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Index Insurance, food security, and poverty

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Title: Index Insurance, food security, and poverty


1

Index Insurance, food security, and poverty
Daniel Osgood deo_at_iri.columbia.edu The
International Research Institute for Climate and
Society Columbia University
2
Index Insurance
  • Problems with traditional insurance have kept it
    from being available to most of the world
  • Traditional Crop insurance
  • Undermined by Private Information problems
  • Almost always subsidized (SUBSIDIES CAN CAUSE
    PROBLEMS)
  • Recent index innovation
  • Insure weather index (eg seasonal rainfall), not
    crop
  • Only partial protection (basis risk), should not
    oversell
  • Cheap, easy to implement, good incentives
  • Implementations only a couple of years old
  • Exploding popularity--dangerous if misused
  • Structure to target each particular goal
  • Design complex
  • Only a naive partner would reveal all their cards
  • All partners must play active role in a
    cooperative design
  • Client must know what is not covered

3
Multiple poverty challenges, multiple index
strategies
  • Insurance is not for its own sakeit is to reduce
    poverty, improve food security, and encourage
    development
  • Implementation strategy driven by context, type
    of risk
  • Damage dropping people into poverty traps
  • Risk preventing people from moving forward
  • Immediate damage
  • http//iri.columbia.edu/publications/search.php?id
    556

4
Projects I have experience with
  • Participated in design of contracts purchased by
    farmers in Africa and Latin America (micro)
  • Worked on micro contracts for
  • Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania, Honduras, Nicaragua,
    supported MVP (macro) insurance design, working
    on contracts for Ethiopia
  • IRI specific
  • Roundtable on Index insurance, poverty, and
    climate risk
  • Climate and Society Publication, Vol II
  • Work with partners to bring existing and new
    research to solve practical implementation
    problems
  • Statistical/stakeholder based design
  • Explicitly build climate into product
  • Stakeholder communication and contract
    verification
  • Forecasts
  • Data poor environments
  • Limitations of and potential for
  • Remote sensing
  • Of crops
  • Of precipitation

5
Macro Example
MVP Index
  • Early warning vs early action?
  • IRI projects
  • Index product for Earth Institute MVP (led by
    Neil Ward, with Asher Seibert, Eric Holthaus in
    IRI, many other partners)
  • Index to ensure development goals of MVP for each
    village cluster
  • If MVP lifts people out of poverty traps
  • Prevent climate from them falling back in
  • Also exploring Locust, fire, malaria, livestock
    disease and international trade, forage, water
    management

6
Drought Index Insurance A contribution to
managing the climate risk
Millennium Villages and Index Insurance
Including C. Palm, D. Osgood, A. Siebert, E.
Holthaus, J. Anttila-Hughes, J. Puri, W.
Baethgen, partnership with Swiss Re, and
partnerships with Meteorological Services in
Africa (processing station rainfall data) and
satellite data sources (NASA and NOAA)
7
Variables that can be a proxy for impact on rural
population
Satellite Regional NDVI
Ground-based Local Rainfall
Rainfall
8
Seasonal rainfall total is not the best indicator
for crop yield Alternative is to use a simple
crop model, e.g. Water Requirement Satisfaction
Index (WRSI)
Water requirement varies through crop growth cycle
Eg for 180-day maize (as used for Sauri)
9
1984
2000
10
Micro Example
  • Malawi Groundnut
  • Farmer gets loan (4500 Malawi Kwacha or 35)
  • Groundnut seed cost (25, ICRSAT bred, delivered
    by farm association)
  • Interest (7), Insurance premium (2), Tax
    (0.50)
  • Prices vary by site
  • Farmer holds insurance contract, max pay is
    loansize
  • Insurance payouts on rainfall index formula
  • Joint liability to farm Clubs of 10 farmers
  • Farmers in 20km radius around met station
  • At end of season
  • Farmer provides yields to farm association
  • Proceeds (and insurance) pay off loan
  • Remainder retained by farmer
  • Farmers pay full financial cost of program (with
    tax)
  • Only subsidy is data and contract design
    assistance

