The Madrid Agenda

1
The Madrid Agenda

• Michael Stohl
• University of California, Santa Barbara
• ANU Terrorism Workshop
• March 31-April 1, 2005

2
Club de Madrid

• International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and
  Security
• March 8-11, 2005
• 200 experts in 16 working groups across four
  areas
• The expert groups met in cyber space from
  November through March
• Prepared papers and summary findings and
  recommendations March 8-9

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Program

• Plenary Expert Working Group Conclusions
• Public Panels and Political Speeches
• Closing Plenary Kofi Annan A Global Strategy
  for fighting Terrorism
• The Announcement of the Madrid Agenda 11 March
  2005

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Working Group Groupings

• Root Causes
• Confronting Terrorism
• Democratic Responses
• Civil Society

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Root CausesLouise Richardson, Harvard

• 1. Psychological-Jerrold Post formerly CIA
• 2. Political-Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan
• 3. Economic-Ted Robert Gurr, Maryland
• 4. Religious- Mark Juergensmeyer, UCSB
• 5. Cultural- Jessica Stern, Harvard

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Root Causes implications

• First, terrorism is a complex phenomenon and
  requires a multifaceted response.
• Second, in responding to terrorism, democracies
  must never abandon the democratic principles they
  are designed to uphold. And
• Third, governments must ensure that their short
  counter terrorist actions do not undermine their
  long term goal of undermining the terrorism
  threat.

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Summary of Root Causes Working Groups

• Remarkable congruence across the groups
• Regrettably, all agreed that there were no
  overarching explanations
• All agree that terrorism must be understood in
  the unique cultural, historical, political
  context
• All agree that democracies must confront and
  counter terrorism within the rule of law with no
  curtailment of civil liberties

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Root Causes RecommendationsConfronting terrorists

• Inhibit joining
• Provoke dissension
• Encourage moderates
• Find accommodative opportunities
• Promote backlash
• Reduce support within the population
• Facilitate exit

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Countering TerrorismRaymond Kendall, formerly
Interpol

• 6. Police- Jurgen Storbeck, formerly Europol
• 7. Intelligence- Brian Jenkins, Rand
• 8. Military-Lawrence Freedman, Kings College
• 9. Finance-Loretta Napoleoni
• 10. Legal- Hans Corell, formerly United Nations

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Police

• Rule of law
• Cooperation across domestic and international
  jurisdictions, timely sharing of intelligence
• Particularly important to build cooperation
  across the democratic nations

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Intelligence

• Develop better mechanisms for sharing
  intelligence
• Rule of law
• Democracies must ensure adequate controls

12
Military

• Terrorism should always be confronted within the
  legal institutional systems first
• Military option should be a last resort

13
Financial

• A special center should be established under
  chapter 7 authority within the United Nations

14
Legal

• Calling for a war against terrorism plays into
  the hands of the perpetrators
• Legal instruments should be employed

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Democratic ResponsesPhilip Bobbitt, Texas

• 11. Human Rights- Asma Jahangir, Pakistan
• 12. Promoting Democracy and Accountable
  Government, Ghia Nodia, Georgia
• 13. International Institutions

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Democratic Responses Conclusions

• Democratic quality
• Local Ownership
• Harness security cooperation to the democratic
  agenda
• Encourage freedom of information
• Eliminate impunity
• Promote civil society
• Promote Transparency

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Civil Society, Mary Kaldor LSE and Miguel Darcy,
Civicus

• 14. Citizens as Actors, Abdullayeva Arzu,
  Helsinki Citizens Assembly
• 15. Civil Society and political Violence Kayode
  Fayemi, Centre for Democracy and Development,
  London
• 16. Civil Society Strategies, Mient Jan Faber,
  Secretary General of the Interchurch Peace
  Council

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Civil Society Recommendations

• Recognize the role of soft power
• Strengthening civil society against extremists
  and violent ideologies, as well as mobilising
  citizens in favour of democracy, are an essential
  part of the long-term response to terrorism

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Civil Society Groups Findings

• although terrorism is a global phenomenon, root
  causes are usually found at the local level
• terrorism is born both in conflict zones and
  under authoritarian regimes, proving that both
  non state terrorism and a terrorism that is
  paramilitary exist.
• third finding is that democratic order, although
  it is necessary to establish stability, cannot be
  implemented with force.
• Madrid is an example of an appropriate answer to
  terrorism, and an example that should be
  followed.

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Kofi AnnanA Comprehensive Strategy

• first, to dissuade disaffected groups from
  choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their
  goals
• second, to deny terrorists the means to carry out
  their attacks
• third, to deter states from supporting
  terrorists
• fourth, to develop state capacity to prevent
  terrorism
• and fifth, to defend human rights in the struggle
  against terrorism

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The Madrid Agenda

• The Madrid Principles
• The Madrid Recommendations
• A Comprehensive Response
• International Cooperation
• Citizens and Democracy

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The Madrid Principles

• Terrorism is a crime against all humanity. It
  endangers the lives of innocent people. It
  creates a climate of hate and fear, it fuels
  global divisions along ethnic and religious
  lines. Terrorism constitutes one of the most
  serious violations of peace, international law
  and the values of human dignity.
• Terrorism is an attack on democracy and human
  rights. No cause justifies the targeting of
  civilians and non-combatants through intimidation
  and deadly acts of violence.

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The Madrid Recommendations

• the adoption of the definition proposed by the
  United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats,
  Challenges and Change in December 2004.
• the ratification and implementation of all
  terrorism-related conventions by those states
  which have not yet done so.
• the speedy conclusion of the Comprehensive
  Convention on International Terrorism.
• the exploration of the possibility of creating
  high commissioners for victims both at the
  international and the national level

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International Cooperation

• the establishment of regular, informal forums for
  law enforcement and intelligence officials, which
  may grow from bilateral consultations into a
  formalised structure for multilateral
  co-operation.
• the strengthening of regional organisations, so
  that measures to combat terrorism are tailored to
  local needs and benefit from local knowledge and
  networks.
• the effective co-ordination of these mechanisms
  at the global level.

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International Cooperation

• the establishment of an international mechanism
  including states, non-governmental organisations
  and the private sector to help link states that
  are in need of resources with those that can
  provide assistance.
• the creation of a trust fund for the purpose of
  assisting governments that lack the financial
  resources to implement their obligations, as
  proposed by the United Nations High-Level Panel.

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The Future

• The Club of Madrid will continue to lobby for the
  Madrid Agenda
• Plan to convene another meeting to commemorate
  9-11 in New York in 2006

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For further information

• http//english.safe-democracy.org/index.html

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Root Causes - Psychological

• No overarching explanation
• Explanations at the level of individual
  psychology are insufficient.
• The concepts of abnormality or psychopathology
  are not useful
• Important to distinguish leaders from followers
• Terrorist life cycle is important

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Root Causes - Political

• Terrorism is rooted in political discontent

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Root Causes discussions

• Economic

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Root Causes discussions

• Religious

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Root Causes discussions

• No single religion or religious tradition may be
  seen as a root cause of terrorism, but it is
  important to recognize the role of religion in
  providing identity, dignity and meaning and thus
  its potential in providing recruitment
  opportunities
• Recognition of the importance of prisons as
  breeding grounds