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Strategic Decisions

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Two beach vendors (selling drinks, t-shirts, other paraphenalia) have been ... Back to the 'Location' Example. Consider the Beach Vendor Problem. Simplifying Problem ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Strategic Decisions


1
Strategic Decisions
  • Class 3
  • Putting Yourself in the Other
  • Persons Shoes

2
Overview
  • In many situations, a player will have to
    determine the best strategy at the the same time
    as a rival
  • Even if the moves are not literally taking place
    at the same moment, the game is a simultaneous
    one if both rivals are unaware of the others
    move until after both have taken place

3
Common Simultaneous ID Location Game
  • Two beach vendors (selling drinks, t-shirts,
    other paraphenalia) have been awarded rights to
    sell on a one mile stretch of beach. Each vendor
    may select a single site anywhere along the beach
    side of a walkway that stretches the length of
    the beach. The vendors must submit in writing
    their decision as to where they will locate by
    the first of March but they may not consult each
    other about locations. Beach season is Memorial
    Day through Labor Day.  During this period daily
    attendance fluctuates, but on both heavily and
    lightly attended days, beach-goers tend to
    distribute themselves fairly evenly along the one
    mile stretch.
  • What statements can you make about best
    locations for on of locations for the two
    vendors?

4
Examples of Simultaneous IDs
  • Product Marketing
  • Positioning -- price-quality mix and specific
    geographic location decisions
  • Pricing Wars
  • Bargaining compensation, contracts,
  • Negotiation over allocation of profits in a joint
    venture or merger that would benefit both
    parties. Delays or impasses reduce the size of
    the pie.
  • Voting and politics
  • One unit gains at other units expense

5
Analyzing Simultaneous IDs
  • Two Main Kinds Constant Sum Variable Sum
  • Constant Sum Games (e.g. zero sum) focus here
  • Dividing a fixed pie
  • Purely competitive situations
  • Price decisions dividing well established market
  • Variable Sum (e.g. positive sum) Games
    -- more in Class 4
  • Strategies determine size of pie division
  • Cooperate-compete situations
  • Example Joint venture player-team negotiations

6
Analyzing Simultaneous IDs Finding Answers
  • Each player puts self in other players shoes
  • However, easy to fall into chasing your own
    tail
  • If I do x, rival does y, but if rival does y, I
    do z,
  • Need Solution Technique to find Nash
    Equilibrium
  • NE A pair (or set) of strategies that are best
    responses to one another

7
Thinking about NE Dominant Dominated
Strategies
  • Determine whether a players strategy is best
    regardless of what other chooses (dominant)
  • Then determine best strategy for other player
  • Determine whether a players strategy is worst
    regardless of what other chooses (dominated)
  • Eliminate dominated options and then look for
    dominant strategies

8
Back to the Location Example
  • Consider the Beach Vendor Problem
  • Simplifying Problem
  • 2 Vendors (1, 2) choosing at same time
  • Beachgoers evenly distributed along section of
    beach
  • Location Options Left, Middle, Right (L, M, R)
  • No cooperation -- Fixed Pie (zero sum)
  • Consider payoffs to combinations (draw map)
  • NE Solution
  • Extremes are dominated can always do at least
    as well in middle

9
Location Problem Solution
  • NE to simple case
  • Rivals side-by-side in middle of beach
  • Simple case serves as common template
  • Retail stores including fast-food, gas stations
    evening news show times political candidates
  • Exceptions
  • Why?
  • What are the limits of the simplifications and
    how might changing them influence the results?

