The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

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• The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
• by Marc Finaud, Faculty Member, GCSP
• Security Policy Training Course
• Diplomatic Academy, Sofia, Bulgaria
• 2 March, 2005

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• Contents
• Definitions
• The Non-Proliferation Regime
• WMD Arsenals and Programs
• The Terrorist Risk
• Current Trends
• Acronyms
• Sources

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• DEFINITIONS
• No generic definition of Weapons of Mass
  Destruction (WMD), only enumeration in UN
  documents (since 1948 Report of the UN Commission
  on Conventional Armaments) and each weapon
  defined in relevant treaties
• Atomic/Nuclear Weapons (NW)
• Bacteriological/Biological Weapons (BW)
• Chemical Weapons (CW)
• ? ABC/NBC
• Radiological Weapons (RW)
• ? BCRN

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• 1. DEFINITIONS (contd)
• A) Nuclear Weapons
• Device with explosive energy, derived mainly
  from
• - fission (splitting the nucleus of an atom,
  usually highly enriched uranium or plutonium,
  releasing energy and additional neutrons that
  bombard nuclei and sustain a chain reaction), or
• - a combination of fission and fusion processes
  (a fission explosion creates the high
  temperatures necessary to join light isotopes of
  hydrogen, usually deuterium and tritium, which
  similarly liberate energy and neutrons),
• Causing catastrophic damage due to high
  temperatures and ground shocks produced by the
  initial blast and the lasting residual radiation.
• Fission bombs (Hiroshima-Nagasaki) are the
  easiest to make and provide the catalyst for more
  complex thermonuclear explosions. Most modern
  nuclear weapons use a combination of the two
  processes, called boosting, to maintain high
  yields in smaller bombs.

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• 1. DEFINITIONS (Contd)
• B) Bacteriological/Biological Weapons
• Intentional dissemination of infectious diseases
  and conditions that would otherwise appear only
  naturally or not at all,
• Using as agents
• - bacteria (such as anthrax),
• - viruses (such as smallpox),
• - rickettsiae (such as Q fever),
• - chlamydia,
• - fungi,
• - and toxins (such as ricin).
• Using as criteria infectivity, virulence,
  toxicity, pathogenicity, incubation period,
  transmissibility, lethality, and stability.
• Using natural replication of living organisms
  after dissemination to increase potential impact.
  Any country possessing a pharmaceutical or food
  storage infrastructure already has an inherent
  stabilization and storage system for biological
  agents. Aerosol delivery is optimal, while
  explosive delivery is also effective, but to a
  lesser extent owing to the possibility for
  organism inactivation because of heat from the
  blast.

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• 1. DEFINITIONS (Contd)
• C) Chemical Weapons
• use toxic properties, not explosive properties,
  of chemical substances to produce physical or
  physiological effects on an enemy
• use as agents
• - chlorine and phosgene (World War I) to cause
  respiratory damage and asphyxiation,
• - blistering agents as mustard gas and lewisite
  (IranIraq War), to cause painful burns and
  resource-debilitating casualties,
• - nerve gases, or anti-cholinesterase agents to
  cause a loss of muscle control, respiratory
  failure, and eventually death effective when
  inhaled or absorbed through the skin classified
  as
• G-agents (sarin),
• V-agents (VX),
• - mental and physical incapacitants (such as BZ)
• - binary systems (toxic when mixed)
• delivered through bombs, rockets, artillery
  shells, spray tanks, and missile warheads, using
  an explosion to expel an internal agent
  laterally.

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• 1. DEFINITIONS (Contd)
• D) Radiological Weapons
• Use conventional explosives such as dynamite and
  C4 to disperse radioactive materials (pellets,
  powder or gas) over large areas
• Apart from explosion, victims would receive
  life-threatening levels of radiation exposure
  radiation would make rescue operations difficult
  and contaminate large areas for years
• A source of radioactive material, such as a
  nuclear reactor or spent-fuel storage depots,
  could be targeted with large explosive devices to
  disperse very high levels of radioactivity into
  the atmosphere and the surrounding area.

