The african standby force

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The african standby force

• Rapid Deployment Capability
• (A priority requirement)

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Background

• The Right to Intervene Constitutive Act
• Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) for
  Preventative Deployment and Humanitarian
  Assistance (Scenario 6)
• Policy Framework African Peace and Security
  Architecture (APSA)
• Early Warning, Binding Decision of the PSC
• Rapid Deployment Capability ASF
• Proposal 1,000 to be in-theatre within 14
  days, plus
• 1,500 to be in-theatre within 30 days
• Trained and Equipped (Role of PLANELM Concept
  Development and Force Development)
• Funding Mechanism TBD

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Aim

• To present the ASFs RDC as envisaged and to
  propose possible enhancements thereof for the
  better strategic role

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Scope

• Causes for Conflict
• The purpose and roles of the RDC
• Requirements
• Concept
• Delivery Options
• Concept of Operations
• Option evaluation
• Logistics
• Conclusion

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Causes of Conflict (Battle Space)

• Inter-state.
• Intra-state Conflict.
• Competition over Scarce and Strategic Resources.
• Projected climatic changes
• AUs conflict management initiatives
• The Contribution of Non-State Actors to
  Insecurity.
• The Rise of International Terrorism
• Mercenaries and/or private military
• Likely African scenario
• Current nature of conflict in Africa

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Purpose of a Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC)

• The early intervention during a crisis to stop
  violent conflict and/or atrocities and to
  stabilise the situation,
• or to render emergency assistance in cases of
  natural or human disasters

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What constitute a Crisis?

• Continuing deterioration of the security
  situation
• A rapidly emerging increase in military threat
• A breakdown of civil order
• Threatening humanitarian crisis (gross human
  rights violations, cases of genocide)
• Reversal of recognition of a Treaty or Agreement
• Short notice withdrawal by a TCC
• A natural or health disaster
• Inability to provide adequate security and other
  support to major spikes in pre-planned activity

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Criteria for Rapid Deployment

• Dynamic Decision Making Process
• Timely Mandate and Rules of Engagement (RoE)
• Funding
• Suitable Trained and Equipped Force
• Flexible, Mobile, Integrated, Interoperable,
  Robust, Adequate Funding Mechanism
• The Capacity to Mount RDC Missions
• Adequate information/intelligence
• Sound Concept of Operations (ConOps)
• Unified Command and Control (C2)
• Available Strategic lift
• Logistically self-sustainable

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Assumptions

• Political determination to solve the crisis
• Availability of Funds
• Member states commitment to providing
  capabilities
• Adequate logistic support
• Strategic lift capabilities

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Roles

• Rapid deployment under Scenario 6
• Rapid deployment to start a Scenario 4 or 5
  Mission.
• Rapid intervention to support to stabilise a
  situation.
• Rapid deployment in support of an existing
  mission.
• Rapid support to provide humanitarian relief.

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Tasks

• Secure point of entry
• Separate belligerents
• Guard key installations
• Active and, if necessary, aggressive patrolling
• Provide protection to civilians
• Assist with the return to rule of law
• Assist with humanitarian relief

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AU PSO Concept
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RDC Concept
Regional Standby Force
RDC
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Concept Option I
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Concept Option II
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Concept Option III
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Concept Option IV
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Requirement

• An aggressive and professional fighting force to
  take the war to the rebels
• Operation ARTEMIS 3000
• Forceful disarmament of Foreign Armed Groups in
  Eastern DRC 3500 (8 10th Military regions)
• Sierra Leone
• Executive Outcomes 150 (1995 - 96)
• British Task Force 500 para offshore support
• Within 3 months

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Envisaged ASF RDC

• A robust flexible force of about 2,500 able to
  deploy within 14 days in 2 Phases depending on
  the Plan
• Phase I about 1,000
• Mission Headquarters communications
  protection support
• Armoured Reconnaissance Troop
• Armoured and Light Infantry (Light Battalion
  Mechanised Coy)
• Engineer Support (Defence, Construction, and
  Water and Hygiene)
• Helicopter Support (Movement and Reconnaissance)
• Logistic Support (Movements, Medical,
  Maintenance, and Supply)
• Phase II about 1,500
• Armoured Reconnaissance Troop
• Armoured and Light Infantry (Light Battalion 3
  Mechanised Coy)
• Follow on Engineer Support, Helicopter Support,
  Logistic Support

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RDC Phase I(Illustrative)
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RDC Phase II(Illustrative)
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Force Multipliers

• Intelligence
• Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisitioning
  and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) fusion
• Satellite imaging
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
• Competent capabilities (ASF HQ and RDCs)
• Strategic lift (air sea)
• (Air superiority)
• (Plan for flexibility and aggression)

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Force Build-up

• What Capability?
• A robust flexible force of about 1,000 able to
  deploy within 14 days
• A follow-on force of a further 1500 able to
  deploy within the next 14 days depending on the
  plan

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Continental Roster
EASF East Africa Standby Force ESF ECCOWAS
Standby Force CASF ECCAS Standby Force NASF
North Africa Regional Capability Standby
Force SASF SADC Standby Capability
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Key Enablers

• Political Will - A high degree of certainty that
  the initial deployment and the follow up forces
  will be made available is required for the RDC
  concept to be credible
• Legal Basis - The RDC Concept cannot operate
  effectively without relevant MOU being signed
• Capacity - Inability to match AU and REC/Regional
  institutional capacity to the development of the
  ASF/RDC concept will inevitably result in failure
• Funding - Sufficient and predictable funds for
  training, mounting and operation of the RDC and
  the follow up deployment is critical to the
  implementation of the concept

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Reality

• ECOWAS 1500 (outside of Bde)
• EASBRICOM 4 x Lead Nations (1500 each)
• SADCBde 1 x Bn (rotation)

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Conclusion

• The ASFs RDC is a reality and possible
• The processes and procedures for mandating
  interventions needs to be reconsidered
• The funding mechanisms needs to be formalised
• The equipment requirements needs to be integrated
  and aligned
• The ASFs RDC is the force on call for the
  Chairperson of the AU Commission

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Force Multipliers

• It is time to take stock of the manner in which
  we conduct peacekeeping operations. Firstly, the
  mental preparedness to do this is lacking with
  most countries who contribute to UN forces.
  Theres a misconception that peacekeeping means
  being very well turned out, wearing a nice blue
  helmet or cap and being in a white vehicle with a
  blue flag fluttering around and marching up and
  down, and that thats peacekeeping. It is not.
  At the moment the international community must
  understand that I need troops who are going to
  neither question nor dither. What I need is
  troops who can deliver.
• General Vijay Muar Jetley, Commander UN Forces
  in Sierra Leone, Freetown, August 2000

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QUESTIONS?