SOA-39: Securing Your SOA - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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SOA-39: Securing Your SOA

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SOA-39: Securing Your SOA Mitigating Security Risks of a De-coupled Infrastructure Francois Martel Principal Solution Engineer – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: SOA-39: Securing Your SOA


1
SOA-39 Securing Your SOA
  • Mitigating Security Risks of a De-coupled
    Infrastructure

Francois Martel
Principal Solution Engineer
2
Agenda
  • The Fundamental Shift
  • SOA Security Challenges
  • The Standards
  • The Progress Security Solution

3
SOA Security The Fundamental Shift
In Traditional applications the backend is
dedicated to the application which provides the
security.
Application
4
SOA Security The Fundamental Shift Application
Silo Security
  • Single (simple) security model
  • Security policies apply to the application only
  • Trustworthiness is not an issue
  • Security decisions have local impact only
  • Hard Coding Security Common
  • Security context commonly sent in the clear

5
SOA Security The Fundamental Shift
In SOA the backend is exposed as Services that
are shared across applications.
Service Provider
Application
Service Provider
Application
6
SOA Security The Fundamental ShiftSOA Business
Processes Span Applications
  • Developers cant account for all interactions
  • Cannot hard-code security into applications
  • Security policies must apply to entire processes
  • Sensitive information may not be intended for all
    parties consuming the same service
  • The typical transport protocol is HTTP(S) which
    is open on most firewalls

7
SOA Security Challenges Functional Aspects of
Security
8
SOA Security TRUST Trust in a SOA
  • Traditional
  • There is typically a concept of a trusted
    computing base. The TCB provides mechanisms for
    enforcing security policy that protects resources
    in a controlled environment

9
SOA Security AUTHENTICITY Authenticity
(Authentication) for SOA
  • Traditional Applications
  • No matter how the user authenticates to the
    application, the onus of validating and
    authorizing the user typically falls on the
    application, regardless of what the application
    is using to do the access control
  • SOA
  • Services are accessed on behalf of users. Service
    developers dont know all the different contexts
    in which their services will be used

10
SOA Security INTEGRITY Data Integrity/Confident
iality Strategy for SOA
  • Traditional
  • Transport layer security (SSL/TLS) is used for
    secure communications between points

SSL
  • SOA
  • SSL everywhere is not practical
  • Message data is relayed from service to service
  • Some data is intended for services further down
    the chain
  • Integrity of relayed data is questionable

11
SOA Security CONTROL Control Procedures for SOA
  • Traditional
  • Controls are tightly coupled to applications and
    thus can be managed directly from the application
    itself
  • SOA
  • Need the ability to centrally and consistently
    enforce and audit policy and procedures across
    disparate applications

12
SOA Security INTEROPERABILITY Interoperability
in a SOA
  • Traditional
  • As interoperability between applications was
    itself not guaranteed, interoperability of
    security implementations was traditionally no a
    topic of great interest as most applications
    could handle this on a one-to-one basis
  • SOA
  • Must support multiple security mechanism because
    there is little control over service consumers

13
SOA Security Challenges Summary
  • Authenticity (Access Control)
  • Services are accessed on behalf of users
  • User identity must be propagated
  • The service consumers are not homogeneous
  • Different credentials must be supported
  • Integrity / Privacy
  • Data is relayed from service to service
  • Some data must be passed but should only be
    accessed by specific backend services
  • Encrypt part of the message
  • Some data has to be passed in the clear but its
    origin verified
  • Sign part of the message
  • Controls and Interoperability
  • Harder to manage as the number of applications
    involved in a process increases

14
SOA Security The Standards
  • The new challenges of SOA Security require both
    new technology as well as new standards.
  • Standards help with security interoperability
  • Two standards have been very broadly adopted
  • WS-Security
  • SAML

15
SOA Security Standards to the RescueWS-Security
  • Specifies how integrity and confidentiality can
    be enforced on Web services messaging
  • Describes how to attach signatures and encryption
    headers to SOAP message
  • Helps with interoperability
  • Supports signing/encrypting message fields

