DAVID ARMSTRONG The Nature of Mind

1
DAVID ARMSTRONGThe Nature of Mind

• A talk for VAPS September 2006
• Ross Phillips, La Trobe University

2
Two theses about the Tooth Fairy
3
Two theses about the Tooth Fairy

• 1. The Tooth Fairy just is my Mum. (I
  discovered that the person exchanging my tooth
  for some coins was my Mum.)
• 2. There is no Tooth Fairy. (It turns out that
  I was fooled by my Mum exchanging my tooth for
  some coins.)

4
Two theses about the Tooth Fairy

• 1. The Tooth Fairy just is my Mum. (I
  discovered the person exchanging my tooth for
  some coins was my Mum.)
• 2. There is no Tooth Fairy. (It turns out that
  I was fooled by my Mum exchanging my tooth for
  some coins.)

A deflationary story. Reduction.
Elimination.
5
Two theses about mental states (events,
processes).

• 1. Mental states just are brain states.
• 2. There are no mental states.

A deflationary story. Reduction.
Elimination.
6
Two theses about mental states (events,
processes).

• 1. Mental states just are brain states.
• 2. There are no mental states.

A deflationary story. Reduction.
Elimination.
NOT ARMSTRONGS POSITION.
7
Armstrongs Thesis

• Mental states (events, processes) just are brain
  states (events, processes).

8
Armstrongs Thesis

• Mental states (events, processes) just are brain
  states (events, processes).
• Whales are mammals.

9
Armstrongs Thesis

• Mental states (events, processes) just are brain
  states (events, processes).
• MS BS

10
Armstrongs Thesis

• Whats the argument for this?
• MS BS

11
Armstrongs Thesis

• Whats the argument for this?
• ? MS BS

12
Armstrongs Argument

• P1. MS X
• P2. X BS
• ? MS BS

13
Armstrongs Argument

• P1. MS X
• P2. X BS
• ? MS BS

14
Armstrongs Argument

• P1. John Howard The Australian PM
• P2. The Australian PM The parliamentary leader
  of the Liberal Party
• ? John Howard The parliamentary leader of the
  Liberal Party

15
Armstrongs Argument

• P1. A B
• P2. B C
• ? A C

So the argument is plainly VALID. But is it sound?
16
Armstrongs Argument

• P1. Mental States (MS) are the inner causes of
  behaviour (ICB)
• P2. The inner causes of behaviour are brain
  states.
• ? Mental states are brain states.

17
Armstrongs Argument

• P1. Mental States (MS) are the inner causes of
  behaviour (ICB)
• P2. The inner causes of behaviour are brain
  states.
• ? Mental states are brain states.

VALID, BUT WHY SHOULD WE BELIEVE THE PREMISSES?
18
Armstrongs essay falls into 3 parts.

• An argument for P1. MS ICB
• An argument for P2. ICB BS
• A reply to an objection to his thesis.

19
Armstrongs essay falls into 3 parts.

• An argument for P1. MS ICB (paras 13-28)
• An argument for P2. ICB BS (paras 1-11)
• A reply to an objection to his thesis.
• (paras 30-42)

20
The argument for P2.ICB BS

• P1. In science there is convergence of learned
  opinion.

21
The argument for P2.ICB BS

• P1. In science there is convergence of learned
  opinion.
• P2. It is rational to believe what the learned
  agree upon.

22
The argument for P2.ICB BS

• P1. In science there is convergence of learned
  opinion.
• P2. It is rational to believe what the learned
  agree upon.
• ? Its rational to believe what scientists agree
  upon.

23
The argument for P2.ICB BS

• P1. In science there is convergence of learned
  opinion.
• P2. It is rational to believe what the learned
  agree upon.
• ? Its rational to believe what scientists agree
  upon.
• P3. Scientists agree that the inner causes of
  behaviour are brain states.
• ? Its rational to believe that ICB BS.

24
The argument for P1MSICB

• Cartesian Dualists would think this a fairly
  trivial empirical claim. Of course our beliefs
  and desires and hopes and fears cause our
  behaviour.

25
The argument for P1MSICB

• Cartesian Dualists would think this a fairly
  trivial empirical claim. Of course our beliefs
  and desires and hopes and fears cause our
  behaviour.
• Armstrong intends it as a conceptual truth.

