Nuclear Power Renaissance

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Nuclear Power Renaissance?

• A Look
• at the Issues
• Jewish Council for Public Affairs
• New York, NY
• June 4, 2006

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Open Nuclear Fuel Cycle
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Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle
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Nuclear Reactors are Categorized According to

• Characteristics of the neutron spectra (fast or
  thermal, i.e., whether the neutrons are moving
  fast or slowly when they are reabsorbed in the
  fuel used to sustain the heat-producing fission
  reaction)
• The neutron-slowing (moderator) material (e.g.,
  light water, heavy water, or graphite) and
• The fuel coolant (e.g., light water, heavy water,
  gas, or liquid metal).

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Nuclear Power Issues

• Economics
• Potential Contribution to the Global Warming
  Solution
• National Security Proliferation and Terrorism
• Reactor Safety
• Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste Disposal
• Occupational and Public Health Risks, e.g. from
  Uranium Mining and Milling

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Current Status

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Nuclear Power Plants (end-2005)

• Capacity
• (Gigawatt-electric)
• Units (GWe)
• U.S. 104 101
• Worldwide 444 372
• Nuclear Provides 16 of global
• and 20 of U.S. electricity

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After 50 years, nuclear energy is still highly
concentrated

• Only 31 countries (16) of UN member states
  operate nuclear power plants
• Six countries USA, France, Japan, Germany,
  Russia, and South Korea account for 75 of
  nuclear electricity produced worldwide
• However, 22 of the last 31 nuclear plants
  connected to a grid have been in Asia
• Historical peak of 294 operating reactors in
  Western Europe-US was reached in 1989

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To Maintain Current Global Total of 444 Nuclear
Plants Requires

• Completion of 8 new reactors per year over the
  next 10 years, and then
• 20 reactors per year over the following 10 years
• Compare to current global rate 1 new plant per
  year since 1988

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A Static-to-Declining IEA Outlook for Nuclear
Energy
Worldwide nuclear capacity is projected to
increase slightly, but the share of nuclear power
in total electricity generation will decline. A
substantial amount of capacity will be added, but
this will be mostly offset by reactor
retirements. Three-quarters of existing
nuclear capacity in OECD Europe is expected to be
retired by 2030, because reactors will have
reached the end of their life or because
governments plan to phase out nuclear
power. Nuclear power generation will increase
in a number of Asian countries, notably in China,
South Korea, Japan and India.
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US EIA Expects Only 6 GW of New US Nuclear
Capacity in Next 25 Years
Nuclear Revival
17
EIA Forecasts Nuclear Share of US Total Electric
Generation Will Decline

• In 2030, even with a national average capacity
  factor of more than 90, nuclear power accounts
  for about 15 of total U.S. generation.
• but
• From 2004 to 2030, 26.4 GW of new renewable
  generating capacity is added (more than 4X
  nuclear)

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Economics

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Nuclear Economics

• Nuclear power is a mature industry, having
  received approximately 80 billion (current
  dollars) in federal subsidies
• Existing nuclear plants can compete favorably
  with fossil-fueled plant today because of their
  low operation and maintenance (OM) and fuel
  costs.
• New nuclear power plants are uneconomical today
  because of their high construction costs.
• There have been no successful nuclear plant
  orders in the U.S. since 1973.

22

• Source MIT Study, The
  Future of Nuclear Power, 2003, p. 42.

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The economic analysis in the MIT Future of
Nuclear Power Study (2003) suggest that

• 100/ton carbon tax would make nuclear
  competitive with a conventional central station
  coal plant
• 200/tC would supposedly make nuclear competitive
  with gas-fired combined-cycle generation at
  sustained high natural gas prices

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MIT Comparative Cost Analysis was too narrow

• Compared nuclear costs only with large
  central-station fossil power costs, when fastest
  growing energy market segments are distributed
  on-site co-generation, end-use efficiency, and
  renewables (wind and solar), with lower average
  delivered costs.
• MIT study did not take account of the fact that
  carbon taxes or cap and trade will also benefit
  new-technology plants featuring coal gasification
  combined cycle with carbon capture, and all forms
  of carbon-neutral distributed generation.

