Timetable to Freedom

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Timetable to Freedom

• A Plan for Iraqi Stability
• and Sovereignty

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• Begin phased troop withdrawals
• Reestablish Iraqi national army
• Create an international stabilization force
• Provide substantial economic assistance

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• A fixed schedule for disengaging U.S. and other
  foreign military forces - the phased
  withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces
• - no permanent bases left behind

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• 2. The rehiring of portions of the former Iraqi
  national army
• - Iraqi government command of all Iraqi
  military and police forces
• - status-of-forces agreement giving Iraqi
  government political control over all
  foreign forces

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• 3. The creation of an international
  stabilization force

- authorization by the UN Security Council,
with the approval of the Iraqi
government - some U.S. forces could serve,
along with troops from Arab states and
other countries
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• 4. Support for reconstruction and economic
  development
• - 10 billion a year U.S. aid
  commitment, with equivalent amounts from
  other international donors
• - run entirely by the Iraqi
  government, without U.S. control, subject
  only to certified international audit

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The Security Dilemma

• Troops cant leave until there is security
• But U.S. presence is the major source of
  insecurity

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The insurgency is primarilya national
resistance againstforeign invasiona natural
response that occurs often in history
Once the foreign invader is gone,this powerful
resistance dynamicwill subside
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- the presence of foreign occupation
forces provokes resistance - U.S. troops
have been frequent targets of attack
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• The withdrawal of U.S. forces
• - removes a principal cause of the
  insurgency
• - reduces the level of violence
• - encourages other nations to
  provide support

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• - gives Iraqis real controlover their country
• - enhances the legitimacy andsovereignty of the
  emergingIraqi government

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But . . .

• - there is a major risk of civil conflict
  
• - any large-scale reduction of forces
  can be destabilizing

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So . . .

• - reduce gradually in stages
• - provide security alternatives

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• Concrete security options are available, but
  will only work if
• - There is real commitment and
  significant motion toward exit

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• Rehire the Iraq National Army
• - Creating a new national army that is not
  seen as U.S. puppet force will reduce
  number of attacks vs. Iraqi troops
• - Iraqi army can command national
  respect, especially in Sunni insurgent
  zones

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• - assure more balanced officer corps
• - combine with current forces
• - begin process of integrating militias

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• 2. Create international stabilization force
  
  
• - to counter internal violence, and
  strengthen the ability of emerging
  government to control the country
• - for limited protective deployments in
  specified localities and potential
  trouble spots, such as Kirkuk

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• - approved and under political direction
  of Iraqi government
• - authorized by UN Security Council

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• - a peace enforcement mission with robust
  rules of engagement, modeled on Bosnia
  and Kosovo
• - not a passive peacekeeping force

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• - Arab troops, perhaps even an Arab
  command structure, to increase Iraqis
  receptivity
• - convene international conference to
  build such a force and to present a
  timeline for U.S. departure