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Democratic Recession in the Philippines What
Went Wrong?

• By Chito Gascon
• Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow
• 17 July 2007
• National Endowment for Democracy
• Please note that the views expressed in this
  presentation represent the opinions and analysis
  of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect
  those of the National Endowment for Democracy

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Presentation Outline

• Basic Facts and Context of the Situation
• Consideration of Some Key Flashpoints
• Assessment and Analysis
• Prospects and Recommendations

The objective of the presentation is to describe
current democratic recession in the Philippines
from the standpoint of a democracy activist in
order to explain some possible reasons for this
occurrence, and to encourage constructive
dialogue that can lead to the articulation of
some workable solutions..
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• When you have complex problems in a complex
  country, you are going to have complex answers to
  them you are going to have complex points of
  view
• - Brian Joseph
• Director for South Southeast Asia
  National Endowment for Democracy
• remarks made on 28 June 2007 on the occasion of
  his first trip to the Philippines on a NED
  Assessment Visit

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First, a Quick History Lesson

• There are certain great principles of government
  which have been made the basis of our
  governmental system, which we deem essential to
  the rule of law and the maintenance of individual
  freedom . . . and that these principles and these
  rules of government must be established and
  maintained in their islands for the sake of their
  liberty and happiness, however much they may
  conflict with the customs or laws of procedure
  with which they are familiar
• President William McKinley to the
  
• Philippine Commission headed by
• William Howard Taft on 7 April 1900

• to fit the people themselves to maintain a
  stable and well-ordered government affording
  equality of right and opportunity to all
  citizens
• William Howard Taft defining the US avowed policy
  
• during his address on the occasion of the
• 1907 inauguration of the Philippine Assembly

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our very first exercise in nation building.
- Observation made by writer, editor, and
historical researcher Kevin Baker
in an essay appearing in American Heritage
Magazine 54 4
Prior to American colonial rule, it is important
to note, the Philippines had no significant
experience with national-level democratic
institutions or national-level political parties
Although it is indeed true that the Philippines
is the Asian country with the most enduring
experience with democratic institutions, one must
also conclude that its democracy got off to a
decidedly inauspicious start - Conclusions
made jointly by Joel Rocamora, PhD
and Paul Hutchcroft, PhD in an academic
article
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Basic Political Facts (pre-1996)

• 85M people in 7,100 islands in Southeast Asia
• 350 years of Spanish rule
• American rule during the 1st half of the 20th
  century
• Prior to immediately after WWII a political
  system was adopted essentially patterned after
  the US
• Widespread poverty, inequality, and injustice
• Internal armed conflicts (ideological/ethnic/relig
  ious)
• Authoritarian rule (1972-1986)
• 1986 democratic breakthrough, bumpy transition
• 1986-1996 political reforms under Aquino
  economic reforms under Ramos

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Complex in its Contrasts

• The good news is the Economy, YET it also
  highlights some of the interesting dynamics of
  the situation
• Economic Stability-Political Instability, Some
  Growth-Little Equity, Capital In-Flow -Human
  Resource Out-Flow
• General Observations by Habito
• The half full half empty Philippine economy
• Tapering inflation / improved fiscal position of
  the government / surging overseas remittances /
  political conflict continues
• Over 5 growth, BUT still slower than the region
• Per capita income now over 1400 self-rated
  poverty is high
• 2 out of 3 not bad prices income versus jobs
• Economic Tango
• A case of good economics taking a back seat to
  other considerations, in matters that profoundly
  affect the public welfare
• One senses here a disturbing return to
  Marcos-era economics

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The Democratic Project

• A harbinger of democratic change on the crest of
  theThird Wave
• PEOPLEPOWER as a modality for effecting
  transition from dictatorships
• Turning Tables in the World democracies vs
  non-democracies
• The challenge of consolidation the problem of
  backsliding, recession, or backlash
• A more sobering reality in Southeast Asia
• Is this trend spreading to the few hold-out
  democracies in the region?

