Cracow Grid Workshop October 16, 2006 Economic Virtualization of ICT Infrastructures Jochen Stoesser

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Cracow Grid WorkshopOctober 16, 2006Economic
Virtualization of ICT InfrastructuresJochen
Stoesser, Arun Anandasivam, Nikolay Borissov,
Dirk NeumannInstitute of Information Systems and
Management (IISM)University of Karlsruhe, Germany
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Agenda

• Requirements for efficient resource allocation in
  the Grid
• Drawbacks of current approaches to pricing and
  scheduling
• Towards market-based resource allocation
  combinatorial double auctions

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Requirements for efficient resource allocation in
the Grid

• Basic requirements
• Demand for and supply of resources highly
  dynamic
• Users (providers) require (offer) combinations of
  resources
• memory, compute, memory, compute,
  application,
• If demand higher than supply of resources award
  resources to requesters who value these resources
  the most.

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Current approaches to scheduling and pricing

• Subscription model
• buyers pay a flat rate on a periodic
• basis to use a resource
• inflexible
• Metered model
• Pay as you go, e.g. Amazons Compute Cloud, SUN
• users are charged on the basis of actual usage
• prices are (temporarily) determined by providers
  only ? inflexible
• Central scheduling
• who shares with whom at what time
• if demand exceeds supply, allocation of resources
  becomes inefficient

q
actual demand/supply
service level
t
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Objective market-based resource allocation
Dynamic and efficient allocation of scarce
resources ? Typical application domain of markets
Buyya et al. 2003

• Objective Development of an Open Grid Market
  that
• is flexible and dynamic,
• provides economic incentives for resource
  provision and
• achieves an efficient allocation of resources.

Grid research projects at the IISM
SESAM
Billing the Grid
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Market-based resource allocation Conventional
auction mechanisms

• Conventional single-sided auctions (cf. eBay)
  and double auctions
• (cf. stock exchanges) not efficient
• Split of supply and demand across multiple
  markets
• Exposure risk requester might only obtain a
  subset of the required resources

resource provider 2 application
resource provider 1 memory, compute
Deal
No deal
resource requester memory, compute, application
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Market-based resource allocation Combinatorial
double auction

• single bid for a combination of resources
• in an aggregated market
• actors can bid for bundles of resources, e.g.
  memory and compute
• logical links between bids, e.g. XOR bids
• Bapna et al., forthcoming de Vries et al. 2003
  Schnizler et al. forthcoming

m resource providers

memory, compute, application

n resource requesters
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Market-based resource allocation Combinatorial
double auction (contd)

• Problems
• Combinatorial assignment problem
• hard to model
• computationally extremely demanding
• can be reduced to multi-dimensional knapsack
  problem ? NP-hard
• Trade-off between economic requirements required
  Parkes et al., 2001
• Incentive compatible
• Efficient allocation
• Budget balanced
• Need for additional attributes SLAs, location,
  time constraints,

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Contribution

• Discussion of related approaches
• Parameterisation of the design space
• derivation of use cases
• market engineering approach

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Contribution (contd)

• Formalization of the bidding language and the
  winner determination problem for sample use cases

Efficiency criterion
Constraints encode the use case

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Thank you for your attention!
Contact Information
Jochen Stoesser mailtostoesser_at_iism.uka.de IISM
Information Market Engineering Universität
Karlsruhe (TH) Englerstr. 14, 76 131 Karlsruhe,
Germany www.iism.uni-karlsruhe.de www.sorma-projec
t.eu
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References

• Rajkumar Buyya, David Abramson, Srikumar
  Venugopal. The Grid Economy. Proceedings of the
  IEEE, Vol. 93, No. 3, March 2005.
• David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam, Marta Eso.
  Achieving budget-balance with vickrey-based
  payment schemes in exchanges. In IJCAI, pp.
  1161-1168, 2001.
• Ravi Bapna, Sanjunkta Das, Robert Garfinkel,
  Jan Stallaert. A market design for grid
  computing. INFORMS Journal of Computing,
  forthcoming.
• Sven de Vries, Rakesh V. Vohra. Combinatorial
  Auctions A Survey. INFORMS Journal on Computing,
  Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 284-309, Summer 2003.
• Björn Schnizler, Dirk Neumann, Daniel Veit,
  Christof Weinhardt. Trading Grid Services A
  Multi-attribute Combinatorial Approach. European
  Journal of Operations Research, forthcoming.

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Combinatorial double auction Formalisation

• Winner determination problem (WDP)

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Parametrization of the design space