Title: Demilitarisation of
1Demilitarisation of the Siachen GlacierÂ
Implementing and Monitoring the Process
- Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, IA (Retd.)
- Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New
Delhi - Visiting Senior Fellow, South Asian Strategic
Stability Institute, London - (A joint project with Brig Asad Hakeem, PA
(Retd.) at CMC, 2005)
2The Project Investigated Modalities for
Demilitarisation of the Siachen Conflict Zone
- Assumption Some form of political consensus
will eventually be reached and the project
focuses on the operational modalities and
monitoring necessary to implement military
disengagement - Questions to be addressed
- What steps would constitute a practical and
feasible disengagement process? - What would be a viable time frame for
demilitarization? - What concept of unilateral or cooperative
monitoring is likely to be acceptable to both
India and Pakistan? - Which current and future monitoring technologies
and procedures can assist in the verification of
demilitarisation?
3Military Operations in the Siachen Conflict Zone
- Troops are arrayed along the Saltoro Range
Indian troops are at advantageous positions - Posts are typically manned by 6 18 troops
- Fire support and logistics camps are farther back
- Troops rotate between camps from low to high
altitude and back - The highest posts are over 20,000 feet
- Troops serve 1 to 3 months at the posts
Pakistani Forward Post and Artillery Position
Photographs used with permission, Martin A.
Sugarman ã
4Operational Constraints on Siachen
- Operations are constrained by
- Terrain
- Altitude
- Climate
- Lack of navigable routes
- Acclimatisation to high altitudes is critical to
survival - A minimum of 48 to 72 hours needed per phase
- Phase I 9000 12000 feet
- Phase II 12000 15000 feet
- Phase III 15000 18000 feet
- Acclimatisation above 18000 feet is extremely
difficult - Attempts to operate without acclimatisation
usually lead to pulmonary and cerebral oedema - Need for acclimatisation makes it difficult to
maintain reserves and impossible to send
reinforcements from outside
5Logistics are key to military operations in
Siachen
- Each side has road-served base camps that serve
as logistics centers.
Pakistans Goma Base
Indias Dzingrulma Base Camp
Images from the Quickbird commercial satellite
6Kumar Base serves as the forward Indian logistics
centre on the Glacier
Camp III on path from Base Camp to Kumar
Base Photo by Teru Kuwayama, Outside Magazine
Kumar Base Photo by Indian Air Force
7Siachen logistics - transportation
- All supply to forward areas is done by aircraft,
jeep, pack animal, or porter - Fixed-wing aircraft and large helicopters drop
supplies with parachutes only limited air
operations possible in the winter - Light helicopters used for evacuation carrying
small loads to forward posts - India has longer supply routes and relies more on
aircraft for supply
Photographs used with permission, Martin A.
Sugarman ã
8Summer is the critical period for logistics
- Supply caches are built on approaches to the
Saltoro during the summer months for use during
winter winter stocking - Indian supply route from railheads at Pathankot
and Jammu by truck through Srinagar, Kargil, to
Partapur or Leh and then to the base camp at
Dzingrulma. - Fixed wing aircraft and large helicopters based
at Thoise and Leh - Pakistan supply route Skardu by road through
the Shigar Valley to Askole (northern sector) and
to Dansam and Goma (central and southern sectors) - Helicopters are based at Skardu
- At base camps, supplies are broken into smaller
loads for pack animal, porter, soldier, and light
helicopter - Units are rotated during summer months
9Indias Strategic Perspective on the Conflict
- Pakistan illegally transferred 5,180 square km of
territory just north of the Siachen area to China
in March 1963 - Although the demarcated LOC ends at NJ 9842, by
the late 1970s Pakistani maps began showing the
LOC running in a northeasterly direction from NJ
9842 towards the Karakoram Pass the Indian
government called this cartographic aggression - At the same time, Pakistan began issuing permits
to international mountaineering expeditions to
enter the Siachen area - India occupied the Siachen Glacier in April 1983
to pre-empt its occupation by the Pakistan army - After the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Indian MoD
finds it difficult to accept verbal Pakistani
assurances that they will not occupy posts
vacated by the Indian Army - joint physical
demarcation of the present positions is
considered essential
10Pakistans Strategic Perspective on the Conflict
- The Indian occupation of Siachen is perceived as
a major act of aggression and a violation of the
1972 Shimla Agreement - Pakistan had de facto control prior to 1984 based
