Secure Pork Supply Board Update

1
Secure Pork Supply Board Update
2
Credit where credit is due!

• Thanks to Dr. Jim Roth and Dr. Pam Zaabel
• Center for Food Security And Public Health _at_ Iowa
  State University
• and the SPS Planning Committee

3
Secure Pork Supply Plan

• Center for Food Security and Public Health _at_ Iowa
  State CVM has received USDA funding to develop
  the plan.
• Coordinating with the Center for Animal Health
  Food Safety _at_ University of Minnesota who also
  has USDA funding
• Will cover movement of swine between production
  sites and processing plants

4
Secure pork supply (Patrick's Interpretation )

• SPS is basically a club
• The benefits that club members get the
  opportunity to move pigs sooner than non-club
  members in an outbreak.
• This is because members agree to implement
• a valid pre-harvest traceability program
• standardized bio security practices
• disease surveillance the level to achieve a
  defined status

5
Secure Pork Supply

• Built on the experiences of
• Secure Egg Supply
• Move eggs in the event of HPAI
• Plan has resulted in MOUs between IA, MN, NE and
  CO
• Secure Milk Supply
• Move milk in the event of FMD
• Secure Turkey Supply
• Move turkeys to harvest in the event of HPAI

6
Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee

• First meeting October 11-12, 2011
• Working Groups formed
• Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak)
• Surveillance (pre and post outbreak)
• Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises
• Data Collection, Management, and Sharing
• Risk Assessments
• Communications
• Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow

7
Secure Pork Supply

• First draft (completed May 2013) covers
• Biosecurity
• Pre-harvest traceability
• Outbreak tomorrow plan
• Data and information sharing agreements
• Producers
• State Vets
• National animal health laboratory network
• Packers and Processors

8
Secure Pork Supply

• Parts still under development
• Data management, risk assessments and disease
  surveillance are longer-term projects and will be
  incorporated in future drafts as they become
  available.

9
Secure Pork Supply

• Groups provided the draft for review
• State and Federal Animal Health Authorities
• USDA FSIS
• State Pork Producers Associations / Councils
• Checkoffs Swine Health Committee
• AMI / NAMA
• AASVs FAD and Swine Health Committees
• Packers and Processors

10
Secure Pork Supply

• Next steps
• Continue to bird-dog the process
• Review Incorporate Comments
• Focusing on getting the disease surveillance
  section completed
• Engage industry leadership on compliance and
  verification issues
• Program needs to be credible and workable
• Need to consider how the industry can verify
  compliance

11
Secure Pork Supply

• is a game of connect the dots
• Many of the practices already occur
• Needs to be documented and verified
• Data information already exists
• Sits in multiple private and government databases
  
• A common denominator is necessary to link
  everything together
• Standard Premises Identification Number

12

• Data Collection, Management Sharing

13

• Producers

14
Valid Pre-harvest Traceability

• Identify all premises with the standard PIN
• Industry is solidly behind PINs
• Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain
  records in electronic format
• Associates PINs with movements
• Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary
  Inspection or electronic IMRs
• Associate PINs with source and destination
• Allow access to movement data by animal health
  officials

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Disease Surveillance

• Maintain animal inventories by premises in an
  electronic format
• Submit surveillance data and samples in
  accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan
• Include validated PIN on all diagnostic
  laboratory submission forms

17
Validated PINs
18
Official PIN Tags

• Sow Packer Requirement
• Condition of sale by January 1st 2015 by various
  companies
• Must be a USDA Approved Official PIN Tag
• http//www.aphis.usda.gov/traceability/downloads/s
  wine_device_listing.pdf
• Industry support for this _at_ Pork Forum

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Official PIN Tags

• Only 2 companies currently have USDA approval to
  manufacture and are selling official PIN Tags
• Destron Fearing
• Allflex
• Available in multiple colors
• Some packers prefer pink

21
Official PIN Tags

• The PIN on the Official Tag is the USDA allocated
  Standardized Premises Identification Number (PIN)
  and not the State allocated Location Identifier
  (LID)
• When ordering the manufacturer will ask for the
  PIN so they can validate it to the address of the
  site

22
Official PIN Tags

• According to the Swine ID Program Standards the
  PIN on the Tag should be the PIN of the breeding
  farm she was on prior to entering harvest
  channels
• Works for systems that are not parity segregated
• Parity segregated systems
• Work with the State Vet to determine what PIN
  make the most sense
• Producer records maintain the traceability

23
Official PIN Tags

• One (or one set) and your done
• Once identified with one PIN tag or a set of
  official tags with same PIN and production number
  then that is it. Producers do not need to put in
  a new one if the animal moves to another
  production site BUT they do need to record that
  movement in case of a traceback.

