European Integration 10

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European Integration 10

• Amsterdam and Nice Treaties
• Wolfgang Renzsch, IPW OvGU

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• IGC 1996/97
• Greatest reform after ratification of Maastricht
  Treaty (TEU) gt follow up IGC agreed upon in
  Maastricht Treaty for left overs and assessing
  the Maastricht amendments
• ICG according Art. N (now 48) TEU gt preparation
  of MAASTRICT TWO gt Amsterdam Treaty
• Grown Challenges
• German unification gt EMU
• Open borders gt fear of immigration from Central
  and Eastern Europe gt asylum, immigration,
  policing policies gt JHA
• Gulf War and Yugoslavia gt common foreign and
  security policy, eventually common defence policy.

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• Pressure for reform
• Inefficiencies of an institutional for originally
  six MS had grown gt chaos of powers,
  institutions and procedures gt hardly responsible
  decision making
• No transparency
• No consensus about finalité gt important for
  yardsticks of democracy gt lack of legitimacy
• New democracies in CEE demanded access gt hardly
  possible unless the EU was reformed

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• IGC was prepared in 1995 by a reflection group
• Started 29 March 1996 at Turin/Italy and drafted
  in the 15 months coming the Amsterdam Treaty
  which was adopted by the European Council 16-18
  June at Amsterdam, final version signed also at
  Amsterdam on 2 October 1997
• Conclusions of (Dutch) presidency June 1997
• Agreement about the schedule for the third stage
  of EMU
• New exchange rat mechanism for EU currencies not
  participating in monetary union ()
• Techniques of Euro-introduction

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• Amsterdam Treaty
• General theme Freedom, Security and Justice
• Eight principal sets of key changes
• Consolidation of the treaties renumbering EC
  Treaty and TEU, housekeeping gt deletion of now
  redundant articles, e.g. timetable for custom
  union

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• EU as a type of liberal order gt EU as guardian of
  liberal constitutionalism, basic democratic
  principles, rule of law, fundamental rights
  protection. Commitment to decision making as
  openly as possible (Art. 1 TEU) (however
  Council behind closed doors) gt
• Art. 6(1) TEU the Union is founded on the
  principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
  human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and the
  rule of law. gt important with respect to new MS
  with little democratic experience.

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• Guarantees of fundamental rights have been made
  justiciable before the ECJ (46 TEU) gt sanctions
  for MS violating this guarantees (though
  questionable whether they would be applied.)
• Additionally measure to combat discrimination
  on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin,
  religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
  orientation (13 EC), right of access to documents
  (255 EC)

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• To a large degree concretisations of judge-led
  or informal or semi-formalised institutional
  arrangements gt nevertheless, they are a
  significant contribution to the EUs
  constitutional framework.

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• 3. Significant amendments within the
  three-pillar-systemgt movement of matters from the
  third pillar to the first gt communitarisation.
  (Second remained unchanged.) gt uneasy balance
  between intergovernmental and supranational
  aspects remained largely untouched

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• 4. New objective EU as an area of freedom,
  security and justice (2 TEU) gt beside
  constitutionalisation also communitarisation
  of large parts of the third pillar gt Part III
  Title IV EC Treaty gt Visas, Asylum, Immigration
  and other policies related to the free movement
  of persons. Schengen acquis was brought in
  framework of the treaties (by Protocol) (Ireland
  and GB opted out and preserved their passport
  union)

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• 5. Common Foreign, Security and Defence policy gt
  merger of EU and WEU failed, however intensified
  relationship gt TEU incorporated Petersberg
  tasks gt military forces for humanitarian and
  rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of
  combat forces in crisis management gt High
  Representative for CFSP gt Ms or Mr CFSP,
  simultaneously Secretary-General of the Council
  (18(3) TEU). Decisions mostly by unanimity but
  with constructive abstention gt de-facto opt-out
  (23(1) TEU) in cases of QMV gt emergency brake
  similar to Luxembourg Accord gt vote will not
  be taken referred to the European Council for
  decision by unanimity. (23(2) TEU)

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• 6. Constitutionalisation of flexibility through
  concept of closer cooperation gt known since
  Maastricht, however significant innovation gt Art.
  43 and 44 TEU allows MS to embark upon future
  closer cooperation, aimed at furthering the
  objectives of the Union difficult to foresee
  the consequences

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• 7. New policies Employment Title, social policy
  was re-integrated into treaties gender
  mainstreaming as task of EC under Art. 32(2) EC
  ability of MS to take positive action
  strengthened (141(4) EC) public health provision
  enhances, also environmental protection gt now
  Art. 6 EC. Protocol on Principles of Subsidiarity
  and Proportionality (Formalisation of informal
  arrangement, Edinburgh summit gt 2 TEU and 5 EC gt
  applicable to all Union activities)

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• 8. Changes of law making process
  co-determination procedure (251 EC) was extended
  to many further areas of the treaties gt more
  genuine partnership of equals between Council and
  EP accountability of Commission to EP enhanced,
  and overall role of Commission President.
  However, thorough institutional reform
  (originally intended) failed Protocol was
  attached to the treaty mandating a review of
  institutional matters such as the size of EP,
  weighting of votes in the Council, extend of QMV
  (vetoed by Chancellor Kohl), composition and size
  of Commission gt under review of an IGC starting
  in Feb. 2000.

