Title: HIGHWAY PPP
1HIGHWAY PPPS, WHY AND HOWEnrique Fuentes,
Development Director Ferrovialand Member of the
Board of European International
ContractorsSeminar on legal, economic
implementation issues on PPPsMinistry of
Economy, Poland, and World BankWarsaw, April
2007
2About EIC PPP experience
- European international contractors take a leading
role in developing the worlds TRANSPORT
infrastructure, such as toll roads, tunnels,
railroads, ports and airports. - The 15 of the Top 35 Transportation Developers
2006, which are associated to EIC, have
implemented 269 PPP projects since the year
1985, whilst in 2006 they had 228 projects under
active proposal.
Warsaw, 18 June 2008
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3About EIC Statistics
With an aggregated international turnover in 2006
of almost 112 billion , European international
contractors are the most important players in the
international construction business.
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4WHO WE ARE FERROVIAL
MKT Cap US 8 bn
- Heathrow
- Gatwick
- Stansted
- Glasgow
- Edimburgh
- Southampton
- Others
MKT Cap US 7 bn
- London underground
- World largest handling
5WHO WE ARE CINTRA
7 Bn market cap 22() concessions More than
2,500() Km of toll roads
65 of the value in North America Present in
7() countries 73() years average concession
life
Ireland Eurolink Motorway M-3
Canada 407 ETR
USA Chicago Skyway Indiana Toll Road Segments
56 SH130
Spain Ausol I M-203 R-4 M45 Ocaña-La
Roda Autema Ausol II
Chile Collipulli Temuco Santiago
Talca Temuco Rio Bueno Talca
Chillan Autopista del Bosque
Portugal E. Algarve Norte Litoral Scut Açores ()
Greece Ionian Roads Central Greece
( ) Including the Scut Açores stake via
Ferrovial Infraestructuras. There are also three
projects pending final award Mantua-Cremona
(Italy), Central Greece (Greece) and SH-121
(USA) () Based on internal valuation released
to the market in December 2006 () Projects
pending final award.
6PPP FORMULAS RISK TRANSFER
- Risks transferred to concessionaire under
different PPP formulas - After Eurostat ruling 11/2004, all of them are
off balance sheet for Governments - but key criteria should be who pays for the
infrastructure
Formula Demand risk OM risk Construction Land Acquisition Financing
Classic Concession User paid toll Yes mitigation possible if risk too high (ie new mkts or no toll culture) Yes Yes Depends on country. Normally no except Spain and, partially, Portugal Yes mitigation in emerging markets)
Shadow tolls Partial Yes Yes Depends on country. Normally no except Spain and, partially, Portugal Yes mitigation in emerging markets)
Availability schemes No Yes Affects not only costs but revenues Yes Depends on country. Normally no except Spain and, partially, Portugal Yes mitigation in emerging markets)
7WHY PPPS SERVICE (CUSTOMER RATHER THAN USER)
- Incentives in a PPP are fully focused on
providing a public service in the most possible
efficient way, especially if traffic risk (and
upside) is transferred - Torontos 407
- Better and proactive winter maintenance in
Torontos 407 increases capture rate in bad
weather periods - Capacity is increased well ahead of contract
obligations in Torontos 407, improving driving
conditions and attracting more customers - Chicago Skyway
- Electronic tolling implemented in six months
(after 30 years of city ownerhip) - Queues reduced from hours to minutes
- Madrid Levante Highway (Spain) incentives
- 4 year extension in the original concession term
depending of its performance in certain criteria
capture rate of heavy traffic, accident rate,
congestion levels, and traffic flow, queues at
toll plazas, pavement surface conditions - Awarding criteria linked to discounts offered to
customers - BUT THIS ONLY WORKS IF THE PRIVATE DEVELOPER
HAS MONEY INVESTED AND RISK AND UPSIDE TRANSFERRED
8WHY PPPS EFFICIENCY INNOVATION
- Deliver the most efficient infrastructure that
serves public needs - Construction focus on value engineering and early
delivery - Stop to cost and delay overruns
- Focus on Life Cycle costs, rather than initial
construction costs - Optimisation of opex / capex balance
- Management of ongoing capex
- Development of new technologies for better
service / enhanced revenue - Free-flow tolling
- Congestion / accident detection systems
- Toll plaza queues Toll Flow technology
