Title: Agenda Setting
1Agenda Setting
- Who gets to decide how we decide?
- Democratic choice is not a free-for-all
- Agenda order method of voting
- Elections electoral system, party platforms
- Debates moderator, time limits
- Parliament order paper, closed rule
- Time for deliberation and / or negotiation
- Do agendas matter?
2Agenda Setting
- A Stylized Example
- 3 Friends want to order pizza
- Only enough money for 1 topping
- Jane proposes a vote to decide what to order
3Agenda Setting
- A Stylized Example
- Jane sets up first vote Salami or Extra Cheese?
- John Jane vote Salami, Tim votes Extra
Cheese - Tim loses 2-1
4Agenda Setting
- A Stylized Example
- Next vote Salami or Green Pepper
- Tim Jane vote Green Pepper, John votes
Salami - Jane gets exactly what she wanted
5Agenda Setting
- A Stylized Example
- Other agendas give different results
- What if Tim had set the agenda?
- Can Jane outwit Tims agenda setting?
6Agenda Setting
- A Stylized Example
- Jane foresees outcome of Tims agenda
- Jane votes insincerely at stage 1
- Thus 2nd vote is on Salami vs Extra Cheese
- Strategic voting voting against your first
preference to avoid your worst payoff
7Agenda Setting
- Legislative Agenda Setting
- Legislatures employ committees
- Congressional committees
- Parliamentary Cabinets
- Gate-keeping power
- Open rule vs. closed rule
8Agenda Setting
- Impact of a Closed Amendment Rule
- Three disciplined parties, equal strength
- Majority rules
- Existing status quo (SQ)
- No agenda power every one proposes alternative
policy, x - Euclidean Preferences, i.e., closer is better
SQ
L
C
R
9Agenda Setting
- Impact of a Closed Amendment Rule
- All in favour of x1gt SQ
- As soon as x1 L gt SQ L, L-Party objects
x1
SQ
L
C
R
10Agenda Setting
- Impact of a Closed Amendment Rule
- All in favour of x1gt SQ
- As soon as x1 L gt SQ L, L-Party objects
- But L outvoted by C R
- Policy moves to x2 on Rs amendment
x1
x2
SQ
L
C
R
11Agenda Setting
- Impact of a Closed Amendment Rule
- But C-Party can do even better
- C-Party proposes x3
- L-Party supports C-partys motion x3 wins
x1
x2
x3
L
C
R
12Agenda Setting
- Impact of a Closed Amendment Rule
- All agendas produce this result
- (i.e., given any SQ, all voting sequences lead
to Cs ideal point) - Lesson The median voter wins
- But must this always be the case?
x2
x1
x3
L
C
R
13Agenda Setting
- Impact of a Closed Amendment Rule
- As initially, but R-Party has agenda power
(e.g., it holds the premiership) - No other party can propose or amend
- R-Party can make take-it or leave-it offer
SQ
L
C
R
14Agenda Setting
- Impact of a Closed Amendment Rule
- R-Party offers x1gt SQ
- C-Party supports because x1-C lt SQ-C, i.e.,
C is better off under x1 than SQ - Closed rule gives non-median voter power
SQ
x1
L
C
R
15Agenda Setting
- Conclusion
- Agendas can matter
- Examples
- Cabinet introduces money bills
- Report stage after 2nd Reading
- Clarity Act who gets to set referendum?
16Agenda Setting
- Multiple Dimensions
- Typically more than one issue or policy to
consider - Education versus health care
- Wholly private (i.e., user pays 100) or
completely public (i.e., free) - Mixtures are possible, e.g., privatized drug
plans but publicly paid hospital visits public
primary schools coexisting with private charter
schools - Actors may want privatization in both sector or
neither or may want more privatization in one
sector (e.g., to improve parental choice in
education) and much less in other (e.g., keeping
health care 100 public)
17Majority Rule in Multiple Dimensions
Completely privatized
Indifference Curve
x
Education
Utility increasing in proximity, i.e., Euclidean
preferences
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
18Majority Rule in Multiple Dimensions
Completely privatized
Education
SQ
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
19Majority Rule in Multiple Dimensions
Winset of SQ all points that defeat SQ in
pairwise competition
Completely privatized
Education
SQ
A core has an empty winset
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
20Majority Rule in Multiple Dimensions
Completely privatized
Education
SQ
Contract curve
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
21Majority Rule in Multiple Dimensions
Completely privatized
Education
x1
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
22Majority Rule in Multiple Dimensions
Completely privatized
x2
Education
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
23Majority Rule in Multiple Dimensions
Completely privatized
x2
Education
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
24Majority Rule in Multiple Dimensions
Completely privatized
Education
x3
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
25Majority Rule in Multiple Dimensions
Completely privatized
Education
x3
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
26Majority Rule in Multiple Dimensions
- Assembly has cycled back to x1
- No core in ?m !
Education
x1
Health Care
27McKelveys Chaos Theorem
- Chronic condition, indeed chaotic
- Voting can start with any point, and lead to
any point
Completely privatized
Education
x1
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
28McKelveys Chaos Theorem
- Credible coalitions?
- Heresthetics
- Agenda manipulation
Completely privatized
Education
x1
Completely public
Completely privatized
Completely public
Health Care
29The Puzzle of Stability
- Parliaments not typically chaotic
- Institutional rules provide structure
- Structure Induced Equilibria (Shepsle 1979)
- Agenda Control
- Discipline
- Committee jurisdictions