The Nature of Systematicity in Natural Language - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 39
About This Presentation
Title:

The Nature of Systematicity in Natural Language

Description:

Title: Embodied OT Author: Blutner Last modified by: Jennifer Created Date: 11/22/2003 4:54:27 PM Document presentation format: Bildschirmpr sentation – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:58
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 40
Provided by: Blutner
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: The Nature of Systematicity in Natural Language


1
The Nature of Systematicity in Natural Language

2
Systematicity
  • Introduced in Fodor Pylyshyn (1988)
  • A feature of cognition, inferential coherence
  • The ability to produce/understand some
    sentences is intrinsically connected to the
    ability to produce/understand certain others.
    (p. 37)
  • Fodor Pylyshyn give no clear definition (see
    van Gelder) and only two examples

3
The operationalization of systematicity
  • When an agent understands the sentence Peter
    likes Maria, she understands the sentence Maria
    likes Peter as well.
  • When an agent understands the expressions brown
    triangle and black square, she understands the
    expressions brown square and black triangle as
    well.

4
Outline
  • What is systematicity?
  • and to what degree is our understanding
    systematic
  • Does compositionality entail systematicity?
  • No, because
  • context-dependence of meaning
  • intrusion of encyclopedic knowledge on language
    understanding
  • What are appropriate models of natural language
    understanding if systematicity is taken into
    account ?

5
Is our understanding systematic ?
  1. Do all who understand good writer and bad teacher
    also understand bad writer and good teacher?
  2. Do all who understand within an hour and without
    a watch also understand within a watch and
    without an hour? (Szabó 2004).
  3. Does a child who understands Mom drives me to
    kindergarten also understand I drive mom to
    kindergarten ?

6
Understanding not Systematic
  • Language understanding is not completely
    systematic.
  • This is because the world is not entirely
    systematic
  • A. Clark (1996) Instead of treating
    systematicity as a property to be directly
    induced by a canny choice of basic architecture,
    it may be fruitful to try to treat it as
    intrinsic to the knowledge we want a system to
    acquire.
  • A good model of language
  • explains the systematic patterns of our language
    understanding
  • gives an account of when and why we find patterns
    that are not really predictable.

7
Does compositionality entail systematicity?
  • Compositionality The meaning of a compound
    expression is determined by the meanings of its
    constituents and the syntactic way these
    constituents are combined.
  • Systematicity there are predictable patterns
    among the sentences we understand.

8
The present position
  • Compositionality does not entail systematicity
  • Systematicity is possible without compositionality

9
How to derive systematicity?
  • Fodor Pylyshyn
  • in the presented case the systematicity of
    linguistic competence derives from the fact that
    the syntactic operation of modification relates
    to the semantic operation of conjunction (or
    intersection)

10
Understanding NL Expressions
  • According to the classical view, the phrase
    'understanding natural language expressions'
    means more than just fixing a denotation.
  • We 'understand' a phrase as brown triangle if
  • (i) we are able to grasp the corresponding
    conceptual representation (brown?triangle)
  • (ii) the corresponding conceptual components
    have an known truth functional content
  • (iii) With the help of the involved logical
    operators it is possible to determine the truth
    conditions of the whole phrase under discussion

11
Sytematicity Clauses A sample derivation
  • understanding the expressions brown triangle and
    black square
  • deriving brown?triangle and black?square
  • extracting the lexicon entries brown ? brown,
    black ? black, triangle ? triangle, square ?
    square.
  • calculating the corresponding conceptual
    representations for brown square and black
    triangle brown?square and black?triangle
  • can get the truth-conditional impact of these
    forms
  • we understand the expressions brown square and
    black triangle

12
But does this actually work?
  • This proposal doesnt work for even the simplest
    of adjective-noun combinations
  • Intersection doesnt give you the systematic
    inferences that you would expect or would desire

13
Why compositionality fails to explain
systematicity
14
Context dependence
  • In his Grundlagen der Mathematik Frege (1884)
    noticed the context-dependence of words (and took
    this as a argument against compositionality in
    NL)
  • One should ask for the meaning of a word only
    in the context of a sentence, and not in
    isolation
  • There are compositional models of semantics that
    take context dependence into account
  • We can use the phenomenon of context-dependence
    for construing an argument against deriving
    systematicity from compositionality.

