THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT REGIME

1

• THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
  REGIME
• by
• Jean du Preez
• Director
• International Organizations and Nonproliferation
  Program
• Center For Nonproliferation Studies
• Monterey Institute of International Studies
• 3 November 2005

2
WHY A NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME?

• Estimated 30 000 nuclear warheads worldwide
• 5 NPT nuclear weapons states (China, France,
  Russia, UK, US)
• 3 de facto nuclear weapons states (India, Israel,
  Pakistan
• North Korea broke out
• Libya, Iran cheated
• Others?

HIROSHIMA August 6, 1945
NAGASAKI August 9, 1945
Fat Man (21Kt)
I have become Death, destoyer of worlds.-Robert
Oppenheimer, quoting the Bhagavad-Gita
Little Boy (15 Kt)
3
WMD DELIVERY SYSTEMS

• Delivery systems capable of delivering nuclear
  weapons
• Ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SRBMs)
• Cruise missiles (airborne, seaborne)
• Gravity bombs
• Rockets, artillery shells, mortars
• UAVs
• Others (trucks, containers, suitcases?)

4
WHAT IS THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME?
5
UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
General Assembly (deliberative)
Security Council
Special sessions on disarmament 1978, 1982 and
1988
Conference on Disarmament (negotiating forum)
Disarmament Commission
First Committee
6
NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES

• NWFZs now cover the entire Southern Hemisphere,
  with more than 100 state parties
• Latin America Caribbean (Tlatelolco) 1st NWFZ
  to affect a major inhabited region (1967), prior
  to the NPT 1962 Cuban missile crisis
• Antarctic
• South Pacific (Rarotonga)
• South East Asia (Bangkok)
• Africa (Pelindaba)
• Mongolia
• Central Asia (?)
• Middle East (?)
• South Asia (?)

7
THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

• Non-treaty based regimes
• EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
• Zangger Committee (1972)
• Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 1974
• Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 1987
• Wassenaar Arrangement 1995
• Australia Group
• OTHER INITIATIVES
• Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missiles
• Proliferation Security Initiative

8
NONPROLIFERATION DISARMAMENT TERMS

• Nuclear Nonproliferation prevention of the
  spread of nuclear weapons
• Horizontal proliferation spread of weapons to
  states not currently possessing nuclear weapons
• Vertical proliferation increase in
  number/destructiveness of nuclear weapons within
  a state already possessing them
• Arms Control Measures to reduce or control
  weapon systems or armed forces.
• Disarmament Total elimination of WMD
• Export control arrangements Agreements to
  restrict sale of sensitive technologies and
  materials to certain countries or to ensure that
  safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to
  the exports
• Safeguards Legal agreements between States and
  the IAEA to verify that a State is not using
  nuclear material or equipment to develop or
  produce nuclear weapons.
• Verification The process of using mechanisms
  such as satellites, seismic monitoring, or
  on-site inspections, to collect data that
  demonstrates a party's compliance with an
  agreement or treaty.

9
NONPROLIFERATION DISARMAMENT TERMS

• International law international rules or norms
  dealing with the relations between two or more
  states
• Treaty Formal agreement between states that
  defines and modifies their mutual duties and
  obligations
• Agreement Formal written agreement between two
  or more parties, or informal agreements among
  states that are often not legally binding
• Protocol A negotiated document supplementary to
  a treaty or agreement
• Adoption Formal act by which the form and
  content of a proposed treaty text are established
  through the expression of the consent of the
  states participating in the treaty-making
  process.
• Signature The signing of a treaty by a senior
  representative of a country which indicates that
  the country accepts the treaty and commits, until
  the country completes its ratification process
• Ratification Implementation of the formal
  process established by a country to legally bind
  its government to a treaty (approval by
  parliament/Senate).
• Accession Act whereby a state accepts the offer
  or the opportunity to become a party to a treaty
  already negotiated and signed by other states.
  Same legal effect as ratification. After the
  treaty has entered into force.
• Deposit written instruments (documents), which
  provide formal evidence of consent to be bound
  placed in the custody of a depository.
  Establishes the consent of a state to be bound by
  the treaty.

10
Nuclear nonproliferation history

• 26 June 1945 UN Charter signed (did not address
  atomic weapons/energy)
• 16 July 1945 US conducts worlds first atomic
  bomb test at Alamogordo, New Mexico
• 6 9 August 1945 US drops atomic bombs Little
  Boy a 15 kiloton HEU gun-type device, and
  Fatman a 21 Kt plutonium device - on
  Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing more than 300,000
• 12 September 1945 US War Secretary Stimson
  recommended
• that US and USSR conclude a treaty to control
  and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an
  instrument of war and .. To direct and encourage
  the development of atomic power4 for peaceful and
  humanitarian purposes.

