Chapter Four

1
Chapter Four

• Domestic Politics and War

2
Domestic Politics and War

• Unitary state assumption the treatment of states
  as coherent actors with a set of interests that
  belong to the state.
• This assumption can be a useful starting place
  for analysis.
• However, states are legal and political
  constructs, not beings capable of taking actions

3
Domestic Politics and War

• War is costly. But the costs of war are
  distributed unevenly.
• Do wars serve the national interest?
• To answer such questions, we must consider
  domestic actors different interests

4
Domestic Politics and War

• Which domestic interests drive foreign policy
  choices depends on
• The strategic interactions between actors
• The institutions within the state
• War is the outcome of interaction between or
  among multiple states.

5
Core of the Analysis

• There are actors within the state who may benefit
  from war
• These actors may have institutional and
  organizational advantages
• Their main effect is to increase the
  aggressiveness of the states foreign policy
• Democratic political institutions can reduce
  their influence

6
National Vs. Particularistic Interests

• General (national) interest
• Something that most actors within the country
  share.
• Narrow or particularistic interests
• Interests held by a relatively small number of
  actors within the country

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National Vs. Particularistic Interests

• An example The US has had a consistent interest
  in oil and the Middle East.
• Nationally, oil is vital to the USs military
  power and economy
• Particularly, oil companies benefit from selling
  oil
• War may sometimes arise because it furthers the
  narrow interests of particular actors.

8
Interactions, Institutions, and Influence

• Without the unitary actor assumption, individuals
  and groups with different interests come into
  play.
• Institutions determine which actors and interests
  have influence
• Some actors may have strategic advantages.
• Due to the collective action problem, small
  groups may have more effective influence

9
Interactions, Institutions, and Influence

• The extent of a groups political influence
  depends on its members ability to cooperate.
• Three kinds of actors
• Leaders who make foreign policy decisions
• Organized groups within the country (bureaucratic
  actors and interests groups)
• The general public

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Interactions, Institutions, and Influence

• The bureaucracy different organizations that
  make up a states structure.
• Includes the military, diplomatic corps and
  intelligence agencies
• Interest groups groups of individuals with
  common interests that have organized in order to
  push for policies that benefit their members.

11
Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold
On to Power at Home?

• In 1982, Argentina sparked war with Britain when
  it invaded the Falkland Islands.
• The territory was not especially valuable and
  Britain had a far superior naval force
• Both governments had domestic problems
• Both economies were in severe recessions

12
What Do Leaders Want?

• Leaders of states have many interests of their
  own
• Ideological beliefs, personal motivation, the
  desire to stay in power, etc.
• Strategic politicians can use their control of
  policy to share their political restraints.
• May use war to enhance their hold on power

13
The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive

• Rally effect peoples tendency to become more
  supportive of their own government during a
  crisis.
• Approval ratings for a leader often jump at the
  onset of a war.
• After the terrorist attacks of September 11,
  2008, President George W. Bushs approval rating
  jumped 35 percent

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The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive
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The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive

• People rally around the flag because
  international conflicts can
• Cause an increase in patriotism
• Ease criticism of the government
• Create a diversion from other problems
• Give leaders an opportunity to scapegoat or blame
  the countrys problems on foreigners

16
The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive

• At times, political leaders may face a
  diversionary incentive
• A temptation to spark an international crisis in
  order to rally public support at home
• Gambling for resurrection
• Taking a risky action, such as starting a war,
  when the alternative is certain to be very bad

17
Do Leaders Wag the Dog?

• The 1997 movie Wag the Dog depicted a leader
  hiring a movie director to produce a fake war in
  order to boost his ratings.
• But there is little evidence that leaders
  systematically resort to force when they are in
  trouble domestically.
• International conflict is more often initiated by
  leaders who are politically secure

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Do Leaders Wag the Dog?

• Why do we not see stronger evidence of
  diversionary incentives?
• Perhaps most leaders are not as cynical as
  assumed and are not simply office seeking
• Or, the political benefits of war relative to
  peace have to be large in order to eliminate the
  possibility of peaceful bargaining

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Do Leaders Wag the Dog?
20
Do Leaders Wag the Dog?

• The size of the bargaining range is determined by
  the sum of war costs to both sides, a b.
• If State A expects war benefits to equal r, the
  total cost of war to State A is a r
• Yet, even if the benefit r is greater than a, a
  bargaining range could still exist that is shown
  by a b r

21
The Political Costs of War

• War can also impose domestic political costs.
• Public support for war changes as the costs
  increase.
• The only US wars that remained popular throughout
  were WWII, the Persian Gulf War and the war in
  Afghanistan

22
The Political Costs of War
23
The Political Costs of War

• Leaders who fight losing or costly wars are more
  likely to be removed from office than those who
  win wars.
• Leaders should see war as a gamble not only for
  the state, but for their political interests.

24
Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military
or Special Interest Groups?

• Though imperialism did not benefit Britain as a
  whole, it was very profitable for wealthy people
  who could invest overseas.
• A British economist, J. A. Hobson, argued that
  wars are fought to benefit military and business
  interests.