- Automatic anti - icing
9WHY PPPS DELIVERABILITY
- Boosting economic development, relieving
congestion, and reducing greenhouse emissions - Spanish highways in the 60s and 70s
- Chilean highways in the 90s
- Portuguese highways
- Irish highway programme
- De- bottlenecking the system and providing
mobility in congested areas - 407ETR highway in Toronto was developed 20 years
ahead of the expected horizon for public funding
development thanks to the involvement of private
developers - Providing crucial future infrastructure for the
long term development - Trans Texas Corridor
10WHY PPPS RATIONALITY OF DECISION MAKING AND
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
- Private involvement in the development of
transport infrastructure brings discipline and
rationality to the political decision process - PPP projects solving actual, critical traffic
problems are the most financially feasible - Private funding used in projects capable of
generating predictable revenue
government funding focused on pure development
projects - Natural tendency to invest where investment is
more needed - Contract with a 3rd party allows to avoid
political review of tariff setting - Where Government retains control of tariffs, they
seldom end up reflecting real cost of service US
turnpikes - Ensures accountable development of
infrastructure, not subject to budgetary
constraints - Ongoing maintenance and future capex
11WHY PPPS COMPARISON WITH TELECOMS
12PPP FORMULAS BIDDING SCHEMES
13PPP FORMULAS WHERE
Risk transfer
USA
Germany
Ireland
Canada (privatizations)
France
Classic concession
Greece
Italy
Spain (ENA)
Spain (Central Govt)
GBR (new?)
Portugal
Spain (OM)
Shadow tolls
Finland
Spain (Regions)
GBR
Holland
Availability schemes
Canada (Quebec)
Bidding scheme
PFI
Auction
Tender
14PPP FORMULAS CONCLUSIONS
- Governments with more PPP experience moving
towards user paid schemes demand risk transfer
and towards simpler bidding schemes - Governments with less experience moving the
opposite way availability and PFI bidding
schemes - Drivers
- Risk cost reduction as long as it is off
balance sheet - Ensure acceptability of the contractual framework
- Beware experience and government structure are
key for the dialogue process being efficient and
objective (not every Government or legal system
is like the UK) - A balance should exist between the formulas
- The key should be
- Risk transfer efficiency brought in by the
Private sector rather than Government budget
constraints - Bidding scheme if there is no track record,
efficiency (cost) and comparability of the
offers, rather than extensive negotiation - . BUT, WHATEVER YOU DO, DO IT NOW!,
INFRASTRUCTURE IS NEEDED
15PPP FORMULAS LIKELY EVOLUTION
- Short / Medium term
- Surge of PFI schemes for off balance sheet
reasons - Minimum risk transfer minimum cost
- Limitation of concessionaire upside
- Initially developed by contractors, later sale to
financial investors - PFI main limitation government future payment
commitments - Budgetary constraint today is accounting,
tomorrow will be financial - Key risk transfer trade off in the long term
efficiency vs cost - Long Term
- Classic user paid concessions for low medium
risk projects - Funds raised or saved are then devoted to higher
risk projects - Possible transformation of PFIs in user paid
schemes - Driver for PFIs efficiency of private sector
- Likely bias towards projects with a significant
recurrent cost component
16HOW TO ATTRACT INVESTORS BALANCED DEAL?
- How can an Administration attract investors?
- Long term deal goes through different
legislation sessions, politicians, economical and
social environments, economic cycles. - All equity and debt are invested upfront and are
unmovable. Assets belong to the State. Private
sector is left there to rely on a piece of paper
relies on its enforceability. - Private sector control on the investment is very
limited. Service can not be interrupted, toll
setting mechanism is stipulated, most service
levels are fixed. - Penalty for default is normally the loss of the
investment for the shareholders and all or most
of the debt for the lenders. - Odds are that future legislators will support the
Admin side rather than the private views. - Can an Administration behave and promise to
behave as an equal partner in a (very) long term
Agreement?