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INDONESIA -----
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INDONESIA -----
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INDONESIA -----
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The Downturn The Last 10 Years

• Asian financial crisis in 1997
• Attempts at changing the rules (CHACHA)
• Ostensibly to guarantee continuity of reform
  efforts
• Perceived as an effort to perpetuate those in
  power
• Emergence of populist politics candidates
• 1998 Presidential Elections ERAP phenomenon
• Bad governance, scandals, corruption
• Counter-reaction by the entrenched elites
• EDSA 2 (promised reforms/urban-based/middle
  class)
• Manipulation of electoral legal processes
  (2004)
• Erosion of trust in key institutions (elections
  /courts)
• Breakdown of consensual politics /public
  alienation
• Resort by some to extra-constitutional efforts
  (Oakwood)

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Context of the Chronic CrisisA Political
Stalemate (déjà vu?)

• Crisis of Legitimacy
• Breach in the constitutional framework
• Unresolved Questions about 2004 Elections
• Politics of Survival
• Transactional politics
• Scorched earth tactics / authoritarian streak
• Strong executive - weakening checks balances
• Polarization
• Public demonstrations / calls for resignation
• Resurgence of rebel activity
• Politicization of the Security Forces
• Involvement in partisan activity
• Discontent within the ranks / reality of mutiny
• Total war policy

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Why Democracy is in Danger

• Weak rule of law (abuse of power, corruption,
  impunity, violence, etc)
• Poor economic performance (poverty, inequality,
  injustice)
• Ethnic religious divisions
• Weak ineffective political institutions
  (parties, parliaments, systems of horizontal
  accountability)
• Weak constraints on authoritarian leaders
  (civil society, international actors)
• BAD GOVERNANCE
• (Diamond)

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Some Flashpoints for Consideration

• The Processes of Political Participation
• Credibility and integrity of elections
• Dominance of dynasties (bossism)
• Weakening of intermediary institutions
• Rule of Law
• Sustaining leadership within the court system
• Fighting the hydra combating systemic corruption
• Culture of violence defense of human rights
• Armed Conflict Security Forces
• Rebel activity peace efforts
• Civilian control vs militarization of civilian
  authority
• The Institutional Framework
• Ensuring mechanisms of accountability
• The reform agenda (what, when, why, how?)
• Charter change / procedural substantive aspects
• Possibility of hijack

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Catholic Bishops Statement (CBCP) January
2007
1. Some Considerations on Political Institutions

• These coming elections in May 2007 are
  especially important. Many of our current
  political problems, which have hindered fuller
  economic development and social justice,
  especially for the poor, can be traced to
  unresolved questions concerning the conduct of
  past elections. As a nation, we cannot afford
  yet another controversial exercise that further
  aggravates social distrust and hopelessness.

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The Results of the Mid-term Elections

• No substantial improvement in administration of
  the election BUT a marked improvement in public
  vigilance
• Election-related fraud (a legacy of cheating)
• Election-related violence
• Politicization of security forces
• Paradox virtual hegemony of the ruling coalition
  at the local level YET failure to deliver votes
  in the Senate
• The Senate vote as a more accurate barometer of
  public sentiment (unequivocal victory for the
  opposition) Final tally 7-2-3
• 80 win for the ruling parties in the House (at
  least 70 seats approximately 1/3 were
  uncontested by the opposition)
• Some cracks in the façade of unity (LAKAS vs
  KAMPI) / Opposition Too
• Emergence of a new generation of national leaders

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As the dust settles

• The Integrity of the Electoral Process
• Electoral process continues to remain vulnerable
  to manipulation.
• Unacceptable levels of election-related violence
  security forces either unable or unwilling to
  control it
• The COMELEC as an institution must be reformed
  top-to-bottom!
• The Dominance of Political Dynasties (Bossism)
• Political clans entrenched in the political
  system since 1986
• Strengthened ties between national leadership
  local clans
• In the House, despite 49 first-term, 75 will be
  from dynasties
• Over 80 of provinces controlled by dynasties
• The Weakening of Intermediary Institutions
• CSOs divided under-funded advocacy NGOs are
  particularly weak
• Political parties underdeveloped weak new
  constraints in the PL
• Very little aggregation, mediation, and synergy
  between these actors

