Scepticism and the Sociology of Knowledge

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All my course outlines and PowerPoint slides can
be downloaded from http//www.freewebs.com/mphk
2/ Friday, November 16th NO LECTURE Friday,
November 23rd 3-4pm Lecture 7
Practice Coffee, tea and biscuits!!! 4-5pm
Lecture 8 Values and Critical Theory
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LECTURE 5 LAWS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES?

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1. Introduction Hempel on Explanation and
Prediction in History (Hempel (1942/1994)
L1, L2, Ln C1, C2, Cn ----------------- E

Explanans
Explanandum
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• Why dont explanations in history have this form
• The laws are sometimes trivial.
• The laws are sometimes too complicated to
  state.
• Note
• The laws often come from other fields.
• Often we get only explanation sketches.

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• 2. Laws and Complexity (Hayek 1967/1994 Scriven
  1956/1994 McIntyre 1993/1994)
• The social world is intrinsically too complex
  for laws. Hayek
• The level of description of the social world
  that interests us is too complex for laws.
  Scriven
• Why cant we change the language and analysis
• even at the level we are interested in?
  McIntyre

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4. Reconstruction of Davidsons Psychology as
Philosophy (1974) Often presented as an
argument against the possibility of laws in the
social sciences
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1 Main thesis There can be no (strict
causal) laws in (intentional) psychology.
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Mind-Body Identity Thesis
Mental
tokens









Physical
Tokens are spatio-temporal particulars.
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Type materialism
A 1 B 2
Mental type A
Mental type B
Mental
tokens









Physical
Physical type 1
Physical type 2
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Token materialism
A? 1 B ? 2
Mental type A
Mental type B
Mental
tokens









Physical
Physical type 1
Physical type 2
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7 Strict causal laws exist only in closed
and deterministic systems. There are physical
strict causal laws, since the physical realm is
closed. At least for materialists this
argument is based upon materialist premises.
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8 Does that mean that there are no
(strict causal) laws covering intentional
psychology? After all, the psychological realm
is not closed.
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9 But does not materialism allow for a
different answer? If psychological entities
are (identical with) physical entities then they
are part of a closed system. Like this
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Psychological law Psych. event type A
causes psych. event type
B. Psychophysical laws AC
BD Physical law
Brain event type C causes
brain event type D.
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Belq Belr
Bels
Belp
?? Bstp
Bstq
Bstr Bsts

Rationality as constitu-tive idea
consistency, coherence
Holism
No echo
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Problem the intentional states are related
by normative relations (of consistency,
coherence, rationality) and these normative
relations have no echo in the physical realm.
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• Kincaid
• Davidson gives us no good reasons against laws
  
• much social science proceeds at the
  macro-level ... As such, it is unaffected by the
  failure of specific theories of individual
  behavior. ... (115)

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LECTURE 6 ACTION EXPLANATIONS, REASONS,
AND CAUSES Davidson Actions, Reasons, and
Causes, 1963
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0. Introduction Claim The social and the
natural sciences differ fundamentally in their
modes of explanation Natural sciences causal
explanations Social sciences non-causal
explanations in terms of reasons. Is that
true?
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1. Preliminary I Intensional vs.
Extensional Contexts
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• A sentence S is an extensional context iff
• Intersubstitutivity salve veritate
  Co-referring expressions can be substituted for
  one another
• in S without that Ss truth value changes.

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• A sentence S is an extensional context iff
• Intersubstitutivity salve veritate
  Co-referring expressions can be substituted for
  one another
• in S without that Ss truth value changes.
• Co-referring expressions Martin Kusch and
• Sarah Gores husband

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• A sentence S is an extensional context iff
• Intersubstitutivity salve veritate
  Co-referring expressions can be substituted for
  one another
• in S without that Ss truth value changes.
• Co-referring expressions Martin Kusch and
• Sarah Gores husband
• If
• Martin Kusch lives on Alpha Road
• is true, then so is
• Sarah Gores husband lives on Alpha Road.

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• A sentence S is an extensional context iff
• Existential generalisation S entails the
  existence
• of the entities to which its expressions refer.
• If Martin Kusch lives on Alpha Road
• is true, then Martin Kusch exists.

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• A sentence S is an intensional context if, and
  only if,
• both (a) and (b) fail.
• Mary believes that Martin Kusch lives on
  Alpha Road
• does not entail that
• Mary believes that Sarah Gores husband lives
  on Alpha Road.

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• A sentence S is an intensional context if, and
  only if,
• both (a) and (b) fail.
• Mary believes that Martin Kusch lives on
  Alpha Road
• does not entail that
• Mary believes that Sarah Gores husband lives
  on Alpha Road.
• (b) Nor does it entail that Martin Kusch
  exists.
• (Mary might be wrong to believe that Im alive.)

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Intentional ? intensional!
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2. Preliminary II Action Descriptions,
Justification and Intensionality
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• Whether an action is justifiable depends on how
  
• it is described.
• Take my action of opening the window.
• We can re-describe this action as the action of
  letting in fresh air.
• This seems to provide a justification of the
  action
• (of opening the window).