16
SOA Security Standards to the RescueWS-Security
- its a protocol, not a toolset
ltwsseSecurity xmlnswsse"..."
xmlnswsu"..."gt ltdsSignature
xmlnsds"http//www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig"gt
ltdsSignedInfogt ltdsReference
URI"body"gtlt/dsReferencegt ltdsReference
URI"keyinfo"gt ltdsTransformsgt
ltdsTransform Algorithm"...STR-Transform"gt
ltwsseTransformationParametersgt ltdsCanonicaliza
tionMethod Algorithm""/gt lt/wsseTransformati
onParametersgt lt/dsTransformgt
lt/dsTransformsgt lt/dsReferencegt
lt/dsSignedInfogt ltdsSignatureValuegtHFLPlt/dsS
ignatureValuegt ltdsKeyInfo Id"keyinfo"gt ltwss
eSecurityTokenReferencegt ltwsseKeyIdentifier
ValueType"X509SubjectKeyIdentifier"gt MIGfMa0
GCSqLKFSJDLSDJ.... lt/wsseKeyIdentifiergt lt/wss
eSecurityTokenReferencegt lt/dsKeyInfogt
lt/dsSignaturegt lt/wsseSecuritygt
17
SOA Security Standards to the RescueSAML
  • Standard for exchanging authentication and
    authorization data between security domains
  • Back end service can verify what user was
    authenticated by the gate keeper
  • Equivalent to Single Sign-On (SSO) for Web
    Services

18
SOA Security Standards to the RescueSAML Its
a protocol, not a toolset
ltsamlAssertion AssertionID" "gt
ltsamlConditions NotBefore"2008-05-06T152313.8
85Z" NotOnOrAfter"2008-05-06T153823.885Z"/gt
ltsamlAttributeStatementgt
ltsamlSubjectgt
ltsamlNameIdentifier Format"
NameQualifier"AI"gttestlt/samlNameIdentifiergt
ltsamlSubjectConfirmationgt
ltsamlConfirmationMethodgturnoas
isnamestcSAML1.0cmsender-voucheslt/samlConfi
rmationMethodgt
lt/samlSubjectConfirmationgt
lt/samlSubjectgt lt/samlAttributeSta
tementgt ltSignature
xmlns"http//www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig"gt
ltSignedInfogt
ltCanonicalizationMethod Algorithm"http//www.w3.o
rg/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n"/gt
ltSignatureMethod Algorithm"http//www.w3.org/2000
/09/xmldsigrsa-sha1"/gt
ltReference URI"Id-3a3c3dd1-debb-9b50-6379-177b18
01e28f"gt ltTransformsgt
ltTransform
Algorithm"http//www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsigenvel
oped-signature"/gt
ltTransform Algorithm"http//www.w3.org/2001/10/xm
l-exc-c14n"/gt
lt/Transformsgt
ltDigestMethod Algorithm"http//www.w3.org/2000/09
/xmldsigsha1"/gt
ltDigestValuegtYQIsRZPBnfEMkehIvuq/WueeGzolt/DigestV
aluegt lt/Referencegt
lt/SignedInfogt
ltSignatureValuegtencoded signaturelt/SignatureValu
egt ltKeyInfogt
ltX509Datagt
ltX509Certificategtencoded public key
certificatelt/X509Certificategt
lt/X509Datagt lt/KeyInfogt
lt/Signaturegt lt/samlAssertiongt
19
SOA Security - Did Standards Save Us?
20
SOA Security Challenge and Opportunity
Separating policies from the service lifecycle
Policy Groups
  • Centralize policy definitions and enforcement
  • No per-service work as policies change

21
SOA Security Challenge and Opportunity
Separating policies from the service lifecycle
22
SOA Security Challenge and Opportunity
  • Security Contracts
  • User Credentials
  • Authentication
  • Authorization
  • Encryption/Signature
  • Schema Validation
  • Applications
  • Managed Service Security Settings
  • Load Balancing
  • Failover
  • Policy Groups
  • Shared Message Processing Blocks

23
SOA Security Challenge and Opportunity
Separating policies from the service lifecycle
First Mile Security
Last Mile Security
Security Proxy
24
Protecting the Last Mile
  • Having a security enforcement point is one thing,
    ensuring all service consumers use it is another.

Service
Authorized consumer
Service
Unauthorized consumer
25
Trust Zones Protect the Last Mile
Last-mileSecurityAttack
CONSUMER
X
Service
Normal Path
INTERNAL CONSUMER
Service
TRUSTZONE
26
Visibility is critical to Security
  • If you cant see it
  • You cant measure it
  • You cant secure it
  • You cant control it
  • You cant manage it

27
Visibility is critical to SOA Security
  • Discover
  • Dynamic service discovery
  • Automatic service delivery flow mapping
  • End-to-end multi-protocol support
  • Service network visualization

Discover ? Monitor ? Evaluate Policy ? Alert ?
Resolve
28
?
Questions
29
Thank You
30
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