11
Nuclear nonproliferation history

• January 1946 1st UNGA resolution established UN
  Atomic Energy Commission
• 13 June 1946 Baruch Plan at UNAEC called for
  IADA disbanded at the end of 1949 as a result
  of disagreement over nuclear disarmament between
  the US and the USSR
• Behind the black portent of the new atomic age
  lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can
  work our salvation. If we fail, then we have
  damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us
  not deceive ourselves We must elect World Peace
  or World Destruction.
• Bernard Baruch to UNAEC

12
Nuclear nonproliferation history
History

• 29 August 1949 Soviet Union tested its first
  atomic bomb
• October 1952 UK carried out a plutonium fission
  bomb on the Christmas Islands
• 8 December 1953 President Eisenhowers Atom
  for Peace speech at the UNGA
• July 1957 The International Atomic Energy Agency
  (IAEA) established following
• the 1956 UN Conference in NY
• 1956 1958 US proposals on CTBT, FMC,
  dismantlement
• February 1960 France conducted its first nuclear
  device test in Algeria

13
Nuclear non-proliferation history

• October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis brought
  US/USSR to brink of nuclear war
• "I think well be facing a situation that could
  well lead to general war
• - Secretary of State Dean Rusk
• "I dont know quite what kind of world we live
  in after weve struck Cuba
• - Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
• 1963 President Kennedy 15 - 20 nuclear armed
  countries by 1975
• October 1964 China conducted first atomic bomb
  test.
• November 1965 UNGA resolution 2028
  Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons -
  conceptual basis for the NPT
• 1967 Tlateloloco Treaty creating the 1st NWFZ
• 1967 Outer Space Treaty

14
Nuclear non-proliferation history

• 11 March 1968 US/USSR presented draft NPT text
  to ENDC
• 12 June 1968 NPT Endorsed by UNGA
• 1 July 1968 Signed by 62 states including 3
  depositary governments (US, USSR, UK)
• 5 March 1970 NPT Entered into force (without
  France China)
• October 3, 1972 ABM Treaty between the U.S. and
  USSR enters into force
• May 18, 1974 India detonates a peaceful nuclear
  explosive
• July 29, 1991 U.S. and USSR sign the START I
  Treaty
• March 24, 1993 South Africa announced it
  dismantled a nuclear weapons program only state
  to develop a nuclear program and dismantle it
  voluntarily
• October 21, 1994 U.S.-North Korea sign the
  Agreed Framework
• May 1995 NPT extended indefinitely at the 1995
  Review and Extension Conference

15
Nuclear nonproliferation history

• May 1998 India and Pakistan conduct nuclear
  tests
• May 19, 2000 2000 NPT Review Conference adopts
  Final Document
• May 24, 2002 The U.S. and Russia sign the Moscow
  Treaty
• June 13 2002 The U.S. formally withdraws from
  the ABM Treaty
• January 10, 2003 North Korea declares its
  withdrawal from the NPT
• March 19, 2003 U.S. and allies invade Iraq on
  basis of non-compliance with UNSC resolutions and
  suspicions over nuclear and other WMD programs
• December 19, 2003 Libya renounces its WMD
  programs
• April 28, 2004 UNSC adopts resolution 1540
• May 2005 NPT RevCon fails to adopt Final
  Document

16
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES

• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
  Weapons
• Partial Test Ban Treaty
• Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
• Sea-bed Treaty
• Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear
  Material
• Nuclear Safety Convention
• Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (?)
• Nuclear Terrorism Convention (?)
• PAROS (?)
• Nuclear Weapons Convention (?)

17
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS

• A cornerstone of global security
• Embodies the international community's efforts to
  prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons
  its aspirations for global disarmament, while
  also facilitating cooperation in the peaceful
  uses of nuclear energy under safeguards
• Entails commitments by both NWS NNWS
• Only multilateral treaty under which the NWS are
  legally committed to nuclear disarmament
• NNWS have permanently renounced nuclear weapons
  and accepted intrusive on-site inspection of all
  nuclear material and activities
• IAEA responsible for verification of compliance
  with nonproliferation undertakings through the
  application of safeguards
• Parties 188 Non-parties India, Israel,
  Pakistan, North Korea? (announced withdrawal on
  April 10, 2003)

18
NPT A Deal Between the Haves and the
Have-nots

• Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)
• retain their nuclear arsenals
• not transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient
  whatsoever
• not assist any NNWS to acquire, manufacture or
  control nuclear weapons
• commit to pursuing negotiations in good faith
  towards ending the nuclear arms race and
  achieving nuclear disarmament
• Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS)
• not build, acquire or possess nuclear weapons
• inalienable right to research, produce use
  nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
• must accept IAEA safeguards (audits and intrusive
  on-site monitoring) on all nuclear activities
  materials to verify peaceful use application
• may conclude regional treaties in order to assure
  the total absence of nuclear weapons

19
NPT A Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament
Deal

• Art I
• NWS not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
  nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
  devices and not to assist, encourage, or induce
  any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire them
• Art II
• NNWS not to receive nuclear weapons or other
  nuclear explosive devices, and not to manufacture
  or acquire them
• Art VI
• All parties to pursue negotiations in good faith
  on effective measures relating to the cessation
  of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear
  disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
  complete disarmament under strict and effective
  international control

20
A Deal to Ensure Peaceful Nuclear Activities

• Art III
• (1) NNWS to accept IAEA safeguards agreements to
  verify fulfillment of obligations.
• (2) All parties not to provide a) source or
  special nuclear material, or (b) equipment or
  material specially designed or prepared for the
  processing, use, or production of special
  fissionable material to any NNWS for peaceful
  purposes, without IAEA safeguards. (basis for
  Zangger Committee controls in INFCIRC/209)
• (3) Safeguards to be implemented in a manner
  to comply with Article IV, and not to hamper
  economic or technological development or
  international peaceful nuclear cooperation
• (4) Negotiation of agreements to commence
  within 180 days from Treatys entry-into-force,
  or upon date of deposit for those states
  ratifying or acceding at later date. Agreements
  to enter into force not later than 18 months
  after the date of initiation of negotiations.

