Analysis of the 802.16e 3-way Handshake Protocol - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Analysis of the 802.16e 3-way Handshake Protocol

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Analysis of the 802.16e 3-way Handshake Protocol Vijay Chauhan Srinivas Inguva 802.16 Recap Basic Idea: Metropolitan area wireless broadband service. – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Analysis of the 802.16e 3-way Handshake Protocol


1
Analysis of the 802.16e 3-way Handshake Protocol
  • Vijay Chauhan
  • Srinivas Inguva

2
802.16 Recap
  • Basic Idea Metropolitan area wireless broadband
    service.
  • Main roles involved in 802.16
  • Base Station (BS)
  • Mobile Station (MS) / Subscriber Station (SS)
  • Two security protocols of interest
  • Authentication/Authorization protocol,
    establishes a shared Authorization Key (AK)
  • 3-way Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) Handshake

3
3-way TEK Handshake
  • After authentication, BS initiates a 3-way
    handshake to transfer TEKs to MS
  • TEKs generated by BS
  • Have a specified lifetime, after which new TEK is
    requested by MS
  • Structure of the 3-way handshake
  • Challenge BS ? MS NBS, PN, AKID, HMAC/CMAC
  • Request MS ? BS NBS, NMS, PN, AKID,
    Capabilities, Parameters, Settings, HMAC/CMAC
  • Response BS ? MS NBS, NMS, PN, AKID, SAID,
    E_KEKTEK, Parameters, HMAC/CMAC

4
Project Overview
  • Modelled the 3-way TEK handshake
  • Rational reconstruction of the protocol
  • Modelled a DoS attack in Murphi on a simplified
    version of the handshake
  • Noticed some vulnerabilities in the 802.16e spec
    that could be exploited

5
Modelling the Handshake
  • Assumptions
  • Shared AK securely established
  • Physical layer attacks outside of our scope
  • Dolev-Yao intruder model
  • Used Murphi to build model
  • Started with minimal protocol and added
    fields/invariants e.g. MACs and PNs
  • Goal verify basic security properties

6
Murphi Model of Handshake
  • MS / BS can engage in multiple handshakes
  • Intruders can
  • Intercept/record messages
  • Replay messages
  • Forge messages with known nonces/MACs
  • Security Properties
  • Protocol Completes as expected If MS is done
    then associated BS must also be done and they
    share a TEK
  • Messages not accepted out of order If MS is
    waiting for challenge, BS cannot have finished
    the handshake

7
Simplified 3-way Handshake
  • No packet numbers (PN)
  • Modelled TEK as a nonce (NTEK )
  • CLG BS ? MS NBS, MACNBS
  • REQ MS ? BS NBS, NMS, MACNBS,NMS
  • RES BS ? MS NBS, NMS, NTEK,
    MACNBS,NMS, NTEK
  • As modelled, no attacks found by Murphi

8
DoS Attack on Simplified Handshake
  • Previously recorded challenge can be replayed by
    an attacker
  • Hopes to cause MS to frequently re-key and
    interrupt normal operation
  • How to model this attack?
  • Need to represent the effects of an attack over
    time
  • Scenario we modelled
  • One honest MS / BS pair
  • Expect to engage in one handshake
  • Reflects the common case of a key exchange
    followed by an extended period of operation

9
Representing a DoS Attack in Murphi
  • Used ideas from Meadows(2000)
  • General setup
  • Create a cost set for protocol actions
  • Compute costs of actions in the protocol
  • Determine a threshold cost for an attacker to
    cause a defender to expend more than a given cost
  • Costs tabulated in Murphi rules for MS/BS
  • Thresholds written as Murphi invariants

10
Action Costs
  • Cost Set 1Cheap, 2Medium, 3Expensive
  • Basic honest operations and their costs
  • Generate Nonce 1
  • Generate/Verify MAC 2
  • Encrypt/Decrypt TEK 3
  • Send/Receive 3
  • Basic intruder operations and their costs
  • Store/Lookup 1
  • Send/Receive 3
  • Assemble message 1

11
Message Costs
  • BS ? genNonce, genMAC, send 6
  • ? MS recv, verMAC 5
  • MS ? genNonce, genMAC, send 6
  • ? BS recv, verMAC 5
  • BS ? buildTEK, genMAC, send 8
  • ? MS recv, verMAC, decryptTEK 8
  • Intruder Actions
  • Intercept Message recv, store 4
  • Replay Message lookup, send 4
  • Compose Message assemble, send 4

12
Attack Threshold
  • Murphi invariant used to make assertions about
    Attacker-Defender costs
  • -- If MS is done gt MS costs RecvCLG SendREQ
    RecvRES
  • invariant "If MS is DONE gt costs
    MS_PROTOCOL_COSTS and
  • intCosts gt INT_THRESHOLD"
  • forall i BSId do
  • forall j MSId do
  • (msj.associationsi.session.state
    MS_DONE)
  • -gt
  • (msj.associationsi.session.costs lt
    MS_PROTOCOL_COSTS
  • msj.associationsi.session.intCosts gt
    INT_THRESHOLD)
  • end
  • end

13
Results of DoS Model
  • An attacker can cause a BS/MS to re-engage in a
    3-way handshake
  • Asymmetric attacker/MS costs indicate a DoS
  • Explains the need for a PN
  • After updating our Murphi model to include PNs,
    this attack is no longer seen

14
Potential Vulnerabilities in the 802.16e
specification
  • Before authentication, these security
    capabilities are negotiated in the clear
  • Authentication protocol version number
  • PN window size
  • Spec should explicitly handle these cases, to
    avoid
  • PKM version rollback deprecate PKMv1?
  • Zero PN window size recheck this value after
    authentication, and fail if different?

15
Conclusions
  • 3-way handshake is a well designed protocol
  • Not susceptible to the types of attacks seen in
    802.11i
  • Murphi can be used to model DoS attacks, assuming
    we can
  • Compute protocol action costs
  • Determine attacker cost thresholds
  • Network Protocol Analysis is fun?

16
Questions?
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