ONTOLOGY

1
ONTOLOGY

• Ontology derives from the Greek words ontos
  being and logos knowledge, and so means
  knowledge of being.
• It was first used by writers in the 17th century,
  such as Christian Wolff, for the branch of
  metaphysics which deals with what kinds of thing
  have being or exist. For instance, it is an
  ontological question whether immaterial things
  exist or have being in addition to immaterial
  things. Ontology also concerns the question
  whether or not any being or beings are necessary.
• It is a further ontological question whether or
  not objects can be divided into those which
  exist, and those which subsist. Also, are there
  entities which neither exist nor subsist?

2
THE ONTOLOGY OF ARTWORKS

• When we ask what kind(s) of being or existence
  works of art of all kinds have, including
  paintings, sculptures, novels, dramas,
  symphonies, etc. we are asking about the ontology
  of artworks.
• Distinctions relevant to the ontology of artworks
  include 1) spatial and temporal art forms, e.g.
  painting and music 2) performing and
  non-performing arts, e.g. dance and sculpture 3)
  types and tokens, e.g. Don Quixote and copies of
  Don Quixote.

3
THE TYPE-TOKEN DISTINCTION I

• The type-token distinction comes from C. S.
  Peirce (1839-1914), and is meant to distinguish
  between a word as a kind of thing which can be
  repeated in speech or writing or both, and a
  visible or auditory instance of the word so
  repeated.
• For instance, in I am I there are two tokens of
  the type indicated by I, and one token of the
  type indicated by am.

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THE TYPE-TOKEN DISTINCTION II

• The type-token distinction need not be restricted
  to language. More generally, a type is a kind of
  thing which can have instances, and a token is an
  instance of the type. For instance, coin is a
  type of thing of which there are any number of
  tokens pennies, nickels, quarters, etc. Here
  the single quotes indicate that the type is being
  spoken of, not any particular instance of it, but
  also not the name of the type as opposed to the
  type itself.
• There can also be subtypes within broader or more
  general types. For instance, penny is a subtype
  of the broader type coin, and pennies in
  space-time are tokens of that type at the same
  time that they are also tokens of the type
  coin, and other broader types such as money,
  artifact, and thing. In fact, every type
  other than the very broadest type, namely that of
  object will be a subtype of a type.

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TYPES AND TOKENS AND WORKS OF ART I

• Some artworks have or permit copies or instances
  of themselves. The copy or instance is a token,
  and the artwork copied is a type.
• For instance, a recording or performance of
  Bartoks String Quartet No. 5 by the Emerson
  Quartet is a token of the type named Bartoks
  String Quartet No. 5. My copy of Camuss The
  Stranger is a token of the type The Stranger,
  and a print of Jasper Johns lithograph Four
  Panels from Untitled 1972, is a token of the type
  which is the lithograph of that title.

6
Four Panels from Untitled 1972, Japer Johns, 1978
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OBJECT (Maximum type)
Artwork (subtype of the maximum type object)
Print (subtype of the type artwork)
Lithograph (subtype of the type print)
Four Panels from Untitled 1972, by Japer Johns,
1978 (subtype of the type lithograph)
A particular print of Johns Four Panels from
Untitled 1972 (token of the the type Four
Panels from Untitled 1972, which type is a
subtype of the type lithograph)
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TYPES AND TOKENS AND WORKS OF ART II

• According to P. F. Strawson (1919-), an artwork
  which is a type is not itself a particular
  physical phenomenon, but to speak of an artwork
  as a type means that it can be embodied in
  different particular physical phenomena in
  different times and places.
• Some artworks seem to be essentially particular
  objects which, as such, do not have or permit
  copies (tokens) of themselves. For instance,
  there is only one Mona Lisa and only one Notre
  Dame Cathedral.

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TYPES AND TOKENS AND WORKS OF ART III

• However, Strawson says that no artworks are
  intrinsically particular, or which are such that
  they cant, in theory, have tokens. Thus all
  artworks, including paintings, are logically
  types in that they could, in theory, have copies
  of them.
• Should this someday become possible, then we
  would say that we were seeing the same Mona Lisa
  in New York as in Paris as much as we say that we
  hear the same performance of Beethovens Seventh
  Symphony in Los Angeles as we do in Oslo.

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TYPES AND TOKENS AND WORKS OF ART IV

• A major distinction between types and tokens is
  that tokens can be destroyed, or can come into
  and go out of existence. And if a work, such as a
  painting, is individual, then with the
  destruction of the painting comes the destruction
  of the work, and so it cannot be experienced
  again.
• On the other hand, with a work such as a
  symphony, which is essentially a type, the work
  does not cease to exist when the performance of
  the symphony ends, and you cannot destroy Vaughan
  Williams Symphony No. 5 by destroying your CD of
  a particular recording of that work, and the work
  can be reexperienced anytime the work is played
  again.
• How then does the being of a painting differ from
  the being of a symphony? What if paintings
  someday become reproducable as symphonies are
  now?