17HOW TO ATTRACT INVESTORS ADEQUATE STABLE
LEGISLATION
- Adequate legislation not only for the concession
in itself, but also for ancillary (but key)
agreements - Financing no limits to foreign lending or to
step in rights for lenders - Land acquisition has to be predictable in cost
time adequate title to land - Ownership of the asset / contract no limits to
nationality or nature - Types of legislative changes with effects that
should be protected or compensated - discriminatory legislation
- Tax legislation that alters the financial balance
- legislation that affects an essential right in
the Agreement - Compensation should be calculated based on
effective damage (loss of future value) - Compensation based on forecasts
- Present value
- Possibility Independent calculation
18HOW TO ATTRACT INVESTORS COMPETING INFRASTRUCTURE
- Admin should be able to implement virtually
anything but must compensate for certain
damages - Fair and balanced provisions relating to
competing facilities the private sector assumes
a reasonable and defined amount of risk, but it
is not unfairly burdened by an unanticipated
source of competition - Examples of competing facilities that would not
generate compensation - Those specifically planned in the concession date
- Improvements in nearby facilities due to reaching
certain congestion levels - New or improved facilities that do not cause
material negative impact to Developer
19HOW TO ATRACT INVESTORS ROAD STANDARDS
- Safety and design
- Specify clear design rules and standards and
let private sector to optimize - Developer must adhere to future safety specs
but in a fair and non discriminatory manner - Substantial changes that affect the nature of the
asset should be negotiated - Policing and rules as in any other similar
road. - Signs, lights, speed, Traffic Code
- Patrolling, fines, surveillance
- Traffic Management
20HOW TO ATTRACT INVESTORS ELECTRONIC TOLLS
- Need for State authority to define and enforce
interoperability rules - For State Agencies and Private Operators
- Recognize different agents issuers and operators
- Technical standards for transponder issuers
- Technical standards for road operators
- Basic interoperability rules (interfaces,
transponder lists ) - Enforceability and costs
- It is invented but seldom applied
21HOW TO ATTRACT INVESTORS ENFORCEABILITY
- Of the Agreement
- Are both parties subject to the Law and the
Courts? (Sovereign Immunity?) - Appropriations to pay compensations
- Independent dispute resolution method third
party valuation - Recourse to Justice by any party
- Effectiveness of decision
- Independent justice system (local or foreign)
- Of the tolls
- Legal standing of the Concessionaire
- Access to data (plate owner, address )
- Enforceability within state or region
22HOW TO ATTRACT INVESTORS TOLL RATES
- Method to be established at time of agreement
- Negotiated approach works were concessionaire is
public or semi public (France, Italy), or were
there is a long track record (UK) - Objective method must not be subject to
legislative or administrative decisions - May consider CPI or per capita GDP to keep up
with long term cost of goods - Can be related to congestion levels
- Many possible parameters can help achieve
transportation objectives - Peak hour tolls, night time rates, congestion
tolls - Truck / car differentials
- Premiums / deterrents to specific customers high
occupancy, extra heavy, local residents (but
beware of fraud!) - If tolls want to be kept low, it can be specified
in the agreement upfront
23HOW TO ATTRACT INVESTORS TERMINATION
- Termination for Default
- Administration Default must compensate the
investors, ensure payments, get control when
paid. - Developers Default first right of lenders to
cure, then step-in of Administration. - Termination for convenience (of the Admin)
- Investors should be compensated as per
Termination for Administrations Default - Formula to calculate compensation must be fixed
in Contract. Should compensate for loss of value.
Third party valuation under fixed set of rules - Beware of situations where it limits upside
without covering downside
24HOW TO ATTRACT INVESTORS DOS AND DONTS
- Main decisions taken and in force by the time of
the tender and politically supported - Be aware of political timing concessions and
even tenders can outdate election periods - Be aware of hurdles in your legislation is it
ready for the deal? - If not, implement the necessary changes
beforehand - Understand cost for the taxpayer of each
condition you feel you have to ask for - Be as flexible as your environment allows to hear
proposed improvements from prospective bidders - Avoid subjective decisions will scare
competition and certainly devaluate the deal - In lack of proven track record, extra care on
legislative / enforcement framework - Get ready ahead of time and have a dedicated team
- Feasible projects take time to develop before
they can be tendered
25EIC White Book on BOT/PPP Recommendations
- 3 TENDER PROCESS
- Use Pre-qualification of bidders
- Ensure Transparency Confidentiality throughout
process - Present clear award criteria
- Reimburse Bidding Costs
- Unsolicited Bids ??? (outside EU )
- 4 RISK MITIGATION
- Provide for optimal risk identification
allocation - Invite financial risk mitigation through IFIs,
ECAs, etc.
- 1 GENERAL PRECONDITIONS
- Ensure true Government Support
- Create a PPP Task Force
- Enhance Country Legal Framework(Accounting,
Taxes, Procurement) - 2 PROJECT PREPARATION
- Put in place sound procurement strategy
- Present comprehensive, reliable project
documentation - Provide for a steady and secure payment mechanism
- Agree on affordable level of tariffs
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