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Cognitive development and the generation of culture

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Title: Cognitive development and the generation of culture


1
Cognitive development and the generation of
culture
  • Childrens concepts of race
  • Supernatural ideas gods, spirits, and ancestors
  • What is the design of the instinct that causes
    learning in a given domain?
  • How does the activation of evolved cognitive
    mechanisms shape the ideas people form?
  • Does this influence which ideas spread easily
    from mind to mind and which do not? (cultural
    transmission)
  • Final Bring pink parscore.Thursday, Dec 11,
    730-1030pm

2
Views of culture flow from views of the evolved
architecture of the mind, structure of concepts,
conceptual development
  • The Standard Social Science Model (20th century)
  • Blank slate/ driven by perception
  • Classical concepts, Family resemblance concepts
  • Concept formation is bottom-up driven by
    perception, language (wug blue triangle)
  • Implies mind is like a video cameraall cultural
    content comes solely from perception, social
    experience

3
Alternative to Standard Social Science Model
  • Mind reliably develops evolved inference systems
    that are domain-specialized, each with
    proprietary concepts, inferences, privileged
    hypotheses
  • Theory of mind (intuitive psychology)
  • Intuitive physics artifact (tool) concepts
  • Natural kind concepts / essentialism
  • Intuitive biology
  • Intuitive sociology??
  • Evolved inference mechanisms structure our
    cultural ideas
  • Language still important one mode of cultural
    transmission

4
Alternative to Standard Social Science Model
  • Evolved inference mechanisms structure our
    cultural ideas
  • Proper domain versus actual domain
  • Proper domain inference system evolved for
  • Actual all domains in which the inference
    system is activated (that meet input conditions)
  • dueling triangles
  • Does not imply one inference system per cultural
    idea
  • Cultural ideas may be shaped by activation of
    multiple domain-specific concepts
  • Example Development of racial thinking in
    children

5
Development of racial thinking in children
  • We see distinct racial categories, BUT
  • Humanity is not divided into discrete racial
    types
  • Most genetic variation is within population, not
    between populations
  • Virtually no expressed genes that are present in
    all members of one race that are not present in
    substantial percentage of members of another race
  • Genetic variation exists, but is geographically
    graded, and dimensions of variation not highly
    correlated
  • What counts as a race varies over time
  • Mixed race marriage, early 1900s??
  • Southern European Catholic with Protestant
    (Italian English)

6
Where are they from?
7
Development of racial thinking in children
  • For those reasons
  • Races are not just out there to be discovered
    by the mind
  • Do not correspond to biological kinds
  • So where do racial categories and racial thinking
    come from?

8
Natural Kinds and Essentialism
  • When it comes to natural kinds, both children and
    adults are psychological essentialists we act as
    though natural kinds have hidden essences,
    underlying natures that make them the thing that
    they are (Medin, 1989, pp. 1476-1477).
  • Living species (racoons, tigers, oak trees)
  • Minerals (gold, granite)
  • The claim is not that things in the world in fact
    have defining essences, but that we have an
    inference system that represents them as such.

9
Question Do children treat social groups as
natural kinds?
  • Are social groups seen as having underlying
    essences?
  • Ethnic groups? Racial groups?
  • Are ethnic and racial groups interpreted as
    species by our folk biology system? (Gil-White)
  • Are our minds equipped with an intuitive
    sociology?
  • Larry Hirschfeld Race in the Making Cognition,
    culture, and the childs construction of human
    kinds. (1996, MIT Press)

10
Essentialism Folk Sociology
  • According to Hirschfeld
  • humans organize themselves into collectivities
    and define themselves into social kinds as a
    function of group membership
  • the human cognitive architecture has evolved an
    intuitive theory of society (analogous to
    theory of mind theory of bodies (object
    mechanics)
  • Function to produce expectations about the
    skeletal structure of society, including what
    kinds of people there are.
  • Uses an essentialist mode of construal (as do
    other systems, such as the folk biology system).