15
What is a white triangle?
  • A

The white triangle
A
The black triangle
From P. Bosch (2002) Explaining semantic
productivity. Paper presented at the Symposium on
Logic and Creativity Integrating Categorial
Rules and Experience, Osnabrück.
16
Context Dependence?
  • Does the proposition expressed by black
    triangle depend on the contrast set?
  • Answer 1 No.
  • The contrast set is relevant only for choosing a
    good/appropriate/optimal referring expression
  • PROBLEM ? Triangle 1 is black and white (in one
    and the same respect)
  • Answer 2 Yes.
  • Context-dependency of utterance meaning is
    widely accepted and also applies here
  • (Kaplans characters Haas-Spohns hidden
    indexicality e.g. in connection with natural
    kind terms like water theories of
    underspecification, e.g. Carstons 2002
    explicatures in relevance theory)

17
What is a red apple?
  • (a) a red apple red peel
  • (b) a sweet apple sweet pulp
  • (c) a reddish grapefruit reddish pulp
  • (d) a white room/ a white house inside/outside

A red apple? No, its a green apple but its red
on the inside
18
More examples
  • Quine (1960) was the first who noted the contrast
    between red apple (red on the outside) and pink
    grapefruit (pink on the inside).
  • In a similar vein, Lahav (1993) argues that an
    adjective such as brown doesnt make a simple and
    fixed contribution to any composite expression in
    which it appears
  • In order for a cow to be brown most of its
    bodys surface should be brown, though not its
    udders, eyes, or internal organs. A brown
    crystal, on the other hand, needs to be brown
    both inside and outside. A brown book is brown if
    its cover, but not necessarily its inner pages,
    are mostly brown, while a newspaper is brown only
    if all its pages are brown. For a potato to be
    brown it needs to be brown only outside, ...
    (Lahav 1993 76).

19
Three consequences
  • Intersectivity, A(B) A(?)?B,
    doesnt hold for most absolute adjectives and
    Fodor Pylyshyn's compositional analysis breaks
    down
  • Systematicity statements cannot be derived from
    compositionality if intersectivity fails
  • Encyclopedic knowledge is required to determine
    the truth conditional content of an utterance
    (explicature in Relevance Theory)
  • When an agent understands the expressions red
    apple (RED PEEL) and sweet grapefruit (SWEET
    PULP), then it's likely that she understands red
    grapefruit (RED PULP) and sweet apple (SWEET
    PULP) as well.

20
The Theoretical Part
21
Approach 1 The underspecification view
  • Radical underspecification augmented with
    contextual enrichment
  • small ? ?x small(x,N) small terrier ? ?x
    small(x,N) terrier(x)
  • Analogously for red apple with place-holders for
    the relevant partsred ? ?x part(Y,x)
    red(Y)red apple ??x part(Y,x) red(Y)
    apple(x)
  • How to determine the proper values for N and Y,
    respectively?
  • with small(x,N) ? size(x) lt N

22
A mechanism of contextual enrichment
  • The variables are specified in a way that
    maximizes the relevance of the corresponding
    question
  • Small Terrier Is a (randomly selected) terrier
    smaller than N?
  • Red Apple What color is part Y (of a randomly
    selected apple)?
  • Probabilistic Theory of Relevance, see
  • Robert van Rooy (2000) Comparing Questions and
    Answers A bit of Logic, a bit of Language, and
    some bits of Information

23
Entropy of a question
  • The semantic value of a question Q is a partition
    q1, ..., qn of the domain O.
  • ? inf(q) -log2 prob(q) information
    measure of surprise
  • ?
    Entropy of a question Q
  • The entropy of a question expresses our
    uncertainty about the answer. Good questions have
    high entropies

24
What is a black triangle?
What color is the inner part? E1 E0
What color is the outer part? E0 E1

25
What is a red apple?
A red apple? What color is an apple? Q1 What
color is its peel? Q2 What color is its
pulp? E(Q1) gtgt E(Q2) Color differences between
apples are expected for the peel and not for the
pulp.
Therefore, the presented apple is considered as a
green apple (inside red) and not as a red apple
(outside green).This can change if we update
our probability distribution.
26
Problems with the underspecification view
  • Requires rather clumsy lexical entries
  • How much of the peel of an apple has to be red in
    order to call it a red peel?
  • This theory does not really clarify how the
    border line between the underspecified
    representation and the contextual enrichment is
    ever to be determined

27
Approach 2 Adnominal functors
  • Take Montague (1970) as its starting-point and
    take adjectives as adnominal functors.
  • red(X) means roughly the property
  • (a) of having a red inner volume if X denotes
    fruits only the inside of which is edible
  • (b) of having a red surface if X denotes fruits
    with edible outside
  • (c) of having a functional part that is red if X
    denotes tools,

28
Montague and systematicity clauses
  • We cannot derive the intended systematicity
    clauses if we realize compositionality via
    adnominal functors!
  • f(a) p, g(b) q
  • f(b) ?, g(a) ?
  • Compositionality is often very simple to realize
    if (higher order) functions are introduced
  • In many cases, this idea realizes generalizations
    to the worst case
  • Unfortunately, we cannot derive interesting
    systematicity clauses from this style of
    compositionality!

