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Security Sector Reform in the Palestinian
Territories Challenges and Prospects
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Introduction

• On 30 July 2005 in Ramallah one day workshop
  under the title Security Sector Reform in the
  Palestinian Territories Challenges and
  Prospects
• Promoters the Palestinian Academic Society for
  the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) and
  the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of
  Armed Forces (DCAF)
• Participants more than 60 Palestinian security
  practitioners, politicians, representatives of
  civil society and academics
• Main topics to discuss the challenges of
  Palestinian security governance and the prospects
  for Security Sector Reform (SSR)
• This was the first time that security sector
  governance and reform were discussed in
  Palestine, and probably even in the Arab world,
  with large participation from the civil society.
• Main problems a sharply deteriorating internal
  security situation as lawlessness and anarchy
  continue to rise the Palestinian National
  Authority (PNA) and its security agencies
  encounter serious difficulties as they try to
  impose law and order on the Palestinian street
  In many areas, Hamas has effectively replaced the
  PNA as the holder of the monopoly of force
  Israel as it plans to withdraw its settlers and
  troops from Gaza and parts of the northern West
  Bank

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Aim of the workshop

• No big interest about this topic before
• Why this workshop? To contribute to a better
  understanding of Palestinian security governance
  and analyze its significance within the specific
  national context, which remains strongly
  influenced by the Israeli occupation, a
  perception of chaos in the security forces, and a
  widespread feeling of insecurity amongst the
  Palestinian population.
• it was not its goal to accuse, attack, condemn or
  judge any person or group within the security
  apparatus or the government.
• The focus should rather be on the future and what
  is needed in Palestine to strengthen the security
  sector and make it more efficient.
• Ensuring a proper legal framework, a clear
  separation of powers and a delimitation of roles.
• An overcoming a governance system which was still
  influenced by the legacy of the former President
  Yasser Arafat had pursued a long-term policy of
  centralizing control and power in his person,
  establishing him as the sole arbiter and giving
  him discretionary powers to appoint, pay and arm
  those loyal to him without referring to any
  coordination or consultation.
• To help to enhance the capability of Palestinian
  security forces to guarantee law and order and
  provide protection for the Palestinian population
  from Israeli attacks, internal violence and
  lawlessness.

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Key areas

• the development of a Palestinian National
  Security Policy
• the institutional set-up of Palestinian security
  governance
• legislative and public oversight mechanisms
• the role of international assistance

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Introduction to the Concept of Security Sector
Reform (SSR)

• The security sector involves not only a wide
  range of armed forces, but also a complex and
  multilayered governance structure
• - In a functioning security sector
• - executive and legislative authorities
• - the judiciary, civilian research and training
  institutions
• - civilian experts, the media, and eventually
  the public at large play an important role in
  controlling and overseeing the defence, security
  and intelligence organisations and prevent them
  from becoming a state within the state.

• Security sector reform does not just target
  defence, police or intelligence services.
• But also means
• - Developing functioning ministries
• - strengthening the parliamentary role in
  defence and security
• - and establishing macro-policy frameworks,
  proper legal systems and processes for budget
  scrutiny are equally important components of a
  comprehensive security sector reform programme.

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The Challenge of Developing a National Security
Policy in the Palestinian Context
Problems
Discussion

• the needs and concerns related to the formulation
  of a Palestinian National Security Policy in the
  context of the Israeli occupation
• the central role of security in Israeli strategic
  thinking. Trough the Oslo process Israel has
  basically accepted the notion that functioning
  Palestinian security forces are key for its own
  security. Providing security to Israel is a means
  of securing Palestinian national rights.
• National security policy - the uncertain future
  of the Fatah movement, the significant military
  destruction of the Palestinian security
  infrastructure, Yasser Arafats legacy of
  militarising the Second Intifada, as well as lack
  of political will on the side of the current
  Palestinian leadership

• internal and occupation-related security
  challenges
• the high degree of external domination of the
  Palestinian polity posed significant constraints
  to the formulation of both a National Security
  Policy and a broader political strategy vis-à-vis
  the peace process.
• the necessity to link security reform to the
  broader Palestinian development agenda

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Challenges of Palestinian Security Governance
Legal Framework, Structures and Institutions
Problems
Discussion

• the need for a clear legal framework for
  Palestinian security governance as a prerequisite
  for successful reform and regretted that this was
  still missing.
• the institutional role of the Prime Minister in
  the security domain remained still unclear.
• Security laws
• the close linkage between Palestinian governance
  reform and the peace process
• the Palestinian political regime
• Corruption and policy of staffing