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2.Rule of Law

• Independence of the Judiciary
• The Supreme Court is perceived as a critical last
  bastion for defense of democracy and has thus far
  (on the whole) resisted pressure
• The last 3 Chief Justices (including the
  incumbent) have exercised leadership of the
  Court to safeguard Civil Liberties
• Question remains for how long given the
  appointment process
• Judicial independence less of a reality below the
  SC level
• Fighting the Hydra Combating Systemic Corruption
• Institutionalized corruption has entrenched the
  power structure and stymied reform efforts
• Gains in one area are lost in another
• Anti-corruption agencies exhibit similar
  weaknesses as the COMELEC
• Culture of Violence Defense of Human Rights
• Different forms of violence is unabated law
  enforcement is weak
• Marked increase in human rights violations (EJK
  ED in particular)

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The Political Context of Extra-Judicial Killings
and other Human Rights Violations in the
Philippines

• No senior civilian or military official has ever
  been held accountable for serious human rights
  violations
• There exists an aggravated culture of impunity
  amidst a prevailing culture of violence
• The continuing political crisis is a backdrop for
  understanding the current spate of outrages
  against international standards
• Politics of polarization
• Politics of fear

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3. The Armed Conflict Security Forces

• Some Concerns Regarding the Security Forces
• Renewed politicization (out of barracks)
• Militarization of civilian authority
• A historical anti-left bias
• Currently being exploited by ideological forces
• Undeclared policy of looking away
• Some cleavages but as yet not serious
• Weak mechanisms for civilian oversight
• Some Concerns Regarding the Armed Left
• A long history of armed conflict
  (disciplined/well organized)
• An ethic of struggling against the system rather
  than working within the system (politics of
  exclusion)
• Existing social, economic, and political
  conditions are conducive to hard left-oriented
  politics
• A peace process without an end (tactical rather
  than strategic commitment by the contending
  parties)

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• Some Concerns On the Mindanao Conflict
• A long standing, multi-faceted conflict that
  requires intervention at the national community
  levels
• A communal dialogue process involving all
  stakeholders is essential to resolving it
• Need for Workable Solutions to Different
  Conflicts
• Without jeopardizing operational concerns at
  guaranteeing human security in affected areas,
  peace processes have to be pursued
• Ultimately, some key questions are justice,
  inclusion, empowerment and participation
• Security Sector Reform cannot be postponed

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4. The Institutional Framework
Charter Change (Cha Cha) the Crisis in
Democratic Institutions?

• Amidst the crisis of institutions, reforms are
  being actively pursued across the political
  spectrum to the point that it will not be a
  matter of if but when for Cha Cha.
• Challenge is to proceed while guaranteeing
  accountability
• Cha Cha as the Panacea?
• Real danger of hijacking for selfish ends (with
  precedent!)
• Cha Cha in order to be viable
• At the right time, for the right reasons, thru
  the right process, championed by right
  advocates (broad buy-in)
• Should address the institutional weaknesses of
  the current political system (electoral systems,
  allocation of power, accountability mechanisms,
  central local competencies)

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Possible Explanations for the Current Democratic
Recession

• Conjunctural
• Crisis of legitimation the search for
  equilibrium
• Absence of a consensus for democracy
• Structural
• Political economy of neo-patrimonialism
• Behavioral (Socio-Psychological)
• Attitudes about democracy, particularly of a key
  driving force the Middle
• A Reassertion of the Developmentalist Model

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The Crisis of Legitimation
3 periods of similar crises in modern Philippine
political history 1969-1973 resulted in
authoritarian consolidation 1983-1986 resulted
in democratic restoration 2001-present
currently being contested (search for /
manufacturing of) (Teehankee)
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How People View Democracy

• Declines in the Philippines (2001 to 2005)
• Democracy is always preferable - 64 to
  51
• Democracy is suitable for our country - 80
  to 57
• Satisfaction with way Democracy works - 54 to
  39
• Reject authoritarian strong leader - 70 to
  59
• (Diamond, 2007)