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WHAT IS MUSIC?

• Jerrold Levinson says that the question what is
  music? concerns the definition of music. It
  must be distinguished from
• 1) What kind of thing is music? This is an
  ontological question. Is music particular,
  universal, mental, physical, abstract?
• 2) How is music recognized? This question is
  psychological.
• 3) What makes music good, great, bad, or
  terrible? This concerns evaluation.

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IS MUSIC ORGANIZED SOUND?

• Levinson says no. Being organized sound is not a
  sufficient condition of a things being music
  since some sounds exhibit organization which are
  not music, for instance the ticking of a clock or
  the barking of a dog are organized sounds but are
  not music.
• Strayer Organized sound is also not a necessary
  condition of a things being a musical work since
  aleatoric music lacks organization. In fact, the
  very point of using chance processes to determine
  a work is to defeat organization.
• Strayer There is also nothing to prevent a
  composer from specifying a certain collection of
  sounds to be her musical work. For instance a
  composer could specify that the sounds of rush
  hour traffic in the loop in Chicago on a
  particular date constitute a particular musical
  work of hers.

13
IS MUSIC ORGANIZED SOUND HUMANLY PRODUCED?

• Levinson says no. The sounds of a recited speech
  are both organized and humanly produced, but are
  not music.
• However, Levinson says that a human intention is
  a necessary condition of a things being music.

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ORGANIZED SOUND VS. TYPICAL FEATURES OF MUSIC

• Levinson also maintains that we cant use typical
  features of music such as melody, harmony, and
  rhythm to define it and distinguish it from other
  kinds of organized sounds.
• Levinson Melody, rhythm, and harmony are
  important features of a lot of music, but they
  nonetheless remain only typical features for
  music in general, not necessary ones. In fact, it
  should be apparent that there are no longer any
  intrinsic properties of sound that are required
  for something possibly to be music, and none that
  absolutely exludes a sonic phenomenon from that
  category.

15
MUSIC AND EMOTIONS

• Expressing emotion or causing emotion in the
  hearer is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
  condition of sound being music.
• It is not a necessary condition since not all
  music either expresses or causes emotion. Some
  music is more abstract or intellectual, the
  string quartets of Elliot Carter, for instance.
• It is not a sufficient condition since some
  sounds either express or cause emotion or both
  which are not music. The cry of a young child can
  express fear that in turn causes sadness in a
  parent.

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MUSIC, INTENTIONS, AND AESTHETIC APPRECIATION

• Levinson Music is sound produced (or
  determined) with a certain intent. But what
  intent is this?
• Levinson says that we cant say that music is
  produced for aesthetic appreciation since some
  things qualify as music which are not aimed at
  aesthetic appreciation. For instance, music which
  accompanies ritual or an event, such as opening
  the World Series with the Star Spangled Banner.
• Also, some sound sequences are aimed at aesthetic
  appreciation which are not music, such as
  dramatic performances and recited poetry.

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MUSIC VS. RECITED POETRY

• In listening to music we attend to sound as
  sound.
• In listening to recited poetry we attend to the
  meanings of the words in addition to whatever
  sounds form part of the aesthetic experience.
• Music can contain words, but to constitute music
  the verbal component must either be combined with
  more purely sonorous material such as that
  provided by instruments or, if not so
  accompanied, be such that one is to attend to it
  primarily for its sonic qualities and whatever is
  supervenient on them.

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ATTENDING TO SOUND AS SOUND I

• Levinson says that to say that the point of
  attending to sound as sound is aesthetic
  appreciation is too narrow an end to comprise
  all activity that we would count as the making of
  music.
• It is better to say that the point of attending
  to sound as sound is a certain heightening of
  life or consciousness.
• Thus, the point of so attending is the
  enrichment or intensification of experience. And
  this heightening and enrichment will apply both
  to such things as listening to music in a concert
  hall and responding to music which forms part of
  a ritual.

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ATTENDING TO SOUND AS SOUND II

• Levinson says that music is aimed at the
  enrichment or intensification of experience
  through active engagement with organized sounds.
  And he calls this the central core of the
  music-making intention.
• The notion of active engagement is crucial here
  since sound which is humanly organized for the
  enrichment of experience but which does not
  actively engage the listener is not music. See
  psychology example.
• Levinson Sound organized for our own good but
  which does not ask us to listen to or otherwise
  actively engage with it is not music.

