Positions, Policies and Prospects a view from outside the Six

1
Positions, Policies and Prospects a view from
outside the Six

• Tim Beal
• CSCAP New Zealand

2
Outsiders view

• Positions and policies of the Six
• With a look at prospects
• From outside the Six
• Really outside
• New Zealand

3
Dispassionate observer from New Zealand

• NZ concerned by not directly involved
• Has friends but not allies
• No natural leanings towards, or against any
  country
• Outside academic
• Currently teaching international marketing at
  Korea University
• My opinions not necessarily CSCAP NZ

4
Positions and policies

• Follow Bob Bedeski in focusing on national
  interest
• Sceptical approach to policy statements
• Try to unearth what lies beneath

5
Russia and China

• Although differences, have much in common
• Traditional allies of DPRK
• Relations strained by DPRK search for
  independence
• Cf ROK-US relations
• Good relations with US foundation of foreign
  policy

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Commonalities

• ROK has become significant economic partner
• Especially China (4th export, 3rd import)
• War centered on Korean peninsula would be
  appalling
• Refugees, tension, loss of markets, accelerate
  remilitarization of Japan
• China has treaty obligations

7
Commonalities

• Collapse of DPRK would have very serious
  consequences
• Refugees, militarily and symbolically (US troops
  in north?), economically
• Both have interest in peaceful economic/political
  integration of peninsula
• Gas, railways (Iron Silk Road)

8
Differences

• China more involved
• Putin attempted mediation with Losyukov mission
• US rejected offer
• (Losyukov former ambassador to NZ)
• China succeeded

9
Chinas achievement

• Three party talks in April
• 1st Six Party Talks ..2nd SPT
• Historical symbolism
• Beijing as arbiter between tributary state and
  barbarians

10
Japan

• Double volte-face
• Struggle between peace and militaristic forces
• Heiwa boke versus normal state
• US pressure
• September 2002 Koizumi-Kim summit in Pyongyang
• Sudden announcement end August

11
Koizumi-Kim summit

• Preceded by bad relations
• spy boat incident, raids on Chongryon
• Abductees issue
• Claim for apology/compensation for colonialism
• Pressure from Seoul
• Initiatives from Pyongyang

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Pyongyang declaration 17 Sep 02

• Pledged to normalize relations
• Kim apologized for abductions, promised to
  continue moratorium on missile tests
• Koizumi apologized for colonial period
• Agreed to discuss reparations
• Looked like a breakthrough
• Tokyo removed main Asian problem
• Pyongyang outflanked Washington

13
Solution was the problem

• Soon after returning Koizumi reneged on agreement
• Abductees were abducted
• Abductee issue was blown up by media, government
  even though the Pyongyang summit had essentially
  solved it
• Relations now worse than ever
• What happened?

14
Collapse of Pyongyang accord

• Jonathan Pollack
• The United States, North Korea, and the end of
  the Agreed Framework. Naval War College Review,
  2003. LVI(3), lthttp//www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Revie
  w/2003/Summer/art1-su3.htmgt
• Sees collapse of Agreed Framework as triggered by
  K-K summit
• Armitage only given one days warning of
  announcement
• Coincided with new findings about enriched
  uranium
• Kelly visit announced 1 week later
• Collapse AFgtgtcollapse of Pyongyang accord
• the DPRK had opened the door to a new
  relationship with Americas most important Asian
  ally

15
ROK

• Shares with China and Russia -
• but in heightened degree
• Importance of US relationship
• Fear of war
• Fear of collapse of DPRK
• Awful economic and social consequences
• Therefore urges US to negotiate

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DPRK

• National survival
• The opportunity to engage in the international
  economy without US hindrance
• Sanctions, access to international loans,
  relations with ROK, Japan
• US compliance with AF
• LW reactors and compensation for delay, economic
  and humanitarian aid

17
25 October 2002 statement

• clarified that it was ready to seek a negotiated
  settlement of this issue on the following three
  conditions firstly, if the U.S. recognizes the
  DPRKs sovereignty, secondly, if it assures the
  DPRK of nonaggression and thirdly, if the U.S.
  does not hinder the economic development of the
  DPRK

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Sequencing

• Other main issue of contention between DPRK and
  US
• US wants DPRK abandonment of nuclear program
  before US concessions
• DPRK wants simultaneous actions

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Simultaneous actions

• DPRK wants
• Economic and humanitarian aid
• Opening diplomatic ties
• Building nuclear reactors
• Nonaggression treaty
• DPRK offers
• Willingness to give up nuclear development
• Allow nuclear inspections
• Give up missile exports
• Finally dismantle nuclear facilities
• Pyongyang Ready to Consider Washington's Offer
  of Written Security Assurance, DPRK Foreign
  Ministry statement 25 October 2003

20
US policy

• Based on hostility, refusal to negotiate
• Struggle between realists and neocons
• Realists
• Want removal of NK threat even even if such an
  outcome might trigger severe instability and
  potential military dangers (Pollack)
• Neocons
• Want to use NK threat as means to bring about
  collapse

21
Enriched uranium issue

• Claim that discovery of EU program in 2002
  caused collapse of AF, and that DPRK admitted EU,
  both suspect
• Gilman Report 1999
• there is significant evidence that North Korea is
  continuing its activities to develop nuclear
  weapons.  Remarkably, North Korea's efforts to
  acquire uranium technologies, that is, a second
  path to nuclear weapons, and their efforts to
  weaponize their nuclear material do not violate
  the 1994 Agreed Framework

22
EU issue sexed up?

• Even if true, weaponization only a distant and
  very uncertain possibility (Pollack)
• USA Today report 4 November 2003
• N. Korean nuclear efforts looking less
  threatening
• http//www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-11-04-kor
  ea-usat_x.htm
• Experts say it is possible some U.S. officials
  exaggerated the extent of the uranium program to
  torpedo AF

23
Kelly visit

• Kelly went to threaten not negotiate
• Because US was genuinely surprised and shocked?
• To disrupt Tokyo-Pyongyang relations?
• To influence ROK elections?
• Led to tension but AF survived until US broke HFO
  shipments in Nov 2002
• HFO suspension both legal and practical severing
  of AF
• DPRK reactions were rapid, stepped and
  calculated, allowing negotiation

24
Limited talk, no negotiation

• Sen. Joe Biden
• What we need to do is have more contact with
  North Korea. There were only 40 minutes of
  one-on-one dialog with North Korea last August in
  Beijing. That, with the translation requirements
  in such an exchange, is barely enough time to
  clear one's throat
• Senator Biden's Congressional Record comments on
  North Korea -- on the occasion of introducing
  Senate Resolution 256, 31 October 2003

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Prospects

• Both sides showing more flexibility
• DPRK cannot shift very much from negotiating
  position because embedded in national interest
• China, Russia, ROK share common objectives
• Negotiation to remove nuclear issue
• Avoid collapse of DPRK

26
US?

• Continued struggle between realists and neocons
• Perhaps strengthening of Democrats position
• All impacted by Iraq, etc
• Semi-negotiations but no conclusive ones
• Neither war nor peace

27
Waiting game

• US presidential election campaign will overshadow
  and dampen
• Everyone waiting for next US president
• That may offer opportunity for resolution of
  US-DPRK conflict