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
• A - International Agreements
• B Export Control Regimes
• C Other Initiatives

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
• A) International Agreements
• Nuclear Weapons
• Bilateral Treaties
• USA-USSR/RF 1972 ABM, 1972 SALT-I, 1974 TTBT,
  1976 PNET, 1979 SALT-II, 1987 INF, 1991 START-I,
  1992 Agreement on Destruction Non-Proliferation
  of NW, 1993 START II, 1997-98 START-III, 2002
  SORT.
• India-Pakistan 1999 Lahore Declaration and MOU
  2004 Talks (moratorium on nuclear tests prior
  notification of flight tests non-deployment of
  nuclear capable ballistic missiles moratorium on
  ABM systems, CBMs discussion on nuclear
  doctrines).
• Brazil-Argentine 1980 Agreement on the Peaceful
  Use of Nuclear Energy, 1985 Joint Declarations on
  Nuclear Policy, 1990 Declaration on Common
  Nuclear Policy, 1991 Agreement on the Exclusively
  Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, 1991 Agreement
  with IAEA.

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A)
  International Agreements/
• a) Nuclear Weapons (Contd)
• Multilateral Treaties
• 1959 (EIF 1961) Antarctic Treaty bans any
  military activity, incl. nuclear tests. 45
  ratifications.
• 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty bans all nuclear
  tests except underground and assistance to other
  states testing. 124 ratifications.
• 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans placing any WMD in
  earth orbit, stationing WMD in OS or on any
  celestial body. 98 ratifications.
• 1968 (EIF 1970) Treaty on Nuclear
  Non-Proliferation (NPT) states having tested NW
  before 1967 agree not to transfer them, to
  cooperate with all on peaceful uses of nuclear
  energy, and negotiate on nuclear disarmament
  states without NW agree not to acquire them and
  conclude safeguards agreement with IAEA. 189
  ratifications (not India, Pakistan, Israel).
• 1971 (EIF 1972) Seabed Treaty bans deployment
  and testing of any WMD on the seabed ocean
  floor beyond territorial waters. 92
  ratifications.
• 1979 (EIF 1984) Moon Treaty bans positioning of
  WMD on Moon, its orbit and other celestial
  bodies. 11 ratifications.
• 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans
  all nuclear tests. Verification regime (CTBTO).
  120 ratifications (not USA, China, India,
  Pakistan, Israel, Iran, required for EIF).

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A)
  International Agreements/
• a) Nuclear Weapons (Contd)
• Regional Agreements (Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones)
• 1967 Tlatelolco (Latin America) 33 ratifications
  5 NWS Party to Protocols
• 1985 (EIF 1986) Rarotonga (Pacific) 13
  ratifications 4 NWS Party to Protocols (US not
  ratified)
• 1995 (EIF 1997) Bangkok (South East Asia) 10
  ratifications. No Protocols.
• 1996 Pelindaba (Africa) 19 ratifications (28
  required for EIF) 3 NWS Party to Protocols (USA
  Russia not ratified).
• 2002 Central Asia not yet signed, awaiting NWS
  endorsement.

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A)
  International Agreements (Contd)
• b) Bacteriological/Biological Weapons
• 1925 (EIF 1928) Geneva Protocol bans the use in
  war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases
  and bacteriological methods of warfare. Not
  prohibited use in internal conflicts, threat of
  use, production, RD 133 ratifications with many
  reservations (not applicable if other states
  breach).
• 1972 (EIF 1975) BW Convention bans development,
  production, stockpiling, acquisition transfer
  of microbial or other biological agents or toxins
  and weapons for use of such agents toxins for
  hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
  Destruction of existing stockpiles. Applies only
  to types and quantities not justified for
  peaceful purposes. No verification provisions.
  152 ratifications. CBMs agreed. Verification
  Protocol negotiated but rejected by USA in 2001.

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
• A) International Agreements (Contd)
• c) Chemical Weapons
• 1925 (EIF 1928) Geneva Protocol bans the use in
  war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases
  and bacteriological methods of warfare. Not
  prohibited use in internal conflicts, threat of
  use, production, RD 133 ratifications with many
  reservations (not applicable if other states
  breach).
• 1990 USA/USSR Agreement on CW stopping of
  production, reduction of stockpiles (500 t
  allowed), cooperation in destruction, support for
  a multilateral ban.
• 1993 (EIF 1997) Paris Convention on CWC bans
  development, production, stockpiling,
  acquisition, use transfer of toxic chemicals
  precursors for non-peaceful purposes as well as
  any equipment for such activities. Destruction of
  stockpiles facilities. Intrusive verification
  system (OPCW). Cooperation for peaceful uses. 167
  ratifications.

