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WrapUp on Operations Management

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Title: WrapUp on Operations Management


1
Wrap-Up on Operations Management
  • Execution, Incentives, Planning, Implementation

2
Agenda
  • Discuss leftover items present some case
    studies on the various themes we have
    addressed.
  • Raise and discuss other issues in operations.
    Draw freely on your experience.

3
Some Books and References
  • Production and Operations Analysis by Steven
    Nahmias, McGraw-Hill/Irwin
  • Designing and Managing The Supply Chain, David
    Simchi-Levi, Phil Kaminsky, Edith Simchi-Levi
    McGraw-Hill/Irwin
  • Supply Chain Management Strategy, Planning and
    Operation, Sunil Chopra and Peter Meindl,
    Prentice-Hall.
  • Achieving Supply Chain Excellence Through
    Technology (www.ascet.com)
  • What is the Right Supply Chain for your Product,
    Marshall Fisher, Harvard Business Review.
  • Manufacturing's Crisis New Technologies,
    Obsolete Organizations Robert H. Hayes
    Ramchandran Jaikumar, Harvard Business Review.
  • Competing Through Manufacturing Steven C.
    Wheelwright Robert H. Hayes Harvard Business
    Review.
  • Staple Yourself to an Order Benson P. Shapiro V.
    Kasturi Rangan John J. Sviokla, Harvard Business
    Review
  • The Focused Factory C. Wickham Skinner, Harvard
    Business Review
  • The Productivity Paradox C. Wickham Skinner,
    Harvard Business Review
  • Made in America, Sam Walton with John Huey,
    Bantam Books (the first 75)

4
Operational Execution
  • Execute To carry out, to accomplish to
    execute a plan or order
  • Information Quality cannot be taken for Granted

Execution The Missing Link in Retail
Operations, Ananth Raman, Nicole DeHoratius,
and Zeynep Ton California Management Review,
Spring 2001.
5
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6
B.J. Scheihing
  • Head of operations, joined Arrow as inventory
    clerk in 1968, retired as board member and head
    of operations in 2004. Began as Cardex Girl out
    of Philadelphia Bible College.
  • Passion for accurate inventory. (Missionarys
    zeal)
  • Salespeople not allowed to interfere in warehouse
    operations. Salespeople not allowed to bypass
    warehouse procedures even to satisfy very
    important customer. Even salesperson presence
    could be problematic.
  • System to direct all movement within warehouse.
  • Asset Control Group to constantly clean data.
  • 98 accuracy at most DCs, some had 99.8 accuracy.

7
Summary
  • Operational Execution cannot be taken for
    granted! It needs to be managed. Bad data and
    poor information quality plague most operations
    even today.
  • Poor operational execution can compromise
    strategic plans and IT systems. Technology is not
    a substitute for good process management.
  • Numerous studies over the last few decades have
    documented enormous performance differences among
    similar operational units.
  • Attention to process details, measurement and
    senior management understanding and support
    vital.
  • People at all levels make the difference.

8
Incentive Alignment

9
Incentives in Supply Chains
  • Implementing change in supply chains is often
    difficult due to behavioral or organizational
    issues.
  • At times, hard to change peoples behavior
    because of habit or lack of knowledge.
  • Often, problem can be traced to Incentives.
  • Focus on not only how much, but also how, various
    people and firms are compensated.

10
Principal-Agent Theory
Find problems and solutions through rigorous
role-play in the supply chain.
Finding problems and solutions requires
creativity. Framework does not lead to formulas
that can be applied directly.
11
Impact of Store Manager Incentives in Consumer
Electronics Retailing

Harvard Business School Working paper, Nicole
DeHoratius and Ananth Raman
12
Store Manager Incentives
  • Bryn Mawr
  • Bonus based on of sales
  • Min 0.2
  • Max 5
  • Deduction in pay based on shrink
  • Deduct one dollar in pay for every dollar of
    shrink
  • Tweeter
  • Bonus based on of store operating income
  • Min 300
  • Max 20

13
Store Manager Behavior
  • Bryn Mawr Defensive
  • Sales Prevention Environment
  • Key Holders
  • Focus
  • Disincentivizing bad behavior
  • Sales people 2nd class citizens
  • Tweeter Aggressive
  • Sales Driven Environment
  • Sales Leaders
  • Focus
  • Incentivizing good behavior
  • Entrepreneurs

14
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15
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16
Did Incentives Drive Sales and Shrink?
Sales
Incentives Monetary Non-Monetary
Store Profit
Store Mgr. Behavior
Shrink
17
Rival Hypotheses
APP (Automatic Price Protection)
Growth in Industry
Assortment
Sales
Processes/Training
Advertising
Incentives Monetary Non-Monetary
Store Profit
Store Mgr. Behavior
Inventory
Turnover
Shrink
18
Store Level Impact of Change in Incentive System
  • 9.94 in SALES
  • An average store generates
  • 185,946
  • additional sales dollars per year
  • SHRINK also changed
  • An average store loses 8,834
  • additional dollars
  • per year


19
Chain-Wide Impact
  • 2,231,348 additional SALES
  • vs.
  • 106,006 additional SHRINK
  • per year.
  • INCREASE IN NET PROFIT AMOUNTS TO
  • 2.5 of SALES
  • (Retailers typically earn 2 of sales)

Tweeter has applied similar approach at other
acquisitions.
20
Distribution of Medical Supplies
  • The Market for Services

