, techniques, and
    procedures (TTP) and research material to the
    U.S. Army.
  • History 1985, 89, 96, 97, 98 and NOW.

4
Focused RotationA Vehicle for Change
  • The TRADOC Trends Reversal Program (T-RAP)
    identifies negative trends observed at the CTCs
    and assigns a lead proponent to develop a
    corrective action plan (TRADOC Reg. 11-13) Oct
    96.
  • The proponent develops a solution set and gives
    it to a unit to use and validate at a focused
    rotation.
  • The proponent then implements a solution across
    the Army in a way that permanently corrects the
    problem.

5
Urban Combat OperationsCALL Newsletter No. 99-16
  • The idea November of 1997
  • Soliciting support
  • CO-OP Infantry School (MOUT Proponent)
  • MOUT Collection Plan and Workshop
  • Focused Rotation, March 1998
  • Newsletter development and consensus

6
Urban Focused Pre-RotationAssumptions (as of
Nov. 1997)
  • 1. U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban
    areas is outdated.
  • 2. The political realities of urban combat have
    resulted in the use of terms that tend to place
    limitations on the conduct of these operations.
  • 3. The manpower resources needed to conduct urban
    combat is a problem for the U.S. Army. Under the
    current downsizing agenda, the Army does not have
    the soldiers to do the job on a scale of the
    Russian experience at Grozny and meet its two
    regional war mission.

7
Urban Focused Pre-Rotation Assumptions
  • 4. Training in villages will not prepare the Army
    for combat in the large metropolitan areas.
  • 5. U.S. forces currently do not have the special
    weapons needed and lack the quantities of weapons
    necessary for urban operations. The weapons
    historically needed to do the job are in many
    cases either not in the inventory or not
    available for training in the urban environment.
  • 6. Quantity of supplies is another issue that the
    Army must be prepared to address in the urban
    combat situation. Previous evidence shows that
    urban combat uses an inordinate amount of
    supplies, from ammunition to bandages.

8
Urban FocusedPre-Rotation Assumptions
  • 7. Munitions now in the inventory are not
    suitable for urban combat. In past wars the types
    of ammunition in the inventory worked for all
    possibilities.
  • 8. Specialty communications equipment is now only
    available to special units. This communications
    equipment is needed now for regular infantry for
    training and potential combat operations.
  • 9. Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated
    into urban combat training.

9
Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training
Environment
  • The Battlefield Operating System (BOS)
  • TA.1 Maneuver
  • TA.2 Fire Support
  • TA.3 Air Defense
  • TA.4 Command and Control
  • TA.5 Intelligence
  • TA.6 Mobility and Survivability
  • TA.7 Combat Service Support

10
TA.1 Maneuver
  • There is a lack of focus in the movement to the
    objective, resulting in significant casualties.
  • Units lack focus in the use of combined arms
    tactics, techniques and procedures for armor,
    aviation, and close air support for urban combat.
  • Uncoordinated maneuver and over-watch are more
    common in the urban environment.
  • Marksmanship at all levels is poor, with the
    exception of Special Operations Units.

11
TA.2 Fire Support
  • Units have problems with allocation of resources
    and positioning of fire support assets in the
    urban fight.
  • Units do a poor job using restrictive rule of
    engagement in dealing with collateral damage and
    associated urban combat effects.
  • Units were not effective in the use of counter
    battery fires.
  • Units did a poor job in the use of precision
    munitions.

12
TA.3 Air Defense
  • There is a poor allocation of air defense
    artillery assets to support the urban fight
    overall.
  • Attack aviation vulnerability in battle positions
    is not taken into consideration in the operations
    order planning.
  • Focusing the correct air defense asset at the
    proper place and time in the battle is poor.

13
TA.4 Command and Control
  • Units do not effectively locate their command and
    control nodes.
  • Leaders at all levels have problems with rules of
    engagement and proportionality.
  • Sniper teams are not properly planned for or
    considered eyes on the objective.
  • Wargaming and course of action development for
    urban combat needs work this must be more
    precise.

14
TA.5 Intelligence
  • The intelligence preparation of the battlefield
    (IPB) is not specific enough for the urban
    battle.
  • The use of psychological operations and civil
    affairs operations are not planned well enough.
  • Identification of decision points and setting
    conditions for success are not emphasized.
  • Little thought is given to intelligence
    collection or care of civilians on the
    battlefield.

15
TA.6 Mobility and Survivability
  • The operations order does not properly allocate
    engineer resources for urban fight.
  • Units are not effective in suppress, obscure,
    secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.
  • Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.
  • Lack of eyes on the objective prevent obstacle
    identification.

16
TA.7 Combat Service Support
  • Allocation of assets to support the urban fight
    is poor.
  • Re-supply and casualty evacuation are not
    conducted well.
  • Urban specific supply items ladders, knee and
    elbow pads, ropes with grappling hooks, as well
    as specialty weapons and ammunition need to be
    made available.
  • Speed, not haste, should be the norm in urban
    operations.

17
Conclusions
  • The world in which the Army will fight in the
    21st century is even more politically complex and
    dangerous than just a few years ago. There is a
    dramatic increase in the lethality of weapons
    available to hostile elements. The United States
    must cope with advanced technologies that
    re-invent themselves in hours, days, and weeks.

18
Conclusions
  • The Army now faces a dangerous world without a
    defined foe. The enemy is nebulous, and the Army
    is caught between a highly successful (but
    increasingly outmoded) doctrine and the desire to
    prepare to meet future adversaries. Urban combat
    will be a small piece of any new doctrine.

19
Conclusions
  • The Army cannot wait for the next revision of FM
    100-5, Operations, to be completed. Possibly the
    best approach is to develop new TTP for future
    contingencies and conflicts now. Developing and
    formalizing the TTP may generate broader thought
    that will lead to the new doctrine.

20
The CALL Homepage and MOUT
  • http//call.army.mil
  • MOUT hot button
  • Links
  • Published Articles CALL/FMSO/Others
  • DOD Urban Operations Journals
  • SAMS Urban Operations Curriculum
  • USMC Related Articles
  • Briefings

21
Other CALL Products
  • Newsletters
  • Handbooks
  • Special Studies
  • CTC Bulletins
  • Trends
  • Videos
  • News From the Front
  • Training Techniques

22
Connect
23
Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training
Environment
  • DTLOMS
  • Doctrine
  • Training
  • Leader Development
  • Organization
  • Materiel
  • Soldiers
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com