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Factors in Addition to Generating Cost That Crimp
a Nuclear Revival

• No approved licensed path for long-term geologic
  disposal of spent fuel
• Added security concerns and risks in an age of
  terrorism
• Proliferation concerns if advanced fuel cycles
  are used
• Long gestation/construction period increases risk
  of market obsolescence and stranded costs
• Uranium mining, milling, and enrichment can often
  have harmful environmental impacts

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Nuclear Powers Role in Curbing Global Warming

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Can Nuclear Deliver Serious Amounts of Carbon
Reduction?

• Overall Goal Keep global average temp increase
  to within 2 deg. C above pre-industrialized
  levels to avert dangerous climate impacts. Apply
  seven complementary carbon-reducing approaches
  such that each displaces 1 GtC/yr in 2050,
  stabilizing atmospheric carbon concentration at
  current level.
• We asked the question How much nuclear capacity
  would be needed to avert carbon accumulation
  sufficient to warm the atmosphere by 0.2 deg. C.
  during the second half of this century
• To achieve this level of carbon displacement, our
  model suggests that from 2010 to 2050 the world
  would have to add 700 GWe nuclear worldwide
  (17.5 plants/year), and
• Maintain 1100 GWe from 2050 through 2100

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Hypothetical Nuclear Wedge

• Add 700 GWe nuclear worldwide (2010-2050)
• Maintain 700 GWe from 2050 through 2100

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Nuclear vs Carbon Reality Check

• 0.2 degrees Celsius avoided requires almost a
  tripling of current global nuclear capacity
  within 40 years
• 1200 nuclear power plants (plant life 40 years)
• 15 enrichment plants (plant capacity 8 million
  separative work units/year (SWU/y)
• plant life 40 y) 9 plants in a given year
• 14 Yucca Mountains for 973,000 t spent fuel (SF)
  containing approximately
• 10,000,000 kilograms of plutonium or
• 50 reprocessing plants if all SF were to be
  reprocessed (plant capacity 800 t SF/y and
  plant life 40 y)
• Construction of these facilities requires 2.5 -
  3 trillion dollars in capital

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Comparison of Per Capita Electricity Consumed in
U.S. and CA Since 1975 US per capita energy use
has increased by 50, but California has held
roughly constant. With 37 million people in the
state, by saving 5,000 kwh/y-person, California
has avoided the equivalent of more than twenty
average-size nuclear power plants that would have
cost on the order of 50 billion.
Source California Energy Commission, 2005.i
i John Wilson, California Energy Commission,
November 2005.
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California has Achieved 30 Reduction in Per
Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions While the Rest of
the U.S. has Remained Essentially Static
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Curbing Global Warming is the ObjectiveNuclear
Construction Subsidies vs RD

• Subsidizing a few noncompetitive nuclear plants
  e.g., paying the current cost difference between
  nuclear and fossil plants is economically
  inefficient. It will drain funds from more
  efficient and more cost competitive non-nuclear
  technologies, thereby slowing achievement of
  meaningful CO2 reductions and it will divert
  funds from nuclear RD that could provide a
  greater contribution to CO2 reductions in the
  longer term.
• The best policy is to internalize all
  pollution/security/waste isolation costs through
  regulation (or a tax on emissions), e.g. by
  capping greenhouse gas emissions, and rely on the
  free market to select energy supply technologies
  in fair and open competition with demand side
  management alternatives.

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Proliferation

• Nuclear Power is the only existing energy
  technology that requires an international
  safeguards regime.
• As evidenced by Iran and the two Koreas, current
  IAEA safeguards have major vulnerabilities.