11
Essentialism Folk Sociology (Hirchfeld)
  • Because the essentialist mode is activated both
    by kind labels and by perceptual similarity,
    children encountering racial terms (and, perhaps,
    some within race perceptual similarity), they
    interpret racial labels as refering to social
    kinds.
  • The essentialist inference system then generates
    inferences about that racial category
  • In this view, essentialist reasoning enables (but
    does not require) the notion that humans are
    biologically clustered, because this same
    essentialist mode functions across many domains,
    and plays a role in generating a folk biology.

12
Properties of an essentialist inference system
  • (Based on experiments discussed by Markman, Keil,
    Springer, S. Gelman, Gil-White, etc.)
  • Possessing the right essence is what makes an
    entity a member of a particular natural kind.
  • Members of a natural kind e.g., raccoons
    might share a large number of perceptual
    properties, and may look very similar. But
    possession of the same essence, not perceptual
    similarity, is what makes them all raccoons.
    Having the right essence is a necessary
    condition, as well as a sufficient one.

13
Properties of an essentialist inference system
  • Essence causes other properties.
  • domain-specific constraints on which properties
    an essence causes / associated with kind
    membership, esp. for animals (e.g., manner of
    breathing, but not weight color of fur, but not
    habits)
  • Individuals with the same essence / members of
    same natural kind will have similar properties.
  • many shared properties, including non-obvious
    ones
  • internal organs, ways of breathing, melting
    temperatures (for elements), temperament, dietary
    preferences, etc. (Markman, Springer)

14
Properties of an essentialist inference system
  • The defining essence is inalienable
  • For natural kinds, altering surface appearances
    does not change the essence.
  • An animal can look like a skunk yet be a raccoon,
  • all that glitters is not gold
  • E.g., Keil raccoon painted to look like skunk
    still a raccoon, will continue to give birth to
    raccoon babies, will have raccoon innards (etc),
    (Keil, 1989).

15
Properties of an essentialist inference system
  • Essence-based reasoning is implicit it can occur
    independently from explicit beliefs about what an
    essence is or how it is acquired.
  • Diverse theories, culturally transmitted, about
    what counts as an essence how it is acquired
    (generated when asked)
  • Essence genes, an immortal soul, a particular
    atomic structure, possession of a special
    internal organ
  • Acquired by divine grace, inheritance of genes,
    transmission through mothers milk, possession of
    same blood

16
How does mind decide whether two things belong in
the same natural kind category?
  • Cues to natural kindhood
  • Surface similarity.
  • The essence gives rise to other properties,
    including surface properties. Makes members of a
    natural kind perceptually similar to one another.
  • As a result, perceptual similarity can be one cue
    the system uses in guessing whether two entities
    belong to the same kind.
  • essentialist heuristic the hypothesis that
    things that look alike tend to share deeper
    properties (similarities). (Medin, 1989)

17
Cues to natural kindhood
  • Surface similarity (perceptual cues)
  • Verbal labels (this fish, this dolphin)
  • Nouns, not adjectives
  • Label can trump perceptual similarity.
  • Gelman Markman

18
Category membership vs. perceptual similarity
See this fish? It breathes under water.
See this dolphin? It pops up above the water to
breathe.
What does this fish do? Does it pop up above the
water to breathe, or does it breathe under water?
19
Race and Essentialist Reasoning
  • Is the human mind (mis)interpreting race /
    ethnicity as indicating membership in a natural
    kind category?
  • Racial group seen as a living kind, a species
  • And/Or
  • Is the mind equipped with a theory of society
    that uses the essentialist reasoning system?
  • If either is true, then
  • the assumptions and inferences that the
    essentialist inference system produces should be
    produced in response to racial categories.

