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Additional Congressional Powers

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Title: Additional Congressional Powers


1
Additional Congressional Powers
  • Congress enjoys some other important powers
    besides the Commerce Clause power
  • The power to tax
  • The power to spend
  • The power to enforce the Reconstruction
    Amendments (13th-15th Amendments)

2
Taxing power
  • The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
    Taxes. . . .
  • Art. I, 8, cl. 1

3
Taxing Power
  • Before 1937, the Supreme Court drew a distinction
    between revenue-raising taxes (e.g., income or
    general sales taxes) and regulatory taxes (e.g.,
    corporate tax on companies that make goods with
    child labor)
  • Under Bailey (a 1922 case), the taxing power
    could be used to raise revenue but not for
    regulatory purposes
  • This was an internal limit on the taxing power

4
Taxing Power
  • If Congress wanted to impose a regulatory tax, it
    needed an independent power to regulate
  • If Congress wanted to regulate working conditions
    in factories, it could do so through a tax only
    if it had the power to regulate the working
    conditions under the Commerce Clause or another
    clause
  • For two reasons, the regulatory tax principle is
    not important
  • With an expansive Commerce Clause authority,
    there are no meaningful limits on the taxing
    powerLopez doesnt change this since activities
    likely to be taxed are commercial activities with
    an interstate dimension
  • Since 1937, the Supreme Court has required only a
    non-exclusive revenue raising purpose for a
    taxand the amount of revenues raised need not be
    substantial

5
Taxing Power
  • What about the challenges to the individual
    mandate to purchase health care insurance under
    PPACA?
  • The government claims that the individual
    mandate is an exercise of the taxing power
  • Individuals will pay 2.5 percent of income (above
    the filing threshold) if they dont have
    insurance
  • There also are minimum and maximum levies
  • This is the functional equivalent of a 2.5
    percent income tax, with an exemption for those
    who have health care coverage

6
Taxing Power
  • The courts have not questioned whether the
    individual mandate could have been passed as an
    exercise of the taxing power
  • Rather they claim that Congress did not in fact
    use its taxing power
  • Instead Congress explicitly invoked its Commerce
    Clause power, and failure to purchase insurance
    will generate a penalty, not a tax
  • Does it matter whether Congress said it was using
    its taxing power?
  • Does it matter whether Congress called the levy a
    penalty rather than a tax?
  • Is there an accountability problem?

7
Spending Power
  • The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
    Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
    Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare
    of the United States. . . .
  • Art. I, 8, cl. 1
  • How would you read the spending power to create a
    general police power?
  • The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide
    for the . . . general Welfare of the United
    States. . . .

8
Spending Power
  • The spending power has some internal limits, but
    they are not very constraining
  • Must be exercised in pursuit of the general
    welfare (deferring to Congress on question
    whether a general purpose is served)
  • Any conditions on the receipt of funds must be
    unambiguous (this is the most significant limit)
  • Conditions on federal grants must be related to
    the federal interest in national projects or
    programs (not clear whether they need to be
    related to the purpose of the grants in any
    case, there need not be a reasonably close
    relation)
  • Congress cannot coerce states into compliance
    with its conditions

9
Enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments (13-15)
  • The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
    appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
    article.
  • 14th Amendment, section 5

10
Enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments (13-15)
  • Congress can exercise its enforcement power when
  • There has been a real problem with a states
    compliance with its obligations under the
    amendment and
  • The congressional legislation is well targeted at
    the states lack of compliance
  • Thus, because states had a history of using
    literacy tests to restrict the right to vote,
    Congress could ban literacy tests in the Voting
    Rights Act of 1965
  • But an exemption from laws of general
    applicability that restricted religious practice
    (e.g., peyote use) was struck down as applied to
    the states (the laws were not passed because of
    anti-religious sentiment)

11
10th Amendment Overview
  • The 10th Amendment essentially restates the
    principle that the national government is a
    government of limited powers
  • According to the Amendment, governmental powers
    not granted to the national government are
    reserved to the states
  • Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has interpreted
    the 10th Amendment to limit the freedom of
    Congress to regulate state and local governments
  • Congress may be able to regulate the behavior of
    private individuals, but state autonomy is
    especially threatened when Congress tries to
    regulate the behavior of state and local public
    officials
  • New York v. United States and Printz set the
    current standard for 10th Amendment analysis

12
10th Amendment
  • The Powers not delegated to the United States by
    the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
    States, are reserved to the States respectively,
    or to the people.