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Bulk Handling Facilities

• Uranium Enrichment Plants
• Reprocessing Plants
• Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Plants (MOX Plants)
• The timely warning criteria cannot be met if
  these plants are located in non-weapon states.
• Inventory differences exceed the amount of
  material required for a nuclear explosive device.

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IAEA Significant Quantities

• Material ______________________ SQ_________
• Direct use nuclear material
• Pua 8 kg
• U-233 8 kg
• HEU (U-235 20) 25 kg
• Indirect use nuclear material
• U (U-235 lt 20)b 75 kg
• (or 10 t natural U
• or 20 t depleted U)
• Th 20 t
• ______________________________________ ________
• a For Pu containing less than 80 Pu-238.
• b Including low enriched, natural and depleted
  uranium.

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NRDC Significant Quantity

• WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM (kg)
• Yield Technical Capability
• (kt) Low Medium High
• 1 3 1.5 1
• 5 4 2.5 1.5
• 10 5 3 2
• 20 6 3.5 3

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ESTIMATED MATERIAL CONVERSION TIMES FORFINISHED
Pu OR U METAL COMPONENTS1

• Beginning material form
  Conversion time
• __________________________________________________
  _____________
• Pu, HEU or U-233 metal Order of days
  (710)
• PuO2, Pu(NO3)4 or other pure Pu compounds
  Order of weeks (13)a
• HEU or U-233 oxide or other pure U compounds
• MOX or other non-irradiated pure mixtures
• containing Pu, U (U-233 U-235 20)
• Pu, HEU and/or U-233 in scrap or other
• miscellaneous impure compounds
• Pu, HEU or U-233 in irradiated fuel
  Order of months
  (13)
• U containing lt20 U-235 and U-233 Th
  Order of months (312)
• __________________________________________________
  _____________
• a This range is not determined by any single
  factor but the pure Pu and U compounds
• will tend to be at the lower end of the range and
  the mixtures and scrap at the higher
• end.
• 1 IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 Edition,
  Paragraph 3.13.

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Enrichment Plants

• Small gas centrifuge plants can be readily
  hidden from IAEA inspectors and foreign
  intelligence forces. If a State is permitted to
  possess a safeguarded enrichment plant, it can be
  used a cover for procuring components and
  materials needed for a small clandestine plant. A
  State possessing a safeguarded centrifuge
  enrichment plant can rapidly reconfigure the
  plant to produce HEU. Also, a State may have a
  small clandestine enrichment plant. In either
  case the conversion time could be on the order of
  weeks to months depending on the number of size
  of the plant and the technology employed.

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Enrichment Requirements to Obtain One SQ of HEU

• Product ( U-235) 93.5
  93.5 93.5 93.5
• Feed ( U-235) 0.711
  0.711 4.0 4.0
• Tails ( U-23) 0.25 0.5 0.25
  2.0
• Enrichment Work (kg SWU) 5,422 4,021
  1,769 894
• U feed (tonnes)
  5.057 11.02 0.622 1.144
• Centrifuges Required to Obtain 1 SQ HEU/y1
• 2 kg SWU/y/centrifuge (P1) 2,711
  2,011 885 447
• 5 kg SWU/y/centrifuge (P2) 1,084
  804 354 179
• 10 kg SWU/y/centrifuge (Russia) 542 402
  177 89
• 40 kg SWU/y/centrifuge (URENCO) 136 101
  44 22
• 300 kg SWU/y/centrifuge (U.S. RD) 18 13
  6 3
• 1Individual centrifuge capacity values are from
  Marvin Miller, The Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear
  Proliferation, Appendix. 1, Table 1, in Victor
  Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, and Harmon Hubbard, A
  Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of
  Light Water Reactors (Washington, D.C. The
  Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
  September 2004).

