DRE: DirectRecording Electronic Voting System

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DRE Direct-Recording Electronic Voting System

• Molly Binenfeld, Julie Calnero,
• Maeve Keirans

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Overview

• Now called the AccuVote-TS
• Machines interact with the user via an integrated
  touch screen LCD display
• Like an ATM machines (Diebold makes these too)

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On Voting Day

• Voting machines are stored by local precincts
• Before the election machines are delivered to
  polling places where they are set up and prepared
  by poll workers
• Poll workers may configure Ballot Station. They
  enter the Pre-Download mode and test the machine
  for accuracy
• When a voter arrives, he is given a voter card
  a smart card that signifies that the voter is
  entitled to cast a vote
• Voter inserts voting card
• Machine validates voting card and the screen with
  the candidates appears
• After making and confirming selections, voter
  pushes a button to cast a vote
• The machine then modifies the voter card making
  it invalid and injects it
• When the election day has ended, poll workers can
  use the machine to print a result tape showing
  final vote tallies
• They make sure that the result tape has the votes
  for the same number of voters that voted

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Benefits

• For All DREs
• No ballot stuffing
• Fraud on a simplistic level is difficult
• Accessible for people with disabilities and
  people who speak different languages
• Voter card is invalidated after an individual
  votes
• No risk of hanging chads, or incorrectly filled
  bubbles
• For DREs With Paper Trails
• Combination of paper voting and internet voting
  but you do have to go to the location
• By combining the two, many of the risks and
  problems cancel one another
• Machines produce a result tape which is a
  modified paper trail

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RisksComplexity is the Enemy of Security

• Vote Stealing Attacks
• Voters can easily program their own smartcards
  to simulate the behavior of valid smartcards used
  in the election. With homemade cards, a voter
  can cast multiple ballots without leaving any
  trace.
• Information is transmitted over unsecured phone
  lines, or wireless internet connections, and
  someone can change the information as its being
  transmitted while remaining untraceable
• Voting Machine Viruses
• Susceptibility DREs have 11 places where viruses
  can get in
• Hacking into the system is very easy even
  beginning programmers can write a code that
  displays votes one way on a screen, records them
  another way, and tallies them yet another way.
  This can happen for a variety of reasons,
  including software and hardware errors, or
  hacks installed into the voting machines. These
  problems can occur even when voting machines have
  been thoroughly inspected and tested.
• Machines can be physically disabled or damaged

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Mitigation

• Most important strategy is to use a
  voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT)
  coupled with random audits
• Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit Trail
• DRE Voting system needs to use printer
  attachments to produce a printer paper ballot
  printed in the voters native language
• Voter can check that his/her vote is correct
• Computer printed ballot should be treated with
  the care of traditional paper ballots
• Ballots are anonymous and kept in secure ballot
  boxes, like typical paper ballots are
• -OR-
• A traditional Optical Scan System
• After casting the vote electronically, the voter
  uses an optical scan system ballot and fills in a
  bubble next to the name of his/her intended
  candidate

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• When the DRE produces a paper ballot, the vender
  software doesnt need to be as secure
• If a ballot is wrong, then its a spoiled ballot
  and traditional procedures should be applied
• If the paper ballots submitted differ from the
  votes cast on the DRE, the paper ballots should
  be counted because they are unique to each voter,
  but have also been read and verified as correct

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Other Mitigation Strategies

• Parallel Testing Election officials choose some
  voting machines at random and set them aside,
  casting simulated votes on them throughout
  election day and verifying at the end of the
  election that the machines counted the simulated
  votes correctly

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States That Use Direct Recording Electronic
Voting Systems and Require Voter Verified Paper
Audit Trails

• Alaska
• Arizona
• California
• Hawaii
• Illinois
• Missouri
• Nevada
• North Carolina
• Ohio
• Utah
• West Virginia
• Washington
• Wisconsin
• Wyoming

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States That Use Direct Recording Electronic
Voting Systems and Have Optional Voter Verified
Paper Audit Trails

• These states use DREs, but vary by precinct on
  use of VVPATs
• Arkansas
• Colorado
• Kansas
• Mississippi

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States That Use Direct Recording Electronic
Voting Systems and Do Not Require Voter Verified
Paper Audit Trails

• Delaware
• District of Columbia
• Florida
• Georgia
• Indiana
• Kentucky
• Louisiana
• Maryland
• New Jersey
• Ohio
• Pennsylvania
• South Carolina
• Texas
• Virginia