Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

1
Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism
2
Radiological/Nuclear Threat Matrix
Stolen Nuclear Weapons
Source http//www.ctc.org/DHSIF/Bowyer20Panel.pd
f
Threat Sophistication Low Medium High
Nuclear Power Accidents
Improvised Nuclear Devices
Research Reactor Accident
Criticality Incident
Spent Fuel Dispersal
Dispersed Radioactive Sources
Radiological Waste Dispersal
Low Medium High Potential Consequence
3
Necessary steps for a nuclear terror act to occur

• 1) Terrorist group with extreme objectives,
  technical financial resources
• Who has the motivation to pursue nuclear
  terrorism?
• Apocalyptic groups? (bringing on the end of the
  world)
• Politico-religious groups? (al-Qaida, but maybe
  not subgroups)
• Nationalist/separatist groups? (actual use likely
  to be counter-productive, but may want to develop
  a credible threat)
• Single-issue terrorists? A lone individual?
• 2) Must choose to engage in nuclear terrorism
• strategic considerations, growing lethality of
  terrorist attacks, aura of fear and myth
• BUT moral issues, response fears

4
Terrorist Motivations

• Traditional thinking Terrorists want a lot of
  people watching, not a lot of people dead.
  Brian Jenkins, RAND
• New Breed of Terrorist Group
• Al Qaida politico-religious
• Aum Shinrikyo apocalyptic
• Want to kill many and have even more watching in
  dread

5
U.S. view
Unclassified version of the most recent U.S.
National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism
threats (July 2007) indicates that al-Qaida will
remain the most serious threat to the United
States and that the group will continue attempts
to acquire and deploy unconventional weapons

• We assess that al-Qaida will continue to try
  to acquire and employ chemical, biological,
  radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and
  would not hesitate to use them if it develops
  what it deems is sufficient capability.

This assessment is echoed in the October 2007
National Strategy for Homeland Security
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Necessary steps for a nuclear terror act to occur
(2)

• 3) Must seize intact nuclear weapon or acquire
  fissile material to make an IND
• 4) Must bypass or defeat safeguards in intact
  weapon, or assemble IND
• - Permissive actions links (PALs) electronic
  locks allow only limited number of tries to enter
  correct codes, then disable warhead
• - Safing, arming, fusing, and firing (SAFF)
  procedures strict arming sequence, linked to
  weapons mission, verified by sensors in weapon

7
Gun-type nuclear device

• Fires HEU projectile down tube at another piece
  of HEU.
• Requires large amount of HEU, as it does not
  appreciably compress or change the density of the
  fissile material.
• IAEA SQ (25 kg) likely insufficient for terrorist
  group (40-60 kg needed for crude device)
• Does not have to be weapons-gradefresh or
  spent fuel will work too

Source http//www.fas.org
8
Critical mass as function of uranium enrichment
(with a beryllium reflector)
Alexander Glaser, Frank Von Hippel, Arms Control
Today, January 2006
9
Implosion-type nuclear device

• Fast and smooth squeezing of fissile material
  into a supercritical state.
• Requires knowledge of high-speed electronics and
  high explosive lenses.
• Can use either plutonium or HEU to produce high
  yield

Source http//www.fas.org
10
Major Hurdle Acquisition of Fissile Material

• Ref David Albright and Kimberly Kramer,
  Fissile Material Stockpiles Still Growing,
  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
  November/December 2004.

11
Civilian use of HEU worldwide

• Research and test reactors
• Critical assemblies
• Fast reactors
• Icebreakers

Chart source Ole Reistad, International Panel
on Fissile Materials
12
Securing nuclear materials (MPCA)

• Physical protection systems (PP)
• Fences, barriers, sensors, vaults, access control
  systems, armed response forces
• Material control systems
• Tags, seals, security cameras, portal monitors,
  two man rule procedures
• Material accounting systems
• Measure the amounts and characteristics of
  nuclear material

13
Illicit trafficking of nuclear material
14
Magnitude of the task U.S. Border crossings

• On average, at 621 US Border Crossings
• 360,000 vehicles
• 5,100 trucks/containers
• 2600 aircraft
• 600 vessels
• enter the United States every day.
• To protect US interests, estimates of as many as
  2400 radiation portals would be required to
  effectively screen 100 of goods with minimal
  effect to commerce.

