Political Culture and Democratization

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Political Culture and Democratization

• Preliminary thoughts for chapter 8 of Approaching
  Democracy Research Methods in Comparative
  Politics
• Michael Coppedge

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Relevant individual Attitudes Diffuse vs.
specific support, Confidence in institutions
and Leaders, interpersonal trust, Tolerance,
moderation
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Determinants of attitudes Age, education,
income, ethnicity, religion, party, inequality,
etc.
Relevant individual attitudes
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Determinants of attitudes
Relevant individual attitudes
Individual participation Voting, contacting,
donating Petitioning, demonstrating, Striking,
violence
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Collective identities Nationality,
ethnicity Religion, tribe, class, Party
Determinants of attitudes
Relevant individual attitudes
Individual participation
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Elite orientations Ideology, programs, Moderation
, ambitions Polarization
Collective identities
Determinants of attitudes
Relevant individual attitudes
Individual participation
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Collective identities
Elite orientations
Determinants of attitudes
Policies
Relevant individual attitudes
Individual participation
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Collective identities
Elite orientations
The regime Level, change, longevity
Determinants of attitudes
Policies
Relevant individual attitudes
Individual participation
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Collective identities
Elite orientations
Institutions And Processes
Regime
Determinants of attitudes
Policies
Relevant individual attitudes
Individual participation
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Forms of direct action by row actor to replace
column actor
Military Mass Executive Legisla-ture Courts
Military Civil war Dirty war Military coup Military coup Military coup
Mass insurgency Civil war Election protest Uprising Election protest Uprising protest
Executive Manipula-tion of promotions Police action or repression Resigna-tion Presi-dential coup Presi-dential coup
Legisla-ture Impeach-ment
Courts Impeach-ment
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If this actor takes direct action Democratic outcomes Undemocratic outcomes
Mass Failed or repressed uprising or insurgency constitutional succession after successful uprising resignation Unconstitutional succession after uprising or insurgency violence provokes excessive repression, coup, or civil war
Executive Failed presidential coup constitutional dissolution resignation Successful presidential coup excessive repression
Military Repression, dirty war, military coup, back presidential coup, civil war
Legislature Impeachment, vote of no confidence
Courts Actions are constitutional by definition
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Complete independence
Mass support for
policies
leaders
executive
congress
institutions
Government performance
The actual regime
courts
Democracy In principle
military
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Complete independence no change
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Connected mass attitudes
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Mass attitudes converge
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Connected elite positions
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Elite orientations converge
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Bottom-up influence
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Elite orientations converge to mass average
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Top-down influence
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Mass converges to elite average
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or to the most influential elite actor
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More bottom-up than top-down
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Elites converge to mass position faster than mass
converges toward elite position
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More top-down than bottom-up
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Mass converges to elite average faster than
elites converge toward mass average
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Government performance affects mass support
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Mass support trends in direction of exogenous
performance
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Government performance affects elite orientations
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Elite orientations trend in direction of
exogenous performance
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Positive performance exogenous, all else
endogenous
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Eventually, all actors trend in the direction of
steady positive performance because its exogenous
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Negative performance exogenous, all else
endogenous
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Eventually, all actors trend in the direction of
steady negative performance because its exogenous
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Variable performance exogenous, all else
endogenous
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Without a steady trend, actors that are only
indirectly influenced by performance may never
converge with the others
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Recap

• We should expect no strong relationship between
  mass attitudes toward democracy and regimes
  because
• Other kinds of attitudes may matter more
• Attitudes dont matter unless they are translated
  into action, even if indirectly
• Their impact on regimes is necessarily mediated
• Snapshots and cross-sections cant capture the
  dynamic, endogenous relationships

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Implications for research

• Test for associations between attitudes and more
  proximate outcomes on the pathways to regime
  change
• Election of semiloyal leaders
• Mass support for violent, direct action
• Elite beliefs about mass reactions to moves that
  create, preserve, or undermine democracy. How
  constrained do they feel?
• Measure mass elite attitudes frequently
• Test for convergences, controlling for exogenous
  factors