Title: Intrusion Detection Techniques for Mobile Wireless Networks
1Intrusion Detection Techniques for Mobile
Wireless Networks
- Authors
- Yongguang Zhang, HRL Laboratories LLC, Malibu,
California. - Wenke Lee, College of Computing, Georgia
Institute of Technology. - Yi-An Huang, College of Computing, Georgia
Institute of Technology. - Presenter
- Narendra Pentakota
2Outline
- Problem Inadequacies of security systems for
providing security for wireless and mobile
devices. - Motivation The mobility of wireless devices
demand more resilient, stronger and effective
security schemes. - Solution Design of IDS system for detecting
intrusions into wireless networks and keep the
wireless communications out of harms way.
3Definitions
- Intrusion Unauthorized or unwanted access to
restricted space.
- Intrusion detection One or more security
measures or devices used to detect and may be
even prevent intrusion.
4Types of IDS
- Intrusion Detection involves
- Capturing audit data.
- Reasoning the evidence in the data to determine
whether the system is under attack. - Types of IDS
- Network based IDS data and packet flow
inspection on the network edge. - Host based IDS Collect operating system audit
data like event and system calls.
5Intrusion Detection Techniques
- Misuse based detection
- Use patterns of well-known attacks or weak spots.
- Accurate and efficient against known attacks.
- Lacks the ability to detect a new attacks.
- Anomaly based detection
- Detect anomalies or abnormalities in the network
or service usage. - Does not required prior knowledge of Intrusion.
- May have high false positive rate.
6Vulnerabilities of Mobile Wireless Networks.
- The very advantage of its mobility leads to its
disadvantage. - Possible attacks ranging from passive
eavesdropping to active interference. - Communication infrastructure and communication
topology different from wired communications. - Damages include loss of privacy, confidentiality,
security etc...
7Vulnerabilities of Mobile Wireless Networks
(cont..).
- Autonomous nature, roaming independence.
- Unprotected physical medium.
- Node tracking is difficult.
- Decentralized network infrastructure and decision
making. Mostly rely on cooperative participation. - Susceptible to attacks designed to break the
cooperative algorithms.
8Vulnerabilities of Mobile Wireless Networks
(cont..).
- Bandwidth and power constraints make conventional
security measures inept to attacks that exploit
applications relying on them. - Wireless networks involving base node
communications (ex. access points) are vulnerable
to DoS attacks like dis-association and
de-authentication attacks. - No clear line of defense.
9Problems with current IDS techniques
- Current IDS techniques hugely rely on mounting
defense measures on a common access or routing
points like switches or routers.
10Problems with current IDS techniques (cont..)
- Wireless nodes in an ad-hoc network do not rely
on any common access point. Thus current IDS
techniques are not good enough.
11Key design issues.
- Build Intrusion detection and response system
that fits the features of mobile ad-hoc networks.
Should be both distributed and cooperative. - Choose appropriate data audit sources. Local
audit data versus global audit data. - Separate normalcy from anomaly.
12Architecture for Intrusion Detection.
- Intrusion detection and response should be both
distributed and cooperative to suite the needs of
mobile adhoc networks. - Every node participates in intrusion detection
and response. - Each node is responsible for detection and
reporting of intrusions independently. All nodes
can investigate into an intrusion event.
13System View.
- Individual IDS agents placed on the nodes
collectively form the IDS system to defend the
mobile ad-hoc network.
14System view (cont..)
- Data collection module is responsible for
gathering local audit traces and activity logs. - Detection engine uses this data to detect local
anomaly. - Cooperative detection engines provide
collaborations among IDS agents. - Both local and global response modules provide
intrusion response actions. - Local response module triggers actions local to
the node while the global one coordinates actions
among neighboring nodes. - A secure communication module provides a high
confidence communication channel among IDS agents.
15IDS in Action
- The following event are part of the design
process of Intrusion detection and response of
IDS agents. - Data collection
- Local detection
- Cooperative detection
- Intrusion response
- Multi-Layer integrated intrusion detection and
response
16IDS architecture
17IDS architecture (cont..)