13
Treaty power
  • The President shall have Power, by and with the
    Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
    Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
    present concur. . . . Art. II, 2, cl. 2

14
Missouri v. Holland
  • Federalism concerns do not apply to relations
    with other countries the way they do to domestic
    policies
  • The treaty-making power is a power that is
    quintessentially a power of national governments,
    and we dont want states interfering with foreign
    relations
  • Are there any limits on the treaty power?
  • Treaties must deal with questions that are
    properly the subject of negotiation with a
    foreign country
  • Treaties are subject to the external limits of
    the Bill of Rights (Reid v. Covert, page 333)

15
Treaty power
  • But why is the treaty power limited by the Bill
    of Rights?
  • This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
    States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
    and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
    under the Authority of the United States, shall
    be the supreme Law of the Land. . . .
  • Article VI, 2 (Supremacy Clause)
  • The framers wanted to preserve treaties made
    under the Articles of Confederation (page 333)

16
10th Amendment
  • As weve seen with other provisions, Supreme
    Court interpretations have varied over time
  • In National League of Cities, the Court
    prohibited Congress from regulating states when
    they were engaging in their traditional
    governmental functions
  • In Garcia, the Court held that states should rely
    on the procedural safeguards inherent in the
    structure of the federal system rather than
    judicial intervention
  • See also Baker (page 336) States must find
    their protection from congressional regulation
    through the national political process
  • Then came New York v. United States

17
New York v. United States
  • What was this case about?
  • The case was about a rather complex effort to
    deal with the disposal of radioactive wastes
  • Our economy produces a lot of low level
    radioactive waste, from things like luminous
    watch dials, smoke alarms, materials used at
    nuclear power plants, medical fluids, and
    scientific research.
  • The waste needs to be disposed of at special
    sites but people generally do not want the
    disposal sites in their communityits the
    not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) problem

18
New York v. United States
  • Note on page 337 some things that foreshadow what
    we will see in the dormant commerce clause
    section of the course
  • Why did the SC Governor order a 50 percent
    reduction in radioactive waste accepted at the SC
    waste disposal site rather than just limit
    importation of radioactive waste from other
    states?
  • Cant discriminate based on geography
  • If the SC Governor couldnt limit importation
    from other states, why was it okay for the 1985
    statute to authorize states to impose surcharges
    on waste from other states?
  • Congress can override the Commerce Clauses
    restrictions on states

19
New York v. United States
  • What was this case about?
  • The National Governors Association fashioned a
    compromise between the few states with disposal
    sites and the states without disposal sites, and
    Congress enacted the compromise in 1985 (page
    337)
  • The legislation gave states some financial
    incentives to dispose of wastes within their
    borders but also required them to take possession
    of the privately generated wastes in their state
    if they had not provided for disposal of the
    wastes by 1996

20
New York v. United States
  • Why did the states need federal legislation for
    their deal?
  • Article I, 10, cl.3 requires Congressional
    approval for interstate compacts
  • No State shall , without the Consent of Congress,
    . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with
    another State. . . .
  • Also, they needed to avoid dormant Commerce
    Clause problems.

21
New York v. United States
  • How did the statute try to regulate disposal of
    the radioactive wastes?
  • States with disposal sites could impose
    surcharges on waste from other states, which
    would be returned to states that arranged for
    disposal of their own wastes
  • After a series of surcharge increases, existing
    sites could deny access to wastes from states
    that were not part of a regional compact to
    dispose of wastes
  • If a state was unable to provide for disposal of
    its own waste by 1996, it was to take title to
    the waste and would be obligated to take
    possession of the waste

22
New York v. United States
  • On page 338, the Court began its analysis
  • First, the Court observed that there are both
    external (e.g., first amendment) and internal
    limits on the Article I powers of Congress
  • The Tenth Amendment reminds us that principles of
    state sovereignty impose limits on the Article I
    powers
  • We can view the Tenth Amendment analysis as
    either one of internal or external limits
  • The Constitution may adapt to changes in
    circumstances, but it also imposes its own
    structure that limits the powers of the national
    government

23
New York v. United States
  • How may Congress interfere with state sovereignty
    (pages 338-339)?
  • It may directly regulate the disposal of
    privately-generated radioactive waste
  • In doing so, it may preempt state regulations for
    the disposal of radioactive waste
  • It may subject states to generally applicable
    laws (i.e., if Congress adopts regulations on
    private generators of radioactive waste, it can
    impose the regulations on governmental generators
    of radioactive waste)

24
New York v. United States
  • In what way may Congress not interfere with state
    sovereignty (pages 339-340)?
  • Congress may not simply commandeer the
    legislative processes of the States by directly
    compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
    regulatory program.
  • Congress may not require the States to govern
    according to Congress instructions.
  • In other words, Congress may not force state
    legislatures to carry out its policies

25
New York v. United States
  • Where does this limitation come from?
  • Original intent The framers wanted to replace
    federal regulation of states under the Articles
    of Confederation with federal regulation of
    individuals under the Constitution (page 339)
  • The inability of Congress to regulate individuals
    was a key defect in the Articles
  • Note in Printz that Stevens read the legislative
    history differentlyin his view, the framers
    wanted to add regulation of individuals to
    regulation of states, not substitute one for the
    other (pages 348, 350)