Courtesy M. Carter
15
Necessary steps for a nuclear terror act to occur
(3)

• 5) Must transport weapon to high-value target
• - suitcase, boat, light aircraft, assemble in
  place?
• 6) Must detonate the weapon

16
Detection of Terrorist Weapons

• Detection methods based on 3 properties of
  nuclear explosive materials
• Radioactive use radiation detector
• Dense bombard with x-rays, see if absorbed
• Fissionable irradiate and see if any fissions
  result
• Signal must be distinguishable from background
  radiation level
• HEU Pu-239 are not intensely radioactive, need
  to know where to look

17
Nuclear terror conclusions

• Catastrophic damage, but far more difficult to
  achieve than radiological terror
• Construction of gun-type device more achievable,
  so securing/consolidating/eliminating HEU stocks
  is essential first step
• Constructing nuclear device with Pu is also
  achievable securing the material is the best
  way to prevent terrorists from creating a weapon.

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International Approaches

• Physical Security of nuclear materials
• Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear
  Materials standards only apply to material in
  international transit. In May 2001, most of the
  parties to the convention agreed to amend it to
  cover material used or stored domestically.
  However, no concrete standards for domestic
  protection were specified, nor have such
  standards subsequently been negotiated.
• IAEA INFCIRC 225, Rev. 4 recommends that
  physical protection be based on design basis
  threat (DBT), but does not specify any minimum
  threat to be guarded against
• Cooperative Threat Reduction
• UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 2004)
  on weapons of mass destruction and non-state
  trafficking of nuclear material
• Related Proliferation Security Initiative
• International Convention for the Suppression of
  Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (April 4, 2005)

In reality, security requirements for nuclear
programs vary greatly from country to country
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weapons of mass disruption

• Radiological devices are often referred to as
  weapons of mass disruption they could cause
  panic, but not a large number of deaths and
  widespread physical destruction.
• To date, there have been several notable
  radiological accidents at and attempted attacks
  on nuclear power plants. But there has not yet
  been a successful malicious attack resulting in
  extensive destruction. Therefore, the physical,
  financial, environmental, psychological, and
  political effects of a radiological terrorist
  attack cannot be fully grasped.

20
Types of radiological terrorism

• Radiological devices.
• Radiation-emitting devices (REDs)
• Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs)
• Manually pouring or spilling radioactive material
  onto a surface or water source.
• Attacks on nuclear facilities or on materials
  during transport.
• Nuclear facilities include nuclear power plants,
  cooling ponds for spent nuclear fuel rods,
  research reactors, nuclear reprocessing
  facilities, and nuclear waste sites.

21
Availability of radiological materials
Source LANL, http//eed.llnl.gov/ans/2002/mullen/
mullen_ans_2002.pdf
22
Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs)

• An RDD is a device designed to spread radioactive
  material through the detonation of conventional
  explosives or other dispersal means.
• A dirty bomb could be constructed by wrapping a
  conventional high explosive with some radioactive
  material and detonating the explosive so that
  contamination could be spread.
• This should not be confused with a nuclear
  explosion, which involves the triggering of a
  nuclear chain reaction and a release of energy.

23
Radioisotopes that Pose the Greatest Security Risk
24
Polonium?

• Alpha radiation threat fast-moving helium
  nuclei, can be shielded, must drink, inhale, or
  be injected smoky bomb?
• Alpha particles stop at a short distancehard to
  get many victims, but all of the energy is
  deposited in a relatively small number of cells,
  killing them or causing mutations
• To make inhalable burn it, blow it up, dissolve
  in water, pulverize
• Gamma radiation super-powered packets of light,
  hard to shield, effective at a distance, but does
  not kill many people (dirty bomb material)

25
Additional Considerations RegardingMaterials for
Use in RDDs

• Detectibility
• Unshielded source materials can be detected,
  in general, if sufficient quantity
• Some materials are easier to shield than
  others
• Dispersibility
• Some materials can be dispersed more
  effectively than others
• Decontamination
• Some materials could pose greater challenges
  for decontamination

26
Sources used in mobile cesium irradiators in the
former Soviet Unioncontaining 3500 Curies of
cesium-137.Photo Credit IAEA,
http//www.iaea.org
27
Industrial Irradiators(Sterilization sources)

• Large stationary irradiation facilities may
  utilize mega-Curies of Cesium or Cobalt. They
  require extremely high levels of shielding.
  Sources are arranged in arrays and often stored
  in water pools to provide both thermal control
  and shielding.