24
Official PIN Tags
25
Disease Surveillance

• Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through
  the PINs associated with subsets of diagnostic
  samples to the NHALN for the express purposes of
  surveillance for foreign animal (and program
  diseases)
• Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the
  PINs associated with diagnostic samples for the
  express purposes of surveillance for foreign
  animal (and program diseases).

26
Disease Surveillance

• Allow access by state and federal animal health
  officials to the geospatial information stored in
  the National and State Premises Repositories for
  the express purposes of emergency preparedness
  and surveillance for foreign animal (and program
  diseases).

27
Recommendations (Not Required)

• Annual Employee FAD Awareness
• Separate PINs for epidemiological separate
  premises more than ¼ mile apart.
• Provide annual premises updates to SAHO
• Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine
  interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19)
• A word on the Code

28
Sow / Boar Surveillance
29
Market Hog Surveillance
30
Veterinary Diagnostic Labs
31
Packer Received Pigs from SPS sites AA13579
on XX / XX /2012 BB24688 on XX / XX
/2012 ETC..
PIN-765432A Pork Packer
PIN-AA13579 Wean to Finish
PIN-1234567B Wean to Finish
What the State Vet can determine 1. Site is a
part of Secure Pork? 2. Valid traceability
system up and running? 3. Standardized
biosecurity in place? 4. Achieved a negative
disease status?
Permitted Movements
PIN-BB24688 Wean to Finish
PIN -123456A Sow Farm
PIN-1234567C Swine Finisher
32
E2E Proof-of-Concept Demonstration
Premises and Plants (SCS)
Producer (3rd Party S/W)
Testing Results (Diag. Lab)
Producer Census and Movement Data
State Premises and Plant Data
Testing Data
Show premises disease status and support the
decision on whether or not to move animals.
Show the day-to-day usefulness for monitoring
facility disease status.
33

• Thank You!

34
Secure Pork Disease Awareness, Preparedness,
Response and Recovery

• Dr. Patrick Webb
• Director, Swine Health Programs

35
Secure Pork Supply PlanA Continuity of Business
Plan for the Swine Industry in the Face of a
Foreign Animal Disease

• James A. Roth, DVM, PhD, DACVM
• Center for Food Security and Public Health
• College of Veterinary Medicine
• Iowa State University

36
US Animal Agriculture is Highly Vulnerable to
Foreign Animal Diseases

• US production animals have no immunity to FADs
• Export markets will be lost
• Prices will drop dramatically
• Emergency vaccine stocks are far below what would
  be required to address a livestock dense state or
  multi-state outbreak
• The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive
  movement inherent in the U.S. livestock
  industries will present unprecedented challenges
  in the event of a FAD outbreak

37
USDA APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness
and Response Plan
38
USDA FAD PReP FMD Response Plan

39
Common Components of Secure Food Supply Business
Continuity Plans
Secure Egg Supply (HPAI) Secure Turkey Supply
(HPAI) Secure Milk Supply (FMD)Secure Pork
Supply (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)

• Voluntary pre-outbreak preparedness components
• Biosecurity, surveillance, epidemiology
  questionnaires, movement permits
• Risk assessments (completed and in process)
• Plans must be based on current capabilities and
  will evolve with science, risk assessments and
  new capabilities
• Guidelines only Final decisions made by
  responsible officials during outbreak
• Outreach and training pre and post outbreak

40
SPS Partners

• SPS Planning Committee
• Federal and State officials
• Representatives of all phases of the swine
  industry
• NPB, NPPC, AASV
• Academia
• Iowa State University
• University of Minnesota

