War and Peace

1
War and Peace

• Domestic Politics and War

2
The Puzzle

• War is costly for states. But what if there are
  actors within the state politicians, the
  military, special interests who see war as
  beneficial or expect to pay little or none of its
  costs? Do states fight wars to satisfy narrow
  interests within them?
• Did we fight the Iraq war for the Israeli lobby?
• Did we fight the Iraq war for the oil companies?

3
Blood for ?

• Special interests can make countries more
  belligerent by making them less easily satisfied
  in negotiations.
• But as long as war is costly, there will usually
  be a range of agreements that both sides prefer
  to fighting.
• The proximate cause of war remains incomplete
  information and problems of credible commitment.

4
Who Wants War?

• Political leaders in search of a rally around
  the flag, leaders may wag the dog or gamble
  for resurrection. Act in self-interest rather
  than general interest.
• But likely to be removed from office for losing
  war.
• Military have an interest in larger budgets.
• But tend to be acutely sensitive to loss of life.
• Special Interests receive concentrated benefits
  and bear only a fraction of the costs of war.
• Example Oil companies profit from access and we
  all pay costs of fighting.

5
Hawkish Interests and the Bargaining Range
Bargaining range
Deals that A prefers to war
Deals that B prefers to war
No Hawks
As ideal point
Bs ideal point
p
pb
p-a
Bargaining range
Deals that A prefers to war
Deals that B prefers to war
Hawks
As ideal point
Bs ideal point
p
pb
p-a
If q in this range, A has incentive to challenge
If q in this range, neither has incentive to
challenge
If q in this range, B has incentive to challenge
6
Rally Effects and the Bargaining Range
Bargaining range
Deals that A prefers to war
Deals that B prefers to war
As ideal point
Bs ideal point
p
pb
p-a
Bargaining range
Deals that A prefers to war
Deals that B prefers to war
As ideal point
Bs ideal point
p
pb
p-a
If q in this range, A has incentive to challenge
If q in this range, neither has incentive to
challenge
If q in this range, B has incentive to challenge
7
But What If Special Interests Gain Only Through
Fighting?

• The Haliburton explanation. Military
  contractors make money only if there is actual
  fighting.
• Probably never true, but
• Costs of war would have to be redistributed as
  gains entirely to firms. As long as the public
  incurred some net cost, there would still be a
  bargaining range.
• Effect is identical to rally effect.

8
Special Interests Make Countries More Belligerent

• As the value attached to the issue in dispute
  increases, or as the costs of fighting for a
  group decline,
• The smaller the bargaining range
• The more likely the state is to challenge the
  other
• The better the deal it takes to satisfy the state
• But as long as a bargaining range exists, the
  proximate cause of war remains either incomplete
  information, problems of credible commitment, and
  indivisibilities.
• War is inevitable only when costs of war are
  negative for both countries in the conflict.

9
The Democratic Peace

• The closest thing to an empirical law in
  international relations although democracies
  fight on average as frequently as other states,
  they tend not to fight one another.

10
An Interest Explanation

• Special interests are less likely to prevail in
  democracies accountable to the people.
• Decisions are made by those who bear the costs of
  fighting.
• Suggests that democracies should be more pacific
  overall, not just with other democracies.

11
An Informational Explanation

• Democracies are more transparent.
• Democracies are less able to bluff
• But challenges, once made, are more credible.
• Democracies may have higher audience costs.
• Leaders appear to pay a higher political cost for
  making a challenge and then backing down.
• This also means that challenges are more credible.

12
Conclusion

• Conflicts of interest are necessary but
  insufficient to explain war.
• States fail to reach mutually preferred bargains
  when information is incomplete, agreements lack
  credibility, or issues are indivisible.
• International institutions facilitate cooperation
  and deter challengers but exacerbate problems of
  incomplete information.
• Domestic interests typically make countries more
  belligerent, but usually do not directly cause
  war.
• Democratic institutions reduce information
  asymmetries and the likelihood of war.