PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE SECURITY ASSESSING the Sit

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PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE SECURITYASSESSING the
Sit EXPLORING THE OPTIONS

• Kiran NAIR
• Centre for Airpower Studies
• New Delhi

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SCOPE

• Confine to the present foreseeable future.
• Inclusive of
• ? Prevailing Military Dynamics.
• ? Prevailing Legislative Dynamics.
• ? Prevailing Civil Commercial Dynamics.
• ? Prevailing Environmental Dynamics.
• Wider Perspective - Common rather than collective
  space security.

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Common ? Collective

• Original Wilsonian concept of Collective
  Security concept not likely to apply in space.
• Normal Interpretation Connotates coalition of
  states or groups for securing interests.
• ? OS accptd as common heritage, comn area
  beyond state jursdcn less suited to indvdual or
  collective interests more to common.
• ?Common utility dependency on space rising.
  States, individuals, industry etc incrsngly
  depend on space. Widen concept to incld variety
  of common intrst concerns of present times.
• ? Conditions mature for co-op transition to seek
  solutions to common problems secure common
  rather than competing intrsts. Eg Space debris.

Nonetheless, core ( tougher) issue is Space
Security. Semantic noise secondary ( easier)
issue. Finally, goal which approaches offer
the most productive path towards achieving a
space environment free of threats to all peaceful
uses of space
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Space Security

• Defined as secure and sustainable access to and
  use of space and freedom from space based
  threats. Space Security 2003
• Confine myself largely to secure sustainable
  use of space measures possible for freedom from
  space based threats.
• Explore the determinants of insecurity in space.

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Prevailing Military Dynamics

• Unlike CW era, greater no. of nations draw
  military capabilities from satellites.
• Visions of Force Application wpns in space.
• Concerns over Counter Space Ops leading to
  weaponisation of space.
• Concerns over emerging technologies of BMD,
  consequent shooting galleries in space etc.
• BLUF Not much headway in reducing concerns on
  account of the above.
• Mil dynamics related to national dynamics and
  individual perceptions of self defence etc.
  Little common ground.

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Prevailing Legislative Dynamics

• Semantic noise on terms like peaceful uses,
  weapons, delimitation of outer space etc.
• Legal lacunae in OST other legsltion being
  targeted for fulfilling indvdl self-interests.
• Negotiations on legal instrument for banning
  weapons in space at CD deadlocked since 1998.
• In brief, prevailing legislation widely perceived
  to be inadequate in need of change. For eg, OST
  bans only nuclear WMD, hence KEASAT tests etc,
  etc.
• Fairly well known.

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Other Significant Dynamics

• More ( diverse) stake holders in space today.
  Greater inter-relation complexity. Eg no clear
  demarcation of mil, civil or cmrcl use sats.
• Increasing debris in space.
• Traffic congestion in space.
• Conflicts over distribution of space resources.
• Legislation based on Cold War era focus largely
  on regulating military affairs of states.
• As opposed to the above

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An Unconventional View

• FA Wpns No wpns after 05 decades too ambitious
  in next 05 years.
• CS Wpns No sys with known oprnl utility. At
  least nothing akin to aircraft within 1st two
  decades of air flight.
• No sats destroyed in warfare till date, though
  capabilities did exist.
• ASAT tests great source of concern, but on a
  comparative scale
• ? No of ASAT tests during Cold War average less
  than 2/yr as opposed to 01nuclear test/week in
  same time frame.
• ? Last ASAT test in 1985. Jan 11, 2007 ???
• No known cases of mil interference in sat ops as
  opposed to over 1,374 reported incidents (till
  2005) in civil commercial arena.

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• Mil msns most useful suited to space already
  there Sats for info/FE no shared global desire
  for their elimination.
• Mil dynamics, areas of intense national interst,
  less common vulnerabilities, less scop
• Concerns OK, focus since last 05 decades yielding
  no great results. CD deadlock since almost
  decade, do we continue?
• Continue, meanwhile Focus also
• ? On areas of reduced national allegiance.
• ? Areas of common insecurity.

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• Areas which include not only state but also
  non-state entities like commercial firms,
  industry, insurance coys, individuals etc.
• Areas more amenable to equitable security by
  mutual agreement negotiation.
• Areas where insecurities need to be addressed
  emergently have greater scope of redress.
• Areas where demonstrated progress would trigger
  scope for opening deadlock in other areas.
• Areas less visible and well known but with potent
  for equally disastrous consequences.

IN PRESENT ERA, INCREASED FOCUS ON THESE AREAS
DOESNT NECESSARILY IMPLY REDUCED FOCUS ON
CONVENTIONAL ASPECTS BCOS MORE STAKEHOLDERS,
MORE POSSIBILITY OF DSTBN OF LABOUR UNLIKE IN CW
ERA.
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Areas

• To begin with, in near term, focus also on
  workable near-term space security options for
• ? Debris mitigation.
• ? Equitable space resource allocation.
• ? Traffic management.
• ? Common security measures (share RD,
  Technology) against natural threats like
  asteroids, solar activity etc.
• ? Regulate non-state activities.
• ? Reinforce (not review) the OST other
  legislation for greater common security in space.
• Some measures underway in some areas but grossly
  insufficient.

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Whats in it for Asia?

• The same as for all much more.
• ? Asian continent most disaster prone.
• ? Great scope for human development
• 60 of human popln,10/20 most populous
  countries, 02 worlds largest populaces.
• ? Rising economies lo cost ? hi commercial gain.
• energy dependent He reserves of Moon.
• ? Earth resource detection distribution.
• Imperative to explore solutions for Secure
  sustainable use of space measures possible for
  freedom from space based threats.

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• In the end, the roots of mans security does
  not lie in his weaponry. It lies in his mind.
• Robert McNamara
• US Secy of Defence
• 1967.

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Some examples of close encounters/collisions in
orbit
Satellite name Date of collision/close encounter Damage Safety measure
US Fltsatcom-1 3 May 1980 Predicted distance from DSP-F4 9.4km and reduced to 3.5km a few day later Fltsatcom-1 performed evasive manouvre
US Fltsatcom-1 During 2nd half of 1981 Eight close encounters with US SBS-1 satellite, five between 2.6km and 6km and five encounters with four other satellites Collision avoidance manoeuvres performed
Cerise, a French military micro-satellite July 1996 Stabilisation boom damaged by debris from Ariane booster Regained attitude control by reprogramming the payload
CRISTA-SPAS-a communications satellite 12 August 1997 Passed very close (3.1km) to an old rocket motor from 1984 Shuttle Failed to reach the GSO
Russian Mir station 15 September 1997 US satellite MSTI-2 passed close (500m) Mir not manoeuvred
Russian Mir station 28 July 1999 Close encounter with a rocket body Mir not manoeuvred
Several Shuttle missions STS-44, -48, -53, -72, -82 In each at least five manoeuvres were carried out
International Space Station (ISS) 26 October 1999 Altitude raised to avoid close encounter with a satellite rocket
ISS 28 March 2002 Passed within 14km of a Delta 2 rocket ISS manoeuvred to avoid collision
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Orbital Debris Created by the Breakup of a 10-ton
Satellite
Debris
Proportion Of Break-ups in Orbit
1mm to 1cm 1cm to 10cm gt 10 cm
Total debris in LEO as on Dec06 140 million 180,000 9,700
Debris From B-up of 10 Ton Sat 14 million 250,000 5,000