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MUSIC AND TIME

• Music is a temporal organization of sound.
• Levinson The organization of sound must be
  temporal organization if the product is to count
  as musical.
• The sounds of something like a symphony are not
  produced all at once, but unfold deliberately
  over time.
• Accordingly, Levinson says that we must recognize
  that music is as much an art of time as it is of
  sound.

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LEVINSONS DEFINITION OF MUSIC

• Music df. Sounds temporally organized by a
  person for the purpose of enriching or
  intensifying experience through active engagement
  (e.g., listening, dancing, performing) with the
  sounds regarded primarily, or in significant
  measure, as sounds.

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MAIN POINTS OF LEVINSONS DEFINITION OF MUSIC I

• 1) Music consists of sounds temporally organized
• 2) This organization follows from the
  intention(s) of a human being
• 3) This organization has a purpose. The purpose
  is the enrichment or intensification of
  experience.
• 4) This demands active engagement with the sounds
  on the part of the listener.

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MAIN POINTS OF LEVINSONS DEFINITION OF MUSIC II

• 5) The sounds of music are to be attended to as
  sounds. Or we might say that music is sound for
  sounds sake.
• 6) This definition of music is meant to apply to
  philosophically to all cultures, even to those
  which may have a different concept of music
• 7) The makers of music intend their creations to
  be worth hearing, that is, to have value
• 8) Music is creator-oriented, music is produced
  by its creator, not by the listener.

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THE CHALLENGE OF CAGE I

• According to John Cage, any and all sounds are
  music.
• Levinson maintains that this is simply false.
• It is false because it fails to recognize the
  distinction between sounds which are music and
  sounds which can be treated as if they were
  music.
• Perhaps Cage has illustrated the latter, but he
  has not proved the former.
• It also makes the mistake of thinking that the
  listener determines whether or not music is
  present rather than the composer.

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THE CHALLENGE OF CAGE II

• For Levinson, Cages view obscures more than it
  illuminates, and denies several features which
  are crucial to music, namely
• 1. Sentient origin
• 2. Artistic intent
• 3. Public character.
• Cages view also fails, according to Levinson,
  because it is a hopelessly relativistic notion,
  making the status of anything as music relative
  to each individual listener and occasion.

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HISTORICAL DIVISIONS OF MAJOR ART FORMS

• 1) Works which are conceived of and (normally)
  produced by the artist - e.g. painting and
  sculpture. (Goodmans autographic works.)
• 2) Works which depend on people in addition to
  the artist performers /interpreters - e.g.
  music, drama, dance. (Goodmans allographic
  works.)
• Type 1) works are experienced directly
  (substantially) as the artist produced them. We
  experience performances of type 2) works.

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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TYPE 1) AND TYPE 2) ARTWORKS

• We dont (cant?) say that we see a performance
  of the Mona Lisa when see it, and there is only
  one object with which this artwork is meant to be
  identified.
• We dont (cant?) say that we hear Beethovens
  Ninth Symphony itself rather than hearing a
  performance of it.
• Performances of the same symphony can be played
  at the same time but in different places.
  However, only one work is being performed.
• A performance comes into and goes out of
  existence within a time span that is not
  identical to the existence of the work of which
  it is a performance.

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THE ONTOLOGY OF MUSIC I

• What is a symphony? Not the original score
  because 1) the score may cease to exist without
  the symphony ceasing to exist since either a)
  other copies of the score may be extant, or b)
  people may remember how to play it, or both 2)
  the score is simply a notation for a performance,
  but a symphony is a sequence of sounds, not a
  number of marks on paper. (cf. Levinson).

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THE ONTOLOGY OF MUSIC II

• What is a symphony? Not the ideas in the mind of
  the composer since 1) the composer can die or
  forget the notes to the symphony, but it can
  continue in notation, performances, and the minds
  of others 2) the ideas of the composer end with
  his/her death, but the symphony need not 3) what
  if two or more composers conceive of the same
  symphony - note by note in the same order for the
  same instruments at the same or different time
  unbeknownst to one another? Do we say that each
  has thought of the same work or a different one?

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THE ONTOLOGY OF MUSIC III

• A symphony is not any particular, even perfect,
  performance of it since 1) one performance is
  equally a performance of the symphony if the
  score is followed, good or bad 2) if perfect
  performance means one which follows the
  composers score precisely this is not possible,
  since scores give too much latitude to
  conductors/performers for interpretation to talk
  about a perfect performance 3) even if this were
  possible, what happens when two or more
  conductors and two or more orchestras follow the
  score to the letter?