21
ROLE OF IAEA IN THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
REGIME

• NNWS to place all nuclear materials in all
  peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards
  (NPT Art III)
• IAEA verifies compliance with nonproliferation
  obligations through safeguards
• All nuclear material facilities subject to
  safeguards agreements in order to verify
  compliance
• Conduct independent inspections
• Board of Governors approve safeguards procedures
  safeguards agreements, general supervision of
  safeguards activities
• Non-compliance Board of Governors is to call
  upon the violator to remedy such non-compliance
  to report the non-compliance to the UN Security
  Council and General Assembly.

22
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) TODAY

• Foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific
  and technical co-operation in the peaceful use of
  nuclear technology
• Inspection system verifies States compliance
  with NPT and other nonproliferation agreements
  ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear material and
  facilities
• Assists Member States in the peaceful uses of
  nuclear energy
• Member States meet on an annual basis at the
  General Conference while the Board of Governors
  meets at regular intervals.

Autonomous organization under the UN 138 Member
States Located in Vienna, Austria
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WHAT IS THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM?

• Continual monitoring of nuclear material to
  ensure non-military use
• set of technical measures to independently verify
  correctness and completeness of state
  declarations about their nuclear material and
  activities nuclear accountancy
• confidence-building tools of the nuclear
  nonproliferation regime in inspections of nuclear
  and related facilities under safeguards
  agreements
• NNWS committed not to possess nuclear weapons,
  pursuant to the NPT - IAEA is the verification
  authority
• Trilateral Initiative between Russia, US, IAEA -
  supports steps to verify weapon-origin and other
  fissile materials released from defense programs
• As of September 2005, 155 states have
  safeguards agreement in force with the IAEA, 104
  states have signed the Additional Protocol, and
  69 states have entered it into force.

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WHAT IS THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM? (cont.)

• Why are safeguards important?
• Prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
• Foster the beneficial uses of atomic energy
• Provide confidence and build trust

Verification in Iraq UNSC resolutions mandated
the IAEA as inspectorate for nuclear-related
monitoring and verification in Iraq. Activities
were carried out by IAEA's Iraq Nuclear
Verification Office (INVO).
25
TYPES OF SAFEGUARDS

• Classical Full scope safeguards (INFCIRC/153,
  1972)
• Legal agreements with IAEA required under NPT Art
  III
• Compromise between need to verify compliance and
  national sovereignty concerns
• Verification of correctness of States initial
  declarations on nuclear material facilities
  through inspections, surveillance and physical
  inspections
• Restricted to defined strategic points
• 40 NPT NNWS without agreements in place
• IAEA not capable to detect
• Diversion or misuse of very small amounts of
  materials
• Nuclear activities that had not been declared to
  the IAEA
• 1991 Iraq clandestine nuclear program
• 2002 DPRK hidden reprocessing facility

26
TYPES OF SAFEGUARDS

• Strengthened Safeguards (INFCIRC/540)
• Additional Protocol
• Complimentary legal authority
• Result of failures in Iraq DPRK
• Detect undeclared nuclear facilities and
  activities diversion from peaceful to military
  use
• Voluntary measures expansion of legal agreement
  with IAEA
• Information and access to all parts of a States
  nuclear fuel cycle declared or not
• Comprehensive picture of a States nuclear
  related activities, including imports and exports
• Short-notice access to all buildings on a nuclear
  site
• Collection of environmental samples at locations
  beyond those provided under safeguards agreements
• Voluntary character
• Only 69 NPT States have implemented (in force)
  but 104 Signatories, 112 approved by the Board
• Constrained Resources
• Middle Eastern States regard Protocol as lesser
  priority than Israeli acceptance of full scope
  safeguards

27
NuclearFuel Cycle
28
NWS Safeguards

• Nuclear Weapon States Voluntary Offer Agreements
  (VOA)
• Not required under the NPT
• Designed to satisfy NNWS concerns that IAEA
  safeguards might place them at commercial and
  industrial disadvantage in developing nuclear
  energy for peaceful use
• Cover specified non-military facilities only
• First offer by United States 1967, entered into
  force with UK in 1976, US in 1980, France in
  1981, USSR/Russia in 1985 and China in 1988. Now
  India?

29
Integrated Safeguards

• significantly strengthen efficiency
  effectiveness of the safeguards system
• builds on lessons learned after the 1991 Gulf War
• give the Agency more flexibility in deciding
  where to focus efforts and limited resources,
  including what inspectors should concentrate on,
  where they need to go, and which verification
  tools to apply
• Combines "classical" and "strengthened"
  safeguards measures in place
• IAEA can move ahead with inspections that are
  tailored on a State-by-State basis to give a more
  accurate and fuller picture of the entire nuclear
  program.
• End result higher level of assurance that
  safeguarded nuclear material is not being
  diverted for weapons-making
• only applied in States that have the required set
  of legal agreements in force with the Agency -
  safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the
  NPT, and the Additional Protocol
• applied in Australia, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan,
  Norway, and Uzbekistan

30
A Deal to Ensure Peaceful Nuclear Activities

• In exchange for Article III
• Art IV
• (1) Not to affect the inalienable right of all
  parties to develop research, production and use
  of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
  discrimination and in conformity with Articles I
  and II of the Treaty.
• (2) All parties to facilitate and
  participate in the fullest possible exchange of
  equipment, materials, and scientific and
  technological information for the peaceful uses
  of nuclear energy.
• Art V
• Each party to take appropriate measures, to
  ensure that under appropriate international
  observation and procedures, potential benefits of
  peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will
  be made available to NNWS party to the Treaty on
  a non-discriminatory basis.
• - None sought or accrued, subsequently overtaken
  by 1996 CTBT.