Boxes of medical supplies, readied for radiation
conveyor
Schematic of industrial irradiator
28
Radioisotope Thermal Generators

• Strontium sources, approx. 40,000 curies, used as
  navigational beacons
• Assistance from Norway, U.S., Canada, France,
  Germany, Denmark
• Defense Ministry, other agencies requesting
  assistance
• Drafting Action Plan to address remaining RTGs in
  Russia by 2014 April 2008 meeting to be held at
  Kurchatov Institute on RTG Action Plan

RTG in Murmansk Oblast
An RTG dismantled by metals thieves, Valentin
village, Primorsky Krai
29
Sabotage scenario

• Example Diablo Canyon, near San Luis Obispo
• Spent fuel in holding pools contain much more
  radioactivity than active fuel
• Loss of coolant from holding pools could case
  fire, catastrophic release
• Dry cask storage after 5 years reduces risk

30
Spent Nuclear Fuel Pool

• Keep spent fuel rods under at least 20 feet of
  water to provide adequate shielding from the
  radiation for anyone near the pool
• Spent Fuel Pools were designed as TEMPORARY
  storage for fuel while short lived isotopes decay
  (lt1 yr)

31
Nuclear Plant Schematic
Containment (Hardened Structure)
Fuel Building(Soft Structure)
32
Russian suggestions for actions to address
nuclear terrorism threat

• Sergey Pertsev, head of the Defense Ministrys
  12th Central Scientific Research Institute
• Voluntary certification of individual facilities
  ability to withstand a terrorist attack
  (antiterroristicheskaya ustoychivost), to be in
  force by 2010, should be made mandatory
• Russias rules on physical protection should be
  supplemented with legislation focused on the
  terrorism threat, and include non-nuclear WMD
  threats
• clarify meaning of term bezopasnost (safety or
  security) in Russian laws
• institute regular inspections of vulnerability
  levels/physical protection at facilities
• establish priority-setting mechanism (to
  determine which facilities are most important in
  a counter-terrorism context)

33
Cases Attempted malicious use of radiological
materials

• September 2003 Gu Tianming, a Chinese nuclear
  medicine expert, is given a suspended death
  sentence after being convicted of placing
  iridium-192 pellets in a colleagues office.
• Gu worked at a Chinese hospital and used forged
  official papers to buy the iridium-192. He placed
  them in his colleagues ceiling as a form of
  revenge. Soon after, the poisoned colleague began
  complaining of memory loss, fatigue, loss of
  appetite, headaches, vomiting, and bleeding gums.
  Before the radioactive pellets were uncovered,
  another 74 hospital staff members were found to
  have similar symptoms.

34
RDD attack results

• More immediate deaths likely to be caused by the
  conventional bomb blast and ensuing panic than
  from radiological material (intensity of
  radioactive materials diluted by scattering).
• NB here we are talking about an RDD, not
  smoky bomb à la Litvinenko or Gu

35
RDD attack results (2)

• Contamination could lead to slower recovery or
  permanent internal and external damage.
• Inhalation of microscopic particles, which can
  stay lodged in the body, or exposure to beta or
  gamma radiation.
• Exposure to high enough radiation levels may
  increase risk of long-term illnesses. Surrounding
  areas may be affected by the radiation if
  radioactive particles travel downwind. Since a
  dirty bomb blast may appear to be simply a
  conventional attack, people covered in
  radioactive dust may unwittingly spread particles
  to hospitals and homes as they try to evacuate
  the area.

36
Obstacles to Conducting Radiological Terrorism

• Terrorists might be exposed to radiation
  themselves
• Radiological terrorism requires a bare minimum of
  technical expertise and a basic understanding of
  radiation and radioactive materials
• To make an effective RDD, radioactive material
  must be turned into a usable form (grinding
  radioactive pellets to make radioactive dust, for
  instance).
• The terrorists must be able to build a device to
  scatter the radioactive material.
• The terrorists have to understand how different
  radioactive sources pose different security
  risks.

37
Creating a potent RDD is difficult, but

• Usage of an RDD, even one that is not potent, may
  trigger panic out of proportion of true risk to
  human health and safety
• Radiological incidents give us some sense of the
  possible physical and economic effects of a
  radiological attack

38
Incident in Goiania, Brazil

• September 1987
• A canister of cesium-137 was taken from an
  abandoned cancer clinic, broken into parts, and
  pried open.

