Towards%20Achieving%20Integrated%20Battle%20Command

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Towards Achieving Integrated Battle Command

• Presentation for the
• Information Age Metrics Working Group
• March 8, 2006
• Robert Clemence, Ph.D.
• Dennis Leedom, Ph.D.
• Evidence Based Research, Inc.

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Outline

• Fingerspitzengefuhlen
• Setting A Context for Integrated Battle Command
• A Very Brief History of the Evolution of Military
  Staffs
• A Modern Staff The Standing Joint Force
  Headquarters
• The Effects Based Approach to Planning and
  Operational Net Assessment
• The Integrated Battle Command Program
• The Hypotheses
• The Metrics
• The Campaign of Experiments
• Adventures in Experimentation
• Discussion

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Fingerspitzengefuhlen

• Fingertip sense The leaders ability to
  recognize at the precise moment in battle the
  truth, or in other words, a high level of
  situational awareness that the mind would
  ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long
  study and reflection.

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Context Military Staff Development

• If I attempted to answer the mass of futile
  correspondence that surrounds me, I should be
  debarred from all serious business of
  campaigning. I shall see that no officer under
  my Command is debarred, by attending to the
  futile driveling of mere quill-driving in your
  Lordship's office, from attending to his first
  dutywhich is, and always has been, so to train
  the private men that they may without question,
  beat any force opposed to them in the field.

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Context Military Staff Development

• Revolutionary and Imperial France Evolution from
  aide de camp and personal staffs to a
  organization that combined these roles with a
  planning staff responsible for troop movements,
  supply and personnel matters.
• Prussia and Imperial Germany Institutionalizing
  the Military Staff war academies, permanent
  corps and division staffs, a focus on the
  tactical and operational concerns of war

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Context The 20th Century Military Staff

• The G-1 is the chief of staff for personnel.
• The G-2 is the intelligence staff officer.
• The G-3 is the chief of staff for plans,
  operations, and training.
• The G-4 is the logistics officer.
• The G-5 is the civil affairs or public affairs
  officer.
• The G-6 is the command, control, communications,
  and computer systems staff officer.
• The G-7 is the joint operations staff officer.
• The G-8 is the resource management officer.

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Context Understanding the Complexity of the
Battlespace
DIPLOMATIC INFORMATION MILITARY ECONOMIC
Mechanisms ofNational SecurityPolicy
DIME
Actions
FunctionalDimensions ofthe Battlespace
Political Military Economic Social Information Inf
rastructure
PMESII
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Example DIME Actions
D I M E
Strategic Treaty signed U.S. President delivers speech Ballistic missile launched Country defaults on IMF loans
Operational Toughen visa requirements Jam radio broadcasts Carrier group dispatched WTO rules against country in dispute
Tactical Close embassy Pamphlet distribution Bridge destroyed Firm to firm trading
Multiple Actors including U.S. military, other
government agencies, foreign governments,
non-governmental organizations, individuals, etc.
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Example PMESII Effects
P M E S I I
Strategic Regime change ends hegemonic rule Nation disavows use of nuclear weapons Currency markets are stable Civil society develops (institutions) Perception of U.S. improves in Muslim world Global communications enhanced
Operational Peaceful elections held Regional arms race abates Regional trade imbalance corrected Health statistics improve Target nation agrees to adhere to Intellectual Property Rights laws Electricity production increases in target nation
Tactical Local rebel leader expelled Local militia turn in arms Trade dispute with nation avoided Outbreak of diphtheria contained Internet access provided Water production facility is restored
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Context A Working Definition of EBO

• Operations that are planned, executed, assessed,
  and adapted based on a holistic understanding of
  the operational environment in order to influence
  or change system behavior or capabilities using
  the integrated application of selected
  instruments of power to achieve directed policy
  aims.
• An effect is the physical and/or behavioral
  state of a PMESII system that results from a
  military or non-military action or set of
  actions.

Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element)
SOP, 14 Jul 04
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Context Effects Based Operations
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Context EBO in Comparison with other
Methodologies
Target-Based (TBO)

• ID enemy entities, destroy them
• Focus physical effects at target level
• Looks at 1st and 2nd order effects only

Effects-Based
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Context JFCOM Battle Command Initiatives
JFCOM INITIATIVE
WHAT IT PROVIDES
Effects-Based Operations
Extends military planning beyond traditional
campaign analysis to consider the full range of
PMESII effects within the battlespace
Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters
Provides proficient staff cadre and
knowledge-focused organizational structure upon
which to build an effects-based planning and
execution process
Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters
Provides proficient staff cadre and
knowledge-focused organizational structure upon
which to build an effects-based planning and
execution process
Operational Net Assessment
Provides organized staff work flows, data
architecture, and decision products for
considering PMESII impact on key nodes and links
Collaborative Information Environment
Facilitates internal and external staff
interactions for collaborative problem solving
and knowledge sharing
Joint Interagency Coordination Group
Provides multifunction advisory element to the
Joint Commander that facilitates collaboration
and information reach back through other national
agencies
Joint Fires Initiative
Provides system architectural solutions for
facilitating joint targeting solutions and
tactical-to-operation linkage
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Context A Modern Staff - The SJFHQ (CE)
SJTFHQ Deployment Optionsin Support of Regional
Combatant Commander

• Redesigned JTFHQ
• Effects-based, knowledge-driven
• Collaborative process
• Extensive reach-back

EFFECTS TASKING ORDER
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Context Operational Net Assessment
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Conducting Future Campaigns

Effects based approach to operations
Integrated and Interdependent
Synergistic and Reinforcing
Effects Based
Unified
Diplomatic Information Military Economic Other
Political Military Economic Social Information Inf
rastructure Other
PMESII Effects
DIME Actions
Theory being developed by JFCOM/DARPA Mentors
Transformation Plan
Power
Obstructionist
Legitimate Institutions
Intervention is not about totally defeating a
Nation-State or Alliance Its about transferring
power from a hostile regime to a friendly and
democratic regime using all forms of national
power available . . . while minimizing the
undesired consequences
and effects
Time
Integrated Campaign Plan
Achievement of multiple integrated and
interdependent/ mutually supporting objectives to
shape the environment
Security, Stability, Transition, Reconstruction
Major Military Operations
D-Day
Pre-Conflict
Time
Political-Diplomatic Effort
Military Effort
Sources The Quest for Viable Peace International
Intervention and Strategies for Conflict
Transformation, Jock Covey, Michael Dziedzic and
Leonard Hawley, editors, United States Institute
of Peace Press, May 2005 Capstone Concept for
Joint Operations, DoD, August 2005
End State
Rule of Law Effort
Political-Economy Effort
And so forth
Problem How to get from the theory to a workable
plan?
This chart and accompanying notes are Approved
for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited
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Outline

• Fingerspitzengefuhlen
• Setting A Context for Integrated Battle Command
• A Very Brief History of the Evolution of Military
  Staffs
• A Modern Staff The Standing Joint Force
  Headquarters
• The Effects Based Approach to Planning and
  Operational Net Assessment
• The Integrated Battle Command Program
• The Hypotheses
• The Metrics
• The Campaign of Experiments
• Adventures in Experimentation
• Discussion

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The Integrated Battle Command Program

• The future battlespace will increasingly be
  characterized by effects-based operations that
  synchronize the impact of diplomatic,
  information, military, and economic (DIME)
  actions designed to influence the will of an
  adversary within the context of coalition
  partners and 3rd-party interests
• In response, future Joint Task Force headquarters
  will be transformed along several dimensions
• Organizationally, to better incorporate a broad
  range of expertise
• Procedurally, to better manage the creation of
  actionable knowledge
• Doctrinally, to better focus on key adversary
  nodes and linkages
• The increased level of operational complexity
  also demands a new generation of supporting
  technology to assist the commander and his staff
  in visualizing, assessing, and collaborating
  operations across multiple dimensions
• However, technology required to support the
  planning and execution of effects-based
  operations across the political, military,
  economic, social, information, and infrastructure
  (PMESII) dimensions of the battlespace has yet to
  emerge
• To this end, the DARPA Integrated Battle Command
  Program complements current JFCOM
  transformational efforts by providing an
  integrated suite of tools to assist the Joint
  Force Commander in collaboratively visualizing
  and assessing effects-based operations within the
  future battlespace