29
Constraining the models
  • Additional constraints are required that restrict
    the set of possible models
  • I will assume that these constraints can be
    extracted from a Bayesian picture of the mental
    encyclopedia
  • This is not so different from assuming a system
    of violable constraints (ranked defaults instead
    of inviolable meaning postulates)
  • Systematicity mainly results from these
    additional constraints!

30
Approach 3 Connectionst model of adjectival
modification
  • Overcoming the gap between compositionality and
    systematicity
  • Modeling both the truth-functional aspects of
    adjectival modification and the typicality
    effects (Kamp Partee 1995)
  • Connectionist variant of the selective
    modification model of Smith et al. (1988)
  • It shares with this model the (localist)
    attribute-value representation for the prototypes
    (apple, grapefruit, ) and for the relevant
    instances.
  • From Blutner, Hendriks, de Hoop, Schwartz (to
    appear) When compositionality fails to predict
    systematicity

31
The simplified model
32
Conclusions
  1. Systematicity of natural language understanding
    is intimately related to knowledge about the
    world
  2. Systematicity clauses have to reflect this
    reality
  3. A compositional representational system doesnt
    give you systematicity of understanding because
    context-dependency of lexical meaning and
    world-knowledge both affect understanding

33
Conclusions cont.
  • (4) If lexical principles like intersectivity
    fail (because of context dependency)
    systematicity clauses can no longer be derived
    from compositionality
  • (5) A Bayesian and/or connectionist picture of
    the mental encyclopedia is the key for deriving
    systematicity clauses!
  • (6) The principle of compositionality of meaning
    may be interesting ? not as part of cognitive
    architecture, but as a consequence of
    evolutionary learning (e.g. Kirby).

34
Thank you for your attention

35
... other problems with adjectival modification
  • Typicality effects
  • The problems of typicality don't relate to the
    truth-conditional impact of adjectival
    modification. However, a good model should
    account for both effects the truth-conditional
    peculiarities of adjectival modification and the
    typicality effects.

36
The red hair problem
  • Quine (1960) the different colors typically
    denoted (strong preference) by red in red apple
    and red hair
  • In Japanese, aka-zatoo 'brown sugar' (lit. 'red
    sugar') comes in the same range of colors as
    shira-miso, lit. 'white bean paste
  • the actual color value deviates in a systematic
    way from the prototypical color value that can be
    assigned to the color adjective in isolation in
    dependency on the conceptual properties of the
    modified noun

37
The pet fish problem
  • Goldfish is a poorish example of a fish, and a
    poorish example of a pet, but it's quite a good
    example of a pet fish (the conjunction effect of
    typicality cx(AB) gt cx(B))
  • In case of "incompatible conjunctions" such as
    pet fish, striped apple or brown apple the
    conjunction effect is greater than in "compatible
    conjunctions (red apple).

38
Prototype effects
  • Using Tversky's (1977) contrast rule (formulated
    for activation vectors)
  • sim(s,t) ??i min(si,ti) ? ??i si ?ti
  • sim(sred apple, t1) gt sim(sapple, t1)
  • sim(sbrown apple,t2)?sim(sapple,t2) gt sim(sred
    apple,t1)?sim(sapple,t1)

39
Next steps
  • Extend the model by distinguish different parts
    of the fruits (inside and outside)
  • Since without further learning the model starts
    with a uniform weight matrix, we expect that the
    'neutral' force of modification affects all parts
    uniformly
  • After learning, that the color of the outside of
    fruits is more discriminating than the color of
    its inside, we expect that the learning mechanism
    correctly reproduces the expected sort of
    modification
  • Similarities to Zwarts' (2003) "strongest
    meaning" model which starts with an initial
    default hypothesis which is subsequentially
    modified if more encyclopedic knowledge comes in.
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com