20
Cross-culturally recurrent features of racial
thinking
  • there are different kinds of humans
  • people of different races are different in kind
  • being of a certain race causes many properties,
    both physical and non-physical
  • including nonobvious ones such as inner traits
    and dispositions (temperament, character, shared
    blood)
  • possessing the correct underlying nature is
    what makes one of given race, regardless of
    perceptual properties
  • how you look may be a good clue to your race, but
    a person may look like one race yet really be
    of another.
  • Racial terms (noun labels) invite natural kind
    inferences
  • She has blonde hair versus Shes a blonde

21
Natural Kinds and Essentialism
  • People act as if things (e.g., objects) have
    essences or underlying natures that make them the
    thing that they are. Furthermore, the essence
    constrains or generates properties that may vary
    in their centrality. One of the things that
    theories do is to embody or provide causal
    linkages from deeper properties to more
    superficial or surface properties. Medin (1989)
  • Culturally transmitted, explicitly held
    (metarepresented) racial theories of causal
    linkages from race to supposed properties
  • These differ from place to place

22
What about racial inferences in children?
  • Development of racial categories, racial thinking
  • Racial categories are not out there to be found
    in the world
  • Racial categories not induced bottom up from
    perception
  • Early emergence (4 years old)
  • Matching person to race doesnt map onto adults
    perceptual cues
  • Verbal labels more important than perceptual
    properties
  • Some features more likely to be inferred on basis
    of race than others

23
Which is the adult as a child? (identity)Which
is the child of the adult? (inheritance)Which
looks more like the adult? (similarity)
24
Identity Which is the adult as a child?
25
Which is the adult as a child? (identity/growth)W
hich is the child of the adult? (inheritance)
Growth Inheritance of features show same pattern
26
Identity versus Similarity
  • Judgments of identity DO NOT follow same pattern
    as judgments of similarity
  • Perceptual similarity per se is not driving
    judgments of who the adult was as a child
  • Same occupation judged more similar than same race

Occupation over body build
27
Is the effect specific to persons? (Yes)
Which is his car? No consistent pattern
28
Kind labels Nouns
  • Rose eats a lot of carrots (describes action)
  • Rose is a carrot-eater (noun)
  • 5 7 year olds evaluate preferences as stronger,
    more stable with noun
  • Narratives Verbal versus visual (like a comic)
  • After which does child recall more racial
    categories?

29
Verbal narrative
Visual narrative
With pictures in plain view
30
Verbal labels more potent than perceptual cues
(as in natural kind reasoning...)
  • Children recalled more about a characters race
    after listening to complex verbal narrative than
    after viewing complex visual narrative
  • True even when racial labels primed just before
    viewing visual
  • Visual led to more identification and recall of
    gender
  • Having a social context decreased salience of
    race as a factor in classifying people
  • Recalled less about race than occupation or
    behavior in contrast to first study)

31
Kinship Inheritance of biological properties
(Springer, ducks)
  • Is racial identity inherited from parent to
    child?
  • Is there a developmental change as child becomes
    more assimilated into surrounding culture?
  • Does the inheritance of physical properties show
    the same pattern as the inheritance of racial
    identity?
  • Skin color, hair color
  • Do all physical properties show same pattern, or
    are some induced more like identity than others?

32
Hibbles and Glerks
  • Island on which 2 kinds of people live hibbles
    and glerks
  • Show color drawing of white family (glerks) and a
    black family (hibbles)
  • Color drawings of man, woman and infant, with
    green dot over infants face (no skin visible)
  • Is the baby a hibble, a glerk, or something else?
  • 2nd graders did not know term race, so cant ask
    what race is the baby? black and white
    ambiguous race or skin color?

33
Identity What is their baby? (one parent
black, one white)
34
Do other physical traits generalize like identity
does? (not really)
Identity
Skin color
Y-axes are not lined up
35
Do other physical traits generalize like identity
does?
Identity
Hair color
Y-axes not lined up
36
Skin and hair similar?
Hair color
Skin color
Y-axes not lined up
37
Is racial thinking shaped by multiple
domain-specific inference systems?
  • Race encoding can decrease extent to which
    adults encode (notice and remember) targets race
    by creating coalitions where race does not
    predict coalitional alliance
  • Is race encoding a byproduct of coalition
    encoding?
  • Do identity judgments tap into system for
    identifying coalitional membership?
  • Do physical judgments tap into intuitive biology?
  • Adults identity and physical judgments very
    different
  • Coalition can also predict similar underlying
    dispositions

