Fishing Vessel Stability

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Fishing Vessel Stability
A Draft Guideline Harvey Linton, Industry
Services Manager Shane Neifer, OSO, Fish Team
Leader
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BackgroundThe Human Case

• 1975, the Bravado
• Sank crossing Hecate Straits, light with net on
  the drum
• 7 lives lost
• Coroner and jury recommends
• Inspection should include stability
• Modifications that effect stability be reported
• Stability criteria down to 40 feet (from 80)
• Modifications recorded and reported

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BackgroundThe Human Case

• 1997, the Pacific Charmer
• Sank in Georgia Strait while trawling for herring
• 5 persons on board, 3 rescued, 2 died
• Corners jury recommended
• Any major modifications or changes to vessels
  weight that effect stability be documented and
  forwarded to proper authorities

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BackgroundThe Human Case

• 2002, the Cap Rouge II
• Returning to Fraser River from fishing
• 7 people on board, 2 children. Only two adult
  survivors
• Corner and jury recommendations
• Current vessels without stability data have roll
  period test and freeboard verification
• Fishing stability taught in a manner
  understandable to fishermen

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BackgroundThe Human Case

• 2002, the Cap Rouge II (cont)
• All vessels at risk undergo a full inclining
  experiment and provide complete instructions to
  master
• Safe maximum load line placed on every vessel
• Addition of a maintenance modification log
  documenting changes to the vessel, remaining with
  the vessel for life
• 30 years, same recommendations

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BackgroundThe Human Case
Fatalities, Claims Participation 1991 - 2003
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BackgroundThe Human Case
Fishing Percentages of BC Workforce
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BackgroundThe Human Case
Fatalities by Gear Type 1991 2001 85 Drown
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BackgroundThe Human Case
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BackgroundThe Human Case

• Summary of the Human Case
• 85 of fishing fatalities are from drowning or
  being lost at sea
• About 50 of these result from vessels sinking or
  capsizing
• A good year (1997) 1 in 7238 fishermen died
• A bad year (2001) 1 in 1425 fishermen died
• Last year (2004) 1 in 1214 fishermen died
• Industry wrongly accepts this high fatality rate
  as part of the life at sea!

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BackgroundThe Financial Case

• In 2000, Mike Ross Senior Operating Officer
  Fishing
• Initiate cross divisional review of fishing
  industry activities
• WCB forgives approximately 35 million in
  unfunded liability
• Introduce 6 CUs to replace the single CU
• Addressed areas of revenue leakage

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BackgroundThe Financial Case

• In Fishing, fatalities are claims cost driver
  (injuries drive claim costs in other industries)
• Approximately 43 of fishing fatal claims result
  from unstable fishing vessels
• Since 2000, back to unfunded liability

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BackgroundThe Financial Case

• Financial State of Fishing CUs

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BackgroundThe Legal Case

• A Brief History
• 1991 Supreme Court of Canada denies appeal of
  Ontario Labour Board decision determining that
  business of fishing falls to provincial
  jurisdiction
• January 1995, WCB of BC introduces Canadas first
  and only Provincial fishing specific safety
  regulation
• Spring 2002, WCB and Transport Canada enter into
  an MOU on jurisdiction on fishing vessel safety

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BackgroundThe Legal Case

• OHSR Stability related requirements
• S.24.70 Fishing vessels maintained in a seaworthy
  condition
• S.24.71(2) The owner must ensure that major
  modifications do not affect stability
• S.24.72(b) The owner must provide documentation
  on vessel characteristics, including stability
• S.24.76(a) The master must ensure that the vessel
  is capable of safely making the voyage, due
  consideration to seaworthiness

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BackgroundThe Legal Case

• Prevention Policy around vessel stability
  sections of the OHSR is fairly extensive
• Policy allows officers to require formal
  stability when stability is suspect
• Policy also details responsibilities of owners
  and vessel masters

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Why a Guideline

• The Cap Rouge II investigation highlighted the
  complexities of determining adequate vessel
  stability
• Prevention Policy does not address what is
  expected from officers and by industry as
  acceptable stability criteria
• There are no formal federal stability
  requirements for most small fishing vessels

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Why a Guideline

• Requirements in the regulation around vessel
  stability are general and offer no guidance for
  consistency
• Industry will require a level playing field
  from which to measure the stability of their
  vessel
• The Guideline is a proactive measure to allow
  industry to address these issues before
  enforcement is initiated
• The Guideline will offer consistency of
  enforcement so that industry will be aware of
  what the enforcement criteria are
• Administration of Guideline should ensure
  regulatory due diligence

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Why a Guideline

• What does the Guideline say?
• S.24.72(b) of the OSHR requires the owner to
  offer appropriate instructions for the stability
  of the vessel
• As in all other equipment operations, these
  instructions need to be meaningful
• A vessel must be formally assessed to determine a
  baseline from which various operating conditions
  can be modeled and described
• Suggests inclining experiments for vessels with
  closed (void) spaces and freeboard verification
  and sailing restrictions for vessel with no void
  spaces
• It is only from these formal assessments that
  owners can offer appropriate and meaningful
  instructions on vessel stability to their crew

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Consultations

• Transport Canada
• They will be required to approve stability books
  and will see a significant increase in work load.
  They accept this and are working at increasing
  staffing levels in anticipation
• Stability is a federal responsibility but they
  are a few years away from formal requirements and
  support the efforts of the WCB. They are hopeful
  that this specific initiative will aid in their
  national agenda on fishing vessel stability

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Consultations

• Industry
• A recent formal meeting was held on this issue.
  Represented were
• BC Seafood Alliance
• BC Council of Professional Fish Harvesters
• Fishing Vessel Owners Association
• Fishermens Mutual Marine Insurance
• Northern Native Brotherhood
• Ocean Fisheries
• Underwater Harvesters Association
• Transport Canada
• Transportation Safety Board
• This issue was also discussed with the UFAWU who
  were unable to attend this recent meeting

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Consultations

• Industry Comments
• Industry is concerned about the cost for this
  requirement (2 to 10 K per vessel, plus need
  repairs if required)
• They do not dispute the need for this work to be
  completed
• They understand that this is a one time
  requirement as long as the data are maintained
• They want to be proactive and participate in the
  required educational component of this initiative

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Conclusion

• This Guideline will ensure that fishing vessels
  are afforded the same level of stability
  assessment as all other commercial vessels,
  vehicles, rail, aircraft and mobile equipment
• There is a significant education component
  required once the Guideline has been approved.
  Work in this regard is underway
• The Guideline, and the ensuing action coming from
  it, addresses may years of recommendations from
  Coroners Courts and Accident Investigations. It
  also advises on what WCB accepts as compliance of
  these stability requirements

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Example

• Modified, overloaded(?) in Prince Rupert Harbour

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Example

• Any Problems?

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Example

• Another questionable operation.