Title: Sin ttulo de diapositiva
1 2005 APEX Conference Orlando, 31th October 2005
SESSION 3 PANEL DISCUSSION NODAL/ZONAL PRICING.
Maria Luisa Huidobro President CEO of OMEL
2NODAL/ZONAL PRICING SOLUTIONS
- Driven by the capacity of the transportation
network available in the system - If there is relatively week network. Nodal
pricing - If there are very few internal structural
congestions. Zonal pricing (the existing internal
constraints will be solved later by
counter-tradding) - Several nodes connected by non-overloaded lines
will have the same nodal price. - Multinode (zonal) price leads to zonal/system
price - The single price solution, when viable (few
internal constraints), has the advantage of the
transparency of the results
3COOPERATION BETWEEN ORGANIZED MARKETS TROUGH
MARKET COUPLING
- Why a methodology of cooperation between
interconnected organized markets in Europe ? - Maximum price convergence between all cooperating
markets in case of congestions - The energy flows from the low price area to the
high price area - Maximum use of the limited cross-border capacity
- Equal price if there are no congestions
- Enlarge the relevant market and therefore
decreases the market power of the regional
participants - Is the only way to apply in a consistent manner
the use it or lose it rule of the long term
physical rights over the interconnection
capacities - Allows market bids and bilateral trades to
compete under the same conditions - Makes clear that, when liquid markets exist,
explicit auctions of the capacity are pure
financial hedging tools.
4BORDER BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN. Recommended
solution MARKET SPLITTING
- LONG TERM Hedging of price differences between
Portugal and Spain using financial instruments. - Long term explicit cross border rights provide
more opportunities for market power abuse than
financial instruments, with no additional fair
benefits for participants over financial
instruments - Every market participant can hedge the price
difference risk using a financial instruments,
without the restriction that the explicit
auctions have derived from the limited commercial
capacity - DAY-AHEAD market splitting.
- It is the only solution that do not distort
artificially the day ahead prices in both
systems. - It can be implemented immediately, since it could
be independent of the MIBEL official opening. - Since the energy that crosses the border do not
belong to any particular participant, it is the
procedure that creates less market power abuse
opportunities being impossible to leave the
commercial capacity empty, if economically makes
sense that it is occupied. - Since long term hedging is done financially, all
commercial capacity will be utilized in the
Day-ahead market splitting. - Only commercial capacity that is physically
available will be used (no artificial minimum
capacities) in order to avoid market price
artificial distortions and market power abuse
opportunities - No discrimination between bilateral contracts and
market participants - REAL TIME SECURITY redispatching.
- The redispatching horizon should be limited to
the period between intra-day markets never
invading hours with a true both sides market
(demand and supply) pending (1 or 2 hours)
5BORDER BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN. Recommended
solution MARKET COUPLING (I)
- LONG TERM Hedging of price differences between
France and Portugal using financial instruments. - Long term explicit cross border rights provide
more opportunities for market power abuse than
financial instruments, with no additional fair
benefits for participants over financial
instruments - Every market participant can hedge the price
difference risk using a financial instruments,
avoiding the physical limitation that the
explicit auctions have, due to the limited
commercial capacity available for each auction
and the impossibility of netting. - DAY-AHEAD market coupling.
- It is the only solution that do not distort
artificially the day ahead prices. - It can be implemented immediately, prior to other
French borders where the flow of electricity
through one border is influenced by the flow
through other borders - Since the energy that crosses the border do not
belong to any particular participant, it is the
procedure that creates less market power abuse
opportunities being impossible to leave the
commercial capacity empty, if economically makes
sense that it is occupied. - Since long term hedging is done financially, all
commercial capacity will be utilized in the
Day-ahead market coupling. - Only commercial capacity that is physically
available will be used (no artificial minimum
capacities) in order to avoid market price
artificial distortions and market power abuse
opportunities
6BORDER BETWEEN FRANCE AND SPAIN. Recommended
solution MARKET COUPLING (II)
- INTRADAY MARKETS market coupling.
- A Market Coupling mechanism should be developed
to couple the two existing intraday adjusting
mechanisms in France and in Spain (intraday
markets in Spain and intraday and/or balancing
markets in France) - All market participants, even the ones that have
scheduled a bilateral contract, should be allowed
in these mechanisms. Forbidding the participation
of some agents in these mechanisms would create
market power abuse opportunities - REAL TIME SECURITY redispatching.
- The redispatching horizon should be limited to
the period between intra-day markets never
invading hours with a true both sides market
(demand and production) pending (1 or 2 hours)
7PENDING PROBLEMS FOR JOINING/COUPLING ELECTRICITY
MARKETS
- IDENTICAL REGULATIONS ARE NOT NECESSARY
- SOME LEVEL OF HARMONIZATION IS IMPERATIVE
- IN LESS REGULATED SYSTEMS, THE REGULATION COULD
BE SUBSTITUTED BY COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
MARKET/SYSTEM OPERATORS
8IF MARGINAL TECHNOLOGY IS COMBINED CYCLE GAS
TURBINES, THEN
- THE MARGINAL PRICE OF ELECTRICITY WILL BE
CONDITIONED BY THE GAS PRICE - IF ELECTRICITY INTERCONNECTIONS ARE WEAK, GAS
CONNECTIONS OR REGASIFICATION PLANTS CAN SERVE
FOR THE SAME PURPOSE - ENOUGH GAS STORAGE IS NEEDED