41
FADs included in SPS plan

• Foot and mouth disease
• Swine, cattle, sheep, goats, deer
• Classical swine fever
• African swine fever
• Swine vesicular disease

Foot and Mouth Disease 7 days post infection
PIADC
42
Disease Transmission(FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD)

• Not zoonotic
• Direct contact and oral exposure are the most
  important routes of infection for swine (Pigs are
  relatively resistant to airborne infection by all
  4 FADs)
• Indirect contact (fomites) also can play a lesser
  role for transmission
• Pigs exhale large concentrations of FMDV, cattle
  are highly susceptible to aerosolized virus

43
Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee

• First meeting October 11-12, 2011
• Working Groups formed
• Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak)
• Surveillance (pre and post outbreak)
• Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises
• Data Collection, Management, and Sharing
• Risk Assessments
• Communications
• Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow

44

• Getting On the Same Page

45
North American Animal Agriculture Industry is
Unique

• The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive
  movement inherent in the U.S. and North American
  livestock industries will present unprecedented
  challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak
• Strategies for the response to, and management
  of, a FAD outbreak will change as the outbreak
  progresses and will depend upon the magnitude,
  location and other characteristics of the
  outbreak.

46
Phases and Types of FMD Response
http//www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-and-types-
of-an-fmd-outbreak
47
Phases of FMD Response
48
FMD Detection in the United States Types of an
FMD Outbreak
Six Types of FMD Outbreaks
48
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Differentiating between Types of FMD Outbreaks
  Geographic Size of Outbreak Animal Movement Number of Premises Size of Premises Vaccine Assumptions Appropriate Strategies Minimum Time Required to Achieve FMD Free Status
Type 1-Focal FMD outbreak One state or small region No extensive animal movement Small number Relatively small Not applicable Stamping-out   3 months after the last case
Type 2-Moderate regional FMD outbreak Few focal areas in one region No extensive animal movement out of the Control Area Small to moderate number Small to medium Sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate designated animals Stamping-out Vaccinate-to-kill Vaccinate-to-slaughter Discontinue vaccination after the last case 3 months after the last case and slaughter of all vaccinated animals, or 6 months after last case or last vaccination if all vaccinated animals are not slaughtered
Type 3-Large regional FMD outbreak Multiple areas in a region No extensive animal movement outside of the region Moderate number Medium to large Sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate designated animals Vaccinate-to-live Vaccinate-to-slaughter Discontinue vaccination after the last case 12 months after the last evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD vaccine was administered
Type 4-Widespread or national FMD outbreak Widespread areas of infection Extensive animal movement Moderate to large number Medium to large Sufficient vaccine is available to vaccinate designated animals Vaccinate-to-live Vaccinate-to-slaughter Continue vaccination after the last case FMD Free with Vaccination 18 months after the last case
Type 5-Catastrophic FMD outbreak Widespread areas of infection Extensive animal movement Large number Large Sufficient vaccine is NOT available to vaccinate designated animals Endemic FMD control program Vaccinate-to-live Continue vaccination after the last case FMD Free with Vaccination 2 years after the last outbreak
Type 6-North American FMD outbreak Widespread infection in Mexico / Canada/ US Extensive animal movement Large number Large Sufficient vaccine is NOT available to vaccinate designated animals Endemic FMD control program Vaccinate-to-live Continue vaccination after the last case FMD Free with Vaccination 2 years after the last outbreak
50
FMD Outbreak in IowaLarge Control Area
Source NASS, 2007
Number of Swine Affected 19,883,988 Number
of Bovines Affected 2,366,535 Number of
Operations Affected 110,727
50
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Type 5 Catastrophic FMD Outbreak

• Widespread areas of infection are detected
  involving a large portion of the United States.
  Sufficient vaccine and resources are not
  available to quickly vaccinate all designated
  susceptible animals in the affected regions. The
  number of vaccinated animals is too great to
  consider a vaccinate-to-kill or
  vaccinate-to-slaughter (only) policy. It becomes
  apparent that FMD is widespread, and will not be
  eradicated within a year.
• Declare FMD to be an endemic disease and
  implement a program for long term eradication and
  control, including vaccinate-to-live