• the establishment of a legal-normative framework
  for the Palestinian security sector and
  underlined the importance of parallel reform of
  the judicial system.
• the politicisation of the security forces
• The fight against corruption
• the lack of professionalism, low morale and high
  absenteeism
• The recruitment policy
• the need for developing a coherent strategy for
  DDR (Demobilisation, Disarmament and
  Re-integration)
• the high turnover of personnel and the salaries
  for security personnel

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Challenges of Palestinian Security Governance
Legislative Oversight and Public Control
Problems
Discussion

• the lack of willingness of the PLC to exercise
  oversight
• the nationalistic political culture in the
  Palestinian Territory
• the lack of parliamentary expertise
• the monolithic ideological structure of the
  Council and its domination by Fatah
• the loyalty of security personnel
• the internal reform of Fatah

• a complete absence of legislative policy
• public control
• The copying laws from neighbouring Arab countries

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Palestinian Security Sector Reform and the Role
of External Assistance
Problems
Discussion

• A multilateral and bilateral aid channelled into
  security assistance had produced very limited
  results
• to define their higher national interest as well
  as their security policy
• The international assistance must be channeled
  through clear mechanisms which had yet to be
  established

• the need to link security reforms to the peace
  process and urged the international community to
  bring Israel back to the negotiating table
• The coordination with Israel

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Conclusion

• Reforming the security sector will be the key
  challenge for Palestinian governance for the
  years to come.
• Palestinian security sector reform is first of
  all a political challenge rather than a technical
  or organisational question.
• without creating and maintaining the necessary
  political conditions for reform, any structural
  or organisational changes in the Palestinian
  security sector are likely to be short-lived.
• A serious dialogue between Palestinian
  policy-makers and society will be of critical
  importance here.

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The EU in Palestine

• The European Neighbourhood Policy in Palestine
• The perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a
  significant degree of integration, including
  through a stake in the EUs Internal Market, and
  the possibility for the Palestinian Authority to
  participate progressively in key aspects of EU
  policies and programmes.
• An upgrade in the scope and intensity of
  political cooperation
• The opportunity for convergence of economic
  legislation, the opening of economies to each
  other, and the continued reduction of trade
  barriers which will stimulate investment and
  growth
• More targeted financial support EU financial
  assistance for the Palestinian Authority will be
  better targeted to support the actions identified
  in the Action Plan
• Possibilities of gradual opening of or reinforced
  participation in relevant Community programmes,
  promoting, inter alia, cultural, educational,
  environmental, technical and scientific links
• Support including technical assistance and
  twinning to meet EU norms and standards, and
  targeted advice and support for legislative
  approximation
• Deepening trade and economic relations, extending
  them progressively to cover agriculture and the
  service sector, and to provide the conditions for
  increasing investment and exports.

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The EU in Palestine

• EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
  (EUPOL COPPS)
• On 14 November 2005, the Council
  established an EU Police Mission in the
  Palestinian Territories under the European
  Security and Defence Policy. The operational
  phase started on 1 January 2006 and will have an
  initial duration of 3 years. The EU Police
  Mission for the Palestinian Territories,
  code-named EUPOL COPPS, has a long term reform
  focus and provides enhanced support to the
  Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable
  and effective policing arrangements.
• EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing
  Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU
• BAM Rafah)
• On 15 November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian
  Authority concluded an "Agreement on Movement and
  Access", including agreed principles for Rafah
  crossing (Gaza). On 21 November 2005, the Council
  of the EU welcomed the Agreement and agreed that
  the EU should undertake the Third Party role
  proposed in the Agreement. It therefore decided
  to launch the EU Border Assistance Mission at
  Rafah crossing point, code-named EU BAM Rafah, to
  monitor the operations of this border crossing
  point. The operational phase of the Mission began
  on 30 November 2005 and will have a duration of
  12 months.
• On 13 November 2006, the mission's mandate was
  extended for 6 months.

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The EU in Palestine

• Assistance to the Palestinians in 2006 (MEUR)
• Interim Emergency Relief Contribution (IERC) -
  I 40,00
• UNRWA 2006 Support to the General Fund 64,41
• UNRWA Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and
  Syria 10,00
• TIM Window 1 (ESSP) 10,00
• TIM Window 2 (Interim Emergency Relief
  Contribution (IERC) - II) 40,00
• TIM Window 3 - (Social Allowances to Health
  Workers and Vulnerable) 42,75
• TIM reinforcement following TIMs extension
  6,00
• Technical Assistance and Capacity Building
  (ENPSI) 12,00
• Humanitarian Aid for Palestinian populations in
  WBGS, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon 34,00
• Humanitarian aid for WBGS 50,00
• Food and Food Security (UNRWA - 15m, WFP -
  5m) 20,00
• TOTAL 329,16