25
Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military
or Special Interest Groups?

• Military-industrial complex
• An alliance of military leaders and arms
  manufacturers who presumably have a vested
  interest in an aggressive foreign policy
• While hawkish domestic interests do not lead
  directly to the breakdown of bargaining, they do
  create more opportunities for such failures.

26
Bureaucratic Politics and the Military

• Decisions about war and peace are not only shaped
  by state leaders, but also by the interests of
  bureaucratic organizations.
• These organizations generally seek
• Bigger budgets, more input into policy-making,
  and opportunities for personal promotion

27
Bureaucratic Politics and the Military

• The military is usually the most influential
  bureaucratic actor in matters of war.
• Does military influence over foreign policy
  decision-making affect a states belligerence?
• The military sees benefits to war that other
  actors may not
• Yet, it is important not to equate the military
  with militarism

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Interest Groups Economic and Ethnic Lobbies

• Interest groups organize around economic and
  ethnic motives.
• Economic motives when an actors income depends
  on events in other countries
• Ethnic motives when groups are motivated by
  ethnic attachment or ideological interests to
  support or oppose a particular country

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Interest Groups Economic and Ethnic Lobbies

• Economic actors do not always prefer belligerent
  policies.
• May depend on peaceful relations with other
  countries
• Depending on where and how they do business
• Economic actors can have an interest in peaceful
  relations with some countries and/or hostile
  relations with others

30
How Can Small Groups Have A Big Influence On
Policy?

• The answer lies in the nature of the interactions
  between these different actors and the
  institutions that regulate their relations.
• An example The militarys influence derives from
  the fact that it controls a vast portion of a
  states coercive resources.

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How Can Small Groups Have A Big Influence On
Policy?

• Political leaders rely on the information and
  expertise of bureaucratic actors.
• When making decisions about war, the military
  could shape the outcome by manipulating the
  information that the leader uses to calculated
  the expected value of war and its alternatives.

32
How Can Small Groups Have A Big Influence On
Policy?

• How can interest groups hijack a states
  foreign policy for their own narrow interests?
• Because taxpayers are more numerous, the costs of
  intervention to any individual are quite low
• Organized interest groups can provide political
  leaders with
• Things they need and want in exchange for favored
  policies

33
How Can Small Groups Have A Big Influence On
Policy?

• In a democracy, interest groups can also promise
  the support of motivated voters.
• Examples the Cuban-American and pro-Israel
  lobbies
• However, just because a policy benefits a
  particular group does not mean the policy must
  have been enacted in order to benefit that group.

34
How Can Small Groups Have A Big Influence On
Policy?

• For every foreign policy decision that might be
  made to serve a narrow interest, there are
  alternative arguments based on national
  interests.
• For example Some argue that imperialism was a
  product of military-strategic competition among
  the principal powers.

35
How Do Domestic Interests Affect International
Bargaining?

• By influencing the costs and benefits of
  conflict
• Domestic interests help determine the extent of
  the states ambition in an international conflict
• However, these interests are generally not
  sufficient to cause war in any given situation.

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How Do Domestic Interests Affect International
Bargaining?
37
How Do Domestic Interests Affect International
Bargaining?

• What would happen if State As interests changed
  in response to the influence of hawkish actors?
• An example the good is territory with oil in it
  and the governments core supporters are
  environmentalists.
• The costs of war would be considered high, at
  aD war is considered unattractive

38
How Do Domestic Interests Affect International
Bargaining?

• If the dovish leader is replaced by a leader who
  draws support from oil companies
• More value is placed on the land, so aH is the
  new expected cost of war
• The value of war now shifts to the right, but a
  bargaining range still exists
• The shift creates a danger of war that did not
  exist before.

39
How Do Domestic Interests Affect International
Bargaining?

• If war depends on features of the bargaining
  interaction, such as
• How information is distributed
• Whether states can credibly commit to a deal
• It is hard to argue that interest groups alone
  can explain why crises sometimes become wars.

40
Why Dont Democracies Fight One Another?

• Democratic peace a well-established observation
  that there are few, if any, clear cases of war
  between mature democratic states.
• The strength of the claim depends on how one
  defines democracy and what events one considers
  war.

41
Why Dont Democracies Fight One Another?

• Democracies are not, overall, less war-prone than
  other kinds of states.
• They are frequently at war with nondemocratic
  states
• Is the absence of war among democracies worldwide
  a coincidence?

42
What Is Democracy?

• Democracy a political system in which candidates
  compete for political office through frequent,
  fair elections in which a sizeable portion of the
  adult population can vote.
• This includes two major aspects of democracy
• Contestation and participation

43
What Is Democracy?

• Contestation
• Is the ability of different individuals and
  groups to compete for political office
• Participation
• Is the ability of a large portion of the country
  to be involved in the selection process through
  voting

44
What Is Democracy?

• Liberal is another term that often accompanies
  democracy
• A philosophy that emphasizes the value of
  individual liberty
• Most liberal democracies, in addition to allowing
  competition and voting have
• Numerous protections of individual civil and
  political rights, such as rights to free speech,
  religion, political association and a free press

45
What Is Democracy?
46
What Is Democracy?

• How could democracies be different when it comes
  to war and peace?
• Two broad ways in which domestic institutions can
  affect the likelihood of war
• By influencing the interests of states and their
  leaders
• By influencing the bargaining interaction between
  and among countries

47
Representation, Accountability, and Interests in
War and Peace

• The costs of war are paid by society at large.
• A leader rarely has direct exposure to costs of
  war
• The interests of the ruler and ruled are not
  always aligned.

