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Sin ttulo de diapositiva

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Title: Sin ttulo de diapositiva


1

2005 APEX Conference Orlando, 31th October 2005
SESSION 3 PANEL DISCUSSION NODAL/ZONAL PRICING.
Maria Luisa Huidobro President CEO of OMEL
2
NODAL/ZONAL PRICING SOLUTIONS
  • Driven by the capacity of the transportation
    network available in the system
  • If there is relatively week network. Nodal
    pricing
  • If there are very few internal structural
    congestions. Zonal pricing (the existing internal
    constraints will be solved later by
    counter-tradding)
  • Several nodes connected by non-overloaded lines
    will have the same nodal price.
  • Multinode (zonal) price leads to zonal/system
    price
  • The single price solution, when viable (few
    internal constraints), has the advantage of the
    transparency of the results

3
COOPERATION BETWEEN ORGANIZED MARKETS TROUGH
MARKET COUPLING
  • Why a methodology of cooperation between
    interconnected organized markets in Europe ?
  • Maximum price convergence between all cooperating
    markets in case of congestions
  • The energy flows from the low price area to the
    high price area
  • Maximum use of the limited cross-border capacity
  • Equal price if there are no congestions
  • Enlarge the relevant market and therefore
    decreases the market power of the regional
    participants
  • Is the only way to apply in a consistent manner
    the use it or lose it rule of the long term
    physical rights over the interconnection
    capacities
  • Allows market bids and bilateral trades to
    compete under the same conditions
  • Makes clear that, when liquid markets exist,
    explicit auctions of the capacity are pure
    financial hedging tools.

4
BORDER BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN. Recommended
solution MARKET SPLITTING
  • LONG TERM Hedging of price differences between
    Portugal and Spain using financial instruments.
  • Long term explicit cross border rights provide
    more opportunities for market power abuse than
    financial instruments, with no additional fair
    benefits for participants over financial
    instruments
  • Every market participant can hedge the price
    difference risk using a financial instruments,
    without the restriction that the explicit
    auctions have derived from the limited commercial
    capacity
  • DAY-AHEAD market splitting.
  • It is the only solution that do not distort
    artificially the day ahead prices in both
    systems.
  • It can be implemented immediately, since it could
    be independent of the MIBEL official opening.
  • Since the energy that crosses the border do not
    belong to any particular participant, it is the
    procedure that creates less market power abuse
    opportunities being impossible to leave the
    commercial capacity empty, if economically makes
    sense that it is occupied.
  • Since long term hedging is done financially, all
    commercial capacity will be utilized in the
    Day-ahead market splitting.
  • Only commercial capacity that is physically
    available will be used (no artificial minimum
    capacities) in order to avoid market price
    artificial distortions and market power abuse
    opportunities
  • No discrimination between bilateral contracts and
    market participants
  • REAL TIME SECURITY redispatching.
  • The redispatching horizon should be limited to
    the period between intra-day markets never
    invading hours with a true both sides market
    (demand and supply) pending (1 or 2 hours)

5
BORDER BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN. Recommended
solution MARKET COUPLING (I)
  • LONG TERM Hedging of price differences between
    France and Portugal using financial instruments.
  • Long term explicit cross border rights provide
    more opportunities for market power abuse than
    financial instruments, with no additional fair
    benefits for participants over financial
    instruments
  • Every market participant can hedge the price
    difference risk using a financial instruments,
    avoiding the physical limitation that the
    explicit auctions have, due to the limited
    commercial capacity available for each auction
    and the impossibility of netting.
  • DAY-AHEAD market coupling.
  • It is the only solution that do not distort
    artificially the day ahead prices.
  • It can be implemented immediately, prior to other
    French borders where the flow of electricity
    through one border is influenced by the flow
    through other borders
  • Since the energy that crosses the border do not
    belong to any particular participant, it is the
    procedure that creates less market power abuse
    opportunities being impossible to leave the
    commercial capacity empty, if economically makes
    sense that it is occupied.
  • Since long term hedging is done financially, all
    commercial capacity will be utilized in the
    Day-ahead market coupling.
  • Only commercial capacity that is physically
    available will be used (no artificial minimum
    capacities) in order to avoid market price
    artificial distortions and market power abuse
    opportunities

6
BORDER BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN. Recommended
solution MARKET COUPLING (II)
  • INTRADAY MARKETS market coupling.
  • A Market Coupling mechanism should be developed
    to couple the two existing intraday adjusting
    mechanisms in France and in Spain (intraday
    markets in Spain and intraday and/or balancing
    markets in France)
  • All market participants, even the ones that have
    scheduled a bilateral contract, should be allowed
    in these mechanisms. Forbidding the participation
    of some agents in these mechanisms would create
    market power abuse opportunities
  • REAL TIME SECURITY redispatching.
  • The redispatching horizon should be limited to
    the period between intra-day markets never
    invading hours with a true both sides market
    (demand and production) pending (1 or 2 hours)

7
PENDING PROBLEMS FOR JOINING/COUPLING ELECTRICITY
MARKETS
  • IDENTICAL REGULATIONS ARE NOT NECESSARY
  • SOME LEVEL OF HARMONIZATION IS IMPERATIVE
  • IN LESS REGULATED SYSTEMS, THE REGULATION COULD
    BE SUBSTITUTED BY COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
    MARKET/SYSTEM OPERATORS

8
IF MARGINAL TECHNOLOGY IS COMBINED CYCLE GAS
TURBINES, THEN
  • THE MARGINAL PRICE OF ELECTRICITY WILL BE
    CONDITIONED BY THE GAS PRICE
  • IF ELECTRICITY INTERCONNECTIONS ARE WEAK, GAS
    CONNECTIONS OR REGASIFICATION PLANTS CAN SERVE
    FOR THE SAME PURPOSE
  • ENOUGH GAS STORAGE IS NEEDED
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