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• But we can also re-describe the same action as
  
• the action of giving the audience a cold.
• Under this description the action (of opening
• the window) is not justifiable.
• Thus, we cannot substitute one action
• description for another without changing
• the value of the action.

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3. Preliminary III Davidson on Causation

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Causal relations are part of the world
causal relations hold between particular
events
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Causal relations are part of the world
causal relations hold between particular
events Causal explanations are part of
language causal explanations hold between
statements or descriptions of events and laws.
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Singular causal statements vs. causal
explanations In singular causal statements
the expression caused relates not sentences but
particular events. The short circuit caused
the fire. Event1
Event2
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Singular causal statements are extensional
contexts If the fire was mentioned at 8am
on the Today Programme on 19/10/07, we can
replace The short-circuit caused the fire
by The short-circuit caused the event
mentioned at 8am on the Today Programme
19/10/07 without changing the truth-value.
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Cf. a causal explanation of the fire.
According to the standard deductive-nomological
account, we explain an event by deducing it from
laws of nature and statements describing various
circumstances before and during the event. L1
. Ln C1 Cn
Explanans ------------------
Explanandum
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• Deduction takes us from sentences to sentences.
  

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• Deduction takes us from sentences to sentences.
  
• Whether or not a deduction (within a causal
  explanation) is possible, depends crucially on
  how we describe the cause and the effect.

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• Deduction takes us from sentences to sentences.
  
• Whether or not a deduction (within a causal
  explanation) is possible, depends crucially on
  how we describe the cause and the effect.
• While there are natural laws from which we can
  deduce The short-circuit caused the fire,

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• Deduction takes us from sentences to sentences.
  
• Whether or not a deduction (within a causal
  explanation) is possible, depends crucially on
  how we describe the cause and the effect.
• While there are natural laws from which we can
  deduce The short-circuit caused the fire,
• there are no natural laws from which we
• can deduce The short-circuit caused the event
  mentioned at 815am on the Today Programme on
  19/10/07.

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Causal explanation is intensional.
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4. Preliminary IV Rationalisations of
Actions
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• Consider the action described as
• Mary came to the lecture.
• Why did she?
• E.g. ()
• because it is on Davidson.
• () provides a reason for Marys action
• it is a rationalisation of her action.

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• () refers to a pro-attitude (desire, wish
  ...) and to a belief (Davidson)
• Pro-attitude Mary desires to learn about
  Davidson today.
• Belief Mary believes that if she comes to
  todays
• lecture, she will be able to learn about
  Davidson.

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• How do we know that, although Mary had the
• mentioned reason, she didnt act on another one?
• She might have any number of reasons.
• Which one moved her?
• According to the received view, the difference
• between having and acting on a reason is
• causal.

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5. The Anti-Causalists Anscombe, Winch,
Melden, Dray, von Wright The difference
cannot be causal! Reasons cannot be causes!
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1 On a Humean view of causation, two events
relate as cause and effect if, and only if, they
instantiate a law of nature. But we do not
have laws of nature covering the relationship
between reasons and actions.
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2 On a Humean view of causation, causal
relations are strictly different from logical or
conceptual ideas. But in a rationalisation the
relationship between the reason and the
explained action is conceptual and logical (or
internal). Cf. The Logical Connection
Argument (here is von Wrights version)
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Agent X intends to bring about state of
affairs p.
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Agent X intends to bring about state of
affairs p. X considers that he cannot bring
about p unless he does action a.

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Agent X intends to bring about state of
affairs p. X considers that he cannot bring
about p unless he does action a.

Ergo X sets himself to do a.
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Agent X intends to bring about state of
affairs p. X considers that he cannot bring
about p unless he does action a.

Ergo X sets himself to do a. Premises and
conclusion are conceptually dependent The
verification of the premises presupposes the
verification of the conclusion, and the
verification of the conclusion presupposes the
verification of the premises. (von Wright
1971).
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6. Davidsons Causalist Response
(Actions, Reasons, and Causes, 1963)
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Rationalisation is a species of causal
explanation. A rationalisation has two
aspects i it justifies the action the
aspect of rationality ii it explains the
action causally the aspect of
causality
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Consider i first. How is this to be analysed
further Note first of all that we always do
intentional actions under a description X has
a primary reason to do action a under description
d, if, and only if 1 X has a pro-attitude
(wish, desire, etc.) towards actions with
property p 2 X has the belief that action a,
under description d, has this property p.
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MK has a primary reason to do the action of
window-opening under the description letting in
fresh air, iff 1 MK wishes for actions that
have the property of keeping his students
awake 2 MK believes that the action of
window-opening under the description letting in
fresh air has the property of keeping his
students awake. The primary reason of an action
is its cause. (Davidson)
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1 Recall Objection One There are no laws
concerning reasons and actions. Davidson
agrees with that point to some extent (cf. L.5)
... generalisations connecting reasons and
actions are not and cannot be sharpened into
the kind of law on the basis of which accurate
predictions can reliably be made (683).
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But remember that (1) reasons are
psychological states (or events), and
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• But remember that
• (1) reasons are psychological states (or
  events), and
• tokens of psychological states (events) are
  identical with tokens of physical states
  (events) of the brain.

