Moral Pluralism and the Environment

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Moral Pluralism and the Environment

• Andrew Brennan

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Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA)

• According to Brennan, CBA assumes that everything
  can be given a value (from the endangered species
  to couches) so that the costs and benefits of
  preserving and using these things can be weighed.
  

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• He thinks this is false and that it cannot
  account for the transformative value of new
  experiences. (466). Rather he thinks we have
  (and need) many different kinds of
  incommensurable values.

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What is wrong with CBA

• Appealing to economic rationality may be immoral.
  Believing that a single preference ordering can
  be given (a single scale of comparison for
  competing values) is irrational. Consider a case
  where its relatively uncontroversial to weigh
  benefits and costs (e.g. deciding how to tax air
  pollution).

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• What might seem straightforward soon becomes
  enormously complex. Shadow pricing is a way to
  deal with this they ask people what they would
  be willing to pay for things like visibility etc.
  A problem with this is many people wont
  cooperate in such experiments perhaps this is
  because they dont think the values reduce to
  dollars.

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Economic Claims about Rationality are Wrong

• Brennan argues that economic claims about
  rationality are wrong. We dont have a single
  order of preferences by which things can be
  judged. Different roles may entail different
  preferences, if so there is no single ordering
  for preferences. Even in a single role people
  may not have well-ordered preference maps. It
  depends on someones moods (music case).

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Preference Ordering

• In addition, in many cases, we do not have
  preferences for what are seen as illicit acts.
  Not all preferences are acceptable in society.
  Illicit acts are not considered preferences.
• This is similar to Sagoffs view that the issues
  arent just about preferences for one thing over
  another. Brennan says values dont reduce to
  preferences.

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Here is his argument for that conclusion

• There are three distinctions to be made between
  kinds of value
• Intrinsic/instrumental value for its own sake
  (happiness)/ value for the sake of something else
  (money).

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• 2. Some instrumental values are valuable because
  they allow us to reflect on our preferences and
  dont merely satisfy our preferences these are
  classified under non-demand values (the
  opposite of demand values) and are a subclass
  called transformative values. Non-demand
  values come in two varieties existence and
  transformative values.

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• 3. Existence values accrue to things that are
  valuable because without them other valuable
  things would be lost. Transformative value is
  specifically the ability to shape preferences.
  There are also two types of demand values use
  values accrue to things that are useful and
  option values to those that might be useful.

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Transformative Value

• The fact that some value is transformative means
  that it has a completely unpredictable effect on
  preferences that is the nature of
  transformative value (to change preferences) so
  we cant capture it with a single value.

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More Precisely

• Transformative value is the ability to change
  preferences in unpredictable ways.
• To capture peoples preferences for
  transformative value one would need to figure out
  how much that preference change is worth, but
  this is impossible if transformative value is the
  ability to change preferences in unpredictable
  ways.
• . Its impossible to capture peoples preferences
  for transformative value
•  

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Diverse Values

• Even in ethics we run into the same problem. Our
  values are diverse and cannot be reduced to
  simple principles. The assumption that our
  behavior falls under simple principles, which we
  simply cannot articulate, clearly is baseless.  

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Useful Assumption?

• But, such an assumption underlies a lot of
  behavior in science, and philosophy as well as
  economic theory. One we realize that there isnt
  anything irrational in letting different criteria
  guide different decisions we should suppose the
  same will be true in our moral principles they
  will be varied.

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This is Moral Pluralism

• Why should we think morality should be different
  from other areas of inquiry? Of course this
  doesnt mean that such a pluralist view will be
  easy to use.

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Two approaches to ethics

• Anthropocentric (human based) and
  non-anthropocentric.
• Biocentric theories are non-anthropocentric claim
  that some other living things have value in their
  own right, some that life itself is not morally
  significant.
•  

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Extensive Ethics

• Some attribute moral and legal standing to
  paintings, corporations as well as living things,
  natural objects, and even systems and processes.
  The non-anthropocentric theories are either
  individualistic or holistic (giving intrinsic
  value to collections of individuals).

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• These accounts all differ on what they think is
  necessary for moral value and standing, whether
  it is intelligence, pain, life/inherent value
  (being the subject of lives), systematicity or
  something else.
•  See p. 473

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Accounting for Value

• Brennan notes that he doesnt think that species,
  natural systems, or landscapes can be seen as
  having interests or flourishing so he doesnt
  think giving such things moral standing is a
  plausible position. He does not think the moral
  community can be extended this far. Rather he
  suggests synthesizing moral views and recognizing
  that not all morality can be captured in these
  principles.

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There are two ways to cash this out

• Different considerations may apply in different
  cases (e.g. counting human welfare differently
  from animal welfare or family obligations
  differently from community obligations). It
  might be that principles from one kind of ethical
  theory apply in some cases but not others (e.g.
  utilitarian vs. rights theories). This wouldnt
  a. be inconsistent or b. necessarily captured
  well in the vocabulary of traditional moral
  categories (especially a single one). This
  shouldnt be too controversial.

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• 2. Even in a particular situation is complex with
  mixed values attached, multiple acts of valuing
  occur. There isnt one single correct way to
  view the issues. One case can be seen in many
  lights. Switching perspectives may prevent us
  from overlooking important things (e.g. different
  maps of the same region). This is the important
  sense of moral pluralism. If it is accepted many
  (though maybe not all) of the different theories
  of environmental ethics cease to be competitors,
  rather they are seen as useful lenses for viewing
  the world.

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Summary

• Brennan argues that CBA wont work because we
  dont have a single preference ordering, we do
  not have preferences for what are seen as illicit
  acts, and not all values reduce to preferences.
  He thinks its totally incapable of accounting for
  transformative value. Brennan he argues for
  value pluralism in two senses 1. We use
  different methods for valuing things at different
  times and even 2. At the same time.

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Questions for Reflection

• What is CBA? What are preferences? How do
  economists try to determine preferences?
• Is value pluralism in the both senses right?
  Offer an argument for and against both sorts of
  value pluralism.
• What are three of his worries about CBA? How
  would an advocate respond to these worries?
• What arguments can you find in Brennan against
  giving moral standing to landscapes etc.? What
  is the best argument for this position? What is
  a plausible response?