on - Statements in 1960s by Indian PM Nehru
- Official Indian protests to China relative to
their border dispute - Orientation of glaciers between NJ 9842 and the
Karakoram Pass - Representation of the LoC past NJ 9842 in
international maps and atlases - There have been Pakistanis on expeditions to the
area since 1962 - The line joining NJ 9842 and KKP is cartographic
expression not aggression - India uses negotiations to delay and deflect
international pressure - The dispute in Kashmir is not over territory but
the right of self determination for Kashmiris
11Outline of the Approach to Demilitarisation
- Formalise the Cease-fire understanding
- Establish communication links between Pakistani
and Indian brigade HQs (Khapalu/Skardu and
Partapur) and Division HQs (Gilgit and Leh) - Establish a core Uninhabited Zone around
Siachen and the Saltoro Range - No permanent residents
- Environmental restoration work permitted
- International scientific research permitted
- Licensed mountaineering expeditions permitted
- Establish a Civilian Zone adjacent to the
Uninhabited Zone - Only civilian residents and their routine
activities permitted - Establish a Joint Liaison and Monitoring Center
(JMC) where the LOC crosses the Shyok River (near
Chalunka) - Monitoring will focus on military logistics and
access - Augment Demilitarized Zone (DMZ-2) around NJ 9842
later
12Schedule for Disengagement
- Operational principles
- Establish a Joint Working Group chaired by the
DGMOs with meetings at the Wagah border crossing - Implement disengagement from higher to lower
positions - Must accept variability in process due to
changeable weather conditions - Weather forces disengagement to be conducted
during the summer season (May September) - Time frame
- Brig Hakeems view 1 season
- Take full advantage of political will to ensure
irreversibility - Brig Kanwals view 2 seasons
- India has more infrastructure and longer
distances to travel
13Disengagement Phases
- Phase 1 Withdraw medium artillery located near
Base Camps (e.g., Dzingrulma, Gyari) - Phases 2 4 Withdraw troops from Northern,
Central, and Southern battalion sub-sectors,
respectively - Forward posts, including crew-served weapons
posts - Declare camps where troops from forward positions
can concentrate - Dismantle camps after withdrawal
- Phase 5 Withdraw from forward logistics camps on
or near the Glacier - Phase 6 Dismantle logistics camps
- Phase 7 Withdraw from base camps
- Phase 8 Dismantle or convert base camps to
scientific/civil use
14Map of the Conceptual Demilitarized Zone
- Demilitarized Zone Uninhabited Zone (UZ)
Civilian Zone (CZ) - DMZ is without prejudice to Pak-China border
agreement and Indias position thereon - DMZ does not affect Indias current patrolling in
the area under its control
UZ
CZ
DMZ-2
CZ
15Two phases of monitoring are necessary
- Phase 1 Monitoring disengagement during the
establishment of the DMZ - Verify that posts, logistics centers, and base
camps vacated - Phase 2 Post-disengagement monitoring of the
DMZ - Verify that military personnel and equipment have
not re-entered the DMZ - The primary monitoring mechanism will be
bilateral and cooperative - India has historically rejected third party
participation - Unilateral monitoring by national technical
means will continue
16Monitoring Disengagement
- Goal is to verify withdrawal and dismantlement of
military facilities - Visual The withdrawal from Indian and Pakistani
posts within line of sight of each other is to be
coordinated so each side can observe activities
of the other. Ammunition and heavy weapons which
cannot be moved will be destroyed in-place. - Joint Aerial Reconnaissance A pair Indian and
Pakistani helicopters rendezvous at an agreed
location and then fly together along the Forward
Battle Positions in the agreed sector to visually
verify and photographically record withdrawal and
dismantlement of post or logistics camp. - On-site inspection Both sides have the right to
request that its representative land by
helicopter a at a location to confirm withdrawal
and dismantlement. - Unilateral activities Both sides should agree
not to interfere with the others national
technical means
17Long-term Monitoring of the DMZ
- Goal of detecting illicit re-occupation of
positions within the DMZ - Monitoring considerations
- Nothing happens fast on Siachen logistics and
weather drive everything - The possibility of a quick stealthy reoccupation,
absent an air bridge, is remote - Aerial operations are obvious
- Small-scale intrusions are neither significant
nor sustainable - Monitoring should focus on logistics
- All Indian logistics flows through Dzingrulma
- Pakistani logistics has multiple paths through
civilian villages
Photograph used with permission, Martin A.