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Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plants

• Commercial-size plants process up to 800 tonnes
  of spent fuel annually
• LWR spent fuel contains 1 plutonium
• Thus, the plant recovers 8 tonnes 8,000
  kilograms of plutonium/year
• Accounting uncertainty is on the order of 0.5 to
  1 of throughput
• Thus, inventory differences are
• ? 40-80 kg Pu/year

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Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing RD

• When conducted in non-weapon states, research
  on reprocessing and transmutation related
  technologies, including those that are unlikely
  to ever be commercialized, simply train cadres of
  experts in actinide chemistry and plutonium
  metallurgy, a proliferation concern in its own
  right. The hot cells, used for on-hands research
  provide readily available facilities for
  separation of plutonium and fabrication of
  plutonium components for weapons. Thus, smaller
  reprocessing activities, and research and
  development on transmutation related technologies
  should not be permitted in non-weapon states.

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The Current International Safeguards Regime Has
Major Loopholes

• IAEA safeguards are inadequate for achieving the
  objective of timely detection of diversion of
  significant quantities of nuclear material from
  peaceful activities to the manufacture of nuclear
  weapons.
• The IAEAs SQ values are technically erroneous
  and excessive.
• The IAEAs timeliness detection goals are too
  long, and timely warning cannot be achieved if
  non-weapon states possess uranium enrichment or
  reprocessing plants.
• Non-weapon states should not be permitted to
  possess an SQ of unirradiated direct use material
  in metal form or uranium enrichment or fuel
  reprocessing plants.

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Terrorism

• The civil nuclear fuel cycle in Russia,
  containing over 30,000 kilograms of separated
  plutonium from reprocessing, is a potential
  source of illicit nuclear weapon materials, and
  represents a significant risk to U.S. national
  security

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Reactor Safety

• No core melt accident since TMI (1979)
• One bad precursor eventdiscovery in March 2002
  of a football-size cavity in the reactor head at
  Davis-Bessiewhich possibly came within 2-6
  months of a core melt accident
• Reactors are thought to be safer today than they
  were two to three decades ago
• The risk of a reactor accident depends on the
  safety culture at the plant
• The safety culture in India, Russia and China
  should be of great concern

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More Nuclear Risks

• Any Nuclear Power investment may be held hostage
  to the conduct of the worst performer -- or even
  the average performer on a bad day -- in the
  event of a nuclear accident or near-accident
  anywhere on the globe.
• "The abiding lesson that Three Mile Island taught
  Wall Street was that a group of N.R.C.-licensed
  reactor operators, as good as any others, could
  turn a 2 billion asset into a 1 billion cleanup
  job in about 90 minutes. -- Former NRC
  Commissioner Peter Bradford

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Spent Fuel and Nuclear Waste

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Yucca Mountain

• Yuccas Geologic Media
• Leaks Like a Sieve
• Containment of Radionuclides Relies Primarily on
  the Engineered Containers

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Realizing that Yucca Mountain Leaks Badly, EPA
Corrupted the Yucca Standards

• Gerrymandered the Compliance Boundary by
  extending it from 5 to 18 km in the direction of
  groundwater flow
• Arbitrarily set a 10,000-year compliance period
  that would allow it to rely on man-made barriers,
  instead of the sites geologic stability, to
  contain radioactivity
• Significantly raised the allowable level of risk
  level in the post-10,000-year period when the
  compliance period was declared unlawful. EPAs
  new proposed standard would permit estimated
  average radioactive doses so large that a woman
  today exposed at these levels over her lifetime
  would face about a 25 percent increased risk of
  dying of cancer.

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Proposals intended to slow, stop and reverse the
accumulation of spent nuclear fuel

• reprocessing using UREX and/or pyroprocessing
• transmutation using fast reactors

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Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle
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The closed fast-reactor fuel cycle for
transmutation of waste is

• Uneconomic
• Unreliable
• Unsafeguardable
• Unsafe
• Unworkable

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Uneconomical

• For transmutation to work every third to fifth
  reactor must be a fast reactor that will cost
  considerably more than a water-cooled thermal
  reactor, perhaps twice the cost.
• A closed cycle with PUREX reprocessing costs more
  than an open cycle, UREX will cost more than
  PUREX and pyprocessing will likely cost more than
  UREX.