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PMESII Problem Space(Framework for Assessing
Situation Awareness and Understanding)

• Key Actors, Protagonists, and Adversaries
• Intentions, aims, commitment, and motivation
• Near-term actions affecting area of operation
• Openness to negotiation and cooperation
• Anticipated reaction to preventative diplomacy
• Anticipated reaction to coercion

• Host Nation Cooperation / International Support
• Cooperation of the host government
• Cooperation of neighboring states
• Support of regional / international organizations
• Enforcement of regional / international sanctions
• Cooperation / participation of major powers
• Anticipated reaction of key nations

• Local Conflict
• Internal political conflict situation
• Ethnic conflict situation
• Military conflict situation
• Weapons of mass destruction threat
  
• Economic drivers of conflict
• Terrorist threat

• Risks of Crisis Expansion or Escalation
• Possible scenarios of crisis escalation or
  expansion
• Potential risks and adverse threats within region
• Potential unintended consequences within region

• Major Geo-Strategic Discontinuities
• Potential emergent discontinuities that would
  require reevaluation of policy
  aims and objectives

• Operating Environment (Long Term)
• Humanitarian emergency situation
• Landmine / unexploded ordnance threat
• AIDS / contagious disease situation
• Infrastructure destruction and physical
  environment
• Lawlessness, civil order, and public security
  situation
• Border security and control
• Collapsed state / local civil administration
  situation
• Rule of law / system of justice situation
• Corruption, organized crime, security extortion
  threat
• Health of economic foundation
• Local media / public information situation
• Human rights abuses / atrocities / war crimes
• Prisoner / abductee situation
• Community / socio-cultural climate

• Initial State / Immediate Entry Conditions
  
• State of fighting
• Presence / evacuation of Americans
• Immediate humanitarian relief needs
• Size / location of war crime victims
• Funding sources for armed groups / predatory
  operations
• Coalition participants
• Cease-fire agreement / compliance
• Spoiler threats and countermoves
• Force protection threats
• Threats to civilians in armed conflict (per UNSCR
  1265)
• Condition of key military bases and
  infrastructure
• Public awareness and support for coalition
  operations
• Host nation support for coalition operation
• Support of neighboring states and key regional
  powers
• Participation and leadership provided by a lead
  nation

• Proposed Peace Settlement
• Suitability of framework for peace process
• Openness of conflicting parties to conflict
  resolution
• Identified spoilers of the peace process
• Possible modes of failure of the peace process

Reference Generic POL-MIL Plan for a
Multilateral ComplexContingency Operation, 18
Jul 2002, Len Hawley, US Dept of State
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JFCOM Battle Command Initiatives(Baseline
Framework for DARPA IBC Program)
JFCOM INITIATIVE WHAT IT PROVIDES
BASELINE RELEVANCE TO IBC
PROGRAM
Effects-Based Operations Extends military planning beyond traditional campaign analysis to consider the full range of PMESII effects within the battlespace Operational concept only-Lacks automated visualization and assessment tools Reflects a battle command process that embraces the need to coordinate military actions with diplomatic, information, and economic initiatives for achieving command intent
Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters Provides proficient staff cadre and knowledge-focused organizational structure upon which to build an effects-based planning and execution process Improved organizational design - Draft SOP/TTPs exist Reflects an organizational framework and planning rhythm that is geared toward collaborative knowledge management, shared problem-solving and the use of automated tools
Operational Net Assessment Provides organized staff work flows, data architecture, and decision products for considering PMESII impact on key nodes and links Developed through manual analysis - Lacks automated visualization and assessment tools Reflects a cognitive process, set of work flows, and staff products already geared to the systematic analysis of DIME actions and PMESII effects
Collaborative Information Environment Facilitates internal and external staff interactions for collaborative problem solving and knowledge sharing First generation tools only (IWS, MS SPPS) - KM business rules Reflects a collaborative work philosophy that is already designed to exploit the advantages of networked actors, tools, and databases
Joint Interagency Coordination Group Provides multifunction advisory element to the Joint Commander that facilitates collaboration and information reach back through other national agencies Staff functional concept only - Lacks automated visualization and collaboration tools Reflects a collaborative mechanism for developing PMESII models and estimates
Joint Fires Initiative Provides system architectural solutions for facilitating joint targeting solutions and tactical-to-operation linkage Architecture joint fires against TSTs - Limited to kinetic effects Reflects improved baseline for dynamic time-sensitive target engagement and automated target information exchange between TBMCS, AFATDS and NFCS
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DARPA Integrated Battle Command Program
Social System Model
Economic System Model
Other Systems?
Political System Model
Military System Model
Multidimensional Assessment
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Battle Command Sensemaking Cyclewithin JTF
Headquarters
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Developing Situation Understanding