31
A Deal to be Free of Nuclear Weapons

• Art VII
• Any group of States has the right to conclude
  regional treaties in order to assure the total
  absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
  territories
• More than 110 states covered by Nuclear Weapons
  Free Zone Treaties
• Antarctic
• Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco)
• South Pacific (Rarotonga)
• South Asia (Bangkok)
• Africa (Pelindaba)
• Mongolia

32
THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME Keeping The
World Free of Nuclear Weapons
33
What is a NWFZ?

• An internationally binding agreement among a
  group of states that prohibits the development,
  manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, testing,
  and control of nuclear weapons by states that
  join the zone.
• In a NWFZ, peaceful uses and applications of
  nuclear energy, under IAEA supervision, are
  permitted.
• Local or municipal nuclear-free zones, such as
  those declared by many cities in Western Europe
  or the United States (such as Santa Cruz), are
  not considered as NWFZs.
• Such local declarations have only political
  significance, but no legal force or international
  recognition

34
What is the Relationship Between the NPT and
NWFZs?

• The NPT only prohibits the control of nuclear
  weapons by NNWS parties
• NWS can thus base their weapons in NNWS parties
  (i.e. U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany)
• NWFZs, by contrast, prohibit any deployment of
  nuclear weapons, regardless of control
• NWFZs may include measures that complement the
  NPT, such as
• confidence-building measures
• transparency provisions
• negative security assurances
• NWFZs are thus complementary to the NPT.
• Expanding the number of NWFZs is one possible
  route to achieving nuclear disarmament, as
  codified in Article VI of the NPT.

35
No Deal Not to be Threatened by Nuclear Weapons

• NPT does not formally provide security assurances
  NWS agreed to disarm (Art VI) and offered
  non-binding assurances to NNWS
• Positive Security Assurances
• Nuclear aggression against any NNWS parties would
  require immediate action by UNSC (resolution 255,
  1968)
• Negative Security Assurances
• All NWS have issued formal pledges not to
  threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons against
  NNWS parties leading to UNSC resolution 984 of
  1995
• US/other NWS actively used SC resolution to lobby
  for the indefinite extension of the treaty.
• 1995 Principles and Objectives document
  incorporated negative security assurances
  vital to securing indefinite extension of the
  treaty
• 2000 RevCon Final Document could calls for
  recommendations in 2005 (no progress)
• Under NWFZ protocols NWS required to undertake
  legal obligations not to use or threaten to use
  nuclear weapons against NWFZ parties

36
The NPT Amendments and Review Conferences

• Art VIII
• Amendments can be proposed by any State Party. At
  the request of 2/3 of the State Parties,
  Depositary States shall convene an Amendment
  Conference
• (2) Amendments must be approved by a majority of
  all States Parties, including all NWS, and all
  other States Parties which on the date of
  circulation of an amendment are members of the
  IAEA Board of Governors. Amendment shall enter
  into force for each Party that ratifies it. When
  ratifications of all above are deposited, the
  amendment shall enter into force
• (3) Review conference to be held five years after
  the Treatys entry into force (and at intervals
  five years thereafter) to review the operation of
  the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the
  purposes of the Treaty are being realized

37
Ensuring National Sovereignty Leverage

• Article X
• (1) A State Party may withdraw from the Treaty
  in exercising its national sovereignty, if it
  decides that extraordinary events, related to the
  subject matter of the NPT have jeopardized its
  supreme interestsit will give three months
  advance notice to all other States Parties and to
  the UN Secretary Generalsuch notice shall
  include a statement of the extraordinary events
  it regards as having jeopardized its supreme
  interests.
• (2) 25 years after the entry into force of the
  Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide
  whether the Treaty shall continue in force
  indefinitely, or shall be extended for an
  additional fixed period or periods. This decision
  shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to
  the Treaty.
• Art VIII
• Review conference to be held five years after the
  Treatys entry into force (and at intervals five
  years thereafter if so agreed) to review the
  operation of the Treaty

38
NPT Review ConferencesOverview

• Periodic reviews was a novelty devised for the
  NPT
• a) off-set the imbalance in the obligations of
  the majority who had to do something right away
  (accept safeguards to prove non-proliferation)
  and the few who made a long-term promise to
  disarm
• b) a way for the majority to see how the Treaty
  was operating and express themselves on what they
  found
• c) produce conclusions for further action.
• Only the 1975, 1985 2000 Review Conference
  adopted Final Documents
• No Final Document at 1980, 1990, 1995 2005
  Conferences
• No consensus on key nonproliferation
  disarmament issues

39
1995 Review and Extension Conference

• Extended the Treaty indefinitely as part of a
  package deal
• Decision I Strengthened review process
• Decision II Principles and objectives for
  nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament,
  including a Program of Action for implementing
  Art VI
• Decision III Indefinite extension
• Resolution on the Middle East
• No Final Document was adopted.
• Differences between NNWS NWS over
  interpretation over NWS nuclear disarmament
  record

40
NPT Review and Extension Conference
Review process

• Decision I Strengthened review process
  (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1)
• PrepCom each year prior to the RevCons (1997),
  4th in year of RevCon (if necessary) to
• Consider principles, objectives ways to promote
  the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as
  its universality make recommendations thereon to
  the RevCon, including those identified in the
  decision on principles and objectives for nuclear
  non-proliferation and disarmament,
• Make procedural preparations for RevCon
• Mandatory RevCons every 5 years
• RevCons should look forward as well as back.
• evaluate the results of the period under review,
  including the implementation of undertakings of
  the States parties,
• identify the areas in which, and the means
  through which, further progress should be sought
  in the future
• address specifically what might be done to
  strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and
  to achieve its universality