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Unreliable

• Historically, almost one-half of the worlds fast
  reactors have had serious accidents, operated
  unreliably, or were cancelled during
  construction, or shortly after becoming
  operational.
• After years of research pyroprocessing is still
  an unproven technology.

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Unsafeguardable

• IAEAs Significant Quantity (SQ) value for
  plutonium, 8 kilograms, is technically erroneous
  and too large by a factor of about eight.
• Each commercial-size fast reactors will contain
  on the order of five thousand kilograms of
  plutonium, and for each reactor the supporting
  fuel cycle will contain several times the reactor
  inventory.

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Unsafeguardable(Cont.)

• The IAEAs timeliness detection goal cannot be
  met at reprocessing plants.
• Mixtures of plutonium, neptunium-237, americium
  and curium are still direct-use weapon materials
  and are not self-protecting.
• Leaving transuranics mixed with plutonium does
  not solve the State-threat proliferation problem.
• Pyroprocessing RD requires hot cells and cadres
  of experts in plutonium metallurgy and actinide
  chemistry.

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Unsafe

• Fast reactors have a poor safety track record.

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Unworkable

• In an unregulated utility industry, the U.S.
  taxpayer would have to heavily subsidize the fast
  reactors, and/or the federal government would
  have to order nuclear generating companies to
  build them.
• The government would have to federalized the
  entire back-end of the closed fuel cycle
  including reprocessing plants.
• This uneconomic, unreliable, unsafeguardable and
  unsafe fuel cycle would have to take place over
  100 years.

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If This Is Not Bad Enough

• Several costly reprocessing plants would need to
  be built for each geologic repository avoided.
  IAEA safeguards currently permits these
  unsafeguardable facilities to be built and
  operated in non-weapon states. The so-called
  proliferation resistant reprocessing
  technologies actually increase the proliferation
  risks relative to the once-through fuel cycle.
• There is no evidence that the releases from the
  closed fuel cycle will have fewer health impacts
  than the health impacts due to projected releases
  from geologic repositories.

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NRDCs Preferred Solution

• Terminate proliferation risky RD on fast
  reactors and pyroprocessing.
• Initiate a search for a second geological
  repository in the United States.
• Improve interim dry cask storage of spent fuel at
  operating reactor sites.
• Allow away-from-reactor spent fuel storage for
  decommissioned reactors.

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Nuclear Regulation

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Nuclear Regulations

• For 25 years the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry has
  enjoyed a regulatory process of its own design.
• The opportunities for public participation in the
  licensing process have been significantly
  reduced.

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Public Participation!(or Lack Thereof)

• The Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Early Site
  Permits (ESPs) will be good for 20 years and can
  be renewed for an additional 20 years.
• Some 10 to 40 years hence, your children and
  grandchildren will be unable to challenge siting
  issues decided under ESPs or design safety issues
  decided under Construction Operating Licenses
  (COLs).

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Integrity of NRCs Licensing ProcessNRC Chairman
Promotes AP1000 before NRC License Approval

• The top U.S. nuclear regulator vouched for
  the safety of a new Westinghouse nuclear reactor
  -- yet to be built anywhere in the world -- in a
  sales pitch to supply China's growing power
  industry.
• . . . U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  Chairman Nils Diaz said the US1.5 billion (euro
  1.2 billion) AP1000 reactor made by Westinghouse
  Electric Co. is likely to receive regulatory
  approval in the next few months.
• Associated Press, October 19, 2004

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Integrity of the NRC (more)

• The NRC permitted the sole owner of Envirocare, a
  low-level nuclear waste facility -- licensed
  through an Agreement State -- to continue to own
  the facility despite knowing that the owner paid
  the state regulator some 600,000 in cash gold
  coins and a ski condo to obtain the facility
  license and amendments to it.

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END