Few Filipinos believe that there is democratic
governance in the Philippines the big majority
nationwide (82) is comprised by Filipinos who
either acknowledge oligarchic politics or say
they are uncertain about the character of the
countrys political regime. - PULSE ASIA 2006
Survey Report
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The Vicious Double Cycle of State
Capture (Speakers Model of the Philippine
Political Economy described in Hutchcrofts
Booty Capitalism )
Political Finance
Self-aggrandizement Accumulation of Resources
Control of Electoral Political Processes
State Capture By Vested Interests
Concentration of Wealth in EconomicElites
Concentration of Power in Political Elites
Rent-Seeking Behavior Transactional Politics
Marginalization of the Poor Powerless
High-Risk / Low-Investment Economic Political
Environment
The Grand Alliance of Certain Economic
Political Elites
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The Middle Force Dilemma Democratic Revolution
versus Good Governance

• Middle forces socially coherent, culturally
  intellectually dominant, politically ascendant
  segment of the population.
• Democracy was restored in the Philippines through
  democratic revolutions with prominent roles by
  middle forces
• Middle forces often small (about 15 of the
  population) BUT concentrated in the urban areas
  and the capital (up to 40)
• Those democratic rules were broken in EDSA 2
  when procedural democracy was sacrificed in the
  name of good governance
• Ironically, the same discourse was earlier used
  to combat authoritarianism (Cause-Oriented /
  Moral Force)
• What makes these powerful social movements
  threaten the democratic order they help create?
• (Thompsons Assessment of Recent Philippine and
  Thailand Experience )

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The Middle Force Trajectory
Democratic revolution failure of reform
populist challenge renewed
mobilization/insurrectionary reaction

• Failed reformism after restoration of democracy
  leads to disenchantment demobilization
• Fear that democracy will threaten good governance
  leads to return to insurrectionism
• Elections dominated by either traditional
  politicians or populists seen as threats to good
  governance
• Neo-patrimonialism, economic moral crisis can
  cause the middle force to turn against the
  democratic project
• Capable of toppling dictators but not of winning
  elections (People Power as a viable modality to
  fight bad governance BUT less so to guarantee
  good governance)

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Lessons Non-Lessons

• Other democratic developing countries that have
  NOT exhibited middle force insurrectionism (e.g.
  India Costa Rica) have showed
• Integrity of electoral process (Parliamentarianism
  not necessarily superior to presidentialism)
• Depoliticization of, not flirtation with,
  military,
• Stable political parties (often highly dynastic)
• Integration of poor through symbolism social
  programs
• Toleration of legal left, and decentralization
  and autonomy for minorities (armed groups
  confronted, but legal radical groups accepted in
  democratic process)

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Conclusion Central Question

• In the Philippine context, how can democratic
  politics further good governance and both
  mobilize society at the local level and attain
  development outcomes at a national level?

• Where governance is effective, innovations are
  possible but the spread of innovation is slow
  and uneven (pockets!)
• Underdevelopment creates conditions that entrench
  bad governance, particularly as a result of the
  double phenomenon of middle class out-migration
  and patronage politics in the poorest areas /
  periphery (re Hutchcroft, et al)

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Political Will The Essential Condition

• Is the commitment of a countrys rulers to
  democratic and good governance reforms, and their
  readiness to incur the costs necessary to adopt
  and implement these reforms?
• In badly governed states, the central challenge
  is to generate the political will to improve
  governance, control corruption, and generate real
  development.

(Diamond)
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Toward Promoting Full Democracy

• Some principles to inform a reform strategy
• Build and strengthen inclusive, empowering and
  sustainable institutions in the political,
  economic and cultural realms
• Defend the hard-won victories of earlier
  democratic struggles, form consensus around
  democratic processes, broaden constituencies
  for these
• Deepen democracy not just in current formal but
  elitist character, but to one that ensures
  genuine popular participation
• Any major change in political structures should
  not benefit those presently in power (arms
  length), must involve national dialogue and
  public education

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Reflection Need for Political Engagement

• For international actors, its important to
  consider Diamonds 12 point Principles of Action
• Within the Philippines, domestic stakeholders
  need to act in order to foster trust in
  democratic process
• Elections and election administration
• Democratic institutions (parties and parliaments)
• Democratic processes (oversight and rule of law)
• A need to renew reinvigorate civic engagement
  in politics (partisan non-partisan)
• Defend, deepen, widen the political space for
  effective participation
• Support the emergence of democratic leaders
  champions
• Nurture and strengthen constituencies as well as
  energize communities for sustained advocacy of
  reforms