http//iri.columbia.edu/deo/IRI-CRMG-Africa-Insur
ance-Report-6-2007/
11
Insurance design methods
  • Previous methods were based on crop biology and
    did not have a mechanism for systematic inclusion
    of climate information
  • Methodology overview
  • Stakeholders determine
  • Premium constraint
  • Payout frequency target
  • Set initial guess for optimizer
  • Pursue strategies that target alternate risks (eg
    sowing vs flowering)
  • Computer optimization (tuning)
  • Using performance measures, WRSI based loss
  • Optimize upper triggers to
  • Minimize variance of (losses - insurance
    payments)
  • Subject to specified maximum insurance price
  • Compare contracts performance against conflicting
    information sources looking for contract
    strengths and vulnerabilities
  • Adjust parameters to round numbers so that client
    does not get misimpression that design
    information is higher accuracy than it is
  • Communicate results with stakeholders
  • Correct years for correct reasons
  • Is coverage what clients demand?
  • Adapt contracts and models

12
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13
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14
Ranking of losses and payouts
RANK YEAR LOSS PAYOUT? 1, 1995 7641.140
1 2, 1973 6542.680 1 3, 1966 6324.398
0 4, 1996 6315.617 1 5, 1990
5903.817 0 6, 1984 5660.633 1 7,
2005 5598.026 1 8, 1970 4929.469 1 9,
1992 4904.982 0 10, 1997 4459.438 1 11,
1968 4400.516 0 12, 1969 4296.916 1
13, 1980 4235.219 0 14, 1994 4136.128
0 15, 2004 3921.972 0 16, 1979 3513.749
0 17, 2000 3399.898 0 18, 1983
3399.299 0 19, 2001 3367.294 0 20, 2006
3347.076 0 21, 2002 3218.283 1 22, 1967
3070.731 0 23, 1962 0.000 0 24, 1963
0.000 0 25, 1964 0.000 0

26, 1965 0.000 0 27, 1971 0.000
0 28, 1972 0.000 0 29, 1974 0.000
0 30, 1975 0.000 0 31, 1976 0.000
0 32, 1977 0.000 0 33, 1978 0.000
0 34, 1981 0.000 0 35, 1982 0.000
0 36, 1985 0.000 0 37, 1986 0.000
0 38, 1987 0.000 0 39, 1988 0.000
0 40, 1989 0.000 0 41, 1991 0.000
0 42, 1993 0.000 0 43, 1998 0.000
0 44, 1999 0.000 0 45, 2003 0.000
0
15
Stakeholder input drives contracts
  • Look for
  • Do stakeholders understand contracts?
  • Do stakeholders show evidence of negotiating in
    their own interests?
  • Do stakeholders understand basis risk and what is
    not covered?
  • Look for insightful complaints
  • Malawi stakeholders have been very active, driven
    design
  • Original CRMG project proposal was for stand
    alone Maize Insurance
  • Malawi stakeholders proposed groundnut bundle

16
Insurance index developed with farmers
Nicole Peterson, NSF-DMUU
17
Insurance and forecasts
  • Insurance is exact compliment for forecast
  • Community has focused on insurance problems due
    to forecast
  • Overlooked fundamental relationship between
    Insurance, forecasts, and investments
  • Benefits to building forecast into insurance to
    improve use of information in making investments
  • Need to research how to do this
  • Exploring for Malawi case
  • Insurance can be tied to early warning (forecast)
    systems to finance and formalize response
  • Examples WFP and MVP
  • Potential
  • Fire management, flood response, health response,
    etc.
  • With Jim Hansen, Pablo Suarez, Miguel Carriquiri,
    Ashok Mishra, and others