Harvard Business School Case Study 100055
21
Medical Supplies Distribution
  • Most distributors of medical supplies were losing
    money. Owens and Minor, a 3 Billion distributor,
    in its 1995 annual report described the company
    struggling through the two toughest quarters in
    the companys history.
  • Some competitors could offer lower prices because
    they were owned by large manufacturers.
  • Cost-plus contacts in supply chain. (e.g. 7
    above cost)

22
Impact of Misaligned Incentives on Operations
  • Hospitals wanted to buy in smaller quantities.
  • Without paying us more, hospitals wanted us to
    carry more of the inventory, and make more
    deliveries in lower units of measure.
  • OM wanted to ship larger quantities.
  • Cherry Picking
  • Large box of adult diapers that cost 30 yielded
    OM a gross margin 2.10, while a small box of
    cardiovascular sutures that cost 800 yielded a
    gross margin of 56.
  • With cost-plus contracts, OM was also unable to
    identify and pursue more profitable customers.
  • Costplus contracts made it hard for OM to
    evaluate the profitability of different customer
    accounts at the time of signing a contract.

23
Management under Cost contracts
  • Our negotiation with the customer entailed them
    to get our fee down to 6 of the product price
    and us trying to get it up to 8. There was no
    discussion of a change in services it was simply
    who had the strongest will to win. Mike
    Stefanic, OM, Dir of Budgets
  • Constant pressure to reduce SGA expenses at
    distributors. Warehouse personnel costs had to be
    watched very carefully. OM reduced these costs
    from 12.5 of net sales in 1984 to 6.8 in 1994
    but these costs had started rising again in 1995.

24
Activity-Based Costing
  • Customer Profitability determined by
  • The type of service requested (JIT)
  • Number of purchase orders per month
  • Number of lines per purchase order
  • Number of deliveries per week
  • Method of order
  • Inventory carrying cost
  • Many customers unprofitable.

25
Activity-Based Pricing The Concept
  • Developed a price for each activity. (e.g.,
    expedited delivery, smaller shipment sizes,
    kitting -- identify price for each activity).
  • Some hospitals stopped using OM -- unprofitable
    ones?
  • Overall sales increased rare profitable
    distributor growth in profits 1.35 billion
    sales in activity based pricing contracts (out of
    total sales of 4.2 Billion).
  • One of few medical distributors that offers
    services (profitably).

26
Transitioning to the New Contract
  • We had an academically perfect concept but we
    needed a way to sell it.
  • Contract based on two drivers orders/month,
    lines ordered per month.
  • Shared cost and profit data with customers.
  • An accountant-salesman. Customers accepted
    accountants because they werent salesmen.
  • Opportunistic Contract for Ideal.

27
Other Implementation Barriers
  • Hospital accounting systems budgets and transfer
    prices -- were based on cost contracts.
  • To derive benefits from ABP, hospitals had to
    change their behavior and processes.
  • Billing, ordering and all the logistical
    services involvedhave to be streamlined and made
    compatible with our systems.Evaluating entire
    systems and costing individual processes takes
    time and resources. Jose Valderas, Regional Vice
    President, Owens and Minor.

28
Fashion Supply Chains

29
Globalization of Supply
30
Global or Chinese?
31
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32
Misaligned Incentives in Fashion Supply Chains
Importer
Contract Enforcement Often weak
Exporter
  • Importers Fears
  • Risk of reneging
  • Compliance
  • -child labor
  • Bribing
  • Designs could be leaked
  • Exporters Fears
  • Rejection on frivolous grounds
  • failure to pay
  • Designs could be leaked

33
Aligning Incentives in Fashion Supply Chains
  • Personal Relationships
  • Sport Obermeyer Joint venture with Raymond Tse,
    Hong Kong supplier. Business moved to China
    (Raymonds ancestral village) in mid 1990s but
    Raymond ran the show.
  • What if commitment to a single supplier is too
    costly?
  • Intermediaries in Prato, Italy Or Hong Kong
  • In 1981, Prato system has 15,000-20,000 firms
    with 80,000 people, and annual sales of 1.6
    billion (80K/firm).
  • Each firm highly specialized.
  • Commitment to single supplier infeasible and
    inflexible.
  • Episodic relations between customer (in NY) and
    supplier but repeat relationship with Menichetti.
  • Why does this induce incentive alignment?

34
Barriers to Incentive Alignment
  • Often, in ways managers think about these issues.
  • Incentives (how you pay) often confused with
    negotiations (how much you pay).
  • Behavioral problems not recognized as incentive
    problems. Hard for people to acknowledge that
    their own behavior is driven by incentives.
  • Managers with ability to set contracts dont
    understand operational details well enough to
    understand impact of contracts. (Problems tucked
    in operational details.)

35
Implementation and Execution
  • Implementation Start and win small. Keep it
    simple!
  • But temptation to sell big projects.
  • Geeks (and CxOs and Wall Street Analysts) like
    cool toys need to focus on value. But value is
    hard to measure.
  • Supply Chain managers derive extraordinary
    performance from ordinary people.
  • Good supply chain managers or operations managers
    will have to be good teachers
  • Teach people working for and with you.
  • Teach senior management.

36
Picking from a portfolio of supply chain
opportunities
High
Not very common
Move here over time
Magnitude Of Opportunity
Avoid
Start here
Low
High
Low
Organizational and Technical Difficulty of
Harvesting Opportunity
37
Closing Thoughts!
  • Supply chains need your attention
  • HBS needs your expertise and your time. HBS is a
    great institution because many alumni and
    outsiders invest a lot of time to create
    knowledge here.
  • The supply chain group at HBS needs your
    expertise and your time. Stay in touch.
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