Contamination and System Disruption Threats to Drinking Water

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Contamination and System Disruption Threats to
Drinking Water
InfraGard 2005 National Conference August 9, 2005
Mr. Lance Brooks Biological/Chemical
Countermeasures Plans, Programs,
Budgets Science Technology
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Evidence of Terrorist Intent
September 2003 --FBI bulletin warns of Al Qaeda
plans found in Afghanistan to poison U.S. food
and water supplies. April 2003 --Jordan foils
Iraqi plot to poison drinking water supplies from
Zarqa feeding U.S. military bases along the
Eastern desert. December 2002 Al Qaeda
operatives arrested with plans to attack water
networks surrounding the Eiffel Tower
neighborhoods, Paris. February 2002 Al Qaeda
arrested with plans to attack U.S. embassy water
in Rome with cyanide.
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The Nations Infrastructure is a Complex System
of Systems

• Infrastructure
• The framework of interdependent networks and
  systems that provides a continual flow of goods
  and services essential to the defense and
  economic security of the United States

• Critical National Infrastructures
• Infrastructures that are deemed to be so vital
  that their incapacity or destruction would have a
  debilitating regional or national impact or would
  severely disrupt the behavior and activities of
  large numbers of people who depend upon the
  infrastructure

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The National Infrastructure Protection Plan
defines 17 Sectors and Key Resources
Most of the U.S. Infrastructure is privately
owned
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U.S. Critical Infrastructure Protection Challenge

• 5,000 public airports
• 120,000 miles of major railroads
• 590,000 highway bridges
• 2,000,000 miles of pipelines
• 500 urban public transit systems
• 26,600 banks financial institutions
• 66,000 chemical plants
• 80,000 dams
• 3,000 federal government facilities

• 1,912,000 Farms
• 87,000 food-processing plants
• 5,800 registered hospitals
• 87,000 emergency services entities
• 2 billion miles of telecomm cable
• 2,800 electric power plants
• 104 commercial nuclear power plants
• 300,000 oil and natural gas sites
• 460 skyscrapers

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Water-Sector Statistics

• Drinking Water
• There are approximately 160,000 public water
  systems (PWSs).
• 84 of the total U.S. population is served by
  PWSs.
• PWSs produce 51 billion gallons per day of
  drinking water 68 residential
• There are approximately 2.3 million miles of
  distribution system pipes.
• Wastewater
• There are approximately 16,255 publicly owned
  treatment works (POTWs).
• 75 of the total U.S. population is served by
  POTWs.
• Approximately 27,000 commercial and industrial
  facilities rely on POTWs.
• 32 billion gallons of wastewater are treated
  every day.

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A System of Systems Perspective Is Needed for
Analyzing Infrastructure Interdependencies
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A Risk-Based Decision Support System Is Being
Developed for Infrastructure Protection and
Interdependency Analysis
Interdependent Infrastructures

• Decision Support System
• Identification of Critical Nodes
• Consequences of Attacks (cascading effects)
• Consequences of Response Actions
• Measures of Effectiveness
• Investments Strategies for Prevention,
• Protection, Mitigation, Response, Recovery

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Presidential Directives

• o HSPD-7 (Critical Infrastructure Id,
  Prioritization, and Protection)
• Protect CI from terrorist attacks could Be
  catastrophic, Impair government, Damage Water
  Sector, impact the economy
• Identifies EPA as Sector lead
• o HSPD-8 (National Preparedness)
• o HSPD-9 (Defense of US Agriculture and Food)
• Monitoring Surveillance
• Lab Networks for Water Quality
• Expand Countermeasure RD
• Develop Enhance Intelligence Capabilities
• o HSPD-10 (Biodefense for the 21st Century)

EPA lead for the protection of the critical water
sector infrastructure.
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System Study for Municipal Domestic Water
Security
CIP Damage to the physical components of the
purification and distribution system or resulting
from the trusted insider threat.

• Biological countermeasures The near-end-user
  distribution components of the system involving a
  hydrolytically robust threat with sufficient
  toxicity / morbidity to impact even in highly
  diluted concentrations.
• Radiological / nuclear countermeasures
  Potential for having to decontaminate significant
  portions of the distribution system.
• Chemical countermeasures Post-event system
  re-certification challenge.