38
Supernatural ideas Gods, ghosts and spirits
  • Pascal Boyer Religion Explained The
    evolutionary roots of religious thought
  • No evolved dispositions designed for religious
    ideas
  • Supernatural concepts are a byproduct of normal
    cognitive functioning
  • Domain-specific concepts/ inference systems
  • Metarepresentational abilities (ToM)

39
Metarepresentation (Theory of Mind Mechanism)
  • File folder in the mind
  • Propositions decoupled from semantic memory

40
Metarepresentations as a learning mechanism(Dan
Sperber)
  • Strange statment There are male and female
    plants
  • What if you are 3, and your concept of male and
    female involves having long hair, etc?
  • Contradiction! False belief? True? Dont retire
    info to mental encyclopedia of knowledge until it
    can be reconciled with other knowledge (avoid
    data corruption)
  • Store proposition in a metarepresentation
  • My teacher says that there are male female
    plants
  • Agent Attitude Proposition
  • Metarep of contradiction recruits attention until
    statement can be reconciled or is abandoned

41
Contagious supernatural ideas have 2
characteristics
  • They activate an evolved, domain-specific
    inference system, with its concepts, assumptions
  • Kind of person, plant, artefact, etc
  • They include counterintuitive information
  • Not merely strange counter to what the inference
    systems make intuitive
  • Talking table counterintuitive
  • Chocolate table merely strange
  • Concepts with counter-intuitive info are better
    remembered than the merely strange
  • Gabon (Africa), Nepal, America

42
Widespread supernatural concepts
43
What is transmitted verbally?
  • Verbally transmit counter-intuitive information.
  • Verbally transmit which domain concept is
    relevant (kind of person, plant, artifact, etc)
  • No need to verbally transmit default assumptions
    of the activated domain-specific inference system
  • These come for free
  • Ghosts see, feel, think

44
Why are they memorable?
  • Counter-intuitive is metarepresented, recruits
    attention (byproduct of learning mechanism)
  • Domain-specific inference system automatically
    supports many inferences
  • Ghosts see, feel, think, get mad
  • Can imagine many scenarios involving them
  • Activates social inference systems
  • ToM Ghosts know strategic social
    informationwhat would they think if they knew
    what I had done?
  • Social exchange maybe I should appease them?

45
What is not memorable?
  • Supernatural concepts that tie into NO
    domain-specific inference system
  • Do not automatically support many inferences
  • Not memorable Chosts not person, not plant,
    not tool, not mountain... What is it?
  • Certain esoteric religious concepts like
    thisthey stay esoteric
  • Same for certain scientific concepts
  • Freud (lust after your mother contradiction!)
  • Electron (not a particle, not a wave... What is
    it??)

46
Does a similar analysis apply to scientific
concepts?
  • Theory of mind and economics??
  • Behavior caused by beliefs, desires
  • Intuitive physics and quantum physics
  • Mathematically defined entities versus billiard
    ball causality (Newton)
  • Folk taxonomy and scientific taxonomy

47
(No Transcript)
48
Questions to think about throughout 142...
  • What does the child know about the world?
  • How does the child come to know what she knows?
  • Is the childs mind different from the adults
    mind, or does the child just know less?
  • Does the child come factory equipped with any
    knowledge of the world?

49
Questions to think about throughout 142...
  • How does the environment affect development?
  • How does maturation affect development?
  • Why did scientists underestimate how much infants
    know?
  • What is the competence/ performance distinction?
  • Can one part of the brain know something that
    another part of the brain does not know?

50
Questions to think about throughout 142...
  • What is the difference between studying natural
    competences and side-effects?
  • What does learning mean?
  • How many learning processes are there?
  • Is instinct the opposite of learning?
  • What is the design of the instinct that causes
    learning in a given domain?
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