41
NPT Review and Extension Conference

• Decision II Principles and Objectives for
  Nuclear
• Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
  (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2)
• A set of yard sticks and an agenda for measuring
  progress towards the full implementation of the
  treaty
• Reiterated that the ultimate goal of the NPT
  was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons
  and a treaty on general and complete disarmament
  under strict and effective international
  control.
• Contained a program of action on nuclear
  disarmament
• CTBT no later than 1996
• negotiations on a treaty banning production of
  fissile material for nuclear weapons and
• Determined pursuit by NWS of systematic and
  progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons
  globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating
  those weapons
• Further steps (to UNSC 984) should be considered
  to assure NNWS against use or threat of use of
  nuclear weapons could be in form of legally
  binding instrument
• Noted that the IAEA is the competent authority
  to verify and assure compliance with safeguards
  required under the NPT, and that this authority
  should not be undermined
• Transfer of source or fissionable material and
  equipment specifically designed for production of
  such material should require as necessary
  precondition IAEA full-scope safeguards
• Transparency in nuclear related export control
  should be promoted.

42
NPT Review and Extension Conference

• Decision III Indefinite Extension
  (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.3)
• Although a majority of states supported
  indefinite extension no consensus existed
• President Dhanapala formulated a decision based
  on understanding that decisions I and II will be
  taken first as part of a package
• reaffirmed the treatys continued implementation
  in a strengthen manner, and to this end,
  emphasizing the decision on the strengthening the
  review process and the decision on the
  principles and objectives for nuclear
  non-proliferation and disarmament, also adopted
  by the conference
• Decides that, as a majority exists, among States
  party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension,
  the Treaty shall continue in force
  indefinitely
• Several States qualified their support for the
  decision after it was taken

43
NPT Review and Extension Conference

• Resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.1995/32/RE
  S.1)
• Arab States (under leadership of Egypt) blocked
  the indefinite decision unless specific reference
  is made to the need for a NWFZ in the Middle East
  addressing concerns over Israels nuclear weapons
  program
• 3 Depositories sponsored resolution calling on
• All States in the Middle East (not directly
  mentioning Israel) to take practical steps in
  appropriate forums aimed at making progress
  towards, inter alia, the establishment of an
  effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of
  (WMD) and their delivery systems, and to refrain
  from taking any measures that preclude the
  achievement of this objective
• Also called on all States, including the NWS to
  extend their fullest cooperation towards this goal

44
2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

• High expectations following 1995 RevExtCon
• BUT.
• CD was deadlocked
• US Senate rejected CTBT
• US NMD plans
• Renewed legitimization of nuclear weapons in US
  and Russian doctrines
• Unsatisfactory outcomes of 3 PrepCom sessions
• Discord in US-Russia and US-China relations
• Lack of progress in Art VI implementation
• Iraqi and North Korean non-compliance with
  safeguards
• 1998 Indian Pakistani nuclear tests
• Questions over Russian nuclear exports

45
2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

• A milestone agreement in the nuclear
  nonproliferation regime
• Adopted Final Declaration without a vote 1st
  NPT document to fully negotiated, comprehensive
  and forward looking
• Result of negotiations between New Agenda
  countries and the NWS
• Strong political will
• Fear that failed conference could unravel 1995
  agreements
• Decision by NWS to remove NMD issue from agenda
• NWS gave an unequivocal undertaking to
  eliminate their nuclear arsenals as part 13
  practical steps for the systematic and
  progressive efforts to implement Art VI

46
13 PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS THE TOTAL
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS

1. early entry into force of the CTBT
2. moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions
   pending CTBT
3. treaty banning the production of fissile material
   for nuclear weapons within five years
4. CD nuclear disarmament body
5. irreversibility to disarmament, arms control and
   reduction
6. unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total
   elimination of nuclear arsenals
7. entry into force of START II and the conclusion
   of START III while preserving and strengthening
   the ABM
8. completion and implementation of the
   US/Russia/IAEA Trilateral Initiative
9. Steps by all NWS
10. efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals
    unilaterally
11. increased transparency
12. reduction of non-strategic weapons
13. measures to reduce operational status of nuclear
    weapons
14. diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security
    policies
15. engagement of all NWS in the process of
    elimination of nuclear weapons
16. all NWS to place fissile material under
    international verification
17. Reaffirmation of ultimate objective of general
    and complete disarmament under effective
    international control
18. Regular reporting within the framework of the
    strengthened review process (accountability)
19. Further development of the verification
    capabilities to provide assurance of compliance
    with nuclear disarmament agreements

47
2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

• Other significant agreements
• Safeguards
• Endorsed measures of IAEA 1997 Model Protocol
  (Additional Protocol) not mandatory
• Security Assurance Called for recommendations on
  a legally binding instrument
• Middle East
• Called Israel by name to accede to NPT first
  time
• All parties to report on steps taken to promote
  Middle East nuclear-weapon and WMD free zone at
  2005 RevCon
• Noted that IAEA has been unable to provide
  assurance of Iraqs compliance with safeguards
  agreement and UNSC resolution 687
• South Asia
• Declared that nuclear test by India Pakistan do
  not confer NWS status (accede to NPT and observe
  moratorium on FM production)
• DPRK
• Noted that IAEA is unable to verify initial
  declaration (cannot conclude that no diversion
  occurred)

48
2005 Review Conference A Successful failure?

