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DEDICA Project : Project TE 2005 TE

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Title: DEDICA Project : Project TE 2005 TE


1
DEDICA Project Project TE 2005 (TE)
  • Directory Based EDI Certificate Access and
    Management
  • Manuel Medina, Juan Carlos Cruellas, Montse Rubia
    (DAC/UPC)
  • URL http//.www.ac.upc.es/recerca/DISTR/DEDICA/de
    fault.htm

2
DEDICA PARTNERS
Project Manager Téléport Paris Ile de France
List of partners
  • Organization Role Country
  • Software and Systems
  • Engineering Limited C IE
  • Universitat Politecnica
  • de Catalunya C ES
  • R3 Security Engineering ag A CH
  • Cryptomatic A/S A DK
  • G.M.D A DE
  • Organization Role Country
  • Alcatel Business Systems C FR
  • Intrasoft C GR
  • Athens C.C.I A GR
  • Interbank A GR
  • Finsiel C IT
  • Sogei A IT
  • Indra SSI (Eritel) C ES

3
AIM OF DEDICA
  • The aim of the project is the rapid and cost
    effective provision of EDI Certificate management
    infra-structure to EDI users.
  • Addressed to those interested in the use of open
    standard UN/EDIFACT security services and
    interworking with electronic mail and other
    standard services.

4
OVERVIEW OF DEDICA PROJECT OBJECTIVES
  • To supply a gateway tool between the X.509
    certification infrastructure, and the existing
    EDI applications that are following the
    UN/EDIFACT standards for certification and
    electronic signature mechanisms.
  • To specify translation rules to convert X.509
    certificates into EDIFACT certificates and
    viceversa.
  • To set up demonstrators of its applications in
    four experimental sites
  • Disseminate and exploit the results in an
    operational and industrial way

5
DEDICA SCENARIO (I)
6
DEDICA SCENARIO (II)
7
DEDICA SCENARIO (II)
  • User A in an infrastructure IA gives his
    certificate (generated by a CA of IA -initial
    certificate-) and requests to DEDICA a
    certificate in the other infrastructure IB
    (derived certificate).
  • User A sends a message to user B in
    infrastructure IB (with the certificate generated
    by DEDICA)
  • User B requests DEDICA to validate the derived
    certificate of A.
  • DEDICA verifies if the initial certificate of A
    is still valid. He sends to B the answer to his
    request.

8
BLOCK DIAGRAM OF THE DEDICA GATEWAY (I)
9
BLOCK DIAGRAM OF THE DEDICA GATEWAY (II)
CERTMAP
MANGMAP
  • Given a valid certificate generated by a CA
    (initial certificate) in one format, to generate
    a certificate in the other format (derived
    certificate)
  • Mapping information from the initial to the
    derived in the new format.
  • Usage of external tools ASN.1 and crypto tools.
  • Manage connections with users.
  • Collect requests for generating derived
    certificates.
  • Verify the initial certificates arrived (access
    to X.500)
  • Collect requests of validation of derived
    certificates.
  • Build response messages

10
DEVELOPMENT OF CERTMAP
  • 1 Technical analysis of X.509 and UN/EDIFACT
    certificates
  • 2 Definition and specification of the strategy
    for the mapping of the names
  • 3 Formal specification of the mapping of the
    certificates.

11
CERT-MAP STRUCTURE (CM)
12
MAPPING FROM X.509 TO UN/EDIFACT
0. X.509 certificate arrives. 1. CM_KE passes DER
to ASN.1 tool. 2. ASN.1 tool returns X.509
certificate information in an intern
format. 3 to 6 Modules map data elements. 7.
CM_CE returns ToBeSigned part of EDIFACT
certificate. 8. CM_KE passes it to Cryptographic
module. 9. Cryptographic module returns
signature. 10. CM_FF filters signature. 11. CM_CE
generates EDIFACT derived certificate.
13
MAPPING FROM EDIFACT TO X.509
0. EDIFACT certificate arrives. 1. CM_CE returns
certificate information in an intern
format. 2 to 5 Modules perform mapping tasks
of X.509 derived certificate. 6. CM_KE passes
info to ASN.1 tool 7. ASN.1 tool returns
ToBeSigned. 8. CM_KE passes ToBeSigned to
Cryptographic tool. 9. Crypto tool returns
signature. 10. CM_KE passes signature to
ASN.1 tool. 11. ASN.1 tool returns X.509
certificate.
14
MANG-MAP STRUCTURE (I)
15
MANG-MAP STRUCTURE (II)
  • MK MangMap Kernel. Handles the requests arrived
    to the gateway, passes them to the corresponding
    module, requests the mapping of a given
    certificate and coordinates the processing inside
    the gateway
  • KH KEYMAN and EDIFACT Interchange Handling.
    Handles the requesting interchanges and builds
    the answer interchanges.
  • XH X.509 PKI messages Handling. Handles the
    incoming messages from X.509 PKI and builds the
    corresponding answer messages..