• Visualize adversary nodes and linkages
• Collaborate with PMESII experts
• Assess DIME effects on adversary nodes

KEY HYPOTHESES
Better identification of key PMESII
vulnerabilities within Area of Operation
Better dialog and interaction among relevant
PMESII experts (JTFHQ, JIACG, Intell Community,
Centers of Excellence)
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Situation Understanding Metrics
Situation Update












Key PMESII Vulnerabilities Identified
Number of PMESII Experts Engaged inONA
Development
DARPA Tool Set
DARPA Tool Set
Baseline
Base line
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Linking Understanding to Action

• Visualize DIME actions and constraints
• Collaborate with PMESII vetting experts
• Assess effectiveness of DIME actions

KEY HYPOTHESES
Better prioritization and linkage of
nodes-effects-actions with Command Guidance and
Intent
Better vetting and prioritization of effects and
actions across DIME options
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Effect-Action Linkage Metrics
Prioritized Effects-Actions












Node-Effect-Action Pairs Included in PEL
Time Required toDevelop Effect-Action Matrix
DARPA Tool Set
Baseline
DARPA Tool Set
Baseline
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Synchronizing Operations

• Visualize DIME action sequences
• Collaborate with mission executors
• Assess timing of PMESII effects

KEY HYPOTHESES
Greater of targets and effects within Daily ETO
contribute to Command Intent
Lower of targets and effects within Daily ETO
lead to unintended consequences
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Synchronization Metrics












Percentage of Node-Effect-ActionPairs Validly
Linkedto Command Intentand Policy Objectives
Trials with DARPA Tool Suite
Measured Improvement
Baseline Trials
Percentage of Node-Effects-ActionPairs
Producing Unintended Consequences
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Assessing Impact / Updating Plans

• Visualize DIME goals and PMESII outcomes
• Collaborate with mission executors
• Assess of Command Intent achieved

KEY HYPOTHESES
More comprehensive assessment of how Daily ETO
effects have contributed to Command Intent
Faster replanning of follow-on actions within
JFTHQ planning rhythm
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Assessment and Replanning Metrics
Operational Progress Update