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Representation, Accountability, and Interests in
War and Peace

• One solution to this problem is to establish a
  democratic government
• The ruler would be accountable to the people
• This would align the interests of the ruler and
  ruled
• Representative institutions could slow or stop
  the decision to go to war.

49
Representation, Accountability, and Interests in
War and Peace

• Accountability the ability to punish or reward
  leaders for their decisions.
• Elections provide a simple mechanism for people
  to impose these punishments
• Democratic leaders face higher costs from war
  than do nondemocratic leaders.

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Representation, Accountability, and Interests in
War and Peace

• Nondemocratic leaders also find that life after
  losing office is not pleasant.
• Their removal from office usually occurs through
  violent means
• Logic of accountability suggests that democratic
  leaders should be more selective about starting
  wars.
• Nondemocratic leaders may be willing to gamble

51
Democracy and Bargaining

• Democratic institutions make it easier to
  overcome informational problems
• Political systems are much more transparent
• Are more able to send credible signals in crises
• Transparency can reduce the risk of preemptive
  war between democracies.
• Commitment to refrain from attacking is made
  credible because neither can mobilize forces in
  secret

52
Democracy and Bargaining

• Mechanisms of accountability mean that public
  disapproval is more likely to result in some sort
  of punishment for the democratic leader.
• Institutions of accountability
• Make it easier for democratic leaders to credibly
  communicate their resolve because backing down
  creates public disapproval

53
Domestic Institutions or Strategic Interests?

• Could common interests account for the democratic
  peace?
• The verdict Is mixed
• War is a rare phenomenon and there were few
  democracies in the nineteenth century
• Democratic states did experience a high number of
  militarized disputes short of war

54
Domestic Institutions or Strategic Interests?

• It is possible that democracy is not responsible
  for democratic peace.
• Perhaps economic development accounts for the
  democratic peace
• But there is less evidence that wealth promotes
  peace between countries
• Democratic states may also have had relatively
  similar interests.

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Conclusion What If All the World Were Democratic?

• Political leaders may care about what is best for
  their country, but also care about staying in
  office.
• When groups with hawkish interests have superior
  organization and resources, they can push the
  state toward greater international ambition.

56
Conclusion What If All the World Were Democratic?

• When interactions and institutions empower those
  who bear the costs of war
• They can exert a pacifying effect at the
  international level
• The relative openness and transparency of
  democratic political process can
• Reduce informational and commitment problems that
  cause bargaining to fail

57
Conclusion What If All the World Were Democratic?

• Two reasons to be cautious
• Although the number of democracies has increased
  over time, the spread of democracy has also
  experienced reversals
• Not all democratic countries are liberal some
  are built on ethnic or religious identities that
  can foster conflicts

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Conclusion What If All the World Were Democratic?
59
Conclusion What If All the World Were Democratic?

• What if the public is motivated by nationalist,
  ethnocentric, or even genocidal ideas?
• The international effects of democracys spread
  may depend not only on the institutions, but also
  on the interests of those they empower.

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What Do We Know? War and the Fate of Political
Leaders

• What happens to leaders who take their countries
  into war? Three outcomes
• Victories, small losses and big losses
• About 85 percent of leaders who lost costly wars
  also lost office within a year of the wars end.
• Nondemocratic leaders face a much greater risk of
  additional punishment

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What Shaped Our World? The Kargil War and the
Limits of Democratic Peace

• In 1999, India mobilized its troops to repel a
  Pakistani military force from the disputed
  Kashmir region.
• At least 1000 soldiers died
• India and Pakistan had already fought three wars
  since their independence in 1948.
• But, at the time of war, both countries had
  democratically elected governments

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What Shaped Our World? The Kargil War and the
Limits of Democratic Peace

• Why did two democracies go to war?
• The role of religious differences
• The influence of the military in Pakistan
• Little civilian oversight of the diplomatic
  ramifications of the operation
• For democracy to act as a brake on international
  conflicts, elected leaders must have actual
  knowledge of and control over the states
  military actions.

63
Controversy Should We Assassinate Leaders Rather
Than Fight Their Armies?

• Two arguments
• Punish the guilty rather than the innocent
• The common interests of warring states could
  produce a bargaining outcome that minimizes the
  suffering and death of their populations

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Controversy Should We Assassinate Leaders Rather
Than Fight Their Armies?

• However, even if particular assassinations save
  lives
• The general policy might be destabilizing for
  international politics as a whole
• The norm against assassination
• We should promote everyones interest in a stable
  and predictable international order

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Additional Art for Chapter 4
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