16
SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS
UN/EDIFACT derived certificate request (I)
  • User X, with X.509 certificate requests to the
    gateway the production of a derived EDIFACT
    certificate.
  • User X sends KEYMAN X.509 DER encoded within an
    EDIFACT package (UNO-UNP segments).
  • DEDICA gateway answers with an EDIFACT
    certificate within a KEYMAN message

User E
User X
17
SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS
UN/EDIFACT derived certificate request (II)
18
SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS
  • User X sends to user E a secured EDIFACT
    interchange including the derived EDIFACT
    certificate.

User E
User X
19
SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS
UN/EDIFACT derived certificate validation request
(I)
  • User E receives secured interchange with the
    derived EDIFACT certificate.
  • User E requests validation of the certificate to
    the gateway.
  • The gateway answers the request.
  • User E proceeds with the interchange.

KEYMAN( EDIFACT Cert )
KEYMAN (Valid. result)
User E
User X
20
SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS
UN/EDIFACT derived certificate validation request
(II)
21
SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS
  • MangMap access to X.500 Directory by using LDAP
    in order to validate the X.509 initial
    certificate.
  • MangMap validates
  • Signature in X.509 certificate.
  • Revocation List in X.509 initial certificate
    issuers site.
  • Certification Path for the X.509 initial
    certificate.

22
DEDICA AND X.500 ACCESS
X.500 DIRECTORY
KH
XH
MK
DUA
LDAP SERVER
23
OTHER POSSIBLE USAGES
  • DEDICA TOOLS could also be used in other
    environments
  • CAs with DEDICA modules could issue both kind of
    certificates without needing to duplicate
    infrastructure (revocation lists, etc.)
  • Currently existing X.509 CAs could become an
    EDIFACT CA by incorporating DEDICA tools.

24
CURRENT STATUS
  • Conversion rules for X.509 and EDIFACT
    certificates specified.
  • CertMap developed and working in the sense X.509
    -gt EDIFACT.
  • MangMap finished.
  • Pilots starting. Certification services for
    EDIFACT users.

25
COOPERATION ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER PROJECTS AND
PROGRAM SECTORS
  • SEMPER Project
  • ICE-TEL Project
  • E2S

26
PLANS FOR DEMONSTRATION, EXPLOITATION,
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPECTED ACHIEVEMENTS
  • ETS, European Trusted third parties Services
  • Demonstration phase with the involvement of
    European wide users communities
  • Development and/or enhancement of services.

27
COMMITMENT AND ABILITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS TO
OPERATE IN THE MARKET AREAS INVOLVED
  • INTRASOFT/ INTERBANK
  • HEDIVAN project
  • FINSIEL
  • Italian Custom Administration

28
TRANSITION TO A SUCCESSFUL EXPLOITATION PHASE
  • A second users meeting will be organised to
    demonstrate the capabilities of the DEDICA
    gateway to different users comunities, and to
    developers of EDI applications.

29
X.509 INITIAL CERTIFICATE (I) SHORT DN
  • SEQUENCE (331)
  • toBeSigned SEQUENCE (310)
  • version 0 INTEGER (1) 0x00
    (0) DEFAULT
  • serialNumber INTEGER (2) 0x04D2
    (1234)
  • signature SEQUENCE (13)
  • algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER (9)
    pkcs1-md5WithRSAEncryption
  • parameters TYPE (2) with
  • NULL (0)
  • issuer SEQUENCE OF (49) RDN
  • OCARoot, OCASP, OCA_UPC
  • validity SEQUENCE (30)
  • notBefore UTCTime (13) "961218111200Z"
  • notAfter UTCTime (13) "971218111200Z"
  • subject SEQUENCE OF (44) RDN
  • Ces, Oupc, CNmedina
  • subjectPublicKey BIT STRING (141) Encapsulates
  • TYPE (140) with
  • rSAPublicKey SEQUENCE (137)
  • modulus INTEGER (129)
    0x00BF2B9E56769AAEB79564F63D9CE6759FC8CD851761F13C
    D63EC6DABF08A5FE6C2219E888D48DB753E141BE0169D3F404
    F993D7F389DAF1D27370F5D6E173A75BFB9D75E13D11DAFDA2
    D197084355BA0159EE60AE34B1F1C50426D323F1E748CF34C1
    E0B0FA7EC94CF0FFCD41A3D66C5B6AF7B64008D6CDD14806D4
    3A0D461D6F
  • exponent INTEGER (3) 0x010001
    (65537)
  • issuerUId 1 IMPLICIT BIT STRING
    OPTIONAL NOT PRESENT
  • subjectUId 2 IMPLICIT BIT STRING
    OPTIONAL NOT PRESENT
  • extensions 3 SEQUENCE OF
    OPTIONAL NOT PRESENT
  • signatureAlgorithm SEQUENCE (13)
  • algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER (9)
    pkcs1-md5WithRSAEncryption
  • parameters TYPE (2) with
  • NULL (0)