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A)
  International Agreements (Contd)
• d) Radiological Weapons
• 1988 India-Pakistan Agreement on Prohibition of
  Attack against Nuclear Installations and
  Facilities.
• 1979-1990 Unsuccessful Negotiations at the
  Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a Treaty
  banning the spread of radioactive materials other
  than from a nuclear explosion, for hostile
  purposes.

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME (Contd)
• B) Export Control Regimes
• a) Nuclear Weapons
• The Zangger (or NPT Exporters) Committee
  created 1971 (WestWP)gt 1974 Guidelines
  (trigger-lists of equipments requiring IAEA
  safeguards). 35 members (incl. Russia, China).
• The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 1974 London
  Club (incl. France)gt 1976 London Guidelines for
  Nuclear Transfers (inc. technology). Revised 1992
  to include dual-use transfers requiring
  full-scope safeguards. Restraint of export of
  sensitive technologies (uranium enrichment,
  plutonium reprocessing, heavy water production).
  Requirement of physical security. No re-transfer.
  National enforcement consultations. 44 members
  (incl. Russia, China).
• The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
  Conventional Arms Dual-Use Goods and
  Technologies created 1996 to replace COCOM.
  Guidelines, information exchanges on countries
  of concern. 33 members (NATO Russia,
  Argentine, S. Korea).

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
• B) Export Control Regimes (Contd)
• b) Chemical Weapons
• The Australia Group created 1984 to regulate
  export of 8 dual-use chemical precursors 1991
  Warning List includes 54 materials (chemicals,
  pathogens and toxins, dual-use equipment), shared
  with industry and scientific community.
  Coordination of national export controls and
  information sharing on suspicious activities. 38
  States members EU Commission.

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
• B) Export Control Regimes (Contd)
• c) Biological Weapons
• The Australia Group (AG) 1991 Warning List
  includes 54 materials (chemicals, pathogens and
  toxins, dual-use equipment), shared with industry
  and scientific community. Coordination of
  national export controls and information sharing
  on suspicious activities. 38 States members EU.
  

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
• B) Export Control Regimes (Contd)
• d) Missiles
• The Missile Technology Control Regime created
  1987 (G7) gt Guidelines for Sensitive
  Missile-Relevant Transfers export of equipment
  technology of systems capable of delivering NW
  (300km-range, 500kg-payload) 1992 extended to BW
  CW whatever range payload. Cat. I denial
  Cat. II case-by-case. Lists of projects of
  concern. Denial by one member reinforced by
  others (no undercut rule). 33 members (incl.
  NATO former WP) unilateral adherents (incl.
  Israel, China?).
• The International Code of Conduct (ICOC) or The
  Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) adopted 2002.
  Politically-binding document for restraint in
  development, testing, use and spread of ballistic
  missiles. Increases transparency and introduces
  confidence-building measures (annual reporting on
  missile programmes, notification of ballistic
  missile and space launches). 111 subscribers (not
  China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, N.Korea).

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• 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
• C) Other Initiatives
• UN Security Council 1992 Declaration
  (Proliferation of WMD is a threat to intl peace
  security). 2004 Resolution 1540 (terrorist
  risk, strengthening of national legislation,
  cooperation).
• The Global Control System (GCS) 2000 Russian
  initiative (transparency of missile launches,
  incentives for renouncing ICBMs and access to
  SLVs). 71 participants (incl. N.Korea). No
  meeting since 2001.
• The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) US
  initiative before 2003 G8 Evian Summit, joined by
  11 members, supported by some 60. Aims at
  deterring shipments of WMD-related and dual-use
  equipment or materials to countries and non-state
  actors of proliferation concern. Sept. 2003 Paris
  Principles of Interdiction, in conformity with
  intl law. Exchange of information, joint
  exercises. Several shipments intercepted (to
  Libya, N.Korea).
• EU3 (D-F-UK)/Iran negotiations on the Iranian
  nuclear program.

