Scepticism and the Sociology of Knowledge

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All my course outlines and PowerPoint slides can
be downloaded from http//www.freewebs.com/mphk
2/ Friday, November 9th Lecture 6 Causes and
Reasons Friday, November 16th NO
LECTURE Friday, November 23rd 3-4pm Lecture
7 Practice 4-5pm Lecture 8 Values and
Critical Theory
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LECTURE 5 LAWS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES?

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The whole problem/discussion is premised on
the view that we have laws in the natural
sciences. Do we? Cf. van Fraassen, Giere
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1. Introduction Hempel on Explanation and
Prediction in History (Hempel (1942/1994)
L1, L2, Ln C1, C2, Cn ----------------- E

Explanans
Explanandum
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C1 The car was left in the street all night.
C2 Its radiator, which consists of iron, was
completely filled with water, and the lid was
screwed on tightly. C3 The temperature during
the night dropped from 39F. in the evening to
25F. in the morning the air pressure was
normal. C4 The bursting pressure of the
radiator material is so and so much.
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L1 Below 32F., under normal atmospheric
pressure, water freezes. L2 Below 39.2F.,
the pressure of a mass of water increases with
decreasing temperature, if the volume remains
constant or decreases when the water freezes,
the pressure again increases. L3 A
quantitative law concerning the change of
pressure of water as a function of its
temperature and volume. Conclusion (deduced by
logical reasoning) The radiator cracked
during the night.
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• Why dont explanations in history have this form
• The laws are sometimes trivial.

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• Why dont explanations in history have this form
• The laws are sometimes trivial.
• The laws are sometimes too complicated to
  state.

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• Why dont explanations in history have this form
• The laws are sometimes trivial.
• The laws are sometimes too complicated to
  state.
• Note
• The laws often come from other fields.

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• Why dont explanations in history have this form
• The laws are sometimes trivial.
• The laws are sometimes too complicated to
  state.
• Note
• The laws often come from other fields.
• Often we get only explanation sketches.

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1. Introduction Hempel on Explanation and
Prediction in History (Hempel (1942/1994) The
scientific explanation of the event in question
consists of
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1. a set of statements asserting the
occurrence of certain events C1, ..., Cn at
certain times and places,
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1. a set of statements asserting the
occurrence of certain events C1, ..., Cn at
certain times and places, 2. a set of
universal hypotheses, such that a. the
statements of both groups are reasonably well
confirmed by empirical evidence,
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1. a set of statements asserting the
occurrence of certain events C1, ..., Cn at
certain times and places, 2. a set of
universal hypotheses, such that a. the
statements of both groups are reasonably well
confirmed by empirical evidence, b. from the
two groups of statements the sentence asserting
the occurrence of event E can be logically
deduced.( 43-44)
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• The preceding considerations apply to
  explanation in history as well as in any other
  branch of empirical science. (46)

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• The preceding considerations apply to
  explanation in history as well as in any other
  branch of empirical science. (46)
• Most explanations offered in history or
  sociology, fail to include an explicit statement
  of the general regularities they presuppose
  and there seem to be at least two reasons which
  account for this

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• 1 the universal hypotheses in question
  frequently are ... familiar to everybody ...
  
• 2 it would often be very difficult to
  formulate the underlying assumptions explicitly
  ... (47)
• Sometimes the laws in question are statistical.
  
• Usually historians only give explanation
  sketches. They need filling out. (48)
• Often the laws upon which historians rely come
  from other fields. (52)

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• 2. Laws and Complexity (Hayek 1967/1994 Scriven
  1956/1994 McIntyre 1993/1994)
• The social world is intrinsically too complex
  for laws. Hayek

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• 2. Laws and Complexity (Hayek 1967/1994 Scriven
  1956/1994 McIntyre 1993/1994)
• The social world is intrinsically too complex
  for laws. Hayek
• The level of description of the social world
  that interests us is too complex for laws.
  Scriven

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• 2. Laws and Complexity (Hayek 1967/1994 Scriven
  1956/1994 McIntyre 1993/1994)
• The social world is intrinsically too complex
  for laws. Hayek
• The level of description of the social world
  that interests us is too complex for laws.
  Scriven
• Why cant we change the language and analysis
• even at the level we are interested in?
  McIntyre

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• Friedrich Hayek (1967/1994)
• Inquiry is after recurring patterns.

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• Hayek (1967/1994)
• Inquiry is after recurring patterns.
• These can be more or less complex.