• DIFFICULTIES
• Procedural disputes over the agenda and
  subsidiary bodies
• The roles played by the United States, France,
  Egypt, and Iran
• Conference leadership
• Entrenched national positions
• Break-down of regional and political groupings
• Failure to address defection of the DPRK
• No agreement on a Final Document

• ON THE BRIGHT SIDE
• Discussion of key challenges spotlight
• Strong support for some key issues
• Address withdrawal
• Additional Protocol standardization
• Compliance enforcement
• Nuclear security and physical protection
• CTBT entry into force
• Avoided watered down consensus language

49
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

• 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty
• 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

50
In need of a Nuclear Test Ban Early steps
Secretary of Defense McNamaras Secret
declassified memo to President Kennedy on 12
February 1963 The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons
with and without a Test Ban Agreement.
51
TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE
ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER
(PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY - PTBT)

• Entry into force 10 October 1963
• 131 States Parties
• Result of US/USSR compromise on CTBT in late 50s
• Negotiations followed French test in Algeria
  (February 60)
• Bans nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear
  explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space,
  under water, or in any other environment
• Parties to refrain from causing, encouraging, or
  in any way participating in, the carrying out of
  any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other
  nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take
  place in any of the above-described environments.
• no international verification mechanism - it is
  understood that each party may do so by its own
  national technical means
• Made redundant by CTBT. However, should a PTBT
  party withdraw from the CTBT, or not sign the
  CTBT, it would still be bound by the provisions
  of the PTBT

52
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATYOverview

• Long standing goal (1956 US proposals on CTBT and
  FMCT)
• NPT Preamble to seek to achieve the
  discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
  weapons for all time and to continue negotiations
  to this end
• Bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any
  other nuclear explosion (true zero yield) in all
  environments.
• Negotiated in the CD (1993 1996)
• Adopted by General Assembly on 24 September 1996
• Signed by 176 States with 125 State Parties
  (Libya 1/6/04))
• Entry into force requires ratification of 44 CD
  member States with nuclear power capacities 41
  signed, 33 ratified
• Verification by CTBTO

53
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
ORGANIZATION PREPCOM

• Preparatory Commission
• Establish a global verification regime by the
  time Treaty enters into force
• Establish a worldwide network of 321 monitoring
  stations built in 19 countries and run by the
  host countries in cooperation with the PTS (some
  100 stations are already transmitting data to the
  International Data Center in Vienna via
  satellite-based global communications
  infrastructure)
• IMS monitors
• seismological
• radionuclide (16 laboratories)
• hydro acoustic
• infrasound monitoring
• Develop procedures for on-site inspections and
  confidence-building measures
• Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS)
  cooperates with the host countries in the
  development and running of an international
  network of 321 monitoring stations

54
CTBT INTERNATIONAL MONITERING SYSTEM(IMS)
? ? ? ? Seismic primary/secondary
array/stations - Hydroacoustic stations
Radionuclide stations ? Infrasound stations ?
Radionuclide laboratories
55
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATYOverview

• RevCon 10 yrs after entry into force
• Facilitating the Entry into Force Conferences
  (Art XIV)
• Non-signatories include India, North Korea, and
  Pakistan
• US (led efforts to conclude a CTBT and first to
  sign) and China - remaining NWS that have signed
  but not ratified
• U.S. Senate voted in 1999 not to ratify
• Bush Administration stated that it has no plans
  to seek reconsideration of the Senate's action,
  but it intends to maintain its moratorium on
  nuclear testing, in effect since 1992 (?)
• 2000 RevCon early entry into force of the CTBT
  moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions
  pending CTBT
• 2003 U.S National Defense Authorization Act
  plans for achieving enhanced readiness posture
  for resumption of underground nuclear testing -
  from 3yrs to 18 months
• 2005 NPT RevCon Strong US opposition to CTBT

56
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

• Challenges
• Requires 44 specific states to ratify
• Significant nuclear capable states, including
  India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed
• US walked away questions continued value
• Possible US testing (budget allows for shorter
  term notice)
• What will be happen if US resumes testing?
  Others?
• Significant nuclear capable states still outside
• Expensive verification

57
OTHER RELATED TREATIES

• CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR
  MATERIAL (CPPNM)
• To protect nuclear materials (Pu, U-235, U-233
  and irradiated fuel) for peaceful purposes at
  agreed levels during international transport
  across the territory of States Parties or on
  ships or aircraft under their jurisdiction
• CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
• To maintain a high level of safety according to
  international benchmarks at land-based nuclear
  power plants
• JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF SPENT FUEL
  MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE
  MANAGEMENT
• Safe storage of radioactive waste and spent fuel
  in countries with and without nuclear programs
  during all stages of management of such materials
  for civilian uses.
• INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF
  ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
• Cooperation in preventing or prosecuting acts of
  nuclear terrorism by adopting necessary
  legislative and technical measures to protect
  nuclear material, devises, instillations and
  forestall their use by a third party.

58
THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIMEFUTURE
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

• Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
• Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
• Nuclear Weapons Convention

59
UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
General Assembly (deliberative)
Security Council
Special sessions on disarmament 1978, 1982 and
1988
Conference on Disarmament (negotiating forum)
Disarmament Commission
First Committee
60
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
.consider the general principles of cooperation
in the maintenance of international peace and
security, including the principles governing
disarmament and the regulation of armaments UN
Charter, Article 12

• Very first resolution addressed nuclear
  proliferation (1946)
• 191 UN Member States
• The only truly representative body discussing
  disarmament and international security issues and
  its decisions have lead to significant
  developments
• Endorsed NPT (1968), BTWC (1972), CWC (1992),
  CTBT (1996)
• Programme of Action agreed to at the Conference
  on the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and
  Light Weapons (2001)
• Makes recommendations to UN Member States or to
  the Security Council.