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• But remember that
• (1) reasons are psychological states (or
  events), and
• tokens of psychological states (events) are
  identical with tokens of physical states
  (events) of the brain.
• And there are strict physical
  (brain- physiological) laws that govern states
• and events in the brain.

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• Take two event tokens a and b.
• When we want to claim a causal relation between
  
• a and b, we have to describe a and b in some
  way.
• More than one description is usually possible.

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• Humes insistence that singular causal
  statements must be backed by a causal law
  amounts to this
• a caused b entails that there exists a
  causal law instantiated by some true
  descriptions of
• a and b.

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E.g. This primary reason i.e. (token)
belief and pro- attitude caused this action
claims a causal relation between two events (the
primary reason and the action). There can be
no intentional-psychological law that backs up
this singular causal claim.
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But there exists a causal law governing the
relationship between the two token events
nevertheless a brain-physiological law. In
order to make explicit we have to re-describe
the two events tokens in brain-physiological
terms.
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Rationality
reasontoken
actiontoken
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physical eventstoken
brainstatetoken
Causality
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Rationality
reasontoken
actiontoken
physical eventstoken
brainstatetoken
Causality
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Token materialism
A? 1 B ? 2
Mental type A
Mental type B
Mental
tokens









Physical
Physical type 1
Physical type 2
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Token materialism
A? 1 B ? 2
CAUSES
Mental type A
Mental type B
Mental
tokens









Physical
Physical type 1
Physical type 2
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2 Objection Two The Logical Connection
Argument We need to distinguish between events
(i.e. the ontological level) and their
description (i.e. the linguistic level).
Consider
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a The short-circuit caused the fire.
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a The short-circuit caused the fire. b
The short-circuit the cause of the fire.
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a The short-circuit caused the fire. b
The short-circuit the cause of the fire. c
The cause of the fire caused the fire.
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a The short-circuit caused the fire. b
The short-circuit the cause of the fire. c
The cause of the fire caused the fire. Now the
relation is logical-conceptual!
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a The short-circuit caused the fire. b
The short-circuit the cause of the fire. c
The cause of the fire caused the fire. Now the
relation is logical-conceptual! But only on the
level of the description!!!
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Rationalisations describe two events (the
reason and the action) in ways that make their
relationship internal, conceptual or even
logical. But there is always a different
level of description too the level of
brain-physiology and on that level the
relationship is external.
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Insofar as they explain the occurrence of the
action, rationalisations are singular causal
statements.
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Insofar as they explain the occurrence of the
action, rationalisations are singular causal
statements. And singular causal statements are
extensional.
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Insofar as they explain the occurrence of the
action, rationalisations are singular causal
statements. And singular causal statements are
extensional. Hence they remain true when we
replace the intentional-psychological
descriptions with brain-physiological
descriptions.
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So, for Davidson, action explanations have
two aspects they justify and they explain
causally. But these two aspects are kept apart.
Reasons do not cause actions in virtue of
justi- fying them but in virtue of their
instantiating a strict physical law.
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Psychological law Psych. event type A
causes psych. event type
B. Psychophysical laws AC
BD Physical law
Brain event type C causes
brain event type D.
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Psychological claim psy. event token A
causes psy. event token
B. Psychophysical laws
none Physical law Brain event
type C causes brain event type D.
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8. The Anti-Causalists Return? (Stoutland
1988)
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1 If Davidson is right, we can never know
whether a given reason caused a given action.
For in order to know that we need to know the
strict physical law according to which
(re- described as physical events) the reason
caused the action. But we do not know such laws!
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2 The difference between rationalising our
behaviour and explaining it in terms of reasons
is not causal but normative, and normative all
the way down. The reason you act on is one
of the reasons that you have, and it is the
reason that it is most rational to act on in
present circumstances.
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3 It is wrong to think that reasons for
actions must be mental states. Marys coming
to the lecture can be justified by the fact
that the lecture is on Davidson. This fact
also explains why Mary comes to the lecture,
provided only that she meets the pre- condition
of believing the fact. But her mental state is
merely a precondition for the justification to
function as an explanation. It is not part of
the explanation.
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It does become part of the explanation only when
her belief is false. Consider the answers we
give to Why did Mary come to the lecture?
Because the lecture is on Davidson.
(No mental states mentioned here.) Because
she falsely believed that the lecture is on
Davidson. (Mental state mentioned.)
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9. Tentative Conclusion There may be after
all grounds for the claim according to which the
social and the natural sciences differ in their
modes of explanation. This deals a
(further) blow to the unity-of -science thesis.