Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan, 2005

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Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict
Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in
Southern Sudan, 2005 2010

• Policy summary

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Approach

• Independent evaluation
• Standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, assessing
  the extent of progress made by the international
  community in supporting CPPB in Southern Sudan.
• Pilot the working draft of the Guidance on
  evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding
  activities (OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace
  and Development Cooperation and the OECD/DAC
  Network on Development Evaluation).
• Evaluation anchored in Conflict Analysis and
  critique of usage.

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How important are donors?

• 4.05 bn allocated from the 15-donor portfolio.
  About 3.6 bn actually spent to date, 50 for
  humanitarian. Additional 1 bn/year for UNMIS.
• GoSS received a total of US7.9 billion in oil
  revenues from 2005-2009, representing about 95
  of its total income. Drop in oil prices in 2008
  led GoSS to cut its budget by a third.
• Donors met about one-quarter of total GOSS Budget
  in 2009 significant increase in .

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Donor expenditure in Southern Sudan (2005-2009)
US2.96bn
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(No Transcript)
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Overall Findings

• Donor contributions to CPPB have been only
  partially successful, because
• Donor policies and strategies did not fully take
  into account key drivers of violence
• This led to an overemphasis of basic services and
  a relative neglect of security, policing and the
  rule of law, which are essential in state
  formation.
• A dominant theory of change has emerged based on
  the conceptual assumption that all development
  contributes to CPPB.
• This leads to discourse around post-conflict
  recovery and peace dividends, on which the aid
  architecture was based, but is of questionable
  relevance in a context where continuing
  insecurity, humanitarian need and political
  fragility are the defining features.

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Donor Coordination

• Donor coordination limited to sharing
  information, and rarely is there a joint donor
  approach to addressing the immediate causes of
  violence.
• Reasons (1) high level donor meetings (mostly
  on CPA) confined to Khartoum/abroad (2) Joint
  mechanisms usually only about harmonization with
  GoSS (3) flexibility constrained by 3-5 year
  programmes (long procurement/capacity building).
• Too much emphasis on organised IDP/refugee
  returns, not enough on spontaneous return and
  community-based reintegration.
• The limited capacity of GoSS in determining a
  strategic direction for aid policy has, in turn,
  impaired the development of a clear joint donor
  policy.

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Modalities of Aid

• CPPB requires field presence and flexibility.
  USAID performed best on this.
• The slow and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures
  associated with most of the pooled funding
  mechanisms (only 20 of total donor funding) have
  undermined the efficiency, effectiveness and
  impact of programmes. Funding mechanisms such as
  the MDTF, which score highly on donor
  coordination, harmonization, and to some extent
  government ownership have failed to deliver on
  the ground.
• There have been seven major pooled funds, and
  there is evidence to show that those managed by
  contractors have performed more efficiently
•  

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Performance by Aid Category

• The conflict analysis highlighted the importance
  of linking development activities to local peace
  building in three respects the recognition of
  key drivers of violence the appropriate
  geographical placement of assistance in areas
  most prone to violence and the institutional
  support necessary to uphold peaceful relations
  within communities.
• The most effective programmes are those that have
  promoted linkages with the wider governance and
  security environment, including building
  capacities in local government.

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Performance by Aid Category

• Recent improvements in supporting security sector
  reform (SPLA, judiciary, police), but UNMIS
  failure to address civilian security.
• Donors slow to support decentralisation and
  pluralism. Over-emphasis on strengthening central
  (Juba) institutions? And formal governance rather
  than links to customary law.
• Greater emphasis should have been given to
  alternative livelihoods. Particular problems with
  cattle ownership and youth.

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Performance by Aid Category

• Little correlation between supply of basic
  services and incidence of violent conflict. In
  most States the challenge is to ensure security
  before benefits of services can be realised.
  Local conflict analysis required.
• Local Government Act seeks to extend the formal
  justice system to county level, but unclear
  boundaries and tensions between this and
  customary law. More training and integration of
  chiefs and sub-chiefs required.

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Key Conclusions

• In dynamic conflict settings, an analysis of the
  political economy of the transition from war to
  peace must be constantly updated.
•  Aid is not a neutral constituent, and some
  donors have been wrong in trying to separate aid
  from political dialogue.
• There are certain sectors security, policing,
  rule of law where international support is of
  greater priority than basic services.

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Key Conclusions

• Several of the pooled funds have been highly
  inefficient. By contrast, some bilateral
  interventions have provided the most effective
  support towards CPPB, based on frequent
  monitoring and, most importantly, sufficient
  number and continuity of staff on the ground. 
• There has been insufficient assistance given
  towards preparing Southern Sudan for secession.