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• 3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS
• Nuclear Weapons
• 5 official NWS according to NPT (estimates)

Country Strategic Weapons Non-Strategic Weapons Total Weapons
United Kingdom 180 5 185
France 350 350
China 250 120 400
United States 8,646 2,010 10,656
Russia 6,000 4,000 10,000
TOTAL 21,591
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• 3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS
• Nuclear Weapons (Contd)
• 4 non-official NWS according to NPT
  (estimates)

Country Strategic Weapons Non-Strategic Weapons Total Weapons
North Korea 3-5 ? 3-5
India 60 ? 60
Pakistan 28-48 ? 28-48
Israel 100-200 ? 100-200
TOTAL 291-313
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• 3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS (Contd) B)
  Biological Weapons

Country Program Party to BWC
Algeria Research effort, but no evidence of production No
China Likely maintains offensive program Yes
Cuba Probable Research Program Yes
Egypt Likely maintains offensive program No
India Research program but no evidence of production Yes
Iran Likely maintains offensive program Yes
Israel Research with possible production of agents No
N. Korea Research with possible production of agents Yes
Pakistan Possible Yes
Russia Research, some work beyond legitimate defence activities likely Yes
Sudan Possible research program No
Syria Research, with possible production of agents No
Taiwan Possible research program Yes
Vietnam Possible research program Yes
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• 3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS (Contd)
• C) Chemical Weapons
• As of 2004, there were 167 member states of the
  OPCW of which
• 6 declared stockpiles the United States, Russia,
  India, Albania, Libya, and one (not made public)
  State Party", possibly South Korea.
• Iraq's chemical weapons were destroyed under a UN
  program.
• 12 declared chemical weapons production
  facilities (Bosnia and Herzegovina, China,
  France, India, Iran, Japan, Libya, Russia, Serbia
  and Montenegro, United Kingdom, United States and
  possibly South Korea). By the end of 2004, 47 of
  64 declared facilities had been destroyed or
  converted to civilian uses.
• The total world declared stockpile of chemical
  weapons was about 61,325 tons in 2004. At total
  of 71,373 tons have been declared to OPCW of
  which about 10,048 tons had been destroyed.
• Several countries not members are suspected of
  having chemical weapons, (Israel, Egypt, Syria,
  North Korea) or programs (Pakistan, Myanmar,
  Taiwan, Vietnam).
• Some member states (including Sudan and China)
  have been accused of failing to disclose their
  stockpiles or are suspected of conducting
  programs (Algeria, Cuba, Ethiopia).

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  All declared chemical weapons production capacity has been inactivated. Two-thirds of the declared chemical weapons production facilities have been either verifiably destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes. The remainder of the facilities await their destruction or conversion. 164 Member States, representing more than 95 percent of the global population, have joined the OPCW. All declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been inventoried and verified. Almost 25 percent of the declared 8 million chemical weapons, in the form of munitions, have been verifiably destroyed. Over 13 of the 70,000 metric tonnes of declared chemical weapons agent have been verifiably destroyed. More than 1,800 inspections have been conducted at military and industrial sites of 65 State Parties. Over 4,000 industrial facilities are inspectable worldwide

• .

 
 
    

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• 3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS (Contd)
• C) Missiles

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Country Nuclear Biological Chemical
Russia W W W
United States W   W
China W W W
Israel W W W
France W    
United Kingdom W    
India W R W
Pakistan W R R
North Korea W? W W
Iran R W W
Egypt   W W
Syria   R W
Libya   R W
Sudan   R R
W Weapons or agents (known or suspected) R
Research program (known or suspected)
Awaiting destruction
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• 4. THE TERRORIST RISK
• Nuclear Weapons
• Low likelihood of use of nuclear explosive device
  by terrorist group (uneasy to obtain, divert or
  manufacture, expensive, uneasy to deliver, easy
  to detect). But even low risk could lead to
  massive casualties and damage.
• More probable use of radioactive materials
  (radiological weapon) or attack on nuclear
  facility. Even if casualties and damage limited,
  high risk of terror, panic, disruption of
  economic life.