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• Overall
• papering of some cracks of Maastricht, but added
  to complexity and opacity of the whole structure
  (despite rhetoric of Art. 1 TEU). First pillar
  proved to be attractive, at the same time
  increasing differentiation and diversity of
  institutional arrangements. Problem accumulation
  of texts, breeding ever deepening intransparency
  gt alienation (EP election 2004!)

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• Development of the 1990s
• Institutional 1994 Jacques Delors was succeeded
  as Commission President by Jacques Santer (PM
  Luxembourg), compromise candidate. Santer tried
  to reform Commission, however was swept away by
  reform gt Parliament used its new powers after a
  crisis of nepotism (Edith Cresson), fraud and
  mismanagement, forced the Commission to resign
  after it refused to discharge the Commission of
  the 1996 budget.

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• Successor of Santer
• Romano Prodi, served period of office remained
  from Santers period plus a full period of office
  1999-2004

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• CFSP
• Upheaval on the Balkans as a substantial
  challenge since 1993 gt ineffectual action in
  Bosnia failed to prevent armed conflict and
  atrocities against civilians including ethnic
  cleansing.
• Greece imposed unilateral economic sanctions
  against former Yugoslav republic Macedonia gt
  effective NATO and USA.
• Ineffectiveness of EU also obvious in Rwanda and
  elsewhere in Africa gt disagreements about common
  actions, financing etc.

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• CFSP (continued)
• Improved by Amsterdam Treaty new Art. 28 TEU
  provides that CFSP expenditure are to be covered
  by the EC budget
• Mr CFSP had been appointed in 2000 Javier
  Solana, former Secretary-General of NATO also
  appointed to Sec-Gen of WEU despite the formal
  separation of WEU and EU

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• 2003 proposal for an EU rapid reaction force of
  some 50,000-60,000 personnel.
• Petersberg tasks, humanitarian military action
  (17(2) TEU gt as amended ToA)
• European Council 1999 gt Common European Policy on
  Security and Defence (CEPSD)
• Kosovo crisis predictable Albanian nationalism
  vs. Serbian repression and ethnic cleansing gt in
  military terms, the field was left to NATO
• Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe,
  representatives from 38 countries and 15
  international organisations

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• EU applied carrot and stick policies Republics
  of former Yugoslavia would be supported if they
  realized the values of EU democracy, human
  rights, market economy.
• Stabilisation and Association Agreements became a
  new form of contractual relationship with third
  countries gt long-term possibility of accession
  offered, however, subject to conditions
• EU has taken over a central role in the
  reconstruction of the Kosovo,
• Established the European Agency for
  Reconstruction in Nov. 1999

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• Enlargement towards the East (plus Cyprus, Malta
  and Turkey)
• Route plan developed at Essen European Council
  1994 gt Europe Agreement gt (Visegrad) gt
  harmonisation of national legalisation of
  candidate states to EU-law.
• Candidates have to meet the acquis certain
  economic and political criteria (political
  criteria new, 6(1) TEU gt democracy, human rights,
  rule of law, respect for and protection of
  minorities, market economy)

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• 1995 Commission gt White Paper on accession and
  internal market, and preparation of associated
  countries
• 1997 set of Opinions on the applications of
  accession by 10 countries
• Agenda 2000 gt accession and budget, financial
  framework 2000 2006
• 2000 accession strategy
• Europe Agreements
• More recent detailed Accession Partnerships and
  National Programmes for the Adoption of the
  Acquis
• Pre-accession assistance

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• Feb. 2000 IGC (leading to Nice treaty) launched gt
  internal reform institutional issues raised by
  enlargement gt size and composition of the
  Commission and the EP, weighting of votes in the
  Council and QMV gt managing enlargement
• Necessary because of Helsinki European Council
  Dec 1999 gt accession negotiations were to be open
  early 2000
• Incorporation of draft of Charter of Fundamental
  Right of 1999 (not incorporated at Nice, however
  in the Constitution Treaty)

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• Problem
• interplay of size of Commission and weighting
  votes in the Council
• the five big MS were losing one (of two)
  commissioner. Request gt more votes in the
  Council, more QMV
• Small MS insisted on principle one MS, one
  Commissioner, no reason to re-weight the votes in
  the Council
• Alternative to re-weighting votes gt double
  qualified majority gt sufficient number of votes
  and sufficient number of MS
• More QMV in order to prevent deadlocks