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• Hayek (1967/1994)
• Inquiry is after recurring patterns.
• These can be more or less complex.
• Measure of complexity
• ... The minimum number of elements of which an
  instance of the pattern must consist in order to
  exhibit all the characteristic attributes of the
  class of patterns in question ... (56)

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• Example Ideal Gas Law
• PV nRT
• P pressure
• V volume
• n number of moles
• R constant
• T temperature in degrees Kelvin

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• Social phenomena are more complex than physical
  phenomena.

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• Social phenomena are more complex than physical
  phenomena.
• Physics is not more advanced than social
  science
• ... physics has succeeded because it deals
  with phenomena which, in our sense, are simple.
  ... (58)

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• Social phenomena are more complex than physical
  phenomena.
• Physics is not more advanced than social
  science
• ... physics has succeeded because it deals
  with phenomena which, in our sense, are simple.
  ... (58)
• Laws?
• ... the preceding considerations throw some
  doubt on the view that the aim of theoretical
  science is to establish laws. (66)

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• Michael Scriven (1956/1994)
• ... simple laws will very rarely be found even
  under
• the most idealized laboratory conditions. (74)

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• Scriven (1956/1994)
• ... simple laws will very rarely be found even
  under
• the most idealized laboratory conditions. (74)
• Lack of success is due to the multiplicity of
  critical variables in the simplest interesting
  cases. (74)

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• Scriven (1956/1994)
• ... simple laws will very rarely be found even
  under
• the most idealized laboratory conditions. (74)
• Lack of success is due to the multiplicity of
  critical variables in the simplest interesting
  cases. (74)
• The human being is enormously complex and
  there can be no practical sense in which this
  element can
• be reduced to simpler ones. (75)

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• L. McIntyre (1993/1994)
• Against Hayek ... social phenomena are not
  complex as such, but only as described and
  defined at a given level of inquiry. (132).

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• L. McIntyre (1993/1994)
• Against Hayek ... social phenomena are not
  complex as such, but only as described and
  defined at a given level of inquiry. (132).
• Against Scriven He treats it as if once we
  have chosen the level of our interest, we have
  also deter- mined all of the natural kinds that
  govern that level
• But even at one level of interest there may be
  many different possible descriptions,
  categorizations, theories, distinctions, and
  vocabularies ... (136)

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3. Reconstruction of Davidsons Psychology as
Philosophy (1974) Often presented as an
argument against the possibility of laws in the
social sciences
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1 Main thesis There can be no (strict
causal) laws in (intentional) psychology.
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1 Main thesis There can be no (strict
causal) laws in (intentional) psychology. 2
Intentional mental states are mental states
about, or of, real or imagined states of
affairs e.g. belief, desire, intention.
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3 Type versus token He talks and talks
and talks. Three types of words, six tokens.
Tokens are spatio-temporal particulars.
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4 A classification of views on the mind-body
problem mind-body /
\ monism dualism
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4 A classification of views on the mind-body
problem mind-body /
\ monism dualism
/ \ materialism
idealism
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4 A classification of views on the mind-body
problem mind-body /
\ monism dualism
/ \ materialism
idealism / \ type-m.
token-m.
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Mind-Body Identity Thesis
Mental
tokens









Physical
Tokens are spatio-temporal particulars.
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Token materialism
A? 1 B ? 2
Mental type A
Mental type B
Mental
tokens









Physical
Physical type 1
Physical type 2
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Type materialism
A 1 B 2
Mental type A
Mental type B
Mental
tokens









