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ECO 436

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... 27cents/therm. Peoples Gas (Chicago) 813,200 customers 64.09 cents/therm ... North Shore 141,806 customers 56.43 cents/therm. ECO 436 David Loomis 309-438-7979 ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: ECO 436


1
ECO 436
  • Natural Gas

2
Pipeline regulation
  • 25 pipelines account for 90 of volume (1987)
  • Most LDCs served by 3 or fewer pipelines
  • Pipelines bought gas from field producers on LT
    contracts 20 yrs. or more
  • ROR regulated

3
Pipeline regulation (contd)
  • 2 pt. tariff - demand charge - subscribed for a
    certain max level of consumption per period
  • commodity charge - based on quantity actually
    consumed
  • Pipelines buy gas from producers and resell to
    distributor

4
Pipeline regulation (contd)
  • 1985, FERC order 436, did not require pipelines
    to offer transportation - only services, but if
    they did, access rates must not be not
    discriminatory.
  • Some pricing flexibility

5
Pricing
  • Peak load pricing problem
  • Solution
  • storage
  • interruptible tariffs

6
Pipeline regulation (contd)
  • April 92 FERC 636, mandates pipelines to separate
    gas sales from transportation and allowing open
    access to pipeline transportation for gas
    producers and customers
  • Gas shortages in 70s, surplus in 80s
  • 1987 Natural gas provided 22 of total US primary
    energy requirement
  • 45 of all delivered residential energy

7
(No Transcript)
8
Problem of Differentials
  • Max. price was capped for transportation
  • Value of service (shown by price differentials)
    exceeded cap
  • Marketers that owned capacity would only sell
    bundled service

9
FERC 637
  • Passed Feb 2000
  • waived the price ceiling for short-term released
    capacity (less than one year) until September 30,
    2002.
  • Effectiveness of this unregulated secondary
    market for short-term capacity will be assessed
    after the trial period.
  • permitted pipelines to propose contracts for
    capacity with peak/off-peak and term
    differentiated rate structures.

10
LDC Regulation
  • from city gate to burner tip
  • ROR regulated by state
  • gas price is pass thru PGA purchased gas
    adjustment clause

11
IL LDCs
  • 14 investor-owned gas public utilities in IL in
    1999
  • NICOR 2,266,470 customers 42.27cents/therm
  • Peoples Gas (Chicago) 813,200 customers 64.09
    cents/therm
  • Illinois Power 399,871 customers 52.27 cents/them
  • North Shore 141,806 customers 56.43 cents/therm

12
PGA Clause
  • Peoples North Shore proposed eliminating the
    PGA clause and include gas charges in base rates
    in 1999.
  • Commission ordered set fixed gas charge
  • Companies rejected the set rate and elected to
    maintain PGA

13
PGA Clause (contd)
  • NICOR proposed an alternative regulation scheme.
  • Proposal was approved in November, 1999.

14
Armstrong Leppel - combination gas and electric
  • No statistically significant indications of cost
    complementarity or economies of scale in the
    combination gas and electric

15
Lyon Hackett
  • Bottleneck or essential facilities - facilities
    with relatively large economies of scale,
    substantial asset specificity, initially linking
    isolated buyers and sellers.

16
Bottleneck facilities characteristics
  • feature extremely large quasi-rents and require
    protection like vertical integration.
  • governed by regulatory policies that protect both
    investors and customers.
  • Began as providers of a service that tied
    upstream supply with transportation of that
    supply.
  • Networks tend to grow in scope and complexity
    overtime creating greater competition upstream of
    the bottleneck facility.

17
Reasons for using long-term governance structures
in transactions with upstream suppliers
  • quality differences that can only be verified
    thru experience.
  • If spot prices are not free to adjust instantly,
    shocks many cause the markets not to clear.
  • Began as providers of a service that tied
    upstream supply with transportation of that
    supply.
  • Networks tend to grow in scope and complexity
    overtime creating greater competition upstream of
    the bottleneck facility.

18
Transactional Characteristics
  • heterogeneity of customers
  • residential - no storage - cant switch to other
    fuels
  • industrials - dual fuel boiler technology
  • 2 forms of reliable service
  • instantaneous service - allows buyer to take gas
    out of pipeline as soon as buyer as gas put in
  • no notice peak service - allows buyer to take
    as much gas as needed without advance warning to
    the pipeline
  • Reliability costs
  • inventory costs of holding excess gas
    deliverability
  • pipeline costs - holding excess transportation
    capacity maintaining extra system pressure (line
    pack) and monitoring suppliers.

19
Critique of order 636
  • FERC focuses on benefits of unbundling, but
    rejects the possibility of degraded service
    reliability.
  • Some pipelines argued that bundling was necessary
    for reliable no notice service (later refuted)
  • We predict the cost of internalizing
    externalities in the unbundled system will be
    greater than in the bundled system. p. 390
  • FERC 636 should have left bundling as an option.
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