18
Climatology important
  • Northern and Southern Malawi
  • opposite Enso phase response
  • Location of north-south dividing line challenging
    to forecast
  • But climate info still very valuable for
    insurance
  • Natural hedge
  • By strategic pooling of contracts harnessing
    negative correlations of climate
  • Total risk can be reduced, reducing costs of
    insurance
  • Global insurance pool reduces cost of managing of
    risk everywhere
  • Difficult to design based on payout data alone
  • Few payouts in historic record
  • Dont know if statistical have physical forces
    driving them
  • Climate science understanding may guide and
    verify insurance strategies
  • Investigating for Central America
  • With Megan McLauren, Marta Vicarelli, Alessandra
    Giannini

19
Global implications
  • With increasing climate risk need to leverage
    whole world
  • Extreme events
  • Much of Climate Change?
  • Negatively correlated across globe?
  • Whole world distributes risk
  • Need to develop global risk markets
  • Companies want to serve a global insurance market
    that does not yet exist to reduce costs
  • Insurance premiums lower
  • With global markets incentives for optimal global
    production diversification
  • International climate sensitive suppliers

(Based on Ropelewski Halpert, 1987)
20
Learning, insurance and experimental economics
  • Can people cooperatively transfer risk through
    insurance negotiations?
  • Experimental economics pilot
  • Examined alternate educational strategies for
    cooperation
  • Found that people may think of risk more
    rationally when negotiating with others
  • Do people understand the the index?
  • Upcoming basis risk pilot experimental economic
    pilot in Brazil
  • With CRED

21
Monte Carlo, insurance, and pricing uncertainty
  • Monte Carlo simulations useful in insurance
    design methods
  • Apply design optimization to simulated rainfall
  • Price using probabilities from monte carlo payout
    distributions
  • Model uncertainty can be built into insurance
  • Could map uncertainty into insurance product
    using modified simulations
  • Estimate uncertainty in parameters
  • Draw from distribution of parameters
  • Draw from distribution specified by parameters
    drawn
  • Build into rainfall simulator for educational
    tool
  • Could condition on forecast information
  • With Kenny Shirley, Andy Robertson

22
Insurance and paleoclimate data
  • Hypothetical Tree ring insurance
  • Explore consequences of using recent data when
    longer term data is available
  • Impacts of using 50 years of record
  • vs full 370-year record
  • Preliminary findings
  • Size of 100 year disaster overstated.
  • Uncertainty in 50-year estimate brackets true
    risk.
  • Properly including uncertainty in insurance price
    could lead to sustainable product
  • Including information from paleodata may make
    insurance more affordable
  • With Art Greene, Lisa Goddard, Kevin Anchukaitis

N 370 50 Lev -0.56 (-0.49)
Lower -0.58 (-0.63) Upper -0.52
(-0.34)
N 370 50 Lev -0.40 (-0.31)
Lower -0.46 (-0.49) Upper -0.30 (-0.13)
23
Index insurance data
  • Rainfall data is short, with gaps
  • Limited spatial coverage
  • How far is too far from station?
  • Common to many applications
  • Need technique for new stations
  • Most places do not have long met station history
  • Must address for scale-up

24
Micro level projects at scale
  • Develop techniques to utilize remote sensing in
    product design, pricing, maintaining
    uncertainties
  • Treatment of spatial basis risk
  • Increased focus on farmer education, involvement
    in monitoring and design
  • With Paul Block, Tufa Dinku
  • Must have design methodologies with local
    expertise so that contracts and packages can
    adapt every year
  • Eg of these issues Ethiopia micro project with
    Oxfam
  • Compliments WFP and Ethiopian Government national
    index insurance project
  • But need to stop using pilot scale temporary
    solutions solutions for scale up
  • If we want industry we need industrial strength
    solutions and industrial strength processes for
    technique development

25
Training tools (under development with WB-CRMG)
Megan McLauren and Lulin Song
26
Design training tools (under development)
27
Design training tools (under development)
28
Design training tools (under development)
29
Thank you
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