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• Outbreak Tomorrow

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Controlled Movement of Swine in an FMD Outbreak

• At the beginning of an outbreak
• No new movements initiated from the FMD control
  area
• 625,000 pigs on the road each day
• Some will have come from the control area
• 400,000 to 500,000 hogs and sows slaughtered
  daily
• Restarting movement
• Depends on the type of outbreak

55
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility

• Swine may be infected with FMD virus before
  showing any clinical signs or testing positive by
  PCR
• It is not possible to prove freedom from FMD
  infection in a herd, or in an individual animal.
  It is only possible to establish that there is
  lack of evidence of infection
• Therefore, all pork from a processing facility
  that has received swine from the FMD Control Area
  will be considered to potentially contain the FMD
  virus

56
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility

• FMD is not a public health or food safety problem
• Animals which pass ante-mortem and post-mortem
  inspection by USDA FSIS are safe for human
  consumption, even if they may be in the
  pre-clinical stage of FMD infection
• Regulations regarding feeding garbage to swine
  must be strictly enforced.

57
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility

• At the beginning of an FMD outbreak (Phase 1)
• Packing plants should continue to process all
  swine in the plant and in transit to the plant
  which cannot be turned back or euthanized while
  in transit
• During a large FMD outbreak (Phase 2, Type 3 or
  greater)
• Market ready hogs and sows, from herds in the
  Control Area with no evidence of infection should
  be sent to slaughter as quickly as possible

58
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility

• Processing of swine should continue, even if it
  is known that FMD infected animals have been in
  the plant
• Federal and State Officials (Incident Command
  Post) would need to agree to this
• Packing facility owners/managers would also need
  to agree to this

59
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility

• Modern packing facilities process thousands of
  swine daily. At any point in time, there may be
  thousands of live animals in lairage awaiting
  slaughter.
• If any animals are incubating the virus, and the
  processing of swine is stopped, the virus will
  rapidly multiply in the swine in lairage.
• The thousands of animals that are in transit to
  slaughter facilities will not be able to be
  unloaded if the processing of swine at the plant
  is not continued.

60
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility

• Processing of all healthy animals in the
  slaughter facility and in transit to the facility
  is the fastest way to dispose of those animals
  and presents the lowest risk of spreading FMD
  infection
• It also reduces the need for carcass disposal and
  preserves high quality protein for human
  consumption

61
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility

• Finished products from any processing plants that
  received swine from the Control Area must be
  considered to potentially contain FMD virus
• Processed product should be quarantined and
  placed in cold storage until a decision is
  reached by Incident Command on allowable uses for
  the product
• If the outbreak is quickly controlled by stamping
  out, the product should be destroyed
• If it becomes apparent that the outbreak is
  extensive, the product should be released for
  domestic sale

62
Controlled Swine Movement To and Through a
Packing Facility

• Packing plant employees, service personnel, and
  truck drivers must observe proper biosecurity
  protocols to avoid transmitting the FMD virus
  when they leave the plant
• All potential fomites leaving the plant must be
  cleaned and disinfected
• This will be difficult to implement on an
  emergency basis
• Ideally, an emergency plan for implementing
  biosecurity will be in place before an outbreak
• Biosecurity measures will be needed whether the
  plant receiving FMD infected animals continues or
  halts processing of healthy animals

63
Problems to Address

• Will the pork consuming public accept the
  product?
• Will Packers be willing to continue to process
  animals from an FMD control area in a large
  outbreak?
• Will the economics make sense for the Packers?
• Cold storage facilities for excess pork in the
  first months of an outbreak?
• Disposition of herds that have recovered from
  infection?

64

• Data Collection, Management Sharing

65

• Producers

66
Valid Pre-harvest Traceability

• Identify all premises with the standard PIN
• Industry is solidly behind PINs
• Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain
  records in electronic format
• Associates PINs with movements
• Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary
  Inspection or electronic IMRs
• Associate PINs with source and destination
• Allow access to movement data by animal health
  officials

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Disease Surveillance

• Maintain animal inventories by premises in an
  electronic format
• Submit surveillance data and samples in
  accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan
• Include validated PIN on all diagnostic
  laboratory submission forms

69
Validated PINs
70
Disease Surveillance

• Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through
  the PINs associated with subsets of diagnostic
  samples to the NHALN for the express purposes of
  surveillance for foreign animal (and program
  diseases)
• Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the
  PINs associated with diagnostic samples for the
  express purposes of surveillance for foreign
  animal (and program diseases).