30
EDIFACT CERTIFICATE CONTENTS AND CODIFICATION (I)
  • USC (v3) CERTIFICATE SEGMENT
  • 0536....CERTIFICATE REFERENCE
  • 1
  • S500 SECURITY IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
  • 0577....Security party qualifier
  • 3
  • 0538....Key name
  • Manel Medina Key 1
  • 0586....Security party name
  • EDI Manuel Medina
  • S500 SECURITY IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
  • 0577....Security party qualifier
  • 4
  • 0586....Security party name
  • DEDICAName
  • 0544....FORMAT CERTIFICATE VERSION
  • XXY
  • 0505....FILTER FUNCTION, CODED
  • 5
  • USA (v3) SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • S502 SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • 0523....Use of algorithm, coded
  • 3
  • 0527....Algorithm, coded
  • 10
  • USA (v3) SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • S502 SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • 0523....Use of algorithm, coded
  • 4
  • 0527....Algorithm, coded
  • 6
  • USA (v3) SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • S502 SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • 0523....Use of algorithm, coded
  • 6
  • 0527....Algorithm, coded
  • 10
  • S503_V3 ALGORITHM PARAMETER

31
X.509 INITIAL CERTIFICATE (II)LONG DN
  • SEQUENCE (439)
  • toBeSigned SEQUENCE (418)
  • version 0 INTEGER (1) 0x00
    (0) DEFAULT
  • serialNumber INTEGER (2) 0x04D2
    (1234)
  • signature SEQUENCE (13)
  • algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER (9)
    pkcs1-md5WithRSAEncryption
  • parameters TYPE (2) with
  • NULL (0)
  • issuer SEQUENCE OF (49) RDN
  • OCARoot, OCASP, OCA_UPC
  • validity SEQUENCE (30)
  • notBefore UTCTime (13) "961218111200Z"
  • notAfter UTCTime (13) "971218111200Z"
  • subject SEQUENCE OF (151) RDN
  • Ces, OThis is an example of very long
    organisation name, OUorganisational unit name,
    CNlong DN for the subject (Part 1)
  • subjectPublicKey BIT STRING (141) Encapsulates
  • TYPE (140) with
  • rSAPublicKey SEQUENCE (137)
  • modulus INTEGER (129)
    0x00BF2B9E56769AAEB79564F63D9CE6759FC8CD851761F13C
    D63EC6DABF08A5FE6C2219E888D48DB753E141BE0169D3F404
    F993D7F389DAF1D27370F5D6E173A75BFB9D75E13D11DAFDA2
    D197084355BA0159EE60AE34B1F1C50426D323F1E748CF34C1
    E0B0FA7EC94CF0FFCD41A3D66C5B6AF7B64008D6CDD14806D4
    3A0D461D6F
  • exponent INTEGER (3) 0x010001
    (65537)
  • issuerUId 1 IMPLICIT BIT STRING
    OPTIONAL NOT PRESENT
  • subjectUId 2 IMPLICIT BIT STRING
    OPTIONAL NOT PRESENT
  • extensions 3 SEQUENCE OF
    OPTIONAL NOT PRESENT
  • signatureAlgorithm SEQUENCE (13)
  • algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER (9)
    pkcs1-md5WithRSAEncryption
  • parameters TYPE (2) with
  • NULL (0)

32
EDIFACT CERTIFICATE CONTENTS AND CODIFICATION (II)
  • 0504. me...Ti
  • 111200
  • USA (v3) SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • S502 SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • 0523....Use of algorithm, coded
  • 3
  • 0527....Algorithm, coded
  • 10
  • USA (v3) SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • S502 SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • 0523....Use of algorithm, coded
  • 4
  • 0527....Algorithm, coded
  • 6
  • USA (v3) SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • S502 SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • 0523....Use of algorithm, coded
  • 7
  • USC (v3) CERTIFICATE SEGMENT
  • 0536....CERTIFICATE REFERENCE
  • 1
  • S500 SECURITY IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
  • 0577....Security party qualifier
  • 3
  • 0586....Security party name
  • 1234RegSchemeID561 OUorganisationa
  • 0586....Security party name
  • l unit name, CNlong DN for the sub
  • 0586....Security party name
  • ject (Part 1) 0000000001
  • S500 SECURITY IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
  • 0577....Security party qualifier
  • 4
  • 0586....Security party name
  • DEDICAName
  • 0544....FORMAT CERTIFICATE VERSION
  • XXY