• Three Special sessions on disarmament 1978,
  1982, 1988
• Annually adopts resolutions and decisions on
  nonproliferation, disarmament, arms control and
  security on recommendation by its First
  Committee.
• Considers IAEA annual report

61
UN SECURITY COUNCIL
..establishment and maintenance of
international peace and security, including
through disarmament and the establishment of a
system for the regulation of armaments UN
Charter, Article 26

• Members
• Five permanent with veto powers (China, France,
  Russia, UK, USA)
• Ten non-permanent members without veto (Algeria,
  Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Denmark, Greece,
  Japan, Philippines, Romania, Tanzania)

62
UN SECURITY COUNCIL

• Nonproliferation accomplishments
• Mandatory sanctions/inspection in Iraq through
  Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
  Commission (UNMOVIC) and IAEA
• Responded to 1998 nuclear tests by India and
  Pakistan -- denied NWS status
• Recognized negative security assurances by the
  NWS in April 1995
• 1992 Presidential statement declaring the
  proliferation of all WMD a threat to
  international peace and security
• 2004 prohibits use of, or threat to use, nuclear
  material, nuclear fuel, radioactive products or
  waste, or any radioactive substance with toxic,
  explosive, or other dangerous properties.
• Prohibits unauthorized receipt through fraud,
  theft, or forcible seizure of any nuclear
  material, radioactive substances, nuclear
  installations, or nuclear explosive devices
  belonging to a State Party, or demands by the
  threat or use of force or by other forms of
  intimidation for the transfer of such material
• obligates parties to cooperate in preventing or
  prosecuting acts of nuclear terrorism by adopting
  necessary legislative and technical measures to
  protect nuclear material, devises, instillations
  and forestall their use by a third party.
• Res 1540 Nonproliferation of WMD
• 2005 Res 1624 calls upon states to prevent
  terrorist conduct and incitement within their
  territories asks states to sign Nuclear
  Terrorist Convention

63
UN Security Council Resolution 1540

• U.S. and U.K. sponsored
• Addresses non-state actors states
• Response to concerns of
• WMD terrorism (Sept. 11th)
• Illicit trafficking (A.Q. Khan network)
• Complement to WMD treaties filling gaps?
• Under Chapter VII enforcement

• States are required to
• Not provide non-state actors with WMDs
• Develop domestic controls over WMDs
• Develop export controls over WMDs
• Present reports on implementation
• Establishes review committee under UNSC
• Calls for cooperation in preventing illicit
  trafficking (legitimization for US-led PSI?)

64
UNSC Res 1540 Obligations

• New binding legal obligation on every UN member
  state to put in place appropriate effective
• Laws criminalizing non-state WMD proliferation
• Security and accounting for WMD, their means of
  delivery, and related materials
• Physical protection
• Border controls and law enforcement to block
  illicit trafficking
• Export controls and transshipment controls

65
UNSC Res 1540 Obligations II

• Assistance in implementing the resolution
• A call for universal adoption and full
  implementation and strengthening of NBC related
  treaties
• Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on
  non-proliferation
• Submit a report about implementation
• Obligation not limited to parties to NPT or other
  multilateral agreements
• But what would an appropriate effective system
  be, in each of these cases? Not defined
• Definition of related materials (para. 3)
  unclear / potential for confusion over national
  control lists mentioned in definition

66
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

• Single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum
  of the international community
• 66 member states
• Meets in Geneva from January to September
• Own rules and agenda
• Funded by UNGA
• Reports annually to UNGA
• Deadlocked since 1998!

• NPT (1968)
• BTWC (1972)
• CWC (1993)
• CTBT (1996)
• PAROS (?)
• FMCT (?)

67
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

• Long standing goal (56 US proposals on CTBT and
  FMCT)
• Pres Eisenhower 1957 Atoms for Peace
• Pres Clinton 1993 UNGA
• 1993 UNGA resolution (48/75L) called for the
  Prohibition of the production of fissile
  materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
  explosive devices no reference to stockpiles
  to gain consensus
• 1995 CD agreed to negotiate a non-discriminatory,
  multilateral and internationally and effectively
  verifiable treaty banning the production of
  fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
  nuclear explosive devices (Shannon mandate)
• Differences over scope
• only the future production of fissile material
• not only of future but also of past production.
• not only relate to production of fissile
  materials (past or future) but also to other
  issues, such as the management of such material.
• agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee mandate does not
  preclude any delegation from raising for
  consideration in the ad Hoc Committee any of the
  above noted issues

68
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

• Since beginning of space age (1957) UNGA, COPUOS
  and Conference on Disarmament
• Discussed space issues along 2 separate lines
• Peaceful application of space technology
• Prevention of an arms race
• Existing Treaties
• 1963 PTBT
• 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits putting WMB in
  space
• ABM treaty
• 1979 Moon Agreement
• None of these treaties explicitly bans
  space-based weapons, or ASATs (except the ones
  aimed at spy satellites)