10
Simultaneous ID Tables
  • In simultaneous move games, tables are often help
    clarify options
  • used instead of a game trees because the sequence
    of moves no longer matters
  • Rows columns corresponds to strategies for the
    players
  • The cells of the table depict the payoffs for the
    row and column player respectively

11
Simultaneous ID Mechanics Pitcher-Hitter Example
  • Consider 2 firms (hitter pitcher) Firms
  • Pitcher chooses fastball or off-speed
  • Hitter guesses fastball or off-speed
  • Look for dominant strategy
  • If none, look for dominated strategy
  • If needed, then look again for dominant

12
ID with Dominant Strategy
13
Explaining Solution Mechanics
  • Examine outcomes for each column (hitter
    strategy) then determine pitchers best choice
    for that column
  • If hitter guessing FB, FB or OS is same for
    pitcher
  • If hitter guessing OS, FB is pitchers best
    choice
  • FB always at least as good as OS for pitcher
  • FB is (weakly) dominant strategy for pitcher
  • Knowing this, hitter chooses from FB row
  • Guessing FB is best option
  • FB (pitcher) FB (hitters) is Nash Equilibrium
  • If not dominant strategy for player 1, repeat the
    procedure above for player 2

14
Expanding the Situation
  • Same 2 firms pitcher hitter
  • Now, 3 decision possibilities for each
  • Fastball, change-up, slider
  • Advance warning
  • No dominant solution using mechanics just
    described
  • Proceed to looking for dominated solutions

15
ID with Dominated Strategy
16
Dominated Strategies
  • Iterate through pitchers choices
  • If hitter guessing FB, pitchers best option is
    CU
  • If hitter guessing CU, pitchers best option is
    FB
  • If hitter guessing slider, pitcher can choose any
  • Slider is dominated for pitcher he can always
    do at least as well choosing FB or CU
  • Stepping through hitters choices given pitcher
    strategy (examining by rows)
  • Slider is dominated for hitter he can always do
    at least as well will FB or CU
  • ID condenses to upper (4) left cells
  • Isolate these cells and look for
    dominant-dominated strategies
  • No single (pure) strategy Nash Equilibrium
  • Mixing strategies is best

17
Building Intuition
  • Sometimes complexity of situation or lack of
    practice makes finding exact solution difficult
  • Lessons for Being a Better Simultaneous ID
    decision maker?
  • Does I or my opponent have a dominant strategy?
  • Do I or my opponent have a dominated strategy

18
Mixing Strategies
  • Pitcher-Hitter ID had no single best strategy
    whats the best way to mix FB and CU?
  • Take relative gains-losses to each into account
    (See graph on next slide)

19
Best Mix in Pitching Example
20
Finding the Right Mix
  • Optimal proportion fastballs about 65 --
    Intuition?
  • Percentage declines when facing a better fastball
    hitter
  • Percentage declines when facing a poor change-up
    hitter
  • Percentage near 50 only when hitter about same
    against fastball and change-up
  • Intuition from Poker mixing bluffs strong
    hands?
  • No pure strategy -- mixing play of strong hands
    with bluffs is better than either strategy alone
  • The optimal proportion bluffs is usually low
    (e.g. 10) because the risks are very high
  • Bluffs should increase if players beliefs
    easily manipulated
  • Randomly mixing in bluffs is required but harder
    than might appear

21
Learning to Be Unpredictable
  • Unpredictability (randomizing) easy for a
    computer an art for humans
  • MLB Pitcher Poker
  • Lessons From Experiments
  • Coin Matching
  • 3-people -- no match pays reward
  • Setup 1 Players know who rivals are and size of
    payoffs
  • Setup 2 Players dont now rivals or size of
    payoffs
  • Same setup except counterpart exact payoff
    unknown
  • History of plays has effect
  • Why?

22
of Heads Chosen Based on History of Play
Full Payoff Information
Incomplete Information
Heads Last Period
Heads Last Period
23
Lesson from Coin Matching?
  • Setup 1 Players employ almost exact NE (5050)
    with randomized mix
  • Past play history has no effect
  • Setup 2 Players diverge from NE
  • Past play history has effect more heads in
    past round means fewer heads now
  • Why the difference?

24
Takeaways?
  • Simultaneous or Sequential?
  • Dividing a fixed pie or influencing pies size?
  • Eliminate choices where decision maker can do
    better regardless of rivals strategy
  • Look for a strategy that is always best
    regardless of rivals choice
  • If multiple strategies are best
  • Mix them based on relative gains/losses
  • Randomize the appropriate mix
  • Keep in mind the effects of information (or lack
    of it) on the way people solve problems
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