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• Nuclear Materials Trafficking
• IAEA Data Base (since 1 Jan. 1993)
• 182 incidents involving nuclear material,
• 335 incidents involving other radioactive
  material

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• 4. THE TERRORIST RISK (Contd)
• B) Biological Weapons
• Terrorist attempts to acquire biological agents
  have fallen short of successful weaponization.
• Only two significant biological attacks by
  terrorists
• Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo tried to
  produce and weaponize botulinum toxin and
  anthrax. The groups extensive efforts failed,
  and the cult resorted to using the chemical agent
  sarin for attacks in a Tokyo subway in 1994 and
  1995.
• First successful terrorist incident in 1984 in
  Dalles, Oregon, when a religious cult, Rajneesh,
  disseminated salmonella bacteria in ten
  restaurants, infecting 750 people, but with no
  fatalities.
• In October 2001, letters containing anthrax sent
  to members of US Congress and the media, which
  killed 5 and infected 18 others. This limited
  attack caused mass disruption and cost billions
  of dollars in decontamination and prevention
  expenses.

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• 4. THE TERRORIST RISK (Contd)
• C) Chemical Weapons
• Five levels of risk for terrorist use
• Threatened use, with no real capability (many
  cases of hoaxes)
• Unsuccessful attempts to acquire CW (1970s
  Weathermen, Animal Liberation Front, Neo-Nazi
  groups)
• Actual possession of CW (1980s Covenant, Sword,
  and Arm of the Lord group, various Palestinian
  groups)
• Unsuccessful attempts to use CW (Ricin found in
  London?)
• The successful use of CW (1990s Aum Shinrikyo
  sarin attacks in Tokyo)
• Advantages
• Inexpensive
• Easy availability
• Long shelf life
• High level of control and containment
• Effect (death or disability) is immediate
• Destroys infrastructure
• Low risk of detection
• Lack of a signature allows anonymity

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4. THE TERRORIST RISK (Contd) Required
quantities for lethal effect Weapon
Grams Aerial explosives 320
million Fragmentation cluster bombs 32
million Hydrocyanic acid 32 million Mustard
gas 3.2 million Sarin nerve gas
800,000 Radiological weapon 5,000 Type A
botulinal toxin 80 Anthrax
spores 8 Attack on a water
supply Potassium cyanide 18,000 Nerve
agent VX 100 Typhoid culture
1
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• 5. CURRENT TRENDS
• A) Nuclear Proliferation
• Less opposition West/Third World 1992 UNSC
  Declaration Resolution 1540 gt legitimacy of
  non-proliferation.
• Decline in arsenals of NWS (end to vertical
  proliferation?). Issue of qualitative
  developments (US mini-nuke) and fragility of
  testing moratoria without CTBT.
• Risks related to regional conflicts (Middle East,
  South Asia, Korean Peninsula) gt incentive for
  renewed efforts to address them.
• Risks related to non-state actors (nuclear
  trafficking) and commercial/criminal networks
  (Abdul Kadeer Khan)

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• 5. CURRENT TRENDS
• B) Biological Proliferation
• Difficult to get complete picture of countries or
  groups with biological weapons or programs.
  Official assessments rarely distinguish between
  suspected, capability, developing, and weapon.
  States with such capabilities or programs often
  lumped together in lists with countries with CW
  programs or capabilities.
• Attempts to negotiate intrusive verification
  protocol to the BWC failed (US does not deem it
  effective, protects biotech industry) gt
  voluntary transparency cooperation measures,
  CBMs stricter export control regime may raise
  cost of proliferation but not totally prevent it.

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• 5. CURRENT TRENDS
• C) Chemical Proliferation
• OPCW is efficient but
• destruction deadlines (2007) will not be met
  (Russia),
• challenge inspections not used yet risk of
  loosing legitimacy.
• Still programs of concern
• by OPCW members (Iran, India, China, Sudan,
  Pakistan)
• by non-OPCW members (North Korea, Israel, Syria,
  Egypt)
• Russia issue of novichoks (circumvention of
  CWC?)