69
PAROS Any progress possible?

• CD deadlocked over PAROS FMCT

• US reiterated its position in 2002 that it saw
  no need for new outer space arms control
  agreements. - current Outer Space Treaty
  regulating the use of space meets all U.S.
  purposes.
• Intense debate with China, the Russian Federation
  and the G-21 (NAM)
• PAROS should assume greater urgency because of
  legitimate concerns that existing legal
  instruments are inadequate to deter imminent
  attempts for further militarization of outer
  space.
• 2003 Five Ambassadors Initiative (Dembri, Lint,
  Reyes, Salander, Vega) CD to identify and
  examine, without limitation, any specific topics
  or proposals, which could include
  confidence-building measures, general principles,
  treaty commitments and the elaboration of a
  regime capable of preventing an arms race in
  outer space, including the possibility of
  negotiating a relevant international legal
  instrument.
• supported by most all CD members
• China and the Russian Federation announced their
  unified flexibility
• United States and France has not taken a
  position on the issue

70
Nuclear Weapons Convention Is it possible?

• Long standing goal by many NNWS, especially the
  NAM Heads of State or Government reiterated
  their call on the Conference on Disarmament to
  establish, as the highest priority, an ad hoc
  committee to start in 1998 negotiations on a
  phased programme for the complete elimination of
  nuclear weapons with a specified framework of
  time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention
  - Kuala Lampur Summit.
• NPT Article VI All parties to pursue
  negotiations in good faith on effective measures
  relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms
  race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty
  on general and complete disarmament under strict
  and effective international control
• 1995 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of
  Nuclear Weapons while there is a need to
  further develop verification and weapons
  dismantlement systems, there are no technological
  barriers to concluding an agreement or agreements
  to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons
• ICJ determined (1996) that the threat or use of
  nuclear weapons is illegal, and that there exist
  an obligations to pursue and conclude
  negotiations leading to complete nuclear
  disarmament
• CD agreed (1998) to established ad hoc committee
  on nuclear disarmament, but has since been
  deadlocked
• 2000 NPT RevCon unequivocal undertaking to
  accomplish the total elimination of nuclear
  arsenals

71
THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

• NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
• Zangger Committee (1972)
• Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 1974
• Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 1987
• Wassenaar Arrangement 1995

72
Importance of Export Controls

• Export controls are an important element of the
  nonproliferation regime
• While they cannot stop proliferation, they slow
  the spread of WMD and delivery systems
• Assist states to coordinate compliance with
  international agreements
• Effective export controls necessary to maintain
  good standing in the international trading
  community
• Export controls help control borders and prevent
  export violators from making dangerous or
  politically embarrassing transfers

73
Zangger Committee

• Informal group of NPT signatories established in
  1971 under the chairmanship of Claude Zangger
  (Switzerland), to draft a trigger list of items
  that should be subject to IAEA safeguards in
  accordance with Article III(2) of the NPT
• NPT does not describe in detail what materials
  and technology should be subject to safeguards
  when exported to non-nuclear weapon states.
• It names only source or special fissionable
  material and equipment specially designed or
  prepared for the processing, use or production of
  special fissionable material as being subject to
  such safeguards.
• Zangger is an informal regime, and not a treaty.
  Its commitments are political, not legal, and are
  implemented by individual members
• Members share information about their nuclear
  exports and export license applications,
  particularly for exports to NNWS not party to the
  NPT
• Current membership 35, including China

74
Nuclear Suppliers Group

• Prompted by the Indian nuclear test in 1974,
  which showed very clearly that nuclear exports
  could contribute to proliferation.
• NSG provided a forum to reform nuclear export
  controls. It was not limited to interpreting the
  NPT, and could include countries that were not
  NPT members at that time, such as Japan and
  France.
• Requirement for full-scope safeguards.
• NSG established in 1992 a list of nuclear related
  dual-use goods and technologies that could make a
  major contribution to a nuclear explosive
  activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle
  activity. Partly motivated by the Iraq case.
• A political agreement, not a treaty. States that
  join have a political commitment to follow the
  guidelines, but not a binding legal commitment
• States that join have responsibility for
  implementing the guidelines they can also have
  more restrictive national controls
• Membership has now expanded to include 40
  countries. Belarus, Cyprus, Turkey, Slovenia and
  Kazakhstan are the most recent members, joining
  in 2000, 2001 and 2002.

75
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

• Established in 1987 to reduce and ultimately
  eliminate the proliferation of systems (other
  than manned aircraft) capable of delivering WMD
• Controls exports capable of delivering WMD and of
  equipment and technology relevant to missiles
  whose performance in terms of payload and range
  exceeds stated parameters
• MTCR is not a treaty it is an informal
  non-treaty association of governments with common
  interests
• MTCR entails political, but not legal obligations
  and commitments
• MTCR obligations are implemented by each member
  as it sees fit, through its national export
  control system
• Membership later expanded to include 26
  countries, for a total of 33 (as of May 2001).
• Hague Code of Conduct (November 2002 signed by 93
  states)
• politically binding commitments to curb the
  proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles
  and to exercise maximum restraint in developing,
  testing, and deploying such missiles.

76
The Nuclear Nonproliferation RegimeIn a Crises
or Challenged?

• Universality (Outlier states India, Pakistan,
  Israel)
• North Korean withdrawal
• Non-compliance Iran?
• Inalienable right to peaceful nuclear energy or
  cover for nuclear weapons should the fuel cycle
  be limited?
• Strengthening IAEA safeguards comprehensive
  safeguards or additional protocol?
• Nuclear disarmament
• Abrogation of 13 practical steps Any future
  for CTBT, FM(C)T?
• Impact of new nukes resumption of testing new
  arms race?
• De-alerting
• Non-strategic nuclear weapons
• Verifiability and transparency
• Threat of nuclear weapons use