Physical
Physical type 1
Physical type 2
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Key argument for token- (and against type-)
materialism multiple
realizability One and the same type of mental
state can be realised in many different physical
states of the brain.
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5 Psychological events (e.g. intentions)
cause physical events (e.g. movements).
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5 Psychological events (e.g. intentions)
cause physical events (e.g. movements). Psycho
logical events (e.g. intentions) cause
psychological events (e.g. thoughts).
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5 Psychological events (e.g. intentions)
cause physical events (e.g. movements). Psycho
logical events (e.g. intentions) cause
psychological events (e.g. thoughts).
Physical events cause physical events.
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5 Psychological events (e.g. intentions)
cause physical events (e.g. movements). Psycho
logical events (e.g. intentions) cause
psychological events (e.g. thoughts).
Physical events cause physical events.
Physical events (e.g. earthquakes) cause
psychological events (e.g. fear).
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6 Singular causal statements ... Hume is
right that they entail that there is a law.
(Davidson) Let a and b be tokens of types A and
B respectively. The sentence Event token a
causes event token b
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6 Singular causal statements ... Hume is
right that they entail that there is a law.
(Davidson) Let a and b be tokens of types A and
B respectively. The sentence Event token a
causes event token b entails the sentence
Tokens of event type A and tokens of event
type B are constantly conjoined.
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7 Strict causal laws exist only in closed
and deterministic systems. There are physical
strict causal laws, since the physical realm is
closed. At least for materialists this
argument is based upon materialist premises.
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8 Does that mean that there are no
(strict causal) laws covering intentional
psychology? After all, the psychological realm
is not closed.
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9 But does not materialism allow for a
different answer? If psychological entities
are (identical with) physical entities then they
are part of a closed system. Like this
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Psychological law Psych. event type A
causes psych. event type B.
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Psychological law Psych. event type A
causes psych. event type
B. Physical law Brain event
type C causes brain event type D.
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Psychological law Psych. event type A
causes psych. event type
B. Psychophysical laws AC
BD Physical law
Brain event type C causes
brain event type D.
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If psychological types are identical with
physical types then psychological laws turn out
to be physical laws too and can be strict and
determinate. Is that true? No!
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10 There can be no strict psychophysical laws
Belq
Belr Bels
Belp
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10 Belq Belr
Bels
Belp
Rationality as constitu-tive idea
consistency, coherence
Holism
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10
Belq Belr
Bels
Belp
?? Bstp
Bstq
Bstr Bsts

Rationality as constitu-tive idea
consistency, coherence
Holism
No echo
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Problem the intentional states are related
by normative relations (of consistency,
coherence, rationality) and these normative
relations have no echo in the physical realm.
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• 11 Conclusions
• No strict causal laws of intentional
  psychology.
• Only vague statistical generalisations.
• Anti-reductivism.

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• Token materialism is correct, type materialism
  is wrong.
• Every mental state is determined (as a physical
  state).
• (But what if we were dualists? Then again no
  closed system. And idealists? Then the same
  problem in reverse.)

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4. Social Science, Laws and Recent Philosophy of
Science (Kincaid 1990/1994) Against bad
arguments for the claim that there cannot be laws
in the social sciences
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John Searles argument 1. Social kinds have
indefinitely many physical realizations.
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John Searles argument 1. Social kinds have
indefinitely many physical realizations. 2.
When a kind has indefinitely many physical
realizations, it has no systematic connection
to the physical.
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John Searles argument 1. Social kinds have
indefinitely many physical realizations. 2.
When a kind has indefinitely many physical
realizations, it has no systematic connection
to the physical. 3. If a kind is not
systematically connected to the physical, it
cannot support genuine laws.
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John Searles argument 1. Social kinds have
indefinitely many physical realizations. 2.
When a kind has indefinitely many physical
realizations, it has no systematic connection
to the physical. 3. If a kind is not
systematically connected to the physical, it
cannot support genuine laws. 4. Thus social
kinds cannot support genuine laws. (112)
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• Bad argument!
• If systematic connection means law-like
  relation between social and physical predicates
  then this is an undefended reductionism.
• If systematic connection means supervenience
  then 2. is false. (113)

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Other bad arguments against laws in social
science a. The openness of social systems
does not rule out laws physical systems are
open, too. (112-13)
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Other bad arguments against laws in social
science a. The openness of social systems
does not rule out laws physical systems are
open, too. (112-13) b. We can have social
laws without the underlying mechanisms.
Contra Elster. (115)
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Other bad arguments against laws in social
science a. The openness of social systems
does not rule out laws physical systems are
open, too. (112-13) b. We can have social
laws without the underlying mechanisms.
Contra Elster. (115) c. That social laws are
not completely general is no argument against
them. (119)
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d. Social laws have ceteris paribus clauses
but so do physical laws. (120) Examples of
ceteris paribus laws in economics A rise
in the price of a good will result in a
decrease in the quantity demanded. A
decline in the supply of a good will result in
a rise in price. (123-4)
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• Davidson gives us no good reasons against laws
  
• much social science proceeds at the
  macro-level ... As such, it is unaffected by the
  failure of specific theories of individual
  behavior. ... (115)

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More generally, the following form of
argument form is invalid X exists. X has
function Y. X exists because it has function Y.