71
Disease Surveillance

• Allow access by state and federal animal health
  officials to the geospatial information stored in
  the National and State Premises Repositories for
  the express purposes of emergency preparedness
  and surveillance for foreign animal (and program
  diseases).

72
Recommendations (Not Required)

• Annual Employee FAD Awareness
• Separate PINs for epidemiological separate
  premises more than ¼ mile apart.
• Provide annual premises updates to SAHO
• Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine
  interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19)
• A word on the Code

73

• National Animal Health Laboratory Network

74
Data Collection

• Request premises identification numbers (PIN) on
  all swine diagnostic specimens submitted as a
  part of the surveillance component of the SPS
  plan
• Use either separate forms or have an area on
  current form to indicate the samples submitted
  are for the surveillance component of the SPS plan

75
Process Surveillance Submissions

• Receive surveillance samples with accompanying
  producer information submitted for SPS plan
• Scan validated PINs into the LIMS and associate
  with the accession/case
• Pass through PINs with diagnostic samples for
  surveillance for FADs (and program diseases)
• Conduct routine testing on samples and report out
  results to producers / veterinarians

76
Data Sharing

• Coordinate transfer of FAD surveillance results
  with PINs into SPS information reporting system
  prior to and during an outbreak
• Follow current NAHLN protocols for reporting FAD
  testing data related to the SPS plan including
  reporting to state and federal animal health
  officials

77
Recommendations (Not Required)

• Add a statement to the diagnostic submission form
  reminding producers of what participation means
• I agree to the steps outlined in the document
  titled secure pork supply step for producers
  participation

78

• Packers and Processors

79
Pre-harvest traceability

• Develop ability to capture and associate PINs of
  sending premises with normal business information
• Develop a mechanism to record information
  regarding conveyances for each group / lot
• Develop a mechanism to share the following
  information associated w/ each group / lot
• Sending premises, conveyance identification,
  group lot number or animal identification, date
  of shipment, number of head

80
Biosecurity

• Develop plan with USDA for implementation and
  verification plant biosecurity standards in the
  Packer / Processor FAD strategy document

81
Disease Surveillance

• Develop and test a mechanism to associate PINs
  with diagnostic samples collected at the plant
• Develop protocols to deliver diagnostic samples
  to laboratories using common shipping methods or
  plant employees
• Pass through PINs associated with diagnostic
  samples for the express purpose of surveillance
  for FADs (and program diseases) prior, during and
  after an outbreak

82
Recommendations (Not Required)

• Implement awareness training for employees
• Develop and implement plans for reporting suspect
  FADs
• Develop policies for plant operations in the
  control area based on the Packer / Processor FADs
  Strategy Document
• Categorized products into trade categories as
  outlined in the Packer / Processor FADs Strategy
  Document

83

• State Animal Health Officials

84
Pre-harvest traceability

• Issue separate PINs for epidemiologically
  separate premises separated by more than a
  quarter-mile
• Accept electronic formats of CVIs and interstate
  movement reports that include validated PINs for
  sending and receiving premises participating in
  an SPS plan

85
Disease surveillance

• Access geospatial information stored in the
  State/National premises repository for the
  express purposes of emergency preparedness and
  surveillance for foreign animal (and program)
  diseases

86
Communication

• Communicate with NAHLN labs concerning FAD
  testing results using current reporting channels
  for samples submitted through the SPS plan
• Communicate with SAHOs in surrounding states
  concerning compliance with SPS plans
• Premises information, approved biosecurity
  audits, test results for samples submitted under
  the surveillance component of the SPS plan

87
Communication

• Communicate with other SAHOs and the incident
  command any adverse findings, noncompliance with
  SPS standards or protocols, results of site
  evaluations and regulatory actions taken

