Title: Biometrics II
1Biometrics II
- CUBS, University at Buffalo
- http//www.cubs.buffalo.edu
- http//www.cedar.buffalo.edu/govind/CSE717
- govind_at_buffalo.edu
2Maintaining Biometric Databases
- Enrollment
- Base truth established through seed documents
- Positive Enrollment
- Negative Enrollment
- Problems in enrollment
- Biometric System is only as secure as its
enrollment - Fake Identities
- Duplicate Identities
- Quality
- The biometric zoo
- Sheeps,Goats,Wolves,Lambs
3Large Scale Databases
- How large is large scale?
- Application
- US-VISIT
- National ID Thailand, Hong Kong
- Voter Registration Peru
- Accuracy issue
- FARN NFAR
- FRRN FRR
- Number of False accepts scales as O(N2)
- Scalability and retrieval
- Indexing
- Filtering
- Binning
4Indexing Problem
- Biometric template have no natural order
- Natural groups cannot be inferred from
statistical descriptors
5Indexing Problem Solutions
Binning and pruning
Natural feature representation
6Combination of biometric matchers
- Combination of the matching results of different
biometric features provides higher accuracy.
7Sequential combination of matchers
Fingerprint matching
Combination algorithm 1
No
Desired confidence achieved?
Yes
Signature matching
Combination algorithm 2
Yes
No
Desired confidence achieved?
Hand geometry matching
Combination algorithm 3
8Information Fusion
- Multiple sensors
- Compensates environmental variation
- Multiple samples
- Allows interaction induced variation
- Multiple instances of the same biometric
- Multiple matchers
- May use multiple representations
- Serial and hierarchical combination
- Multi-modal biometrics
- Feature level Fusion
- Score level Fusion
- Decision level Fusion
- Loosly coupled integration
- Combination of biometrics and tokens
9Multimodal biometricsFusion approaches
10Security of biometric data
- Issues in biometrics
- Biometrics is secure but not secret
- Permanently associated with user
- Used across multiple applications
- Can be covertly captured
- Types of circumvention
- Denial of service attacks
- Fake biometrics attack
- Replay and Spoof attacks
- Trojan horse attacks
- Back end attacks
- Collusion
- Coercion
11Attacks on a Biometric System
Biometric Sensor
Feature Extraction
Database
Enrollment
Feature Extraction
Biometric Sensor
Matching
Authentication
Result
12Gummy finger
13Fake biometrics
14Synthetic fingerprint
15Securing biometric templates
- Liveness testing
- Cancelable biometrics
- Signal domain distortion
- Feature domain distortion
- Hashing
- Uses non invertible transform
- Watermarking and steganography
- Ensures that sensor input can be trusted
- Encryption and digital signature
- Combines security of encryption with
non-repudiation of bometrics - Challenge response systems
- Conversational biometrics
- CAPTCHAs
16Securing password information
17Hashing
18Cancelable biometrics
19Privacy, social and ethical concerns
- Aspects of privacy
- Secrecy
- Solitude
- Anonymity
- Unintended functional scope
- Retinal pattern is capable of revealing diabetes
- Hand irregularities can be correlated with
genetic defect - This information may be used for discrimination
- Unintended application scope
- Can compromise anonymity of an individual
- Biometric can be used for covert surveillance
- Can be used to track purchases leading to spam
- Social acceptance
- Stigma associated with biometrics
- Reduces level of expected privacy
20Avenues for research
- Face recognition
- Palm verification
- Key stroke dynamics
- Speaker recognition
- Soft biometrics
- Multimodal biometrics
- Classifier combination
- Binning and Indexing
- Security of biometrics
- Interchange standards and API
21Summary
- Enrollment into biometric databases
- Large scale databases
- Filtering, binning and indexing biometric
templates - Combination of classifiers
- Multimodal biometrics
- Attacks on Biometric System
- Securing Biometric Templates
- Privacy Social and Ethical Concerns
22Thank You
- ssc5_at_cedar.buffalo.edu