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• 5. CURRENT TRENDS
• D) Missile Proliferation
• Decreasing ICBM (gt5,500 km-range) arsenals 1987
  USSR 9,378 warheads on 2,380 ICBMs gt 2002
  Russia 5,000 warheads on 1,022 missiles (- 57
  percent less missiles capable of striking
  continental USA).
• IRBM (3,000-5,500km-range) arsenals largely
  eliminated INF Treaty scrapped from US-Russian
  arsenals. France deactivated and destroyed its 18
  land-based and 32 submarine-based IRBMs, while
  China retains some 20 IRBMs. If North Korea
  launched its Taepo Dong II, it would add a few
  missiles to this category.
• More MRBM (1,000-3,000 km-range) programs also
  eliminated for US RF (INF). But China has
  80100 MRBMs. North Korea tested its Taepo Dong I
  (1,320-km) and deployed No Dong (1,300-km ). Iran
  tested Shahab III (1,300-km). Israel deployed 50
  Jericho II (1,500-km). India produces Agni II
  (2,000-km) and works on Agni III (3,500-km).
  Pakistan tested Ghauri (1,300-km) and Ghauri II
  (2,000-km).
• Aging SCUD inventories short-range Scuds from
  USSR in decline. North Korea now primary supplier
  of Scud-type missiles.
• Fewer, poorer programs number of countries
  developing long-range ballistic missiles reduced.
  Also smaller, poorer, and less technologically
  advanced countries.
• US Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence controversial,
  expensive, probably ineffective, risk of pushing
  China to develop ICBMs quantitatively
  qualitatively.
• Proliferation of MANPADs (man-portable air
  defence systems) threat to civil aviation from
  non-state actors.

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Reported non-state use of MANPADs 1999-2001 Reported non-state use of MANPADs 1999-2001 Reported non-state use of MANPADs 1999-2001 Reported non-state use of MANPADs 1999-2001 Reported non-state use of MANPADs 1999-2001 Reported non-state use of MANPADs 1999-2001
Date Non-State Group Missile Type Killed/Injured Aircraft Notes
23 Oct 00 LTTE Stinger 4/0 Mi-24 'Hind' Shot down (Trincomalee).
04 Oct 00 Chechen rebels Stinger 1/0 Su-24MR Shot down (Urus-Martan)
04 Oct 00 Chechen rebels Stinger Unknown Su-25 Shot down on reconnaissance
10 Aug 00 LTTE Unknown 0/0 Fighter aircraft Govt aircraft fired at. No damage.
25-30 Aug 00 Chechen rebels SA-7 0/0 Unreported Federal helicopters fired on. All missiles miss.
07 May 00 Chechen rebels Unknown 2/0 Su-24MR Shot down (Southern Chechnya)
31 Mar 00 LTTE Unknown 40/0 An-26 Transport craft downed
10 Nov 99 FARC Unreported 5/0 DC-3 FARC mistakenly downs civilian craft
04 Apr 99 Hizbullah SA-7 0/0 F-16s 2 missiles fired on IsraelF-16s. Both miss.
06 Mar 99 PKK Unknown 20/0 Puma helicopter Helicopter shot down (Southern Turkey)
02 Jan 99 UNITA Unknown 14/0 C-130 UN plane shot down (Central Angola)

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• 7. SOURCES
• John Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking
  Weapons of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment
  for International Peace, 2002
• Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control, A Guide to
  Negotiations and Agreements, Peace Research
  Institute, Oslo, 2001
• www.opcw.org
• www.iaea.org
• http//www.cdi.org/nuclear/database/nukestab.html
  
• http//www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agni.asp
• http//www.bioterrorism.slu.edu/bt/products/ahec_c
  hem/ppt/17
• http//www.janes.com/security/international_securi
  ty/news/jir021128_1_n.shtml

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• 6. ACRONYMS
• ABC Atomic, Biological, Chemical
• ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
• BCRN Biological Chemical Radiological Nuclear
  (Defence)
• BW Biological Weapon
• BWC Biological Weapons Convention
• CBM Confidence-Building Measure
• CD Conference on Disarmament
• COCOM Coordination Committee
• CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
• CTBTO Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation
• CW Chemical Weapon
• CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
• EIF Entry into Force
• EU European Union
• GCS Global Control System
• HCOC The Hague Code of Conduct
• HEU Highly Enriched Uranium

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• 6. ACRONYMS (Contd)
• MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defence System
• MOU Memorandum of Understanding
• MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
• MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
• NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
• NBC Nuclear, Biological Chemical
• NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
• NW Nuclear Weapon
• NWS Nuclear Weapon State
• OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of
  Chemical Weapons
• OS Outer Space
• PNET Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty
• PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
• RF Russian Federation
• SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
• SLV Space Launch Vehicle

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