Political Identity: territory and regions in Europe

1
Political Identity territory and regions in
Europe

• Alistair Cole

2
Three ways of understanding regions and
regionalism

• Ethno-territorial mobilisation
• Multi-level governance
• New Regionalism?
• Three approaches that might be tested in
  relation to a broad variety of cases

3
Identity and ethno-territorial mobilisation

• Moreno Ethno-territorial identities have
  developed as a result of the decline of the
  Nation-State, hollowed to the core by economic
  globalisation and political integration.
• The new politics in Europe is that of
  ethno-territorial mobilisation. This reflects
  itself in sub-state political institutions,
  distinctive party systems, language rights
  movements and cultural traditions and specific
  forms of elite accommodation.
• There has been renewed interest in minority
  nationalism, ethno-territorial mobilisation and
  how identity has an impact upon institutional
  arrangements .
• In Spain, in theory a unitary state, there has
  developed a State of Autonomies, where three
  nations Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia
  are recognised as historic nationalities in the
  1978 constitution and given extended devolved
  powers.
• In the UK, the minority nationalist question has
  been nested in a broader class cleavage in both
  Scotland and Wales, national identity came as
  a result of a specific feeling of class identity
  and of being different from the rest of the UK.
• If there are fashions, this is one. In Italy, a
  move to regional evolution has accompanied more
  assertive regional claims, such as that of
  Padania in the north.
• But are there other explanations. Is identity
  overplayed?

4
Multi-level governance?

• A different approach but one which focusses on
  regions is that of multi-level governance
• Initially developed by Marks (1992), this
  approach views the European policy process as a
  system of continuous negotiation among nested
  governments at several territorial tiers (Marks,
  1993 p392).
• One of the strongest arguments by supporters of
  multi-level governance is that EU cohesion policy
  has transformed territorial policy styles across
  Europe, by encouraging and facilitating the
  development of new political strategies and
  networks, bypassing State administrations and
  creating new alliances between the European
  Commission and sub-state players.
• This perspective views the multi-level game
  played jointly by the European Commission (and
  latterly the European Parliament) and regional
  actors as a normative one, designed to by-pass
  or evade the centre qua central government, and
  result in an overall strengthening of both
  supranational and regional tiers.
• The multi-level governance perspective is in part
  a decentralisation narrative that emphasises the
  financing of regional and structural programmes,
  the institutionalisation of regional
  representation at EU level and the transnational
  activity of the regions
• Regions are functional spaces, in this model,
  more than harbingers of a post-nation-state future

5
New Regionalism? Be careful..

• The norm in Europe is for an asymmetrical
  configuration of government and a multiplicity of
  institutional regimes(Majone, 2003).
• Regions are strengthened not just because of
  identity, or strategy of the EU, but also because
  they represent functionally appropriate levels of
  government, especially for economic planning.
• Loughlin and Keating (2003) there has been a
  transformation of regions in Europe, from
  functional outposts of central government... to
  genuine political spaces, with directly elected
  institutions and developed forms of capacity
• Strengthening regions in a counterpart to the
  emasculation of the state
• But how accurate is this? The response lies in
  empirical investigation and comparison

6
Identity... Against instrumentalism

• When considering the new regionalism debate
  above, we drew a basic distinction between
  identity-based forms of sub-state mobilisation
  capacity building and more instrumental
  considerations of competencies and
  inter-governmental relations.
• Instrumental models are more likely to focus on
  levels as being the appropriate ones for the
  delivery or co-ordination of a range of services,
  while identity models look to regions as
  historic, cultural and political entities and
  argue for an institutional focus for
  identity-based loyalties.

7
A word of caution

• In some states, regions are weak or non-existent,
  especially where there is a tradition of strong
  local government, as in the Netherlands, the
  Scandinavian countries or for much of its
  history the United Kingdom
• In some of the smaller European Union countries,
  such as Portugal, Greece or Ireland, there is a
  tradition of centralisation that has difficulties
  in accommodating regions. In the countries of
  central and Eastern Europe, there is no tradition
  of autonomous regional level administration
  (Marcou, 2003).
• During the EU enlargement negotiations, there was
  much opposition from within these countries to
  creating new decentralised structures, with the
  new entrants fearful lest irredentist national
  minorities try and break away and create their
  own states.
• Though the European Commission started off by
  advocating decentralisation, it swiftly moved to
  the idea of centralised regional economic
  planning. In some countries, regions are
  principally city regions, based around large
  cities and their hinterland (Parkinson, 1992).

8
Spain an attractive model for devolutionists

• The move to democracy in Spain from 1975 onwards
  was closely linked with accommodating Spains
  historic nations and regions and rallying
  everybody to the democratic cause.
• The State of Autonomies embodied in the 1978
  Constitution represented the most radical
  regionalisation of any European state at the
  time. It created 17 Autonomous Communities with
  far reaching devolved powers. Catalonia, the
  Basque Country and Galicia were recognised early
  on as historic nationalities, facilitating
  their support for the plural Spanish nation.