26
The argument for P1MSICB

• Armstrong thinks we should believe P1 because
  the Behaviourists were nearly right about the
  correct analysis of psychological discourse.

27
A detour through Behaviourism

• Dont rush into metaphysics!

28
A detour through Behaviourism

• Dont rush into metaphysics!
• Think about the language we use when we attribute
  mental qualities to each other.

29
A detour through Behaviourism

• Dont rush into metaphysics!
• Think about the language we use when we attribute
  mental qualities to each other.
• Jane believes that Bill hopes that Maria is
  angry Jack is watching

30
A detour through Behaviourism

• Dont rush into metaphysics!
• Think about the language we use when we attribute
  mental qualities to each other.
• Jane believes that Bill hopes that Maria is
  angry Jack is watching
• To believe you are listening to a lecture just is
  to

31
A detour through Behaviourism

• In short, its the behaviour that makes a
  particular mental predicate attributable, and
  thats the end of the matter.

32
A detour through Behaviourism

• In short, its the behaviour that makes a
  particular mental predicate attributable, and
  thats the end of the matter.
• To be in pain just is to be wincing, calling for
  the aspirin etc etc.

33
A detour through Behaviourism

• In short, its the behaviour that makes a
  particular mental predicate attributable, and
  thats the end of the matter.
• To be in pain just is to be wincing, calling for
  the aspirin etc etc.

OBJECTION! What about stoics? What about actors?
34
A detour through Behaviourism

• A refinement Dispositional Behaviourism
• To be in pain is to be engaging in pain
  behaviour or else to be disposed to do so.

35
A detour through Behaviourism

• A refinement Dispositional Behaviourism
• To be in pain is to be engaging in pain
  behaviour or else disposed to do so.

OBJECTION! This looks like another inner state.
36
A detour through Behaviourism

• To be in pain is to be engaging in pain
  behaviour or else disposed to do so.
• REPLY The conditional analysis of dispositional
  concepts.

OBJECTION! This looks like another inner state.
37
A detour through Behaviourism

• The conditional analysis.
• Fragility is a dispositional concept.
• To say that the vase is fragile is not to speak
  of some inner state or condition of the vase but
  of what would happen if it were dropped, hit with
  a cricket ball etc etc.

38
A detour through Behaviourism

• Armstrongs alternative causal analysis.
• Fragility is a dispositional concept.
• To say that the vase is fragile is to speak of
  some inner state namely, whatever is about the
  vase that would cause it to shatter if it were
  dropped, hit with a cricket ball etc etc.

39
A detour through Behaviourism

• Armstrongs alternative causal analysis.
• So Behaviourists were right to try to define
  mental concepts in terms of behaviour, just wrong
  about how to deal with dispositions.
• Dispositions are causes defined in terms of
  their characteristic effects.

40
The argument for P1MSICB

• P1. Mental states are dispositions to behave (in
  certain ways). Agreeing with Behaviourism
• P2. Dispositions are inner states which cause
  their defining effects. Disgreeing with
  Behaviourist analysis of dispositions.
• ? Mental states are the inner causes of their
  defining effects.

41
The argument for P1MSICB

• P1. Mental states are dispositions to behave (in
  certain ways). Agreeing with Behaviourism
• P2. Dispositions are inner states which cause
  their defining effects. Disgreeing with
  Behaviourist analysis of dispositions.
• ? Mental states are the inner causes of their
  defining effects.
• P3. The defining effects of mental states are
  behaviour. Agreeing with Behaviourism
• ? Mental states are the inner causes of
  behaviour. (MSICB)

42
Armstrongs Argument

• P1. Mental States (MS) are the inner causes of
  behaviour (CB)
• P2. The inner causes of behaviour are brain
  states.
• ? Mental states are brain states.

43
An Objection and Reply

• The Causal Theory of Mind shares a problem with
  Behaviourism.
• It is plausible in the third person case, but
  not the first person. OK for automatic driving
  but it leaves out consciousness.

44
Handling the First Person

• Consciousness is perception of ones own mental
  state.
• Perception is then handled dispositionally.

45

• This PowerPoint and some notes on Armstrongs
  paper at
• www.latrobe.edu.au/philosophy
• Useful linksgt Student resourcesgtVAPS Armstrong
  talk
• Or straight to
• www.latrobe.edu.au/philosophy/handouts_vaps.htm