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Model Checking One Million Lines of C Code

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Title: PowerPoint Presentation Author: hchen Last modified by: Hao Chen Created Date: 5/11/2001 6:43:58 PM Document presentation format: On-screen Show – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Model Checking One Million Lines of C Code


1
Model Checking One Million Lines of C Code
  • Hao Chen
  • Drew Dean (SRI International)
  • David Wagner
  • with
  • David Schultz, Geoff Morrison, Ben Schwarz
  • Jacob West, Jeremy Lin

2
Outline
  • Overview of MOPS
  • Engineering effortsMake MOPS work on lots of
    real world applications
  • ExperienceSecurity properties and findings

3
MOPS (MOdel checking Programs for Security
properties)
  • A static analysis tool that checks source
    programs for temporal safety properties
  • Main features
  • Pushdown model checking
  • Inter-procedural analysis
  • Control flow centric

4
Algorithm Pushdown Model Checking
  • ? set of security operations
  • e.g. ? seteuid(!0), seteuid(0), execl()
  • B?? sequences of security operations that
    violate the property
  • B is a regular language
  • The user describes B by an FSA
  • T?? sequences of security operationsfrom
    feasible traces in the program
  • T is a context-free language
  • MOPS automatically builds T from the program
  • Question Is B ? T ??

B
T
5
The MOPS Process
Safety Property
FSA
Program OK
Program
CFG
Model Checker
Parser
Error Traces (they may violate the property)
FSA Finite State Automaton CFG Control Flow
Graph
6
Integrate MOPS into the Build Process
  • Goal build a CFG for each target executable in
    the source package
  • Low-level programs
  • mops_cc1 parse each foo.c into foo.cfg
  • mops_ld link all .cfg together
  • How to use these programs to build CFGs for each
    package conveniently?

7
First Attempt Edit Makefile
  • Feasible for packages with simple Makefiles
  • OpenSSH
  • Problems
  • Some Makefiles are automatically generated they
    will be overwritten when the package is rebuilt
  • Too many Makefiles to edit some packages
    generate one Makefile in each sub-directory
  • Some Makefiles are very complicated

8
Second Attempt Interpose on the Build Process to
Generate CFGs
  • Set the env variable GCC_EXEC_PREFIXto let gcc
    use
  • mops_cc1 for cc1
  • mops_ld for ld
  • Therefore
  • Each source file foo.c is parsed into a CFG file
    foo.o
  • Each executable file a.out contains a linked CFG
  • Note that machine code is not generated

9
Second Attempt Advantages and Problems
  • Advantage works even if the build process
  • Moves files into other directories (mv)
  • Renames files (mv)
  • Creates libraries (ar)
  • Problem
  • Sometimes machine code is needed
  • By autoconf to test the functionality of the
    compiler
  • By the build process to generate C header files
  • But we let gcc create CFGs instead of machine code

10
Third AttemptBuild Both Machine Code and CFGs
  • Solution
  • Build both machine code and CFGs. For each
    foo.c, build both foo.o and foo.cfg
  • Problem
  • Machine code and its corresponding CFG may be
    separated if the build process
  • Moves and renames files (mv)
  • Creates and uses libraries (ar)
  • We need to bind machine code with its CFG

11
Final Attempt
  • Place both machine code and its CFG in the same
    object file
  • The ELF object format allows user-defined
    sections
  • For each source file foo.c
  • gccs cc1 generates machine code foo.o
  • mops_cc1 generates CFG foo.cfg
  • Run objcopy to place foo.cfg into foo.o

12
Now, as Easy as This
  • mops m property.mfsa -- gcc foo.c bar.c
  • mops b rpm m property.mfsa -- rh9/.src.rpm

13
Experiment Checking Security Properties on Large
Packages
  • Properties
  • Drop privilege before making unsafe system calls
  • Avoid race condition in file system access
  • Create root-jail safely
  • Create temporary files safely
  • Avoid stderr vulnerability
  • Programs
  • 7 programs, total one millions LOC

14
Property Drop Privilege before Executing
Untrusted Programs
  • Setuid-root programs need to drop root privilege
    before executing untrusted programs
  • exec...(), system(), popen()
  • Otherwise, the untrusted program will run with
    the root privilege

15
Property Avoid Race Condition in File System
Access
  • It is suspicious to make two system calls in a
    program path that use the same filename
  • E.g.
  • access(f) followed by open(f)
  • stat(f) followed by create(f)
  • Vulnerability
  • Symbolic links

16
Property Create root jail securely
  • Rule chroot() must be followed by chdir()
    immediately
  • A vulnerable program
  • The adversary sends in ../../etc/password from
    the network

// cwd/var/ftp chroot(/var/ftp/pub) filename
read_from_network() fd open(filename,
O_RDONLY)
17
Property Avoid Race Condition in Creating
Temporary Files
  • victim.cfilename mktemp(template)fd
    open(filename, )
  • But an adversary can create a file with the same
    name between the two statements
  • Then, victim.c will
  • Open the adversarys file, or
  • Fail to create the temporary file (with the
    O_EXCL flag)

18
Rules for Avoiding Race Condition in Creating
Temporary Files
  • Never use the unsafe functionsmktemp(),
    tmpnam(), tempname(), tmpfile()
  • Never reuse the parameter f in mkstemp(f) in any
    other function call, such as stat(), chmod(), etc
  • Because the same name may refer to a different
    file (tmpwatch)

19
Property Avoid stderr Vulnerability
int main() // fd 0 and 1 are open, but fd 2
is closed f open(/etc/passwd, O_RDWR)
// now /etc/passwd is opened to fd 2
fprintf(stderr, s, user_input) // oops,
have written to /etc/passwd
20
Rule Avoid stderr Vulnerability
  • Property
  • The first three file descriptors should not be
    opened by any file except /dev/null and /dev/zero

21
Property stderr vulnerability
Package LOC Running Time Error Traces Error Traces
Package LOC Running Time Real Bugs Total
Sendmail 221K 13m32s 0 2
Postfix 97K 58.2s 0 2
OpenSSH 58K 3m1s 3 7
Apache 240K 53.0s 2 2
BIND 280K 3m13s 1 1
At 5.1K 7.7s 2 2
Cron 3.7K 5.0s 2 2
22
Property create temporary files safely
Package LOC Running Time Error Traces Error Traces
Package LOC Running Time Real Bugs Total
Sendmail 221K 43.9s 0 0
Postfix 97K 28.8s 0 0
OpenSSH 58K 49.0s 0 1
Apache 240K 47.4s 1 1
BIND 280K 67.3s 1 1
At 5.1K 5.3s 0 0
Cron 3.7K 4.4s 0 0
23
Experiment Build CFGs for All RPM Packages in
Redhat 9.0 Linux
  • Number of packages 840
  • Time 3 days 14 hours on 1.5G Pentium
  • Preliminary results
  • Successful 514 packages
  • Failed 326 packages
  • Reasons for failure
  • Lack of prerequisite RPM packages(the major
    reason)
  • Bugs/limitations in MOPSs parser
  • The package was not written in C

24
Summary
  • Engineering efforts in making MOPS work on lots
    of real world applications
  • Experience in checking security properties on
    large applications
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