33
X.509 INITIAL CERTIFICATE (III) EXTENSIONS
  • SEQUENCE (424)
  • toBeSigned SEQUENCE (403)
  • version 0 INTEGER (1) 0x02
    (2)
  • serialNumber INTEGER (2) 0x04D2
    (1234)
  • signature SEQUENCE (13)
  • algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER (9)
    pkcs1-md5WithRSAEncryption
  • parameters TYPE (2) with
  • NULL (0)
  • issuer SEQUENCE OF (49) RDN
  • OCARoot, OCASP, OCA_UPC
  • validity SEQUENCE (30)
  • notBefore UTCTime (13) "961218111200Z"
  • notAfter UTCTime (13) "971218111200Z"
  • subject SEQUENCE OF (44) RDN
  • Ces, Oupc, CNmedina
  • extensions 3 SEQUENCE OF (84)
  • extension SEQUENCE (14)
  • extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER (3)
    id-ce-keyUsage
  • critical BOOLEAN (1) TRUE
  • extnValue OCTET STRING (4) Encapsulates
  • TYPE (4) with
  • BIT STRING (2) 07 80
  • extension SEQUENCE (30)
  • extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER (3)
    id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier
  • critical BOOLEAN (1) TRUE
  • extnValue OCTET STRING (20)
    Encapsulates
  • TYPE (20) with
  • OCTET STRING (18) "Manel Medina Key
    1"

34
EDIFACT CERTIFICATE CONTENTS AND CODIFICATION
(III)
  • USC (v3) CERTIFICATE SEGMENT
  • 0536....CERTIFICATE REFERENCE
  • 1
  • S500 SECURITY IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
  • 0577....Security party qualifier
  • 3
  • 0538....Key name
  • Manel Medina Key 1
  • 0586....Security party name
  • EDI Manel Medina
  • S500 SECURITY IDENTIFICATION DETAILS
  • 0577....Security party qualifier
  • 4
  • 0586....Security party name
  • DEDICAName
  • 0544....FORMAT CERTIFICATE VERSION
  • XXY
  • 0505....FILTER FUNCTION, CODED
  • 5
  • USA (v3) SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • S502 SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • 0523....Use of algorithm, coded
  • 3
  • 0527....Algorithm, coded
  • 10
  • USA (v3) SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • S502 SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • 0523....Use of algorithm, coded
  • 4
  • 0527....Algorithm, coded
  • 6
  • USA (v3) SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • S502 SECURITY ALGORITHM
  • 0523....Use of algorithm, coded
  • 6
  • 0527....Algorithm, coded
  • 10
  • S503_V3 ALGORITHM PARAMETER

USC13Manel Medina Key 1EDI Manel
Medina4DEDICANameXXY522319961218
111200419971218111200'USA310' USA4
6'USA61004J61TB/WLH,PH/D38MYV-1M5BSJO3A
8XH8TSLRM)QJDMAE/X3PAI.QJQUBQG94H08HTE)0TQKK7XU,U
DKT5- FRLTWCG0NCVQLYIV7/2KCZ50T0Y168B)G081X07O55OR
GRB.5G64/W0.STPQ(AOLRHNZAS2ZH-93XTTOCSAYCW8)9TVZS
//0.S81Q9UI2P12 05/0113102414'USRF93IFAG3.
94T8GIFH13O.INHVT/BPC8KIO3XN77LHHL4L214LOVYO83ZU.
86010Z6WL96O8G.1I004NSVWJR29U(L6JIUL /3J8HWYD7HIW
0C0RP1E4S52ZFDOHJO3J66/92.BT8,PIR1D5Z425T48E,51EP3
7I.M3FP2P1PB3CA4M(VU(,6OV8FHAG/YLY'
35
DELIVERABLES LIST
  • ID Title
  • D03.1 Technical description of X509 and
    UN/EDIFACT certificates.
  • Specific user requirements on certificate data
    elements mapping.
  • D03.2 Naming conversion rules specification
  • functional requirements.
  • D03.3 Final specification of CertMap conversion
    rules.
  • D05.1 EDI security functions APIs specification
  • D05.2 Secure EDI communications API specification
  • D06.1 Specification of the CertMap data types and
    architecture.
  • D07.1 Functional specification of MangMap.
  • D07.2 Final specificatio of MangMap Conversion
    Rules.
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