Percentage of Operational Goal Shortfalls
Correctly Identified
Time Required toPlan Remedial Actions
Baseline
DARPA Tool Set
DARPA Tool Set
Baseline
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DARPA IBC Hypothesis Chain
Visualization
Collaboration
Assessment
Improved InformationSuperiority and
KnowledgeManagement
Better dialog and interactionamong relevant
PMESII experts(Hq staff, JIACG, COEs)
Better identification of actions /
capabilitiesrequired for desired effects
Better prediction of PMESIIreactions and
behaviorswithin Area of Operation
Better identification of keyPMESII nodes and
linkageswithin Area of Operation
Situation Awareness
Better identification andarticulation of
keyPMESII effects
Better prediction of 2nd, 3rd-order effects
andunintended consequences
More accurate and fasterdevelopment of
node-effect-action matrix
Situation Understanding
PROCESS
Improved Effects-Based Planning Process
Better prioritization andlinkage of
nodes-effects-actionswith Command Intent
Better synchronization of effects and actions
acrossDIME options
Decision Making
Greater of targets andeffects within Daily
ETOcontribute to Command Intent
Lower of targets andeffects within Daily
ETOlead to unintended outcomes
Command and Control Agility
More Effective and Synchronized ETO
More effective and efficientuse of military force
Force Agility
FocusedCombat Power
OUTCOME
Greater synergy in achievingNational Security
Objectives
OSD Network Centric Operations Perspective
JFCOM Transformation Perspective
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Knowledge Development Metric Path
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Experimentation Campaign
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IBC Technical Campaign Plan
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Adventures in Experimentation
FLAWED EXPERIMENTATIONENVIRONMENT
FLAWED FORMULATION
MEASUREMENTAND ANALYSISPROBLEMS
FLAWED PROJECT PLAN
POST-EXPERIMENTPROBLEMS
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Phase 0 Discovery Experiment

• Use of inappropriate or poorly trained test
  subjects
• Lack of experience and expertise with new
  concepts, technology, etc. will negate any
  potential benefits
• Failure to properly select and train observers /
  controllers
• Training is necessary to sensitize and calibrate
  their observations
• Failure to control for human subjects and
  organizational variables
• Leads to serious confounding of experiment and
  the inability to attribute specific performance
  differences to the concept or technology under
  study
• Failure to hold a rehearsal i.e., last-minute
  set-up
• Rehearsals guard against the inevitable
  unexpected glitches in designs, procedures, and
  measurement methods
• Often leads to failed experiments, wasted
  resources, and program delays
• Reliance upon the happiness test instead of
  empirical data
• Common approach taken when experiment is observed
  by senior officers
• Ignores the fact that people commonly see what
  they want to see

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Phase 1 Experiments
Basal Capability
This chart and accompanying notes are Approved
for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited
38
Go/No-Go Experiment Setup
White/Red Cell
COCOM Commander State Other Government
Agencies Non-Government Agencies Adversary
Team C
Vignette 3
Team B
Vignette 2
Team A
Vignette 1
Three teams operated three different tool
configurations in three vignettes nine trails
1 Commander 3 Red/Blue Planner 1 IO Planner 2
MILPOL 2 SOSA Analysts 1 Intel Analyst
Configuration 0
Configuration 1
Configuration 2
SJTFHQ CIE
Constructive simulation to propagate decisions
forward
Results
Observations Surveys Questions
Subject Matter Experts provide the Gold Standard
Metric Values
Metric Estimator
Plan Evaluator
This chart and accompanying notes are Approved
for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited
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IBC Technology Transition Path
Basal Visualization and Collaboration
Basal Option Exploration
Basal Planning
Comprehensive Capability
Comprehensive Capability
Basal Capability
Baseline Capability
Basal Capability
Experimentation
Experimentation
Exp.
Plan Construction
Increment
Increment
Final
Action/Effect Exploration
Visualization/ Collaboration
Personnel Recovery Planner
JPRA
JFCOM
Standing Joint Task Force HQ (JFCOM and Regional
Combatant Commands)
Army Network Enabled Battle Command/ Command Post
of the Future
USFK TEBO ACTD
NATO Effects Based-TOPFAS (Tool For Operational
Planning Force Activation and Simulation )
Distribution uthorized to U.S. Government
Agencies and their Contractors
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Summary

• While JFCOM has initiated several
  transformational efforts in response to the
  growing complexity of the future battlespace,
  technologies provided by DARPAs Integrated
  Battle Command program may enable these concepts
  to become a reality.
• Quantifiable metrics can be employed to measure
  the improvement of knowledge products throughout
  the planning rhythm thus demonstrating the
  impact of DARPAs new technologies on creating
  the conditions for fingerspitzengefuhlen.

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Questions?