88
Animal Movement

• Allow swine already in transit to cross state
  borders according to the controlled movement
  component of the SPS plan at the beginning of an
  FAD outbreak
• Allow swine across state borders according to the
  controlled movement component of the SPS plan
  when movement is restarted after beginning of an
  outbreak

89
Recommendations (Not Required)

• Work with producers to develop swine production
  health plans for routine interstate swine
  movements of feeder pigs with no change of
  ownership as established by 9 CFR 71.19

90

• Biosecurity

91
Biosecurity Lines On Production Sites

• Lines are imaginary or real barriers to reduce
  risk of pathogen exposure to pigs
• Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)
• Outer control boundary set up around the
  perimeter of the site to limit access of the
  outside world to close contact with animal
  buildings
• Interior Clean-Dirty Line (ICD)
• Established to isolate pigs on the clean side of
  the production site from sources of infection on
  the dirty side of the production site

92
Biosecurity Lines on Production Sites

• Criteria for each line addresses risk mitigation
  measures for swine, people and fomites
• Producers would work with herd veterinarians to
  establish lines and protocols.

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Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site
Biosecurity Lines

• Restricting Entry into the PBA
• Access control
• Ingress / egress
• People
• Routing, designated parking
• Animals
• Animal disposal, feral swine prevention, other
  livestock
• Fomites
• Area for cleaning and disinfection, feed routing

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96
Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site
Biosecurity Lines

• Crossing the ICD line
• People
• Biosecurity protocols
• Animals
• Prevention of non-swine animal exposure
• Fomites
• Biosecurity protocols for delivery of equipment
  feed etc.

97
Factors Considered in Setting up Production Site
Biosecurity Lines

• Crossing the ICD line
• Load outs
• Portable chutes, common load outs, animal flow
  etc.
• Carcass removal
• Movement of carcasses and people
• Weather

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99
Biosecurity Protocols

• Broken into Level I Level II
• Level I is the default for day-to-day practice
• Level II is a heightened protocol for after an
  FAD event
• Producers can choose to operate in level II on a
  day-to-day basis which would shorten the time for
  transition and verification in the event of an
  FAD

100
Visitor Biosecurity

• Two levels and each addresses
• Limiting visitors
• Requiring sign in
• Following biosecurity protocols
• Cleaning of equipment

101
Employee Biosecurity

• Two levels and each addresses
• General employee guidelines
• Employee entry
• Employee movement between sites
• Facility entry

102
Production Site Biosecurity

• Two levels and each addresses
• Access deterrents
• Buildings
• Pest wildlife control
• Crossing the ICD line for operating procedures
• Carcass removal
• Loose pigs

103
Loadout Biosecurity

• Two levels and each addresses
• Drivers
• Each load-out area
• Load-out procedures

104

• Surveillance

105
Natl Surveillance Program Streams
106
PIN Tag Pilot
107
What is next?
108
Iowa E2E Project
109

• Communications

110
Communications

• Cross Species FMD Communications Team
• Developed messaging for FMD outbreaks to reassure
  the consumer about the safety of pork, beef and
  milk.
• Currently studying consumer perceptions regarding
  vaccine
• Working on an educational strategy to raise
  retailer awareness (ounce of prevention)
• http//www.fmdinfo.org/

111

• Monitored Premises Compartmentalization

112
Setting a High Bar
113

• Risk Assessment

114
What is an acceptable risk?
115
SPS Enrolment /Compliance / Verification

• We will be addressing the issue this year
• Goal is to develop a workable, credible and
  affordable solution
• Could develop it as a part of PQA plus

116

• Putting it all together!

117
Packer Received Pigs from SPS sites AA13579
on XX / XX /2012 BB24688 on XX / XX
/2012 ETC..
PIN-765432A Pork Packer
PIN-AA13579 Wean to Finish
PIN-1234567B Wean to Finish
What the State Vet can determine 1. Site is a
part of Secure Pork? 2. Valid traceability
system up and running? 3. Standardized
biosecurity in place? 4. Achieved a negative
disease status?
Permitted Movements
PIN-BB24688 Wean to Finish
PIN -123456A Sow Farm
PIN-1234567C Swine Finisher