9
Spain identity or institutions?

• The Spanish state is neither federal nor
  unitary.. here there is a strong institutional
  argument. No-one wants to be left behind and ACs
  are discovering ancient identities
• Until recently, Apart from one or two exceptions
  (such as the Basque tax-raising powers) in theory
  all autonomous communities have the right to
  exercise the powers of the strongest communities.
  
• Since 1995, the weakest communities have caught
  up with the stronger ones in terms of
  competencies. The precise list of competencies
  depends on the organic laws in existence in each
  of the autonomous communities.
• In some policy areas, the autonomous community
  has complete legislative and regulatory powers,
  not dependent upon the Spanish State. In some
  areas, there are shared powers, and in still
  others exclusive Spanish state responsibility.

10
Spain Institutional incentives to identivise

• There is an inherent tension between recognising
  historic identities and providing the opportunity
  for all Spanish regions to develop their own
  institutional capacity within the Union State.
• In some important respects, the Spanish model
  does not favour the historic nationalities over
  other regions. The constitution does not
  establish a hierarchy between the historic
  communities and the others. In legal terms, any
  autonomous community can call itself a nation, if
  it so desires.
• While during the 1980s, only the three historic
  nationalities plus Andalusia had proclaimed
  themselves to be nations, by 1999 eight out of 17
  autonomous communities were recognised as
  nationalities.
• Weaker regions have pointedly developed their
  national identities in order to prevent
  incorporation by stronger neighbours (the case
  for Valencia in relation to Catalonia).
  Devolution in Spain has somewhat artificially
  provoked a wide range of regionalist demands.
• In the case of Spanish devolution, then, we can
  identify a clear institutional effect.
  Institutions create a spiral effect and have
  introduced a race for autonomy, a lesson
  policy-makers in the UK would be advised to take
  on board.

11
Slippery slope

• New Catalan statute approved by the Catalan
  parliament in 2006, setting out Catalonia as a
  nation. Eventually approved by the Spanish
  lower house on 30th March 2006. The Catalan
  statute involves
• Recognition of Catalan national identity
• national reality as a nationality
• Control over legal affairs
• Strengthens Catalonia in relation to the EU and
  foreign policy
• Catalan parliament to raise 50 of income tax and
  VAT and create a revenue agency
• Catalan examples followed by Valencia, Andalucia
  and Basque country.
• Identity is exaggerated by institutions...

12
Germany instrumentalism ovder identity

• Germany provides a contrast both to Spanish
  asymmetry and Belgian communautarianism. The
  Federal Republic of Germany provides the
  interesting case of a federal system that does
  not allow great room for policy diversity.
• By imposing federalism upon western Germany in
  1949, the occupying powers sought to reduce the
  power of central government and ensure a stable
  democracy.
• Even after sixty years of operation, there
  remains something artificial about German
  federalism. Unlike in a country such as Canada,
  German federalism does not reflect the
  organisation of a society with specific
  minorities. There are no significant ethnic,
  cultural, social or religious tensions in
  Germany.
• Moreover, the 16 state governments (the länder)
  are artificial units that do not correspond to
  historic German regions and do not reflect
  cultural, historic or linguistic differences
  within Germany.
• Even after sixty years of institutional
  existence, Germans feel themselves to be members
  of a local or a national community rather than a
  land. Their real attachment to regions is to
  those based on dialects, customs and culture such
  as the Rhineland, Palatinate, Badenia, or
  Franconia.

13
Germany

• There is a very close interdependency between the
  federal and the state (länder) governments, the
  system of interlocking politics described by
  Scharpf.
• The länder are legally bound into a system of
  joint decision-making and revenue-sharing, and
  share a strong normative commitment to policy
  uniformity.
• The länder co-operate closely with the federal
  government in matters of regional economic
  policy, agriculture and the planning of
  universities.
• The länder are closely involved in
  decision-making at the federal level through the
  composition of the second chamber, the bundesrat,
  which has a veto on federal legislation in around
  50 of cases.
• Unlike in Belgium or even Spain, there is a
  strict system of fiscal redistribution and most
  resources for federal governments and the länder
  come from joint taxes.
• For all these reasons, there is a greater
  uniformity of policy in Germany than might be
  expected in a federal system.
• Identity is squeezed out by institutions

14
Belgium linguistic fracture

• The case of Belgium is the most eloquent in terms
  of demonstrating the centrifugal effects of
  linguistic divisions
• .
• Belgium was created as an independent state in
  1830 domination of the French-speaking Walloons
  in the south.. at the expense of the Dutch
  speaking Flemish, mainly in the north. In the
  course of the mid 20th century, the economic and
  linguistic balance began to shift so that the
  downtrodden Flemish now became the majority of
  the population and the more dynamic economic
  community.
• The only solution discovered to prevent the
  complete dissolution of the Belgian state the
  policy of separate language communities (from
  1963), to deal with issues of education and
  culture, for the different communities.
• The language issue has had a profound impact in
  Belgium, to the extent of changing the party
  system and replacing Belgian-wide parties - e.g.
  Socialists, with specific parties for each
  community. Here language has had the effect of a
  cleavage
• Institutions have encouraged linguistic
  identities and language performs the role of a
  key cleavage.