26
New York v. United States
  • If Congress cant force the states to do
    something, is it powerless with respect to
    getting the states to do things?
  • Weve already seen that Congress can subject
    states to generally applicable laws (page 339)
  • Congress may attach conditions to the receipt of
    funds when it exercises its spending power (page
    340)
  • Congress can let the states regulate private
    activity according to national standards rather
    than having the national government regulate
    (page 340)
  • There is no choice about the content of the
    regulations, but there is choice as to who
    administers the regulations. Environmental
    statutes are important examples. Its not much
    of a choice for the states

27
New York v. United States
  • There are three related problems when Congress
    forces a state to impose regulations
  • The invasion of state autonomythe people of the
    state lose their ability to decide whether to
    follow the national governments lead (page 340)
    (nature or structure of the US Constitution)
  • The blurring of responsibility and accountability
    (who should the public thank or blame when a
    state adopts a policy required by Congress?)
    (page 340) (representation-reinforcement)
  • The imposition of unfunded mandates (states
    having to assume ownership of low level
    radioactive wastes, or in Printz, local sheriffs
    having to enforce gun background checks)

28
New York v. United States
  • Most of the statute is fine (pages 340-341)
  • States with disposal sites may impose a surcharge
    on radioactive wastes received from other States
  • Congress can authorize states to burden
    interstate commerce
  • The Secretary of Energy may collect a portion of
    the surcharge and place the money in an escrow
    account
  • Congress may tax interstate commerce
  • States achieving a series of milestones may
    receive portions of the collected surcharges
  • Congress may spend for the general welfare

29
New York v. United States
  • States may restrict access to their disposal
    sites by raising fees and ultimately denying
    access to waste generated in other states (p.341)
  • Congress can authorize states to discriminate
    against interstate commerce
  • Congress is not telling the states what to do
  • It is telling the states that either (a) they can
    adopt their own policies consistent with federal
    standards for the disposal of privately generated
    wastes or (b) they can let the federal government
    subject private generators of waste to the
    regulation authorizing other states to deny
    access to waste sites in the other states (slide
    26, prong 3)
  • The state is not required to expend any funds by
    the regulation, nor is there a burden on the
    state as a sovereign. The burden falls on the
    private generators of waste.

30
New York v. United States
  • What is the problem with the statute?
  • The requirement that states take possession of
    privately generated radioactive wastes as an
    alternative to making sure that locally generated
    wastes are disposed of properly (pages 341-342)
  • Why is this a problem?
  • With either choice, the state would be enacting a
    federal regulatory program
  • Take possession of radioactive wastes (which is
    the equivalent of granting a state subsidy to
    generators of the waste) or
  • Create local disposal sites or otherwise provide
    for disposal of locally generated wastes
  • Since Congress cannot require either choice
    separately, it cannot require a choice between
    the two options

31
New York v. United States
  • The government argued (page 342) that even if it
    is true that Congress generally cannot tell state
    legislatures what to do, a sufficiently strong
    federal interest should permit Congress to direct
    state legislatures
  • How did the Court respond?
  • Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong
    to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so
    directly it may not conscript state governments
    as its agents (page 343)

32
New York v. United States
  • How can the act violate state sovereignty when
    the states were willing participants in the
    passage of the legislation (page 343)?
  • The state-federal balance was created for the
    benefit of individuals, not for the benefit of
    state governments, so the state governments
    cannot upset the balance
  • It may be in the interests of public officials to
    change the balance so, as in this case, they can
    avoid responsibility for unpopular action.
    Congress can force the states to choose where to
    locate disposal sites the states can blame
    Congress for forcing them to choose (pages
    343-344)
  • Note the dissents point (page 345) that by
    protecting NYs sovereignty, the Court infringes
    the other states sovereignty

33
New York v. United States
  • Congress may impose its policies on state (or
    local) governments when
  • It adopts statutes that are generally applicable
    to both private companies and state and local
    governments
  • If Congress requires private businesses to pay a
    minimum wage, it also can require states to pay
    their employees a minimum wage
  • It uses financial incentives to persuade state
    and local governments to regulate private
    activity in a certain way (the spending power)
  • Regulating private activity, it gives states the
    choice of regulating according to federal
    standards or having the federal government
    preempt state regulation

34
Printz v. United States
  • Just as Congress cannot commandeer state
    legislators, they cannot commandeer state
    executive branch officials
  • Congress wanted local law enforcement officers to
    conduct background checks before someone could
    buy a gun
  • The Court cited to principles of
  • Tradition (compelled enlistment of state
    executive officers for the administration of
    federal programs is, until very recent years at
    least, unprecedented.)
  • Constitutional structure (the federal executive
    branch, not state executive branches, is supposed
    to execute the laws, and Congress intrudes on
    state sovereignty when it tells local law
    enforcement officers how to exercise their policy
    making discretion)
  • Representation-reinforcement (gun purchasers will
    blame the local law enforcement officers for the
    background checks)
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