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Recommendation - Search for Common Ground

• In the Immediate to Medium Term
• Build Foundations for the Next Government
• An opportunity to step back from the brink to
  prevent an escalation of hostilities
• Critical to sustain economic growth and reduce
  public desperation
• Initiate credible political, electoral, and
  administrative reforms to reduce imperfections in
  the political process and ensure credible
  elections in 2010 that will help return stability
  and achieve some equilibrium
• Alternative Attitudes to the Result
• Best outcome
• Administration focuses on reforms rather than
  survival
• Administration agrees to compromise for the
  common good
• Worst outcome
• Administration views its partial win as
  endorsement of its policies
• The rebuke of administration intensifies
  political hostilities

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Some Initial Steps to Restore Credible Elections

• Clean-up the institutions and systems for
  election administration
• Improve the capacity of the COMELEC
• Complete full automation of elections ahead of
  2010
• Consider other mechanisms to further reduce
  opportunities for human intervention / human
  error in the counting tabulation process
• Separate election adjudication election
  disputes resolution from elections management
  functions
• Enforce election laws fully (particularly on
  campaign contribution expenditure) coupled with
  a vigorous anti-corruption effort
• Prosecute to the fullest extent all violators of
  election laws
• Support civic-education and voters education
  efforts
• Institutionalize and sustain citizens oversight
  mechanisms
• Initiate law reform legislation (party law /
  political finance)
• Rationalize the mobilization of election officers
  to include citizens
• Ensure civilian control over security forces,
  including citizen oversight

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Some Other Necessary First Steps

• Need to restore a consensus for democracy in the
  run-up to the 2010 General Elections through
  among others
• Improve mechanisms for public accountability
  (CHR/Senate) and a sustained effort at addressing
  corruption (OMB/PAGC)
• Political party development, strengthening, and
  consolidation
• Allow alternative candidates to emerge with
  distinct platforms and visions of governance
• Promote mechanisms for the political
  representation of the marginalized and
  disenfranchised sectors of society in a process
  that is linked to the larger political
  transformation agenda (political reforms towards
  constitutional reform)
• Sustain economic growth and spread its benefits
• Pursue a reform agenda in social expenditure with
  a sharper focus on safety nets (education,
  health, water, food security)
• Reduce drivers of political polarization, e.g.
  violence exclusion (address impunity)

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• You have spent many lives and much treasure to
  bring freedom to many lands that were reluctant
  to receive it. And here you have a people who won
  it by themselves and need only the help to
  preserve it.
• - President Corazon C. Aquino
• Address to the US Congress
• 18 September 1986

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All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for
good men (and women) to do nothing- Edmund Burke

• In fact it is possibly the commonest political
  quote you will find anywhere on the World Wide
  Web. It is used to warn of the encroachments of
  government, and to warn that governments do not
  do enoughIt is always quoted with considerable
  reverence, and is made to stand as one of the
  unassailable truths about the need for freedom of
  action in democratic societies (www.tartarus.org)

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One Final Story
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Much Thanks!

• Marc Plattner Sally Blair as well as the other
  helpful staff at the International Forum for
  Democratic Studies, DRC and the Journal of
  Democracy
• Ryan White, my ever so patient Research Associate
• All the wonderful people at NED The Core
  Institutes
• The input from academics Robin Broad (AU), Paul
  Hutchcroft (UWis-M), Larry Diamond (Stanford),
  Scott Mainwaring (Notre Dame), Paolo Carozza
  (Notre Dame), Mark Thompson(FAU-EN), Benjie
  Tolosa(Ateneo), Tony La Vina (Ateneo), Julio
  Teehankee (DLSU), Joel Rocamora (IPD) Mario
  Taguiwalo (NIPS)
• And the many insights from the many conversations
  with members of the Washington DC Policy
  Community at State, the Hill, DRL, USAID, Think
  Tanks, and NGOs

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