15
France

• Comparison with other EU states reveals the
  persistence of this belief in equality as
  uniformity and how this constricts local and
  regional capacity building.
• In comparative perspective, France still appears
  as the most resistant of the five major European
  nations to asymmetrical territorial development
  on its mainland. Germany, Spain, the UK and Italy
  have each undergone developments that can in some
  senses be labelled as federal, quasi-federal or
  asymmetrical (different parts of the national
  territory developing more or less advanced forms
  of autonomy).
• In the case of France, a distinctive form of
  sub-national governance has evolved. But there
  are no equivalents to the strong regions with
  fiscal and/or legislative powers, such as
  Scotland, the Belgian and Italian regions, the
  Spanish Autonomous Communities, or the German
  länder. Frances 22 regions have a shared general
  competency, some tax-varying powers but no
  hierarchical control over other layers of local
  government. Governance might challenge the
  state, but not the unitary state form.
• Given its reaction to the Corsican example, it is
  highly likely that any attempt to derogate too
  seriously from the norm of uniformity will be
  resisted by the Council of State, the guardian of
  Frances conservative public law tradition.
• Institutions have, in the main, squeezed out
  identities

16
Lesser Used languages as sources of identity

• There is a strong argument that recent moves to
  more differentiated forms of regional and local
  governance are likely to encourage linguistic
  pluralism (see, for example, Keating, Loughlin
  and Deschouwer, 2003).
• In countries such as Spain, Belgium and Italy,
  the move to enhanced regional self-consciousness
  in the 1980s and 1990s was associated with a
  rediscovery of the value of lesser-used languages
  and cultures and the adoption of new policy
  instruments to plan language revival.
• In the age of think global, act local, language
  can exercise a useful signalling function,
  demonstrating clearly the distinctiveness and
  value-added identity of specific regions.

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Some examples

• Catalonia, Basque country, Galicia ability to
  speak the regional language essential for
  self-promotion
• Ireland Gaelic speakers 2-3 of the population,
  but mastery essential for higher office
• Wales Welsh Language Act (1993) introduces
  bilingualism. Welsh an official langiuage of the
  EU

18
The Welsh Language Identity, institutions

• In broad socio-economic terms, Welsh has expanded
  its usage considerably in the past two decades
  and the language is now used widely in education,
  the media, leisure and selected public services.
• Language survey data suggests that social
  context, family language transmission and
  exposure to formal bilingual education are the
  key factors in language reproduction.
• In the case of Wales, community and family are
  less powerful agents of language reproduction
  than they were previously, but formal bilingual
  education and language planning has slowed the
  rate of absolute decline.

19
Welsh Identity language

• Analysis of family/household composition patterns
  by Aitchison and Carter (1997) show that an
  extremely high proportion of Welsh speakers is
  linguistically isolated within their home
  environments.
• Many communities of the northern and western
  heartland seem to be fragmenting irretrievably,
  threatening the transmission of the Welsh
  language. Welsh is not secure as a community
  language despite its official status.
• Fluent and good Welsh-speakers manifesting a high
  proclivity towards Welsh identity, as do the
  intermediate and basic speakers, when contrasted
  with the non-Welsh speakers.
• Rather like in Spain, devolved instituions create
  a space for a linguistic identity

20
Welsh Identity Class

• There are clearly sociological differences in
  bases to identity.
• Cole and Evans (2007) Individuals residing in
  the Valleys showing a much greater propensity
  towards Welsh identity than the Cardiff
  reference. A Class Identity (Wyn Jones and
  Scully, 2003)?
• In terms of occupational class belonging, two
  classes stand out the petty bourgeoisie, with
  the highest probability of British identity, and
  workers with conversely the highest level of
  Welsh identity.
• Interestingly, even in areas of reputed
  Welshness such as the North-West of Wales and
  mid-Wales, there is no significant difference
  from the capital indeed North-West Wales is
  slightly more British in its identification.

21
Welsh Identity Age

• Cole and Evans (2007) There is an almost
  monotonic relationship between age categories and
  identity, with the two youngest strata
  identifying most strongly with the Welsh
  identity, decreasing in the 55 and older
  categories.
• Educationally, a similarly clear profile emerges.
  Individuals with the lowest educational
  attainment have the highest level of Welsh
  identity, following by the mid-level group.

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Conclusion

• Moreno and ethno-terriorital mobilisation mixing
  up normative and empirical evidence. Appropriate
  for a minority of cases? But how representatives
  are these?
• Multi-level governance? Useful as a metaphor, but
  regions contsructed in instrumental senses
• New Regionalism? In places.. Nut not as a general
  trend
• Comparsion creates a spectrum. When does
  identity drive institutions? What do institutions
  confine identities? How do we explain variation?