Vulnerabilities and Protection of Nuclear Facilities

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Vulnerabilities and Protection of Nuclear
Facilities
Mycle Schneider
Director
World Information Service on Energy (WISE - Paris)
John H Large
Consulting Engineer
Large Associates
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Can Defence in Depth be Adapted to Counter
Terrorism ?
How Easily can Targets be Identified ?
Who are the Adversaries and what are the DBTs ?
Counter Terrorism Structures ?
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Spent Fuel Transports in France
1,250 tons / yr 300 casks
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Plutonium Transports in France
12 tons / yr 90 casks
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Fresh MOX Transports in France
140 tons / yr 70 casks
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40 t of plutonium transported in France every year
gt 25 due to foreign clients
SAFETY AND SECURITY CONCERNS
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(No Transcript)
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IAEA Safety Series 6 - 30 minutes at 800oC
Tunnel Fire 1100oC for gt 24 hours
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Autoroute webcam
Plutonium transports
Terrorist Attack Milan gt50 cm Armour
or Traffic Accident
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MAXIMUM DISPERSION BY FIRE
Terrorist attack research maximum efficiency
Fire Maximum Dispersion
Means of Attack - Milan
OR Suicide gasoline truck
MAXIMUM IMPACT
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Lyon
Plutonium shipment routes can easily be
identified
gt 500 fatal cancers Tens of thousands to evacuate
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Range of impact of different scenarios
National / Worldwide
Reprocessing (gas tanker explosion)
Regional
Plutonium truck (crash fire)
Spent fuel train (crash fire) Plutonium truck
(crash only)
Local
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Natural gas supertanker
What next ?
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Supertanker and load characteristics
25,000 - 130,000 m3 of explosive liquefied gas
1 kg LNG 1 kg TNT
1 m3 LNG (volume) 0.5 t (weight)
1 m3 LNG 0.5 t TNT
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Natural gas supertanker potential
2,5 x Nagasaki Bomb "Fat Man"

50,000 t TNT
100,000 m3 LNG
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La Hague reprocessing plants
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LNG supertanker explosion at La Hague
At least partial destruction of La Hague plants
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What are and How Easily can Targets be Identified
?
THE FUEL PLANTS
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la Hague
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Very large radioactive inventories
Separated plutonium
gt 50 t
Fuel pools
7,000 t
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Very large radioactive inventories
Vitrified waste
gt 1,300 m3
Other wastes
gt 45,000 m3
2/3 unconditioned
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Sellafield
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CHEMICAL PROCESSING PLANTS Relatively Small
Btaches of HLW but Large Thermal Energy
Potential
SELLAFIELD
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(No Transcript)
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SPENT FUEL STORAGE Large Quantities of Fuel and
High Level Radioactive Wastes
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(No Transcript)
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PLUTONIUM OXIDE STORES 70 tonnes of Pu-239
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8,000t Spent Fuel
1100m3 ILW Contaminated Keresene
Plutonium Contaminated Wastes
200t Spent Fuel Pond Sludge
76t Plutonium-239
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INITIATING EVENT
NUCLEAR PLANT DEFENCE
NUCLEAR PL
ANT DEFENCE
RADIOLOGICAL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
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INITIATING EVENT
EITHER
external - earthquake
ACCIDENTAL
internal - malfunction
human - error
act of sabotage
INTENTIONAL
terrorist attack
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Terrorist Attack
INTENTIONAL
World Trade Center 2001
Oklahoma Bomb 1995
SL1 Reactor 1961
Design Basis Threats - DBTs
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Nuclear Safety Case based on-
ACCIDENTAL STUPID
-v-
Terrorism derives from-
INTENTIONAL INTELLIGENT
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Blind Golfer
1) Misses Golf Course
2) Misses Golf Ball
3) Hits Wrong Direction

1. Holes in One

GAME OF CHANCE
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x
Blind Golfer
TERRORIST ORGANISATION
No longer an accidental challenge but a
deliberate and intelligent attack on the plant
safety systems
Could be a Hole-in-One
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United Kingdom Anti-Terrorism Plans
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Blunkett
Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Committee
Denham
Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Sub
Committee
Raynsford
London Resilience Committee
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DTI Senior Security Committee
Memo of Understanding
DTI - OCNS
HSE - NII
REPPIR
Radiation (Emergency Preparedness Public
Information) Regulations
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RADIATION DOSE LIMITS
50/100 mSv
Equipped Trained
ZERO
NotTrained
NOT SPECIFIED
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Not Equipped
up to 500 mSv
Not Equipped or Trained
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Public's Compromise
Public have to accept a significant risk of
reactor sabotage, fuel transport hits and
terrorist attack as the price of having nuclear
power, otherwise the plants will have to shut
down