The blue radioactive powder was distributed
throughout the community children rubbed the
powder on their bodies so that they glowed and
sparkled . Wind and rainwater runoff also spread
contamination.
39
Results of Goiania Incident

• Four deaths, one amputation, 28 people with
  radiation burns, and monitoring of more than
  112,000 people (most of whom experienced no
  contamination).
• One square kilometer had to be decontaminated
  seven homes demolished. About 3,500 cubic meters
  of radioactive waste was created.
• Clean-up costs totaled 20 million, hundreds of
  millions of dollars were lost with collapses in
  tourism and business.
• Many people left due to fears of remaining
  contamination, and although not contaminated,
  prices of manufactured products fell by 40 and
  stayed at that level for 30 to 40 days.

40
RDD economic effects likely to be greater than
immediate physical impact

• Some radioisotopes can chemically bind to
  concrete, metal, and other surfaces.
• Others can settle in surface cracks in buildings
  sidewalks
• This can make decontamination efforts very
  difficult. In some cases, the buildings would
  have to be completely demolished before the area
  is considered safe enough for people to return.
• Business must stop while decontamination is under
  way.
• An attack on a nuclear power plant would also
  likely to have negative spillover effects on the
  nuclear power industry

41
Minimizing the threat of RDD use

• For minor sources public education response
• For large sources tighten controls, detect
  during transport, prepare appropriate responses,
  as well as education

42
Steps to Minimize the RDDThreat (continued)

• 1. Control/Secure/Track Materials of Concern for
  use in RDDs
• Add or Increase security for large source sites,
  including waste sites
• Develop and deploy alternate technologies, e.g.,
  electron accelerators
• Utilize technologies for tracking large remote
  sources such as RTGs
• Support orphan source recovery and disposal
  programs, e.g., IAEA
• 2. Increase Likelihood that Nuclear Smuggling
  Attempts Detected
• Improve technologies better/cheaper/simpler/more
  reliable
• Develop mobile search and response teams
  discover respond to use
• Extend search response efforts to include
  international community
• 3. Prepare Response to Use of RDDs
• Emergency response plan appropriate actions
  communications
• Decontamination technologies and strategies
  needed

43
International EffortsIAEA Code of Conduct on
the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

• Revised to reflect enhanced requirements on the
  security of radioactive sources.
• Approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in
  September 2003, published in January 2004.
• 57 States (including two non-Member States) have
  written to the Director General to fully support
  and endorse the Agencys efforts to enhance the
  safety and security of radioactive sources.

44
Guidance Document

• Document outlining guidelines for the export and
  import of radioactive sources to supplement the
  relevant provisions of the revised Code of
  Conduct.
• Submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors in
  September 2004 for approval.
• Includes
• identification of vital areas in nuclear
  facilities
• the development of a security culture
• combating of cyber attacks on nuclear
  installations

45
IAEA Other international instruments related to
enhancing nuclear radiological security

• The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a
  Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
• The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
  Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
  Management.

46
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)

• On May 26, 2004, U.S. Secretary of Energy
  Abraham announced the Global Threat Reduction
  Initiative in Vienna, Austria.

Mission GTRI will identify, secure,
recover, and/or facilitate the disposition of
vulnerable high-risk nuclear and radiological
materials around the world that pose a potential
threat to the United States and the
international community.
47
GTRI Prioritization Guidelines
Depends on type and quantity of
nuclear/radioactive material, possibility of
direct usein nuclear explosive device or RDD,
potentialconsequences

Material Attractiveness
PrimaryFactor
Internal Site Vulnerability Condition
Assessment of terrorist presence, information
onthefts, etc.
Country LevelThreatEnvironment
Other Factors
Measure of security system
Proximity to Strategic Asset
Strategic asset vital military facilities,
critical national infrastructure, near-border
location, Megaports, Olympic venues, etc.
48
GTRI

• minimize the use of HEU fuel in research
  reactors
• remove fuel to secure storage in the country of
  origin
• convert the cores of civilian research reactors
  from HEU to LEU.
• work to identify and secure other nuclear and
  radiological materials and related equipment that
  are not yet covered by existing threat reduction
  efforts

49
Conclusions

• Steps can be taken to minimize the threat
  worldwide, but it is not likely that we can
  eliminate the threat of radiation terrorism.
• Education is an important tool to minimize panic.
• Given the consequences, we DO have to do
  everything possible to combat the possibility of
  the use of a nuclear device.
• To combat the illicit movement of nuclear
  material we must tighten controls and improve
  detection, including intelligence sharing. The
  number of materials that pose a major threat is
  manageable.