Sugarman ã
18Potential Access Control Point India
- Bridge crossing near Chumikchan on the road to
Dzingrulma
Quickbird commercial satellite image
19Potential Access Control Point - Pakistan
- The road junction at Dansam includes supply
routes to central and southern sectors
Quickbird commercial satellite image
20Remote Monitoring of Access Control Points
- Sensor-activated video camera transmits images of
activity to the Joint Monitoring Center - Solar-powered system with satellite communication
- Less intrusiveness than manned presence
- System records activity in/out of DMZ and
identifies military activity - Milder climate at lower elevations enables
maintenance
Example of prototype camera system and microwave
sensor
21Aerial / Satellite Monitoring
- Commercial satellite imagery is an objective way
to detect large and medium size construction
activities - Coverage every 3 4 days
- Aerial Monitoring
- Conduct regularly scheduled overflights (paired
aircraft or joint crew) of the UZ using video and
thermal imaging cameras - Hand-held thermal imagers have been used
successfully in aerial search and rescue missions - Option to request unscheduled flight to resolve
questions of compliance that may arise
Hand-held Agema 550 thermal imager
Helicopter-mounted L3 Communications thermal
imager
22On-site Inspections
- On-site inspection of dismantlement or conversion
of military facilities in CZ - Some Pakistani organizations/facilities support
the local population - Base camps on both sides can support scientific
activities - Resident observers may be maintained at some
locations such as base camps - Precedents in Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty inspections
23Post-Disengagement Activities in Siachen UZ
- Establishment of a Siachen Science Center
- Center would serve international and regional
science objectives - International civilian staffing
- Environmental restoration of the Siachen Glacier
- Waste poses long-term threat to both countries
through the shared Indus River watershed - Bio-degradation is very slow in this climate
- International material aid likely required UNEP
could coordinate - A long-term remediation effort is necessary
- Indian Army conducted a study of waste on the
Siachen Glacier - 41,000 tons of solid waste
- Fuel spills
- Human and food waste
- Unexploded ordnance
24Siachen DisengagementThe Precedent of Chumik
Glacier Disengagement
- Situation developed in April 1989
- Indian Army dumped supplies and established base
camps for approach to Naveed peak - A race for the top ensued
- Flag meetings held on May 6, 13 and 20 1989
- Agreement in principle achieved on May 13
- Successful withdrawal began on May 21
- Agreement holds to date
Chumik Glacier Naveed Peak
25Conclusions and Observations
- Political will and innovative approaches are
necessary to end the conflict on Siachen - Disengagement is operationally feasible
- The Siachen Working Group needs to agree on
options for disengagement and monitoring
mechanisms
26Conclusions and Observations
- The post-disengagement use of the Uninhabited
Zone should be devoted to international
scientific and mountaineering activities - Post-conflict assessment and cleanup is needed
the UN Environment Programme could help - A joint India-Pakistan request is necessary
- Disengagement in the Siachen Conflict Zone will
serve as a precedent for the entire LOC
27POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
AGPL justified? - Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
alternatives? - Can Pakistan be trusted?
- What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date? - Can a national consensus be built on
demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
sell out a political albatross?
28POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
AGPL justified? - Pakistan Army must accept the reality on ground.
- Need for reference/ start point from which to
begin implementation of agreement. - Vital if agreement fails at a future date.
29POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
alternatives? - India could unilaterally hand over signed
(high-resolution) annotated satellite photos of
current Army positions of both sides on the AGPL
to Pakistan. - These could be combined with recent aerial
photos. - India could even consider sending copies of such
photos to the UN Secretary General.
30POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Can Pakistan be trusted?
- Pakistani View
- No desire to occupy Saltoro and subject
Pakistani troops to adverse conditions that
Indian troops have endured for two decades after
it is vacated. - If India does not wish to demilitarise, Pakistan
Army is happy to let Indian Army sit there six
to eight battalions are not available to India
for internal security duties heavy annual
expenditure. - Indian View Post-Kargil conflict and in view of
Gen Musharrafs book, Pakistan cannot be trusted.
31POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Can Pakistan be trusted?
- Pakistani View
- No desire to occupy Saltoro and subject
Pakistani troops to adverse conditions that
Indian troops have endured for two decades after
it is vacated. - If India does not wish to demilitarise, Pakistan
Army is happy to let Indian Army sit there six
to eight battalions are not available to India
for internal security duties heavy annual
expenditure. - Indian View Post-Kargil conflict and in view f
Gen Musharrafs book, Pakistan cannot be trusted.
Pakistans sincerity is still doubted in India
they do not trust India either.
32POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date? - Clearly state Indias right to open another
front if the demilitarisation agreement is
betrayed. (Skardu? Several other military
options.) - India could withdraw all pol-eco concessions,
break diplomatic ties and threaten to walk out of
treaties like Indus Waters Treaty begin work on
Kishanganga hydel project. - Squeeze Pakistan economically.
- Pakistan will be condemned as an international
pariah.
33POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Can a national consensus be built on
demilitarisation? - Or, will it be seen to be a sell out a
political albatross? - Nation ready for demilitarisation of Siachen.
- PM must seize political initiative and provide
leadership to seek consensus. - Perhaps a trade off with other sensitive issues
is possible. Sir Creek?
34POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
AGPL justified? - Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
alternatives? - Can Pakistan be trusted?
- What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date? - Can a national consensus be built on
demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
sell out a political albatross?
Conflict has not paid dividends.
35POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
AGPL justified? - Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
alternatives? - Can Pakistan be trusted?
- What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date? - Can a national consensus be built on
demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
sell out a political albatross?
Its time to give peace a chance.
36POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
AGPL justified? - Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
alternatives? - Can Pakistan be trusted?
- What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date? - Can a national consensus be built on
demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
sell out a political albatross?
And, be prepared for the worst.
37POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
AGPL justified? - Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
alternatives? - Can Pakistan be trusted?
- What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date? - Can a national consensus be built on
demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
sell out a political albatross?
A resurgent India can take calculated risks and
afford to be magnanimous.
38POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION
- Is the Armys stand on physical demarcation of
AGPL justified? - Is demarcation inescapable? Or, are there some
alternatives? - Can Pakistan be trusted?
- What are Indias options if Pakistan chooses to
occupy the Saltoro Ridge at a later date? - Can a national consensus be built on
demilitarisation? Or, will it be seen to be a
sell out a political albatross?
Demilitarisation of Siachen is an idea whose time
has come.
39(No Transcript)
40Satellite Mosaic of the Siachen Area
Defence L ine