- The intrusion detection state information can
range from a mere level-of-confidence value such
as - with p confidence, node A concludes from its
local data that there is an intrusion - with p confidence, node A concludes from its
local data and neighbor states that there is an
intrusion - with p confidence, node A,B,C, collectively
conclude that there is an intrusion - to a more specific state that list the
suspects, like - with p confidence, node A concludes from its
local data that node X has been compromised
18A Distributed Intrusion Detection (cont..)
- Intrusion response depends on the type of
intrusion and varies with the type of network
protocols and applications, and the confidence in
the evidence. For ex. - Re-initialize communication channels between
nodes (ex. force re-key). - Identifying the compromised nodes and
re-organizing the network to preclude the
compromised nodes.
19Multi-Layered Integrated IDS
- Intrusion detection and response modules are
integrated into every layer of the node. For ex. - An anomaly detected at the routing layer is
reported to the application layer and a
re-authentication process is initiated. - An attack detected at the application layer is
reported to the service and routing layers and
also notify the incident to other nodes.
20Definitions
- Information-Theoretic Branch of applied
mathematics and engineering involving the
quantification of information. Developed to find
the fundamental limits on compressing and
reliably communicating data. - Entropy Uncertainty involved in a variable. For
ex. a fair coin flip will have less entropy than
a roll of a die. - Classifier A mapping from a discrete feature
space to a discrete set of labels.
21Anomaly Detection in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks.
- Building an Anomaly Detection Model.
- Differentiate normal from abnormal.
- Use information-theoretic approaches to identify
classifiers (with low entropy) and classification
algorithms to build anomaly detection models. - When constructing such a classifier, feature with
high information gain (or reduction in entropy)
are needed.
22Anomaly Detection in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
(cont..).
- Building an anomaly detection module (cont..).
- Select (or partition) audit data so that the
normal dataset has low entropy. - Perform appropriate data transformation according
to the entropy measures (for information gain). - Compute classifier using training data.
- Apply the classifier to test data.
- Post-process alarms to produce intrusion reports.
23Anomaly Detection in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
(cont..).
- Attack models
- Route logic compromise.
- Traffic pattern distortion
- Audit data
- Feature selection and essential feature set.
- Classifier algorithms
- RIPPER First-order Inductive rule learner.
- SVM Known to reduce classification error.
- Post-processing
24Anomaly Detection in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
(cont..).
- Detecting abnormal updates to routing tables.
- Given set of training, testing and evaluation
scenarios and modeling algorithms like RIPPER and
SVM which routing protocol with potentially all
its routing table information used, can result in
better performing detection models, i.e.. what
information should be included in the routing
table to make intrusion detection effective?
25Anomaly Detection in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
(cont..).
- Detecting abnormal activities in other layers.
26Routing Protocols
- DSR Dynamic source routing protocol. Demand
based source routing protocol. - AODV Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector. Demand
based routing protocol capable of both unicast
and multicast routing. - DSDV Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector
Routing. Table driven routing protocol. Routing
based on sequence numbers.
27Experimental Results
- Wireless routing protocols were considered to
implement anomaly detection process. - Dynamic source routing.
- Ad-hoc on-demand distance-vector routing.
- Destination-sequenced distance-vector routing.
- These protocols were selected because they
represent different types of ad-hoc wireless
routing protocols, proactive and on-demand.
28Experimental Results (cont..)
- The feature set selected should reflect
information from different sets like routing
change, topological movements - Classification algorithms used
- Induction based classifier, RIPPER.
- A new SVM classifier, SVM_Light.
- Five different test scripts are used to generate
traces for simulation. Different test scenarios
include - Local features on Ad-hoc Protocols.
- Detection performance in terms of detection rate
and false alarm rates on DSR, AODV and DSDV.
29Experimental Results (cont..)
- It is observed that DSR tested with SVM_Light
outperforms the other two a lot. - DSR and AODV are both on-demand protocols with
path and pattern redundancy which help achieve a
better detection performance. - High correlation among changes of traffic flow,
routing activities and topological patterns are
preferred.
30Conclusion
- Architecture for better intrusion detection in
mobile computing environment should be both
distributed and cooperative. - The paper also proves to a point that on-demand
protocols work better than table driven protocols
because the behavior of on-demand protocols
reflects the correlation between traffic pattern
and routing message flows.
31- Any Questions?
- Any suggestions?