COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

1
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

• INDUSTRIAL SPYING
• IN THE 21ST CENTURY

2
Counterintelligence and security countermeasures
3
BASIC Security countermeasures

• Have a technology control plan (TCP)
• Have employee knowledgeable of export control
• Conduct frequent computer security audits
• Write English into all foreign contracts
• Do not respond to requests for visas

4
Foreign visits what is inappropriate?
5
The technique

• Foreign visitors wander away from the group
• Visitors ask questions beyond scope of what was
  approved for discussion
• Fraudulent use of data exchange agreements
• Visitors arrive unannounced at a facility
• Visitors take notes and photographs
• Visitors hold commercial discussions when the
  US Government refuses to sponsor the visit
• Receive last minute or unannounced additions to a
  visiting delegation

6
Security countermeasures

• Do not allow unannounced foreign visitors access
  to the facility.
• Do not allow last minute additions to a visiting
  delegation
• Verify personal identification against the
  original visit request
• Have sufficient number of escorts on hand for a
  visiting delegation
• Brief escorts as to what is critical within the
  facility
• Brief employees of the scope of the foreign visit
  
• If a security incident occurs, ask the visitor to
  leave
• Do not permit any cameras or note taking

7
Front companies who is the end user?
8
The front company

• Hides identity of end user
• May acquire technology legally and export it
  illegally
• Does not know much about the equipment being
  requested
• Declines operator training and warranty
• Conveys impression the equipment is for a third
  party
• May be financed by a foreign bank
• May have connections with a foreign embassy
• May have an office in an embargoed country

9
Front company representative

• May attempt to test the honesty of the US
  contractor to determine if an illicit deal can be
  arranged
• May ask if US contractor has offices overseas
• May offer financial incentives (bribes)
• May imply that officials in the foreign country
  can be easily bribed

10
The Unsolicited request

• Comes from a relatively unknown company
• Is usually sent in broken English
• Is sent on shoddy business letterhead or in an
  unprofessional manner
• Frequently involves a dual-use type of technology

11
Security countermeasures

• Know your customer
• Perform background checks on new companies who
  request sensitive or classified information or
  technology
• Any company that fits any of the indicators
  mentioned is cause for suspicion

12
Internet the fastest growing modus operandi for
unsolicited collection
13
indicators of foreign collection efforts

• The address is in a foreign country
• The recipient has never met the sender
• The sender identifies his/her status as a student
  or consultant
• The sender identifies his/her employer as a
  foreign government
• The sender asks about specific technology
• The sender indicates the third party is
  classified
• The sender advises the recipient to disregard the
  request if it causes a security problem
• The sender assures the recipient that export
  licenses are not required

14
SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES

• All requests for information received via the
  Internet should be viewed with suspicion
• Only respond to people who are personally known
• Verify the identity and address of any unknown
  requester

15
Scholarly approaches to collect scientific and
technical information
16
The technique

• Usually comes in a request for data for a
  masters thesis
• May come as a survey from a foreign university
• May come as a request from a foreign agent
  assigned to a US college or institute

17
SECURITY COUNTERMEASURE

• Refuse all requests from universities and
  colleges
• Never send scientific or technological data to
  unknown entities
• When in doubt, contact Corporate to determine
  what information you can or cannot release

18
Use of contract bidding to elicit information
19
The technique

• US defense contractor receives proposal to bid on
  a foreign defense contract
• Defense contractors submits proprietary
  information to foreign company
• Foreign government acquires preliminary concepts
  and designs for free

20
Security Countermeasures

• Do not do business with countries known to use
  economic or industrial espionage
• Provide minimum amount of information when
  competing for foreign contracts
• Work closely with DSS or other US Government
  agencies when looking to do business with foreign
  countries

21
What are we protecting?
22
What to protect

• Items to protect at DPA
• Classified US Government information
• Company proprietary information financial,
  business, scientific or economic information
• Company assets

23
DPA countermeasures

• Well-trained DPA employees are the first line of
  defense against counterintelligence
• It is the duty of every DPA employee to protect
  classified and sensitive information.
• The protection of DPA information helps protect
  US national security

24
HOW TO REPORT SUSPICIOUS CONTACTS

• Submit a Suspicious Contact Report to Security
  DPA.Security_at_L-3com.com and Export Control
  DPA.ExportControl_at_L-3com.com
• Contact your Senior Security Manager immediately!

25
DPA CONTACTS

• Security
• Felicia Highsmith/Senior Security Manager
• 619-278-2350
• DPA.Security_at_L-3com.com
• Export Control
• Beth Donahue/Export Control Compliance
  Coordinator
• 703-521-6236
• DPA.ExportControl_at_L-3com.com