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THE ONTOLOGY OF MUSIC IV

• A symphony is not the class of its performances
  or recordings or both since 1) it seems
  intelligible to speak of a symphony which remains
  unperformed - here symphony is short for a set
  of instructions when followed will produce a
  sequence of sounds, that is the symphony as an
  auditory object

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THE ONTOLOGY OF MUSIC V

• A symphony is not the class of its performances
  or recordings or both since 2) classes are
  defined by their members - change even a single
  member and you change the class - but this would
  make a symphony a new thing each time it is
  performed or recorded

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THE ONTOLOGY OF MUSIC VI

• A symphony is not the class of its performances
  or recordings or both since 3) the possibility
  of any performance or recording or class of
  performances or class of recordings presupposes
  the symphony itself which the class or classes is
  supposed to account for or with which the
  symphony is supposed to be identified.

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WHAT IS A SYMPHONY?

• If a symphony is not 1) the score or any number
  of copies of the score 2) ideas in the mind of
  the composer 3) any particular performance or
  recording or class of performances or recordings
  4) the class of its performances or the class of
  its recordings or both.
• What is it? Given the points of the preceding
  slides, to what does something like Beethovens
  Ninth Symphony refer?

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MUSIC AND TYPES I

• Perhaps it is a type of which performances and
  recordings are tokens. But this would seem to
  make the symphony an abstract object.
• It is abstract not in space, time, or space and
  time. Scores, performances, and recordings are
  kinds of entity which can have identifiable
  locations within the world, but that does not
  seem to be the case with the symphony as a type
  to which they are related.
• As abstract, a symphony could not have the
  properties with which symphonies are identified,
  namely, sounds in a certain sequence.

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MUSIC AND TYPES II

• Also, what happens when two different composers
  write the same symphony, either at the same or
  different times, but working independently of one
  another, and so without knowledge of what the
  other is doing?
• Is one type created or two?
• Or do we need to say, in Platonic fashion, that
  the type already has being, and each composer
  simply copies it down in writing the proper notes
  in the proper sequence?

37
PERFORMING AND NON-PERFORMING ARTS I

• In the performing arts, the artist provides a set
  of instructions for performers to follow to
  result in a performance of the work.
• In the non-performing arts, the artist produces a
  single object which is the artwork, and which
  would normally be considered a physical object.

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PERFORMING AND NON-PERFORMING ARTS II

• J. O. Urmson says that these are not necessary
  conceptual conditions, but rather reflect common
  artistic practices.
• According to Urmson, sets of instructions are not
  necessary for music. We could have music without
  having scores for repeatable performances of the
  same work.
• Urmson says that it is theoretically possible to
  produce a notation for repeating paintings so
  that they become multiple. If so, then paintings
  would become types as maintained by Strawson.

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DEVIANT CASES

• Urmson points out that not all artworks fit
  neatly into the division of the arts into
  performing and non-performing arts.
• For instance, a work of architecture is not
  produced directly by the architect like a
  painting, and a kind of notation - a blueprint -
  exists for its construction. And it depends on
  others to bring it into existence, and yet it
  differs from arts like music in being
  identifiable with a single, specific, physical
  object.

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WHAT IS LITERATURE? I

• Urmson says that literature does not seem
  obviously to be a performing or non-performing
  art at first sight.
• It is not obvious that the reader is the
  performer of the work - the reader does not seem
  to have technical or interpretative skills
  analogous to a musician.
• Yet, if there is no performing or executant
  artist, how can I myself be the audience or
  spectator of the novel, poem, etc.?

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WHAT IS LITERATURE? II

• Yet Urmson maintains that, even if literature
  does not seem to be a performing art, it is
  nevertheless not like painting or sculpture.
  There is no single, specific, physical object
  with which a novel can be identified. It is a
  type with many copies of it which are its tokens.
• But can we say that literature consists of a
  recipe or set of instructions for executant
  artists?

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WHAT IS LITERATURE? III

• For Urmson, Literature is essentially an oral
  act.
• Literature originally existed as an oral
  tradition, and the texts of early works served as
  a set of instructions, a kind of score, for
  performers.
• Still, most literature today is meant to be read
  silently, and so Urmson compares the reading of a
  novel to a musicians silent reading of a musical
  score which is meant for reading, not performing.

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WHAT IS LITERATURE? IV

• Urmson Learning to read an ordinary language is
  like learning to read a score silently to
  oneself.
• According to Urmson, literature should be
  regarded as analogous to a set of musical scores
  intended primarily for score reading rather than
  for performance.

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WHAT IS LITERATURE? V

• Urmson Literature is in logical character a
  performing art . . . in which we . . . confine
  ourselves to score reading. We read to find out
  how the performance will go and then are
  content.
• For Urmson this is confirmed by criticism of
  writing in terms of how it would sound if it
  were spoken.