Nuclear Safety

1
Nuclear Safety the Independent Technical Review
(ITR) Process

• Presented to OECM Project
• Directors Workshop
• November 14, 2006
• Todd Lapointe, Energy Central Technical
  Authority (CTA) Staff

2006 Project Management Workshop
2
Energy CTA Background
April 26, 2005 Secretarys response to DNFSB
Recommendation 2004-1 on CTA Roles
Responsibilities. Authorities incl

• "Maintaining operational awareness of the
  implementation of nuclear safety requirements and
  guidance, consistent with the principles of
  Integrated Safety Management across the DOE
  ESE/NNSA complex (including, for example,
  reviewing Documented Safety Analyses,
  Authorization Agreements and readiness reviews as
  necessary to evaluate the adequacy of safety
  controls and implementation)"

3
CTA Staff Participation

• Supplement reinforce existing processes
• Participate with HQ teams, Field Office and
  Facility Representatives
• Accountability to site processes
• Promote Criteria Review and Approach Documents
  (CRADs) and consistency
• Promote questioning attitude

4
ITR Background

• Energy CTA staff participated in the Savannah
  River Site (SRS) Salt Waste Processing Facility
  (SWPF) ITR
• SWPF is intended to remove concentrate the
  radioactive Strontium, Actinides, and Cesium from
  the bulk salt waste in the high-level waste tanks
• DOE chartered an ITR team to review the
  preliminary design of the SWPF
• ITR commenced in late-August with the final
  report due mid-November

5
ITR Goal
Well defined goals from the outset critical to
review success - For SWPF, is the design

• Sufficient to support baseline cost and schedule
• Mature enough to request Critical Decision 2 per
  DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management
  for the Acquisition of Capital Assets

6
Responsibilities
Clearly defined responsibilities are a must

• DOE-HQ facilitates communications with the
  Program Office
• DOE-Field interfaces between the ITR and the
  contractor
• ITR team performs a professional review

7
Approach

• Kick-off meeting
• Studies of preliminary design products
• Sub-team meetings
• Final meeting

8
Lines of Inquiry (LOI)
Scope defined in the form of LOI. For SWPF
grouped by

• Civil/Structural Design
• Facility Safety
• Engineering

9
Team Structure

• Experts with extensive experience in
• Design
• Engineering
• Chemical Processing
• Radioactive Waste Management
• Expertise commensurate with established LOI
• Free of conflicts of interest

10
SWPF ITR Preliminary Results

• SWPF project ready to move to final design
  pending a management plan for the mitigation of
  significant technical risks
• Future, focused ITRs recommended for critical
  ongoing activities
• Final report pending

11
Lessons Learned
CNS and CTA staff reviewed the outcome of and
made the following observations

• Facility safety needs to focus more on the
  Preliminary Hazards and Documented Safety
  Analyses (PHA/PDSA)
• ITR sponsors need to have a plan to move forward
  based on the results