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System Study for Municipal Domestic Water
Security Scenario 1 Damage to key components
of a domestic municipal water system from source
to distribution resulting from the trusted
insider threat. Some issues to be taken into
consideration include

• How effective are current measures against this
  threat?
• What are state-of-the-art emerging concepts for
  improved defenses against insider threats?
• What level of damage might be inflicted on a
  system depending on the level of knowledge of the
  insider?
• What are the effects of physical sabotage vs
  electronic sabotage in terms of severity of
  damage?

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System Study for Municipal Domestic Water
Security Scenario 2 The near-end-user
distribution components of a domestic municipal
water system, involving a robust threat which has
sufficient toxicity/morbidity to impact even in
highly diluted concentrations. Scenario is
subdivided into two tasks (a) contamination of
temporary holding tanks and (b) contamination
locally within a distributions system. Some
issues to be taken into consideration include

• What are the current processes, including
  technical methods, for detecting and
  decontaminating a hydrolytically robust chemical
  or biological agent in a water treatment or
  distribution system?
• Are there technical gaps in the ability for
  detection and decontamination of water treatment
  or distribution systems that can be addressed
  through research and development?

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System Study for Municipal Domestic Water
Security Scenario 3 The potential for having to
decontaminate significant portions of the
distribution system if a sufficient quantity of a
long-lived highly active isotope was released.
Some issues to be taken into consideration
include

• What are the current processes, including
  technical methods, for detecting and
  decontaminating a long-lived highly active
  isotope in a water treatment or distribution
  system?
• Are there technical gaps in the ability for
  detection and decontamination of water treatment
  or distribution systems that can be addressed
  through research and development?

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System Study for Municipal Domestic Water
Security Scenario 4 The post-event domestic
municipal water system recertification challenge.
Some issues to be taken into consideration
include

• What would be the process for recertifying a
  water treatment and distribution system in the
  event of (1) chemical (2) biological or (3)
  radiological/nuclear contamination?
• What are the challenges to recertification of
  water treatment or distribution systems,
  including any technical gaps in our ability to
  conduct recertification?
• How might this challenge be remedied through
  improved development of standards or policy?

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Systems Studies Water Security

• Initial Focus
• Two cases
• Point introduction urban area
• Back flush of targeted building
• Toxin, VX

• Ongoing Activities
• Investigation of Impact
• - Number of Causalities
• - Economics
• Study of Multi-tiered Defense

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Water Technology Demonstration
Goal to develop the methodology to be used to
survey, down-select, acquire, lab test, field
test, and use IT tools to evaluate technologies.

• Advisory Council includes EPA, DoD, Utility
  operators
• Provides Technology down-selects for primarily
  chemical attacks on the water sector
• Laboratory (live agent/loop) testing
  methodologies
• Field (Utility) testing methodologies

Transition Methodologies to EPA
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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
and Process Control System (PCS) security

• Process Control Systems Forum
• Help guide the development and adoption of
  standards, protocols, architectures,
  practices
• Focused on the development and deployment of
  future secure PCS and SCADA systems
• Semi-annual Forum

• SCADA Security
• Protect SCADA systems from attack
• Improved Security Information Management
• Physics Based Authentication Location Awareness
• Robust Secure Management for SCADA/EMS Operations

www.hsarpabaa.com
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Other Efforts
Security Guard Study -Determine the existing
requirements/practices of background checks
-Identify the resources available for obtaining
background information -Develop a technical
strategy to enhance background checks
National Academy Critical Infrastructure
Roundtable -establish a roundtable to address
vulnerabilities of critical interdependent
systems.  -develop a long-term strategy for
reducing the vulnerability to debilitating
failures -provide a forum for the free and open
discussion Enhanced Monitoring and
Interpretation (CCTV) -Sensors (CCTV) security
networks create large volumes of data -Fusion of
data and information of different
modalities -leverage capabilities from private
industry and federal RD
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National RD Plan for Critical Infrastructure
Protection
.

• Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
  mandates that an annual Federal Critical
  Infrastructure Protection Research and
  Development Plan (CIP RD Plan) be developed by
• the White House Office of Science and Technology
  Policy (OSTP),
• the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
• Developed by the Infrastructure Subcommittee
  (ISC), established by the National Science
  Technology Council (NSTC)
• The ISC is supported by two Interagency Working
  Groups (IWGs) in this planning effort (physical
  and cyber)
• The annual CIP RD Plan will address RD programs
  and requirements across federal agencies, and
  those of the critical infrastructure sector
  owners and operators and of international
  organizations

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